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
THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE
AMBASSADOR'S REPORT
TOMORROW WITHOUT FEAR

Chester Bowles

THE NEW
DIMENSIONS
OF PEACE.

THE BODLEY HEAD

LONDON



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PREFACE to the British edition

I hope that this edition of **THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF PEACE** creates among its British readers a better understanding of America's potential role in world affairs. Such understanding seems to me particularly important because of the peculiar relevance of the Anglo-American relationship to the problems which confront the Atlantic nations today in dealing with the newly independent or still dependent peoples of Asia, Africa and South America.

The American republic was itself founded on anti-colonialism. After seven years of war we Americans managed to sever the connection, and for generations we retained a reservoir of petulant and suspicious ill-wind towards the old mother empire. The twisting of the Lion's tail was developed as a successful American electioneering technique. Indeed only a generation or so ago the winning candidate for mayor of Chicago made George III the principal issue of his campaign.

Yet behind the haze thrown up by surface conflicts and the suspicions generated by the colonial relationship the course of United States history remained stubbornly linked with and even dependent on this same bluntly rejected parent.

American foreign policy in the early 19th century demanded non-involvement in European affairs. In his Farewell Address President Washington said, "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world." It also demanded the security for our own internal development which could only result from a ban on future European interference in the Western Hemisphere.

Because America's strength was not yet developed, such a guarantee could not have been achieved without a heavy drain on our resources and energies. But happily for the young republic this objective coincided with a British concern for its trade with the newly independent nations of Latin America, and British seapower was in a position to provide the means of enforcement which we lacked.

In the early 1820's this similarity of interests prompted Canning's approach to the American government for a joint declaration on this subject. Nationalist young America, too proud to appear as a

"cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war", rejected this proposal for a bilateral pact and produced its own declaration in the Monroe Doctrine.

Although the British government remained discreetly silent, there were few who doubted that it was the omnipresence of the British fleet standing between the new world and the ambitions of Spain, France, Portugal, Russia and Prussia, that gave the Doctrine meaning and enabled America confidently to turn her face towards the development of her West with scarcely a look over her shoulder at "imperialistic" Europe. Thus it is not too much to say that America was able to expand in profitable isolation between 1815 and 1914 without a major defence investment—one might even say without a foreign policy—largely because of Britain's dominant power in the Atlantic.

Nor was America the gainer only through the screen thrown up by the British navy. *Pax Britannica* was supplemented by larger exports of British capital which financed much of America's explosive industrial growth in the decades after the Civil War. Some of this capital came from British imperial growth and control, and this gave us an indirect stake in the very colonialism which Americans condemned as an evil.

We even participated profitably in the creation of some of their colonial relationships. Many Americans have criticized the strong-arm methods by which British naval power blasted its way into the Chinese ports as one of the least savoury episodes in the creation of the Empire. But their British counterparts would be justified in reminding these critics that after each Chinese surrender the American government promptly demanded our own share of the spoils through equal treaty rights.

With the onset of World War I the military power and even the existence of the United Kingdom came under heavy pressure. Our gradual awakening to the implications of Britain's defeat was the primary reason for America's reluctant decision to enter the two world wars.

As it turned out, too, our fears were justified, and these two wars drastically altered the world balance of power. Their aftermath brought not only the waning of British might but the emergence of sixteen former colonies into nationhood with a total population of 600 million people.

It is this background which makes our Anglo-American experience so relevant to the situation confronting our two nations today. For we are now *both* cast in the old role of colonizer emeritus, or at least that of developed world powers relative to the host of newly independent underdeveloped nations.

These new nations not only find themselves in a situation comparable to that of the United States in the 19th century; they also share many of the basic American attitudes of that period. They are ardently anti-colonialist, apprehensive of military encroachment,

suspicious of all formal political or economic alliances, and cocky in the presentation of their views. Their fervent desire is to be free, to be respected, to be strong, and to prosper.

When Americans take the time to ponder these attitudes, they become aware of the familiar overtones. To the British, of course, such ex-colonial problem children are old hat.

There is, I believe a wealth of understanding to be reaped by Americans from an appraisal of the record of the United Kingdom in this familiar role. In your long and often uneasy relationship with the young American nation you demonstrated, I believe, the only way in which a powerful, long established government can create constructive and mutually profitable relations with new-comers to the family of nations.

Can there be any doubt of the result if you had followed a less patient course? It is not difficult to imagine the reaction in America if British policy-makers had continually insisted on reminding the American people of Britain's contribution to their growth, or if members of Parliament had risen to comment on the profit or lack of it in "saving" their American cousins from the French or Russians, or to chastise America for its ingratitude or its "neutralism" on questions affecting Britain's interest.

Britain provided America not only with a military shield but with substantial amounts of capital during the crucial years of her growth. Britain did this, not as an act of charity or to buy our loyalty, or stimulate gratitude but because such a policy was in Britain's long-term interest. Today it is in the long-term interests of the United States and Britain to make a similar contribution to the new nations of Asia and Africa as well as South America and Western Europe.

The evolution of the Anglo-American partnership teaches us that such relationships inevitably breed many obstacles; but that such obstacles need never be insuperable. It also suggests some valuable guideposts: we must never expect gratitude, or ask to be liked, and least of all demand allegiance; we must learn to cultivate the art of understatement, to concentrate on doing rather than saying, to strive for the flexibility which is an evidence of maturity.

This book is my attempt to analyze against this background the dynamic new forces with which statesmen and people throughout the world are contending. It is my conviction that the Atlantic power must speedily come to understand the new dimensions of power which these forces create or confront inevitable failure and catastrophe.

I have referred to the complexities of the American outlook in foreign relations, and perhaps my readers overseas will question to what extent the ideas contained in this volume reflect widely-held American views.

I believe that the American people are currently in midstream between two main currents of thought--between their traditional isolationism and a new dynamic and, I confidently expect, constructive

internationalism. Indeed both currents mingle in the thinking of most Americans today.

The isolationism that lingers so stubbornly is cloaked in new global phrases. But this makes it no less real. Most of us are still hoping earnestly that somehow the world can be persuaded to leave us alone to enjoy the blessings of our rapidly expanding national income. We are inclined to think of Nato, Seato, and the Baghdad Pact as devices designed to keep intruders away from our shores, a kind of nuclear-jet age Maginot Line.

Yet there is a growing awareness of the futility of this view. In recent travels through more than thirty of our forty-eight states, I have found, mingled with the old parochial aims, a heartening widespread understanding of the constructive role we must play and responsibilities we must carry on this fast shrinking planet that we share for better or worse, with the Russians, Chinese and a billion or more other people.

In this emerging attitude, there is, I believe, solid basis for a measured optimism. When we have achieved greater confidence, insight and maturity in our dealings with the new, largely uncommitted nations, the day indeed may come when the vast majority of the Asian, African and South American peoples realizes, through the haze of post-colonial tensions and conflicts, that their true interests in today's world coincide with those of the Atlantic nations much as America's coincided with Britain's for the last many generations. That day, when it comes, will be a great and decisive day for the cause of human freedom.

C. B.

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
SECTION I

From Victory to Stalemate

WE have come here with memories fresh in our minds of the past ten years—the disappointment, the deep divisions, the moments of danger and almost despair, but also the frequent evidence that the positive spirit of man can cope with the challenge of living together at peace in our interdependent world.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD

United Nations' Tenth Anniversary



CHAPTER 1

Encouragement in Europe

IN late June, 1955, delegates from sixty nations met at San Francisco to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the birth of the United Nations. After long years of Cold War conflict, there was a sense of relaxation in the air as speaker after speaker, in terms of cautious optimism, expressed his hopes for the new world outlook.

If, as President Eisenhower has said, the dawn is breaking however slowly, mankind will agree that the new day is long overdue. In the decade between 1945 and 1955, the world has been turned upside down, and most of us feel that we have been living through a bad dream.

Russia and China, our wartime allies, have become our peacetime adversaries. Our wartime enemies, Germany and Japan, have become our peacetime friends.

The world Communist movement has brought nearly 700 million more people under its control, so that one-third of mankind now lives under Communist rule. Simultaneously 650 million Asians and Africans have managed to free themselves from the more old-fashioned colonialism of the West.

These awesome events have taken place against the background of a war that killed 25 million people, permanently disabled twice that number, and devastated much of Germany, Italy, Poland, the Balkans, Russia, China and Japan. It was a war that also introduced us to the likelihood of total nuclear destruction in the next.

In today's divided world, the mood of 1945 is not easy to recap-

ture but it may be instructive from our present perspective to reminisce briefly on these ten turbulent years

As soldiers of the wartime alliance converged from opposite directions to bring the ground war at last to German soil, the American citizen looked to the end of hostilities with great expectations. He awaited the return of his fighting sons, the reduction of swollen military budgets and the opportunity to buy what he wished, to drive his car unencumbered by ration books, and to relax from the tension that had been with him steadily since that startling Sunday of Pearl Harbor.

The American who faced the postwar world of 1945 had already come far and experienced much. One hundred and seventy years before, he had created a nation founded on the revolutionary concept that all men are created equal. He had opened up a continent of infinite richness whose benefits were widely shared. He had welcomed to its shores tens of millions of European immigrants.

The principles of government which he had championed had aroused enthusiasm among people of varied races and religions throughout the world. In a bitter and costly Civil War, his own goals had been clarified and his birthright reaffirmed.

In each generation after that war he had doubled his gross average income. But in spite of the relative luxury in which he lived, he had never forgotten that his continued progress depended upon hard work.

He had understood liberty in its broadest sense, and had never hesitated to employ his political freedom as a citizen to expand the essential economic freedom which he believed to be his right as a worker, farmer and businessman. Although he instinctively mistrusted big government, he had gradually learned to use government constructively and courageously, in the words of his Constitution, "to promote the general welfare."

He had stumbled into a major depression which might well have ended not only the private ownership system which had carried him so far, but political democracy itself. Yet he had rallied, reassessed the forces facing him, and moved to create a stable economy which would work in everyone's interest and still maintain its dynamism.

Although his experience in foreign affairs had been meager, he had generally stood out in defense of the right of all peoples to determine their form of government. He had entered two world

wars reluctantly, but once involved he had gone all out to provide the margin of victory. His country was now emerging from the second of these wars at a new height of power and leadership.

Yet the future behavior of the new American colossus seemed unpredictable. After World War I, in our search for normalcy, we had beaten a costly retreat into national aloofness. Had Hitler's Panzers roaring across Europe, and Japanese bombers raining death over Pearl Harbor, finally taught us that no major power could be *in* our closely knit world and yet not *of* it? Would we be as ready to help restore the economic ravages of war as we had been to fashion the weapons of victory? Had America been jolted once and for all from her historic isolationism?

In 1945, these questions were being asked in most of the world's capitals, and no less anxiously in our own. Yet there were few who sensed how quickly answers would be needed. The rosiness of war-time collaboration had given little warning of the threat which would soon become evident from across the Oder-Neisse River line.

America's favorite Englishman, Winston Churchill, who years earlier had wanted to "strangle Bolshevism in its cradle," had been the first to pledge his aid to Stalin when Hitler's armies invaded Russia in June, 1941. In Nazi-occupied Europe the resistance movements had always included, and often been led by, Communist leaders who had lived dangerously and died heroically. The exploits of the Red Army itself had been almost daily front page stories in every newspaper in the Atlantic World.

In words which make strange reading today, many American leaders had outdone one another in praising the Soviet Union. "The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the courageous Russian army," said General MacArthur in 1942, adding that "the scale and grandeur of this effort mark it as the greatest military achievement in all history." Referring to his discussion with Stalin in 1943, President Roosevelt said: "I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people—very well indeed."

His recent opponent, Wendell Willkie, who thought Mr. Roosevelt had "not gone far enough" at Cairo and Teheran, felt that postwar co-operation was likely because "the Russians, like us, are a hardy, direct people, and have a great admiration for everything in America, except the capitalist system." In a ceremony at Rocke-

feller Center the American Gold Star Mothers presented the Soviet Government with a plaque in appreciation of the "magnificent" fight of the Red Army as a symbol of the "common aims of the youth of Russia and of this country."

After his trip to Moscow in 1945 where he reviewed a Red Square parade from the top of Lenin's tomb, General of the Army Eisenhower told a Congressional committee that "nothing guides Russian policy so much as a desire for friendship with the United States."

Even those Americans who understood the doctrinaire nature of the world Communist drive took comfort in the thought that Soviet leaders and soldiers had at last been exposed on a grand scale to democratic leaders, ideas, generosity and accomplishments. Might not this experience gradually soften the most dedicated Marxists? If the traditional Russian fear of outsiders had not been buried at Yalta, was it not eclipsed by Ivan and his GI counterpart on the Elbe three months later clasping hands, singing songs, and trying to swap jokes over the language barrier?

The GIs' families, sweethearts and friends who formed the conga line around the White House on V-E Day reflected not only relief that the war was behind them but faith that the prospects for peace were high. In such an atmosphere, it was not surprising that we should proceed to beat our swords into plowshares, lathes and typewriters in record time. The political pressure that struck Washington was irresistible.

On January 22, 1946, in the House Office Building in Washington, General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, was ambushed by representatives of the "Bring Back Daddy" clubs. Angry women stormed after him, backed him up against a wall, and laid down a ten-minute barrage of complaints and demands that left him flushed, breathless, and in his own words at a subsequent hearing of the House Military Affairs Committee, "emotionally upset."

That same day a bipartisan Senate subcommittee, not satisfied with the breakneck speed of demobilization, insisted that there were still two million surplus men in the army, and demanded their discharge. Congressional leaders of both parties outbid each other for public applause in the drive to disband our armies and place most of our navy and air force in mothballs.

IF it had not been for the statesmanship of a few farsighted leaders in both political parties and the enlightened response of most Americans to their proposals, the results of our second headlong scramble for normalcy would have been even more damaging.

Government officials, private institutions and the public generally reacted warmly to the emergency needs of Europe and Asia. Former President Hoover, sent on a world fact-finding tour by President Truman, returned with persuasive arguments for immediate, massive assistance, and Americans responded with their traditional generosity. American initiative as well as dollars, played a major role in the development of UNRRA, the World Bank, the Monetary Fund and the far-flung specialized agencies of the United Nations.

The task in Europe was obviously formidable. Indeed having watched the one-time center of a world civilization undergo two devastating wars in as many generations, the casual American observer could be forgiven if at first he assumed that Europe was finished. After two such holocausts how could the momentum of European life possibly be recovered?

Much in Europe was clearly beyond recovery. From the smoldering ruins of bombed-out cities and the stark desolation of the countryside, from the long bitterness of death and separation, of occupations and undergrounds, the weary Europeans had emerged into the "peace" of V-E Day not knowing what to expect or believe.

The once-solid monuments to the stable splendor of 1914, so badly shaken during the interwar years, had now crumbled in the general rubble. "The lamps are going out all over Europe," the British Foreign Minister, Sir Edward Grey, had said as he stood at the window of the Foreign Office in London on the eve of World War I. "We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." In the perspective of 1945, Sir Edward's fears finally seemed to have been confirmed.

In two world wars France had suffered immense losses. Between 1914 and 1918, she sacrificed 1.3 million dead out of a total population of 32 million. In 1940 when German troops again poured across her borders, she had still not recovered economically or psychologically from World War I. In the second war she again lost more of her young men than Britain or the United States. The wide-

spread effects of the defeat, occupation and liberation of 1940-45 would be with her for many years to come.

The pre-eminence which Britain enjoyed in the century between Waterloo and Somme had also been whittled away. The two world wars, besides taking a grievous toll of British blood, had seriously depleted the capital wealth amassed during the long Victorian era. Britain's postwar economic prospects were particularly alarming for a nation that relied on imports for food.

In their tumultuous history since 1914, the Germans had been flung about between triumph and dejection. During the first three postwar years their dejection was complete: the humiliation of military occupation; the hunger left by a daily 1,200 calorie ration, 33 per cent below the minimum sustenance level; the economic dislocation of ruined machinery and dismantled factories; the influx of seven million destitute refugees from Russian terror into the three Western zones where 40 per cent of the houses had been smashed by Allied bombing.

The condition of Europe was bleak, and the qualities of survival still in doubt, when America undertook her bold sustaining role in European recovery. For millions of Americans Europe was still the "old country" where relatives in France, Germany, Italy, Hungary, Poland and the Balkans were in desperate need. Generosity, economics, and the ties of culture, custom and long association all played a part in our first efforts.

If these factors were not enough, Communist intransigence soon made positive action imperative. The Soviet Union had taken full advantage of its new military and geographic strength to consolidate a far-flung expansion of her territory and influence.

The Yalta pact had hardly been signed when warning signals began to show how casually Stalin made and broke his pledges. Within a matter of months, the truculent behavior of the Russians over the administration of Germany, their continued military emphasis in the face of our rapid disarmament, their blunt rejection of the Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposals for atomic energy control, and their refusal to allow free elections in East Europe had all increased our apprehension.

Yet the hopes which had been fostered by the wartime alliance died slowly. When Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in March, 1946, told us that "an Iron Curtain has descended across the Con-

tinents," his words came as a shock. This was not the sort of thing Americans wanted to hear.

My own attitudes were sharpened during a visit to Europe in November, 1946, for a United Nations meeting. I shall not soon forget the sight of ten thousand grim-faced Communist workers marching with military precision down the Champs Élysées.

Nor shall I forget my first contacts with Russian officialdom a few days later. General Walter Bedell Smith, then our Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had invited us to Moscow for a week. A Soviet visa was promptly provided and the Ambassador's plane arrived in Paris to pick us up. We got no farther than Berlin. After days of fruitless appeals, the Russian officials there, without explanation, refused to clear our departure. For one more American, Churchill's Iron Curtain had become a fact.

Thirteen months later I had two long talks in Prague with Jan Masaryk. Anxiously and repeatedly he inquired how long I thought it might take before "some understanding" could be reached between Moscow and Washington. "We Czechs are in the middle and there is not much we can do," he said sadly. "If we are lucky we might hold out for two years." But luck was running the other way, and a month later at home again in Connecticut, we heard the news of the Communist coup in Prague and of Jan Masaryk's death. On that day for additional millions the nature of the grim struggle confronting the Atlantic nations took on a new and harrowing dimension.

By the spring of 1948, the Kremlin had used its unchallengeable military position in Eastern Europe to fasten its grip on a vast territory from the Baltic to the Aegean, inhabited by more than 120 million people. But by then our position had stiffened toward further Communist designs.

A year before the take-over in Prague, the Soviet Union had threatened to expand into Greece and Turkey. The Kremlin had launched a broad, propaganda attack on the Turkish Government, and revived old Russian claims to Eastern Turkish provinces and to a share in the defense and control of the Dardanelles.

Meanwhile Russia had surreptitiously supplied arms to thousands of Greek Communist-led guerrillas, and a full-fledged rebellion against the Greek Government had begun. The predicament of Greece and Turkey was painfully clear.

Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the powerful Foreign

Relations Committee, accompanied by twenty-odd Republican Senators, joined with the Democrats in supporting President Truman's historic decision that the continued existence of a free Turkey and a free Greece was indispensable to the security of the United States. Our aid was prompt and vigorous, and Soviet pressure in this critical area gradually relaxed.

The Soviet Union soon struck again by cutting rail and road access into Berlin from the Western zones. With keen anticipation the Russians looked forward to the sight of stranded Western officials, soldiers and police deserting Berlin, the historic symbol of Germany, as the Red Army took over.

Once more our response was decisive. Within a few days heavily laden American and British cargo planes were landing at the rate of one every ninety seconds at Berlin's Tempelhof airfield, and a few months later the embargo was suddenly lifted.

In June, 1947, Secretary of State Marshall delivered his historic Harvard commencement speech in which he announced America's willingness to support a large-scale European economic recovery program, a plan "not directed against anyone, but against hunger, chaos and poverty." A meeting was soon called in Paris to which all European nations regardless of political differences were invited. Molotov came from Moscow, remained uncertainly for a few days, and then departed.

In April, 1948, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was established representing the seventeen European partners in the Marshall Plan operation. Six years later intra-European trade among the seventeen member countries was more than double that of 1948 and 69 per cent above that of 1938. Industrial production in 1954 was more than 50 per cent greater than in 1938, agricultural production 30 per cent greater. Under the able leadership of Paul Hoffman and others, the Marshall Plan had helped give Western Europe its second wind. Without it the chaos which Moscow had counted on would have been inevitable.

Positive action was also taken to secure the military defenses of Western Europe which, three years after the war, were almost non-existent. In the words of a British general, the Red Army needed "only shoes" to march to the Atlantic Coast.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by fourteen nations, and NATO came into being. Six years

later, its commanders had created a defensive shield sufficient to deter, if not finally to stop, any Soviet aggression based on ground forces.

Through NATO, the United States pledged herself for the first time to sacrifice men and treasure, not at her own will and timing, but whenever any member of the community of the Atlantic should be attacked. Thus the decision to organize NATO was more than a determined measure of military defense. It was a historic voluntary pooling of resources to preserve against any enemy a common civilization in the Atlantic basin.

America's efforts to help assure the continuing independence of Western Europe constitute an achievement unique in diplomatic history. A majority of Americans had vigorously supported the bold bipartisan policies that wrote that record. They had accepted the drafting of their sons. They had dug deep into their pockets to pay the taxes required not only for military defense but for bolstering the economies of their European allies.

In the summer of 1955 formidable problems still confronted Europe. Germany remained divided, and Red Army troops were still hundreds of miles west of Russia's historic frontiers. Nevertheless, few could deny that massive steps for assuring the military, economic and political independence of Western Europe had been taken, and that a position of strength had been developed from which negotiations with the Russians could be effectively conducted.

Most Americans will agree that Europe deserved first priority in our policy-making in 1945. It had been the most critical area of the war effort. Even after the devastation, Western Europe represented the second largest concentration of industrial resources in the world. It controlled the approaches to the Atlantic, dominated the Mediterranean, and stood astride the most important routes of world commerce.

More than that, Europe was the place where Western ideals of freedom and humanism were born. Our family origins, our political institutions, our culture, our religions were deeply rooted in European soil. European language. were spoken in our cities and taught in our schools. Our artists, writers and professors had gone to Europe to study. Its history was part of our own.

Because our experience had been largely in Europe, it was natural that it was there that our policy response was most prompt,

public support most nearly unanimous, and results most effective. But a power balance in Europe was no longer synonymous with a stable world. The events of this century had released powerful new forces in distant continents formerly "behind God's back." Although a healthy, vital Europe was still essential to our interests, the full dimensions of America's new responsibilities called for an equally sensitive and bold approach on the other side of the world—and there we proved far less effective.

CHAPTER 2

Rebuffs in the Middle World

ON V-J Day, 1945, America stood at the very pinnacle of prestige in the Middle World from Tokyo to Cape-town. We had led the liberation of half of Asia from the Japanese. Our promise to free the Philippines was on its way to quick fulfillment. Our military power was unchallenged. Our democratic institutions were the model for a dozen new governments.

In 1955, ten years later, this position of unparalleled strength had largely been dissipated. China under new leaders was bitterly opposed to us, and had held us to a military stalemate in Korea. When the Peking radio described us as a "paper tiger," millions of Asians smiled in derision. Other millions, disheartened by what seemed to be our support of European colonialism in Indochina and Africa, accused us of turning our backs on our own revolution.

How can we explain this reversal? Why have we been able to draw encouragement only from our postwar record in Europe? Why has our record elsewhere been so largely one of disappointment and sometimes abject failure? Historians may offer many reasons.

Among them will certainly be the fact that in Europe we felt confident of our ground, while Asia and Asians to most Americans still called to mind the "inscrutable East"—mysterious, alien and bewildering. This has helped to make agreement on European policy relatively simple, while our efforts to reach agreement about Asia have often been harassed by bitter partisan disputes. It has also led many of us to subordinate decisions involving world policy to the narrow dimension of European policy, and to attempt to apply

lessons learned in Europe to other parts of the world where often they have failed to fit.

An important example was our bold decision in 1947 to create a new balance of power in Europe through the Truman Doctrine. In taking this essential step we were in a sense underwriting and adapting to the current Cold War conflict the tested policies which had enabled Britain to maintain her position, not only in Europe, but throughout the world for nearly 250 years. Beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession, which ended in 1713, Britain had fought five major wars to keep any power or combination of powers from dominating Europe and excluding her from the resources and markets of that continent.

In 1947 when the Soviet Union started its move toward the Mediterranean in the classic pattern of the Czars, we reacted in the classic pattern of the British, and Soviet encroachment was stopped. In this same tradition we allied ourselves with the NATO powers to block Soviet aggression in Europe.

There was a fundamental difference, however, between the historical situation which Britain had faced and the situation in which we found ourselves following the war. Many American leaders failed to take this difference into account.

Before World War II political and military stability in Europe had been very nearly synonymous with stability throughout the world. For generations China had been governed by weak emperors or quarreling war lords. From the time of her emergence as a world power until 1932, when she exhibited aggressive ambitions of her own, Japan, as Britain's ally, had effectively blocked Russian ambitions in Asia. The principal decisions affecting the rest of Asia, with the exception of Thailand, were made by the colonial powers in London, Paris, Lisbon and The Hague.

Thus, during the long period of Pax Britannica an effective European policy for all practical purposes had been an effective world policy. By 1949, however, this situation had been changed drastically. Some 650 million Asians had broken their colonial ties, India and China were on their way to becoming world powers even in industrial terms, and Japan was emerging from her defeat. Africa was stirring. The need for a world-wide policy which took these new realities into account had become painfully clear.

By that time, unhappily, the atmosphere was no longer favorable

to the thoughtful debate and discussion without which in a democracy an effective foreign policy is impossible. By December, 1949, Mao's grip on China was fully established. Six months later we were plunged unexpectedly into a first-class war against Communist aggression in Korea, and by the following October our troops were in action against the Chinese Army. Instead of joining together in an effort to create a realistic, bipartisan world policy, many American politicians lapsed into new name-calling.

Even if these partisan quarrels had not arisen to befuddle our thinking, an effective policy for the world outside of Europe would have required us to correct another misconception: our experience in both Europe and Asia had left us with a dangerously narrow concept of power.

Instinctively we have recognized Europe, with her long military tradition, as an area where the risks of political intervention were great. European soldiers were as tough and well equipped as our own and usually far more numerous. There was never any thought of casual American military intervention in European affairs, and we entered the two world wars in Europe only after long debate and profound hesitation.

Asia and Latin America, however, were different. America's minor efforts at imperialism occurred in these areas. For four and a half centuries most of Asia had been dominated by the superior military technology of the West, and "gunboat diplomacy" was accepted procedure in dealing with recalcitrant governments.

European nations refrained from gobbling up South America as they had Africa and much of Asia, not because the South Americans had the strength to protect their own interests, but because America imposed the barrier of the Monroe Doctrine and because it was in Britain's interest quietly to place her powerful fleet in support of our position.

The comparative military risks may thus explain to some extent why American policy has been traditionally isolationist in Europe and rather venturesome elsewhere. They also help explain why so many Americans in thinking of Asia as well as Europe unconsciously equate power primarily with military strength.

In two world wars we had demonstrated the capacity of our military and industrial strength to crush the most formidable adversaries. In Europe after the second war, the primary threat from

Moscow again appeared to be a military threat, and we have largely met it on that basis. When the need arose for a more precise military policy in Asia, we turned instinctively to the same concept of massive atomic retaliation which had discouraged a Red Army advance into the vacuum of Europe, even though in Asia this concept had little validity.

Thus our experience, historic and current, has led us to adopt an overly tidy view of the nature of the Cold War challenge, a view which is inadequate not only for the situations we face in Asia, South America and Africa, but for the long haul in Europe as well.

The extent to which this concept has taken charge of our thinking was brought home to me when I once asked eleven respected leaders in Washington for their definition of *power* in the context of today's struggle. They readily agreed that power consisted of a complex of the following: nuclear weapons, air force, army, navy, military alliances such as NATO and SEATO, industrial production, raw materials, communications and geography. Neither people nor ideas were mentioned.

These two omissions are striking evidence of our failure to come to grips with the forces which have largely shaped Asian history in the postwar years, which are today emerging in Africa, and which the Communists are convinced will increasingly write world history from now on. The power of these forces is dramatically summed up by the following fact: since 1947, 1.2 billion people—half of mankind—have generated enough effective power to change their form of government, although the substance of what we have so largely come to accept as power was in each case on the side of the *status quo*.

In China, Mao Tse-tung started in 1926 with one thousand men, two hundred rifles, extraordinary organizational talents, and an idea. By 1949 he had become master of China. In 1947, Gandhi, with personal courage and an idea calling for change through peaceful action, set India and Pakistan free from Britain, and paved the way for the freedom of Ceylon and Burma. In Indonesia and Indochina the vastly superior military and industrial power of the Dutch and the French again succumbed, not to superior material power but to the superior power of people and ideas.

In country after country capable leaders who put their principal faith in ideas, good or bad, have managed in spite of comparative

military weakness to upset the *status quo*. Our own stubborn adherence to a far more narrow concept of power has led us into many miscalculations. For instance since 1945 in regard to the Far East alone we have based much of our thinking on the following fallacies:

1945—Chiang's American-equipped armies can defeat Mao Tse-tung and unite China under a democratic government.

1950—Peking is bluffing when it says that Chinese Communist troops will enter the Korean War if the United Nations forces cross the Thirty-eighth Parallel.

1953—By arming and unleashing Chiang we will make possible his successful invasion of the Chinese mainland.

1950-54—French colonial power can hold Indochina if the United States provides enough weapons.

Through these sample miscalculations runs the same common denominator: our excessive faith in military strength and our failure fully to understand what dynamic ideas can accomplish when keyed to the aspirations of frustrated and hungry people.

Even under the best of circumstances our task in Asia and Africa would not have been easy. Many of the nations with whom we must work are newly independent, and their long experience with European colonialism has left them suspicious and often resentful.

Moreover, most Asians have been intellectually and emotionally isolated from the crisis through which the peoples of the Atlantic basin have been living since Stalin signed his pact with Hitler in 1939. Inevitably the long record of Communist aggression and threats of aggression in Europe have profoundly conditioned American attitudes toward Moscow. Yet in Asia, this critical chapter of history has been scarcely read. In these years most Asians were preoccupied with their own struggles for independence and survival.

When we used our military and economic power to fill the vacuum of Western Europe, we were moving chiefly among people who saw and responded to the same threat we did. But when we acted to discourage Soviet intrusion into the Middle East and Chinese aggression in Korea and Southeast Asia we were met with distrust. In their peninsulas, on their islands and behind their high mountain ranges, the sensitive new governments of South Asia considered the threat of world Communism remote, while their colonial memories remained vivid.

Today in Asia as in Europe we must also contend with a Com-

unist doctrine which shows evidence of a new flexibility and with a Russian and Chinese diplomacy which are growing steadily more astute. Moscow and Peking have never hesitated to borrow our democratic vocabulary. Now they are borrowing our systems of student and cultural exchanges and even Point Four.

Lenin once said that for world Communism the road to Paris lies through Peking and Calcutta. Future attempts to open that road are likely to be formidable.

Since Stalin's death the Kremlin has unceasingly talked about "peaceful coexistence." In 1955 it started to act. It concluded the Austrian peace treaty, came to terms with the once despised government of West Germany, sent its top leaders, hat in hand, to make peace with Tito's Yugoslavia, began to issue visas in non-Communists and anti-Communists allowing them to enter and travel widely inside the USSR, and climaxed its new diplomacy by exuding goodwill at Geneva.

Many reasons have been advanced for the Kremlin's shift in its approach to world politics. Some of these will be discussed in the next section of this book. But whatever the reasons, the future implications may be profound.

Countries like Germany and Japan are likely to re-emerge at an even more rapid rate as great and independent powers, India's influence will surely expand, developments in South Asia, Africa and South America will assume increasing importance, and the oversimplified arithmetic of the Cold War—"You must be either for us or against us"—will become even more meaningless.

The world which gradually evolves will seem more complex than our recent picture of a clear-cut struggle between the Kremlin's world Communism and Washington's Western coalition. Both we and the Russians are likely to exercise less control over events than we have in the past.

Even if the new Soviet leaders only intend this period of co-existence to be a brief tactical respite, after which Russian policy would renew a course of armed expansion, they may find that forces have been released which are hard to contain. Jefferson once said that "the disease of liberty is catching." In this war-weary world the Kremlin, if it again reverts to a tougher tone, may find that peace too has proved infectious.

The challenge to the American people and their policy makers is

also a novel one. We have apparently moved already from a period typified by open aggression and threats of aggression into an uneasy peace by terror. As major tensions ease, minor ones may increase. A whole level of difficulties, complexities, and conflicts may emerge among ourselves and with our allies, which have hitherto been submerged by Cold War politics. A whole new range of problems may arise with which we are presently unprepared to deal.

In this new period we cannot stand on dead center. It will be a time for imaginative action, not inertia. As Pope Pius XII said in his eloquent Christmas message of 1954, "Coexistence based on fear of each other and mutual disillusionment . . . does not deserve the name of peace." It must be transformed, he said, to "truly peaceful living together, inspired and protected by the moral order, or else it will shrivel more and more into a frozen paralysis"—and eventually into the war that all men dread.

The "peaceful living together" which the Pope recommends will require readjustments in thinking all around. As the new world situation unfolds with its cycle of advances and reverses, as disarmament, for instance, is broached with alternate hope and hesitation, there will be a clamor of competing voices. Some will urge us promptly to abandon as proof of our goodwill the very positions of military strength that have helped to open the doors to negotiation. Others will continue glumly to insist that peace remains beyond the reach of man and that the Soviet Union and the United States must continue as "two atomic colossi . . . doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world."

Responsible policy making amid new arguments in a new situation will assuredly require courage, patience and imagination of a high order. Above all, Americans and their leaders should bring to this new situation an awareness that the ultimate test of the capacity of our society to survive may be decided by our relations with the other two-thirds of humanity who live outside the present boundaries of Communism. American policy that remains transfixed by the Kremlin can be self-defeating.

Likewise a concentration on the military aspects of policy, already shown to be inadequate in the decade from 1945-55, may become disastrous in the period of change which lies ahead of us in the decade 1955-65. Our relations with the Middle World will depend even less on our store of nuclear weapons and even more on our

ability to understand how people think and feel, what they want, what they fear, and what the power and nature of the ideas are that move them.

Essential to an understanding of the forces which are now making a shambles of the *status quo* is a basic acquaintance with the three twentieth-century revolutions which in two generations have changed the face of the Eurasian land mass and sent waves of hope, fear, envy and excitement across the other continents. Two of these revolutions have been captured by the Communists, and they are now striving skillfully to woo the third. By new and imaginative methods, Moscow and Peking are, each in its own way, seeking to expand their influence across the Middle World of Asia and Africa, where American policies have been least effective. At this stage it would be folly to assume that their ultimate objectives have changed: the gradual isolation of the United States from its allies and the final triumph of world Communism.

To a comparison of the origins, strengths, weaknesses and implications of these twentieth century revolutions, and to a brief review of our own in their context, we now turn our attention.



SECTION II

Marx Comes to Moscow

RUSSIA, whither flyest thou? Answer! She gives no answer. The ringing of bells melts into music: the air, torn to shreds, whirs and rushes like the wind, everything that is on earth is flying by, and the other states and nations . . . look askance

NIKOLAI GUGOL, 1809–1852

The past of the Russian people is obscure, its present is terrible, but it has claims on the future. It does not believe in its present position, it . . . expects more from time

ALEXANDER HERZEN, 1812–1870

CHAPTER 3

Russian Prologue

THE first passionate outburst of twentieth century revolution occurred among the people of Russia, and Moscow is still its world headquarters. If we are to understand this revolution and its implications, we must know something of the land that gave it birth.

The very word Russia evokes in the minds of most Americans and Western Europeans a picture of a bleak, hard, almost limitless country, a continent in itself, of which Europe is hardly more than a peninsula. Its stubborn, talented and often great people have been scourged by endless suffering. Russian literature voices, as its history reveals, a thousand years of bloodshed, war, tyranny, oppression. During the convulsive days of 1917, with the imperial throne tottering, the Czarina urged her husband Nicholas to be firm, reminding him that "Russians love to feel the whip." Loving it or not, they have felt it for centuries.

And yet this same people, in defense of their homeland, first in 1812 and again in 1943, aroused themselves to turn back the greatest military machines modern Europe has produced.

Until the close of the last century, most Russians were peasants, scratching from the land a thin sustenance by methods as crude and primitive as those of Western Europe in the Middle Ages, and of parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America today. Until 1861, most of the Russian people were serfs, legally salable like slaves, but otherwise bound from birth to death to their feudal masters and to the land they tilled. After that year, they were legally free, but as in

other backward-tradition-bound societies, ignorance and ancient custom were exploited to keep the people in servitude.

Although the sale of land to the peasants accelerated in the last years of Czarism, the life of the peasant was harsh. While such factors as education and health facilities gradually improved, the rule of the aristocracy was often bolstered by unflinching brutality. Poverty combined with paternalism. There was underemployment, lethargy and occasionally famine.

Russia's close contact with Europe did not begin in modern times until the eighteenth century, when Peter the Great and Catherine sought to westernize the country. In 1697 Czar Peter traveled through Europe incognito, visiting factories, working as a common shipbuilder in Holland, and going to London to discover the techniques that were already making Britain rich and powerful. Called back to quench a revolt in Russia, he helped execute the rebels with his own hands, and then briskly proceeded to introduce some of the Western ways he had observed. In a manner prophetic of the behavior of many leaders of underdeveloped countries today, he engaged almost a thousand British, French and German experts to teach his backward subjects the contemporary arts and industries of Europe.

For decades, however, the new forces and ideas thus generated were confined to a relatively small group in the population. Army officers, sons of the nobility, government officials and young students returned from travels in Western Europe with new political and social ideas, but also with a sobering awareness of the differences that set them off from their poverty-stricken fellow countrymen, not only in education but in the conditions of life.

Gradually as the present century opened, Russia began to make great industrial strides. Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Donets basin became modern industrial centers, rising dramatically out of the almost primitive countryside, much like the Damodar Valley industrial area in North India today.

This industrial growth inevitably produced a new class of city-dwelling factory workers. They were largely unskilled, only a few years removed from their villages, and often bewildered over their break with the social institutions of peasant life. Mercilessly sweated by their employers, they resembled the workers of the early Industrial Revolution in Germany, France and England.

In recent years the political explosiveness of this combination has also become apparent elsewhere, sometimes painfully so. In South Asia, Africa and South America, as well as in Russia and China, an oppressed and landless peasantry, a slum-dwelling, underpaid class of factory workers, and a frustrated, Western-educated, intellectual elite is the stuff out of which twentieth century revolution is being made.

In Russia revolutionary activity started as early as December 20, 1825, when a group of army officers, who had tasted the developing liberalism of Western Europe during the wars against Napoleon, rose against Czar Nicholas I on the day of his assumption of power. When their plans narrowly failed, these so-called "Decembrists" were brutally suppressed.

But the fires of revolt continued to smolder. Concessions were wrung from the Czarist government after every war in which Russia was involved—the Crimean War in 1856, the Russo-Turkish War in 1878, the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Each time, however, the concessions were grudgingly given and subject to withdrawal. When in the last years of peace before 1914, such liberal programs as a modest land reform and trial by jury were finally introduced, it was too late. When the Russian Revolution occurred, it overthrew an indecisive regime which had no sense of direction.

Czarist weakness and inefficiency, of course, meant that Czarist terror never matched that of its Communist successors. Parliamentary deputies, especially during the last ten years of the monarchy, carried out independent political action on a limited scale. The press, spasmodically censored though it was, was not entirely controlled by the government. Left wing papers existed, clandestinely before 1905, more openly thereafter.

There was a constant movement in and out of Russia by dissident Russians, and a steady interchange of orders and information between temporary exiles like Lenin and resident revolutionaries like Stalin. Even when the Czar got his hands on Stalin, he was satisfied to send him to Siberia. How many of Stalin's opponents survived to oppose him a second time?

Nevertheless, under the Czars the basis of imperial power remained intact. The army, the state machinery and even the traditional "Little Father" relationship of the Czar to his peasants. As a result, the radical opposition to the government was driven underground.

To the extent that brutality and execution were employed by the Czarist secret police, the opposition not unnaturally responded with the bomb. Sporadic attempts were made on the lives of all four of the last Czars, two of whom came to a brutal end. In Russia the habits of violence were well learned, to the world's misfortune.

After the overthrow of Czar Nicholas II in 1917, the Bolsheviks directed that the statue of his hated father, Alexander III, the last reigning Romanov to die a natural death, should continue to stand in the square opposite the railroad station in Leningrad, but with a new inscription:

The Scarecrow

My son and my father were executed when living, and now disgrace has overtaken me even after death. I stand here like a brazen scarecrow for the land that has shaken off the yoke of autocracy.

In external affairs her very size and military potential were enough to make Russia an important factor in the nineteenth century European balance of power. Russia was a leading member of the victorious coalition against Napoleon, and Alexander I was one of the three monarchs who founded the Holy Alliance, dedicated to the immunization of Europe from contagious new notions of popular government and political liberties.

Inside nineteenth century Russia, the voices of expansionism continued to be even more contagious. "The three holy capitals of the Russian Empire are Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople," wrote the Pan-Slavist Tyutchev. "Where are her boundaries in the North and East, in the South and West? Destiny will show that the path of the future will lead us to the seven inland seas and to the seven great rivers," he continued, "from the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to the Yangtze, from the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube—this is the Russian Empire, and it will last through the ages."

During the last half of the century, the pressure of this expanding empire was exerted alternately toward Turkey, the Balkans and the Middle East on the one hand, and China and the Far East on the other. When the thrust to the Eastern Mediterranean was blocked by the European powers—at Crimea or at San Stefano—the Russian

response was increased colonization in Siberia or concessions wrested from the disintegrating Manchu domain. This finally brought the Czar into conflict with the rising power of Japan, and to defeat at its hands in 1904.

Again with a strange inevitability, Russia's diplomatic effort turned southwestward. Its weapons were not only the threat of the Czar's armies but ideological appeals based on the Russian Orthodox Church, first cousin to the Greek, Lebanese and Coptic Orthodox Churches, and the dream of a united Slavic people. In the first years of our century the Pan-Slavic intrigues of the Czar's government against Austria-Hungary and the remnants of Turkey's Balkan empire helped to bring on World War I.

During this same period the Russian ideological offensive even reached into Africa to establish brotherly relations with the Coptic Christians of Ethiopia. In 1910 Czar Nicholas built the first modern hospital in Addis Ababa and set up a large diplomatic mission. This he hoped might become a base from which he might build a rival sphere of influence to challenge the African empires of Britain, France, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. In 1955, when I visited Ethiopia, these outposts were still flourishing under Kremlin guidance, although seemingly in rather low gear.

Thus long before it became Communist, Russia had developed a mystical sense of mission. Millions, Dostoyevsky said, were convinced that Mother Russia and her Holy Orthodox Church were preserving "the image of Christ fair and undefiled," and that "when the time comes they will show it to the tottering creeds of the world." In Russia the new "star" would rise. Many nineteenth century Russian writers compared their country to a swift horse-drawn troika, racing toward an unknown goal, with all the peoples of the world standing aside respectfully to make way for her.

But Dostoyevsky, rejecting an optimistic view of Russia's world mission, wrote that Russia "dashes on in her headlong flight, perhaps to destruction—for long past men have stretched out imploring hands and called a halt to its ferocious reckless course." In 1849 the great novelist had been exiled to Siberia for participation in revolutionary plots inspired by the European ideas and events of 1848. In the agony of the Siberian wasteland he had lost hope of any political and temporal solution.

Others returned from similar exiles with their revolutionary hopes renewed, and eventually they achieved what Dostoevsky had most feared—"Czarism turned upside down." The substitution of a Communist dictator for a Czar did not occur, however, without the intervention of other events, ideas and men.

CHAPTER 4

Marx Provides a Doctrine

HERE was surely a most improbable creator of revolutions: a bearded, unkempt man, living in a London slum, an exile from his native Germany eking out a meager living by commencing on foreign affairs for British liberal journals. Day after day he walked to the gloomy British Museum to grub there in books and pamphlets and to build laboriously the meticulously detailed structure of his revolutionary theories.

For Karl Marx was revolutionary not only because he advocated and organized men for violent revolution or because revolutions have been fought and won in his name but because his writings have profoundly influenced all later political and economic thinking.

Today his views are accepted in greater or lesser degree by educated people in well over half of the world. If we are to come to grips with the basic forces which are shaping the history of our time we must have at least a rudimentary understanding of this remarkable man and his doctrine.

Marx's thinking was powerful, largely because it was based on a shrewd observation of life around him. It was limited, because he saw only those facts which time and place and inclination permitted him to see.

Those facts were the painful realities of life in the most gruesome days of the Industrial Revolution. He saw his neighbors in the London slums, living on the thinnest of margins, crowding into hovels, working until exhausted. He saw the brutalizing impact of an economy expanding at a forced pace. He saw the terror and rootlessness of its victims, their helplessness as individuals before the power of

the men who owned the factories in which they worked and who controlled the government under which they lived."

Similar conditions could be found in Russia half a century later. Indeed in greater or lesser degree they could be found in most countries, making the difficult transition from an agricultural to a machine economy. By skillfully and sympathetically analyzing these human difficulties and by claiming to offer a way to overcome them, Marx provided a lasting basis for his appeal.

But Marxism was more than a cry of outrage at the bitter injustices of the developing factory system; more even than an appeal for a Socialist solution. Robert Owen and a long line of other English and French philosophers had sounded both these notes. Marx considered them "utopian" for appealing to the factory owners and men of power to share their privileges. Some individuals might be so self-sacrificing, said Marx, but never a whole class.

Instead, just as Darwin saw the evolutionary process at work in life, Marx saw a similar force operating throughout economic history. This he believed made the future course of events predictable within broad limits.

The theories of the German philosopher Hegel struck Marx as relevant. Hegel thought that in history, each great idea, which he called a thesis, called forth its opposite, or antithesis. As these two ideas struggled for supremacy, a synthesis was developed which contained elements of truth from both. This synthesis in turn became a new thesis, and the process was repeated, with each resulting synthesis purer and more perfect than its predecessor. This process was what Hegel called the dialectic.

Marx later claimed that he had "turned Hegel on his head." Instead of the interaction of ideas as the controlling element of historical development, Marx found it in the shifting economic forces in society. Every form of economic organization elevated to power a single social class whose members owned the instruments of production in that particular system.

Because of its economic power, said Marx, this class also controlled the political organs of society. No matter what formal democratic limitations might be established, this political power was inevitably used by the ruling class to bolster its own dominance. The art, culture and manners of a society in the main reflected the tastes

and needs of the ruling class, dictated by the economic drives which had placed that class in power.

Yet each such economic order contained within it what Marx called "internal contradictions." As the means of production changed, the improvements in technology led to the development of a new economic class. As this rising class grew in numbers and power, it began to demand a larger share of the benefits of the new technology. The old ruling class resisted, first by turning the offices and power of the state against the new challengers, and when this proved inadequate, by resorting to violence. This, according to Marx, was something that the "utopian" Socialists had never understood.

It was chiefly by violence that the rising economic class could protect its interests and eventually gain the place of power which had been foreordained for it. Thus violent revolution was the probable midwife at the birth of each new economic order. Once the new order was established, the cycle was repeated, then repeated again.

In Western history Marx saw the classical example of this process in the transition from feudal to capitalist society—a transition which in many parts of the world has not been completed or by-passed in our own lifetime— even less so in his. Under feudalism, then as now, the essential economic organization revolved around agricultural production. Therefore for Marx the landed aristocracy, owners of the "instruments of production" were by definition the ruling class.

The feudal social and political organization, said Marx, was designed with one overriding purpose—to bind the tillers of the soil to the land in order to assure that it would be worked in the interest of the few who owned it.

Inevitably contradictions developed. Better means of transportation and trade, a gradually growing agricultural surplus, the need for wealth in cash rather than in kind to support armies and to buy luxuries, led to the slow development of towns with a new class of merchants, artisans, tradesmen and financiers. This new class, the bourgeoisie, controlled the new means of production—capital and workshops. Inevitably its interests were opposed to the old social and political structure based on land ownership.

The landlord had been interested in order and stability, in a *status quo* relation with his serfs, and in the feudal-aristocratic political order which maintained this pattern of life. The new bourgeois

now insisted on the right to hire his labor where he wished and to foster trade. In pursuit of these aims he began first to champion the king against the nobles and then to demand a voice in the operation of the state as against the king himself. Since the townspeople outnumbered the aristocracy it was entirely to their advantage ultimately to frame their political demands in terms of democratic representative government, thereby attracting other classes to their cause.

The inevitable result, according to Marx, was the violent overthrow of the aristocratic social order by the bourgeoisie. He cited the French Revolution as the best-known example. According to the Marxian analysis, however, the new synthesis did not remain static. Almost at once it began to generate its own contradictions and the process was repeated.

The economic forces at work in the Industrial Revolution, for instance, required ever increasing masses of capital to build the larger and larger factories that were required for its efficient operation. Those few who controlled capital became the new ruling class. Inevitably this new economic pattern of society created its own grave-diggers—the opposing class of the more and more numerous factory workers.

With their numbers swelling daily by new births and new recruits from the countryside, Marx watched them being swept into the voracious maw of the nineteenth century industrial machines of Western Europe. He confidently predicted that this “proletariat,” the class of landless laborers, would continue to be exploited by the new owner-capitalist class whose single goal was profit. The growing industries would gradually become monopolies and wages would be driven to the subsistence level—one of Marx’s fundamental economic predictions which proved false even in nineteenth century Britain.

The small businessman, unable to withstand the concentrated economic power of the capitalist, would be liquidated and forced to join the working class. Step by step all of society would be split into two new contending classes, this time the victimized workers and their capitalist oppressors.

Marx saw evidence of what he believed to be the internal contradictions of capitalism in the cycles of economic ups and downs which were already clearly apparent in the nineteenth century. The

new industrial technology, Marx said, was able to produce far more than the capitalist class could consume itself or would ever permit the workers to purchase. The "epidemics of overproduction," he said, meant inevitable depressions and these depressions, with mass unemployment, would hasten and embitter the new class struggle between workers and capitalists.

As resistance developed among the workers, Marx predicted that the capitalists would use their control of the political machinery to repress them. When these peaceful means proved insufficient to keep the workers in line, the capitalists would be forced to turn to the instruments of naked power which they controlled—the army and the police. The workers would respond with triumphant violence, 'expropriate the expropriators,' and establish a 'proletarian dictatorship' where the means of production would be owned by the state in the name of the workers.

Unlike every previous revolution, however, this one would leave only a single class—the proletariat. All other classes would have been destroyed. Since the state itself was an instrument of class rule which was no longer needed, it would shortly—as Lenin later said—'wither away,' leaving as the final synthesis a classless Communist society, the enduring triumph of the historical process.

* * *

In February, 1848, the first of the revolutions which were in that year to spread over Europe broke out in Germany and France. That very month saw the publication of Karl Marx's *Communist Manifesto*, probably the most important revolutionary pamphlet ever issued. In it Marx gave the first full length sketch of his theory, ending with the portentous words: "The Communists . . . openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. Workers of the world, unite!"

This was an explicit call for world revolution. "The proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie," the *Manifesto* acknowledged, and in form this sounded like a national struggle. In substance and logic, however,

the theme was international. "Workingmen have no country," declared the *Manifesto*. The nation-states of the nineteenth century were nothing but instruments of capitalist oppression. The new triumphant proletariat would have no allegiance to any of them.

On the contrary, class interest and sympathy would lead to growing solidarity with the workers of other countries in common hostility to their common enemies, the national capitalist governments. Just as the economic conditions that brought about the revolution were world-wide in scope, so was the remedy world wide. The eventual triumph of the revolution would lead to a universal classless society and a rationally administered, world economy.

These Marxist answers to the problems created by nationalism have always given an extra dimension to its appeal. The *Manifesto* itself was sponsored by an international group of delegates from France, Belgium, Germany and England. Fifteen years later Marx founded the International Workingmen's Association, the First International, whose aim, according to his collaborator Engels, "was to weld together in *one* huge army the whole militant working class of Europe and America."

Thus Marx announced more than a theory. He also had a campaign tactic for world revolution. "Hitherto," he said, "it was the mission of philosophers to interpret the world; now it is our business to change it."

Marx left his picture of the future conveniently vague. He was far more concerned with the process of struggle than with the structure of a future Communist community or the policies of its leaders. Any speculation on these matters was, for him, bad gambling.

Left similarly vague was the resolution of another important ambiguity in Marxist thought. Marx urged, organized and cajoled his followers to fight for Socialism, and at the same time he tried to demonstrate that it was inevitable. But is there any virtue in working and sacrificing for a foreordained result?

Paradoxically, this ambiguous dogma has appeared to strengthen the Marxist appeal. Many intellectuals and idealists were fired by the noble ethical goals which they read into the doctrine, while discouraged revolutionaries could always take comfort in the knowledge that history was on their side.

This notion of inevitability has also fitted in with the "end justifies the means" flavor of Communism. Because he does not doubt the

final outcome, the convinced Communist is rarely troubled by a bad conscience regardless of his methods

The plausibility of the Marxist alternative to the misery under which so many Europeans were living gave it an immediate appeal. When the vibrant rumblings of Marxism were first disturbing the tranquillity of Mid Victorian England that apostle of liberty and property John Stuart Mill issued a sharp warning to his contemporaries

If the choice were to be made between Communism with all its chances and the present state of society with all its suffering and injustices, if the institution of private property necessarily carried with it as a consequence that the produce of labor should be apportioned as we now see it almost in an inverse ratio to the laborer—the larger portion to those who have never worked it all the next largest to those whose work is almost nominal and so in a descending scale—if this or Communism were the alternative all the difficulties great or small, of Communism would be but as dust in the balance.

In a sense it has been the special objective of the anti-Communist Democratic Socialist parties, most of whom have officially considered themselves Marxist, to see to it that this bitter choice need never be made. If this sounds contradictory we should remember that Marx himself once said that he was not a Marxist and his followers have been inordinately jealous of the right to interpret their master as they see fit.

Harold Laski, the British political theorist and one time chairman of the British Labor Party, was once lecturing in New York when he was interrupted by the heckling of some Communist demonstrators. When the rest of the audience began to hiss the heckler Laski retorted 'Leave them alone. After all we are all followers of Marx—they in their way. I in his.'

In the years since Marx wrote different aspects of his thought have been stressed by different followers with widely varying results. Democratic Socialism which rejects the concept of violent change became the ruling doctrine of the Western European labor movement and its influence affected even American politics. This is a subject to which we will return in a later chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Lenin Turns Spark into Flame

WE have already seen enough of the conspiratorial climate of nineteenth century Russia to predict that a moderate, tolerant evolutionary interpretation of Marxist theory would be inapplicable there.

In the 1870's and 1880's a handful of terrorists had fought the whole relentless machine of Czarist repression to a standstill, murdering many of the top officials including in 1881, Czar Alexander II himself. The Czarist steam roller ground remorselessly on, however, and over the years the terrorists were caught one by one and hanged. Among them was Alexander Ulianov, Lenin's twenty-one-year-old brother.

Marx's doctrine came to Russia just as disillusionment with the pattern of sporadic terror without ideas or plans was reaching its height in the ranks of the underground revolutionists. The new democratic appeal of Christian pacifists like Tolstoy, at the other extreme, seemed futile.

The Marxists alone appeared to offer a practical answer: ideas, skillfully designed to create a mass movement among the workers, and vigorously put into action through disciplined, organized, indoctrinated cadres. The latter's job was to work ceaselessly to educate the factory workers in the necessity for popular uprising and in the methods through which such an uprising could at just the right moment be brought about.

Nikolai Lenin recognized the opportunity more clearly and single-mindedly than any other Russian revolutionary. In 1895, at the age of twenty-seven, he was sent to Siberia for having been

one of the organizers in St. Petersburg of a society called the "Union for the Liberation of the Working Class." During his five years of confinement, he found the leisure to absorb all the Marxian classics, to write his chief analysis on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, and to plot future action.

Appealing to the young intellectuals brought up in the tradition of the revolutionary underground but disgusted with the bankruptcy of pure terror, he placed himself at the head of the most radical wing of the Social Democratic party. This was the vantage point he decided to become the master strategist of the Russian Revolution that shook the world in 1917.

In 1900, few would have bet very much on Lenin's chances. After his release from Siberia, he helped to start *Iskra*, a Marxist magazine published first in Germany, then in England, and finally in Switzerland, with the slogan "From Spark to Flame." He and other Russian emigres wrangled with each other over the doctrines and strategy of revolution, and smuggled their polemics into Russia to little bands of eager intellectuals who met and read them in secret.

These exiles, with their elaborate master plans, were often the subject of ridicule. Victor Adler, a respected Austrian Socialist, sought to convince his foreign minister, Count Berchtold, that a Europe in war would mean a revolution in Russia. "And who would lead this revolution?" Berchtold asked contemptuously. "Perhaps Mr. Bronstein sitting over there at the Cafe Central?" Mr. Bronstein became better known to history under the name of Leon Trotsky.

Not until two months before the Revolution in October, 1917, did Trotsky join Lenin in the extreme left-wing position. But the logic of the situation was already forcing the underground revolutionaries into opposite camps.

Things began to come to a head at the second Congress of the Russian Socialist party, which met in Brussels in 1903 but was dispersed by the police and forced to transfer to London. There Lenin's faction, later called Bolsheviks (men of the majority), defeated the moderates later called Mensheviks (men of the minority), by a small margin in an assembly of forty-three. The basic issue between them was the question of revolutionary tactics: should the revolution rely upon the mass movement which the Mensheviks

thought was essential or upon the small conspiratorial group which the Bolsheviks both advocated and themselves provided.

In 1905 before the Bolshevik-Menshevik split became final, the new Marxist program for revolution received its first test. Following Russian defeats in the war with Japan, the printers of Moscow and St. Petersburg struck against the government. Workers from each struck plant in St. Petersburg elected a delegate to a general council to plan and implement strategy. It was called the "Soviet of Workers' Deputies" and was organized under Menshevik leadership which included Trotsky. For ninety days it purported to rule the capital as a pseudo-government.

In this brief period this spontaneously democratically elected workers body sponsored an extraordinarily short-lived flowering of social and political reform. Complete freedom of the press was established and liberal Socialist and conservative duties of all political hues blundered. The club new day was proclaimed. After his arrest in 1905 a member of the Soviet, Trotsky boldly used his official position not unlike the non-revolutionaries who ruled the Russian Empire as a sounding board for revolutionary needs.

Lenin returned from abroad to help other more leaders to help to direct the revolution. He urged uprising on the Moscow Soviet workers but despite the fires he saw the advantage of the poorly organized but widely revolutionary Soviets as a modern form of a more disciplined Bolsheviks military control of the future revolution.

In the confusion Lenin saw the lesson. The troops which finally put down the strike and dispersed the Soviet were peasant soldiers. Although there were many scattered peasant uprisings in Russia in the years 1904-1906 in the momentary revolutionary mood and temper of the city workers had not reached the backward peasant countryside whence these soldiers came. The fact that they had remained loyal to the Czar's government was decisive.

Lenin saw that factory workers alone could not make a successful revolution. It would need the help of the great mass of the Russian people, the peasants living under miserable conditions on the great estates of the feudal-minded aristocracy. Enlisting this essential peasant support he guessed would not be difficult.

THE successful Bolshevik bid for power came just twelve years later. It came in Petrograd, formerly St. Petersburg and soon to be renamed Leningrad, on October 24, 1917, after about six months of feverish political activity and agitation. It came, as Engels had said it would, as the result of a world war: "No war," he once wrote, "is any longer possible for Prussia-Germany except a world war, and a world war . . . of a violence hitherto undreamed of."

The "lords and gentlemen" of Europe had been warned by Engels that they would eventually be pressed by circumstances into "the last great war dance." For a time, he admitted, "the war may perhaps push us into the background." But he was confident that forces would be unfettered that could no longer be controlled. "At the end of the tragedy you will be ruined, and the victory of the proletariat will either be already achieved, or, at any rate, inevitable."

After 1905, the lines between the Bolsheviks and the more moderate Menshevik Russian Socialists had hardened. The weak and the ineffectual had been weeded out, partly because of the decline of revolutionary activity and partly by Lenin's deliberate design. No longer the "men of the majority," the Bolsheviks were reduced to a relatively small group of fanatical extremists, linked together by a Central Committee stationed abroad, and dominated by Lenin.

Yet the loyalty and toughness of many members had been tested by years in the underground. Some had been trained as agitators and propagandists. Many had seen guerrilla fighting in raids on Czarist pay trains which supplied funds for their revolutionary work. Most important of all, each was prepared to obey the orders of the Central Committee.

To win a class war with capitalist society, Lenin insisted that his party have a central command and an inner discipline essentially like that of an army in the field. Means were to be utterly subservient to ends. All moral scruples were to be suppressed. Under his "democratic centralism," once a decision had been made by the top deliberative body, a party member could be asked to undertake any of those acts of secrecy and violence which are traditionally accepted under the morality of war. By October, 1917, Lenin's army was ready to strike when opportunity offered itself.

In February of that year the Czarist governing machine, drained of its last vitality by staggering defeats at the hands of the German

armies, broke down and ground to a halt. Uprisings spread through the factories and among the war-weary peasants. Soldiers refused to obey their officers, and the sailors at the great Kronstadt naval base in Petrograd broke into organized mutiny. After a week of confusion, the Romanov dynasty was swept aside. Its place was taken by a provisional government composed of liberals and moderate Socialists who rejected the Bolsheviks but welcomed the more moderate Mensheviks.

Before long Lenin was hurrying back to Russia from Switzerland, crossing Europe in a sealed train with the connivance of the German General Staff. Skilled Bolshevik agitators, eventually joined by the latecomer Trotsky, orator of the revolution, moved into the factories and army units. Before almost continuous mass meetings in the capital they repeated over and over again to a confused, disorganized people caught up in the passions and soaring hopes of revolution the simple powerful Bolshevik slogans—Land, Bread and Peace.

The Provisional Government hesitated. It proposed that land reform be delayed until the convening of a constituent assembly which could determine the draft of a constitution redistributing the land. But delay followed delay, and the assembly was not called.

Inflation ran wild. The revolution after three years of war had disrupted the food chain from country to town. Hunger and near famine grew in the cities. While Russians exhausted soldiers and their peasant families cried for peace, the Provisional Government loyally and consistently renewed its pledge to the Western powers to continue the war against Germany.

As this new government gradually attempted to get its bearings, its Menshevik supporters found themselves under challenge in a financial revolution. In the Petrograd Soviet, a council including elected deputies of revolution, army units and striking factories. Here, in the Soviet the Bolsheviks controlled a sizable bloc of deputies. By the late summer of 1917 they had obtained a majority and were issuing orders contrary to those of the new government.

Thus the Soviet ordered Russian soldiers and sailors to refuse to obey their officers and to elect regimental committees to administer the units and enforce revolutionary discipline. This time in contrast to 1905, the Petrograd Soviet drew strength from other Soviets which had appeared not only in the other industrial centers, but also

in the countryside where Soviets of Peasants' Deputies had begun to confiscate land.

Coming a fourth slogan, 'All power to the Soviets,' Lenin now set out deliberately to destroy the Provisional Government. The tempo of Bolshevik agitation in the factories and the armed forces was stepped up. In Petrograd mass demonstrations were an almost daily occurrence.

In early July, 1917, the government made one of these occasions for repressive measures against the Bolshevik party. Lenin and other leaders were accused of being in the pay of the Germans. Many, including Trotsky, were imprisoned. Lenin left discreetly for Finland to emerge again openly only in October after his party had seized power.

Meanwhile the first Provisional Government had given way to one headed by the Menshevik lawyer Kerensky. In September, General Kornilov, opposed to the Czar's return, but seeing no hope in a Provisional Government led by Socialists of any stripe, marched his troops on Petrograd. For the defense of the capital Kerensky was forced to turn to the Soviets, in which the Bolsheviks for the first time had obtained a majority.

Now from his hideout in Finland, Lenin began to urge the Bolshevik Central Committee to take the final step—armed uprisings against the new government. Over stiff opposition in the Committee, Lenin's plan prevailed, supported in his absence by Stalin and Trotsky.

Kerensky was systematically provoked into repressive action, and on the night of October 24 the Bolsheviks struck. The carefully planned military occupation of the capital went off with a minimum of bloodshed. Within a few hours Kerensky was in flight. The Petrograd Soviet controlled the city, and Lenin with his hard core of Bolsheviks controlled the Soviet. Next day Lenin and his followers went before an All-Russian Congress of the Soviets then in session to be acclaimed by the delegates as the new government of Russia.

The Bolsheviks were still strongest with the factory workers and the army. Their organization did not penetrate deeply into the vast Russian hinterland. Yet 80 per cent of the Russian people were peasants, and the debacle of 1905 had taught Lenin that a revolution in the cities was doomed unless it had at least the passive support of

the peasants, the class which Marx had discounted as lost in the "idiocy of rural life"

The truth of the matter is that Marx had very nearly left the peasant out of his calculations. Chiefly familiar with the developing industrial societies of Britain and Germany, Marx had based his theories almost exclusively on factory workers. The *Communist Manifesto* in 1848 alluded only briefly to agriculture. It referred almost casually to the "combination of agriculture with manufacturing industries," and to the "gradual abolition of the distinction between town and country."

Perhaps as a result the leaders of peasant unrest throughout Eastern Europe before the Russian Revolution had largely ignored Marx or opposed him. It was part of Lenin's genius that he understood this grave omission in Marxist theory and acted to correct it. He shrewdly placed the redistribution of land among the principal points of the Bolshevik program.

One of Lenin's first governmental acts was to ratify on November 7, 1917, the earlier spontaneous rejection of the landlords and the division of the land among the peasants. To his associates he said: "We must see that this decree is broadcast throughout the country. Then let them try to take it away. This is the most important achievement of our revolution. Today the Bolshevik revolution will occur and become irrevocable."

Later at critical moments the peasants remained benevolently neutral. Czarist officers with the direct support of British, French and Japanese money, arms and men and with the encouragement of an American expeditionary force in Archangel waged war on the new Bolshevik government. But the peasants refused to rally to their support and largely because of this, the counterrevolution gradually ceased to be a serious threat.

Land and Bread and Peace were the ideas which Lenin used to win his Bolshevik—the name was now changed to Communist—revolution. In the midst of armed conflict, these ideas moved men into action and proved to be the decisive factor. "War is part of the whole," said Lenin, suggesting the central secret of his skill. "The whole is politics."

The peasants were an essential part of that whole. As the city workers sought through revolution to achieve security by collective ownership of factories, so the inert, traditional, politically uncon-

scious peasants sought security in private ownership of their own land.

But war and politics were not to be limited to the domestic scene. The promoters of the Russian Revolution did not intend it for Russia alone.

CHAPTER 6

Revolution for Export

WORKERS of the world unite" was not only the loudest reverberating Marxist slogan but it dramatized the approach which in Marx's opinion distinguished Communists from other revolutionaries. Communists, according to the *Manifesto*, would act according to "the common interests of the entire proletariat independent of all nationality."

But the International Workingmen's Association which Marx organized in his own lifetime proved a failure. The Second International organized in 1889, six years after his death, was more successful. Among its members were the principal European Socialist parties in the years before World War I.

At Basel in 1912, two years before the Kaiser's armies started their sweep through Belgium, the Congress of the International unanimously resolved upon a "war against war." "It would be insanity for the governments not to realize that the very idea of the monstrosity of a world war would inevitably call forth the revolt of the working class," warned the Basel Declaration, adding that workers "consider it a crime to fire at each other for the profits of the capitalists, the ambition of dynasties, or the greater glory of secret diplomatic treaties." Enthusiastically the delegates pledged every means of resistance to war, including a general strike throughout Europe.

But the division between the moderate Democratic Socialists and the revolutionary Socialists on this issue, as on others, remained. The militant left wing groups stressed heavily the antinationalist character of the predicted revolution. Among the moderates, on the

other hand, there was a growing if unrecognized commitment to the nations in whose parliaments they were participating. Their antiwar sentiment although sincere, tended to reflect the more traditional pacifist outlook.

While Europe was at peace, these differences were blurred, and were often no more than the subject matter of ideological debate in the taverns and teahouses. The blunt intrusion of the war, however, thrust theory aside, and showed what men thought by how they acted.

In August 1914, on the eve of the twenty-fifth birthday of the Second International, the Kaiser proclaimed from his Berlin balcony, "I know no parties, I know only Germans" — and the vast majority of the German Social Democrats, the largest and the most articulate of the European Socialist parties, promptly goose stepped off to war.

In France, the leading antiwar figure, Jaurès, was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic, and Socialists in the Allied nations rallied behind their countries' banners. The Belgian Vandervelde, President of the Second International, vowed "as long as German soldiers are billeted in the homes of Belgian workers, there can be no talk of convening the Executive of the International."

The collapse of this great edifice of international Socialism horrified Marxists in all the neutral countries. Even in the beleaguered nations, a few like America's Eugene Debs in 1917, continued to work against the war and to go to jail in consequence.

Lenin wrote bitterly about the "betrayal" of the revolution by the moderate Western Socialists. It was not the idea of war which Lenin disliked, but the "miserable and narrow minded nationalism" of most Western Socialists. Nor had he any sympathy for Socialist pacifists whom he called "sentimental whiners who are afraid of war." "Much has been left in the world that *must* be destroyed by fire and iron," he wrote in 1915 in *The Collapse of the Second International*. He proposed "world proletarian revolution as the only escape from the horrors of a world war."

But how and where would this world-wide revolution begin? How could the devastation and confusion following the World War be turned into such a beginning?

The *Communist Manifesto* had seen capitalism as a world system: "The need of a constantly expanding market for its products

chases the Pourgeois over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. . . . In one word, it creates a world after its own image. Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West '.

It was generally assumed by Marxists that the first successful revolution would come in a highly industrialized country such as Germany where a large and well organized body of workers could provide a base. Lenin however skillfully extended the Marxian analysis to predict that the revolution would begin with capitalism's weakest link Russia where oppression was greatest and capitalism most fragile would accomplish her revolution before industrial Europe, he said.

Year before Lenin had sketched the process by which he thought it might occur. It was in an analysis which is still persuasive in the colonial areas of the world. Asian intellectuals have had very little direct experience of capitalists exploiting labor workers but Lenin's theory of imperialism provides them with a plausible rationale for their own experiences with colonial exploitation.

A concrete competition within nations grew less, said Lenin, the more it crossed international borders among the giant national monopolies would become more acute. The steady pressure for markets and raw materials is inherent in the expansion of capitalist production, would result in an international scramble for underdeveloped territory and the control of less advanced peoples.

Since colonies and subject peoples were essential for the continued profit of the capitalists in each nation, their acquiescence would not be let to emerge or to superiority economic hegemony power. The ruling class in each country would use the full power of the state to gain their objectives.

First the struggle would be through tariffs and trade barriers. Finally the armed forces would be brought into play to assure victory over the capitalists of rival nations. The result would be a series of exhausting imperialist wars in which capitalist world over would bleed itself white, an easy victim for the rising proletariat.

The growing world revolution would strike first at the weakest link among the capitalist countries. Rallying to the revolution's support would be the backward and colonial areas. Revolts against foreign rule and local feudalism there would spark an uprising of the workers in the European citadels of capitalism. While the colonial revolution could thus play a decisive role in the victory of the Western proletariat, the Western revolution itself would be needed to guide the colonial feudal revolt through the difficult state of industrial development and finally into Communism.

Stalin later would say "Leninism has proved that the road to victory of the revolution in the West lies through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism."

* * *

FOR Lenin, World War I was just such an imperialist war, a struggle between German and Allied capitalists for control of colonial Asia and Africa. As such, it signaled for him the beginning of the death throes of capitalism. Revolutions in the European states, which would assure the final victory of the Russian Revolution, could not be far behind.

At first events seemed to bear out Lenin's predictions. At the very moment when he was urging the October uprising on the Bolshevik Central Committee, a revolt broke out in the German Navy. Indeed he used this fact as one of the most telling arguments for the timing of the Bolshevik coup.

For the next few months revolution flamed over Eastern and Central Europe. Leon Trotsky, the first Soviet Foreign Minister, expressed the optimism of his colleagues. His job, he said, would be a simple one. "I shall publish a few revolutionary proclamations and then close shop."

In Germany, Workers' Councils in the cities and Soldiers' Councils in the rear area units were formed, much on the order of the Russian Soviets. By January, 1919, there was a revolutionary uprising in the streets of Berlin, and crowds seized the main government buildings.

In March, a Republic of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Councils was proclaimed in Hungary under the leadership of the Communist Bela Kun

Strikes, riots and local revolts spread in Italy. Even in France, the militant wing of the Socialist party, later to become Communist, claimed a majority following among the workers. Not only the European but the world proletariat in revolution is maturing before the eyes of all. Lenin declared confidently:

In the midst of this turbulence, a conference of European Socialist parties called by Lenin in Moscow, proclaimed the Third International the Comintern to press the world revolution. In its first year the Comintern was impotent. The civil war still raged in Russia and all the new government's energies were required to combat it.

Meanwhile the European revolutions started to cool. The heart of the German uprising was crushed and its leaders assassinated. The Finnish Revolution collapsed. Bela Kun fell into the Marxist doctrinal trap that Lenin avoided in his dealings with agriculture. Without waiting to consolidate his power, he repudiated his promise that the peasants would be guaranteed the permanent ownership of the land and moved directly toward forced collectivized farming. The Hungarian peasants reacted vigorously, other difficulties arose and by August of 1919 his government was overthrown.

In Italy militant Socialist activity fizzled out for want of leadership by the end of 1920. Mussolini, an ex-Socialist himself, began to organize the force which he later led in the Fascist march on Rome.

In 1920 the one hopeful force that remained from Lenin's point of view was the Red Army then advancing into Poland and threatening to link the Russian Communist power with the remnants of the revolution in Germany. Soviet troops were at the gates of Warsaw when the Second Congress of the Comintern convened.

This Congress laid down twenty-one conditions with which all Comintern parties had to comply. But the Soviet forces were badly defeated on the Vistula a week later and all hope of an immediate proletarian revolution sweeping through Europe disappeared.

These twenty-one conditions however were an important landmark in the development of Communist revolutionary tactics. They were designed by Lenin to split off, once and for all, the extreme

revolutionary elements from the more moderate forces of European Socialism. Although he knew that this meant a sacrifice of numbers for militancy, just as it had earlier in his own Russian Bolshevik party, there was no place in his scheme of things for the liberal idealist.

The principal condition was the organization of member parties along the Bolshevik lines, and the agreement of the local parties to obey implicitly the orders of the Comintern. At this stage, however, it was not yet assumed that these decisions would be dictated by the Russian party, but rather by the free vote of the Central Executive of the Comintern, which would contain representatives of all the member parties.

The twenty-one conditions also illustrated Lenin's continued grasp of the importance of the peasantry to successful revolution. All parties were required to make special efforts to gain peasant support. Following Lenin's theory of the political vulnerability of Europe's colonial possessions in Asia and Africa all member parties were also required to support and work for the emancipation of oppressed nationalities and subject peoples.

* * *

IN 1924 with the loss of Lenin, revolutionary fervor outside the USSR subsided. Those Russian leaders who still insisted on the orthodox Bolshevik thesis that the survival of the new Soviet Union depended upon immediate revolution in Europe were discredited—that revolution had failed to come.

Consequently Stalin, in order to adapt the official creed to the new facts, was forced to propose a new theory of "Communism in one country." The new theory required all Communist parties abroad to subordinate the objective of revolution in their own countries to the necessities of safeguarding Russia, the motherland of the revolution. Although Communists in the rest of the world swallowed hard at this retreat, most of them agreed that it was dictated by circumstances. Their feelings were mirrored in Mao Tse-tung's remark that "it is no use preaching Socialism unless you have a country to practice it in."

As the fervor for world revolution dampened in the 1920's and

'30's, a friendlier attitude toward the Soviet Union sprang up abroad. The fear of Bolshevism which had swept the West, including America under the Wilson and Harding administrations, was gradually overcome.

American corporations sent engineers to the USSR to aid in the new development programs. Large contracts were let to General Electric and Ford. There was more Soviet-American trading in the 1920's than occurred after our official recognition of the USSR in the 1930's.

Respectable businessmen and their families went on summer cruises to Leningrad and returned full of praise for the accomplishments of the Stalin regime. In the depression-ridden '30's, their counterparts were often found among American youth disillusioned and unemployed who without traveling to Leningrad were prepared to believe anything about the classless, race-free paradise portrayed by Soviet propaganda.

For Stalin never dropped his second argument that the Soviet Union was far more than one country. It was not only the nucleus of world revolution but the emphasized "the living prototype of the future union of nations and the world economic system."

The logic of the United Front led to a shot unyielding of Russian nationalism and world Communism. The union combined two of the most powerful forces on earth: a great nation state and a world-embracing idea. Russian imperialism and the historic Russian drive for an expanding empire were now united with an ideology tied to an organized movement which was the ordinary fifth column. And world Communism found itself with a national base and with the Red Army as its instrument.

"The wheel of history," said the Bulgarian Communist leader Georgi Dimitroff at the Seventh World Congress of the International in 1935, "is turning forward and will continue to turn forward until a world wide Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have been established until the final victory of Socialism throughout the whole world."

But rather than steady wheel-like progress internal contradictions were concealed to be at work inside the Comintern. Stalin's victory over Trotsky, who wished to precipitate world revolution without the risks for the Russians, meant the end of any hope of independence for Communist parties abroad.

Thereafter, they became increasingly subjugated to the rule of Moscow and the Comintern was a channel for the transmission of Stalin's orders.

As a result any twist or turn of policy, any tactic, became admissible if it served Russian interests. Tactics employed in Germany offer us an excellent illustration of those twists and turns at work.

From 1927 to 1932, while Hitler and his Nazis were slowly gathering strength, the Comintern ordered the German Communists to attack not the Nazis, but the Social Democrats. This has often been explained on the ground that the Communists believed Hitler was only preparing the chaos out of which would come their own triumph. But it is also true that the Social Democrats were the leading German group which sought agreement with England and France and since the civil war of 1918 these two nations had been considered the enemies of the Soviet Union. For whatever reason, the Communists facilitated the Nazi march to power.

In March, 1933 when Stalin finally realized that he had helped to create a new and far more dangerous enemy, he reversed his tactics toward Hitler. This did not, however, prevent him from delivering Trotskyites by the hundred to the German Gestapo for slaughter.

But to counter pressure from Hitler against the Soviet Union, Stalin sought to play off his old enemies, Britain and France, against the new Nazi Germany. British and French Communists were ordered to 'stop denouncing' their governments and indeed to start co-operating with them in Popular Front movements.

Later his tactic was also abandoned in favor of direct dealings with Hitler. In August, 1939, these culminated in the cynical Nazi-Soviet pact which set the stage for the German attack on Poland two weeks later and for the beginning of World War II.

Communist parties the world over were now told to withdraw support from the British and French war efforts against Germany because the war was an 'imperialist war'. When Nazi Panzer divisions crossed the Soviet border in June, 1941, loyal Communists were required once again to reverse the tables. The fight against Germany now became a 'people's war'.

In 1943, having served its varied purposes, the Comintern was officially and formally dissolved. It appears that between 1947 and 1955, this cycle has again been repeated and its successor, the Cominform, may be headed for early liquidation.

Thus the Communist parties of the world became instruments of a Soviet foreign policy which pursued goals scarcely distinguishable from those of the Czars. Gone was the flaming dream of a world-wide revolution of the working classes, led by the Communist party vanguard. Undoubtedly this dream still lived for some idealistic Communists in many lands. But its new and far more sinister form was Stalin's dream of Russian-run world Communism, imposed by subversion and the power of the Red Army.

CHAPTER 7

Stalin's Plans and Purges

WHEN Lenin died in January of 1924, four men, Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, contended for the succession. Each was a hero of the Revolution, a collaborator with Lenin, and a leader in his government.

One in particular had good cause to breathe more freely after Lenin's death. That one was Stalin. Only a year earlier Lenin had written of Stalin that he had "concentrated an enormous power in his hands." Furthermore, he added, "Stalin is too rude and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary. Therefore I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin from that position." Four years later the struggle for succession ended in Stalin's complete victory. This was a man who had named himself steel.

His eventual triumph was based on a blending of tactics and doctrine as skillful as Lenin's in 1917, coupled with his strategic position as General Secretary of the Communist party. Indeed Lenin had carefully laid down the method to be used. "If there are five parties," he said, "join with three to crush the fifth. Then side with two of the remainder and eliminate the fourth. Then team with one of the two to destroy the third. That leaves only one opponent, which can be easily handled."

Taking a leaf from Lenin's book, Stalin first combined with Zinoviev and Kamenev, the party bosses of Leningrad and Moscow, against Trotsky, who seemed at the outset the most formidable of the four challengers. Within a year of Lenin's death, Trotsky was

forced to resign his chairmanship of the Revolutionary War Council, and his effective power was at an end. After years of exile abroad, he was finally murdered by Kremlin agents in Mexico.

Stalin then turned to the other two who in a sense began to echo Trotsky's intensified socialism and industrialization revolution abroad and more freedom of opinion within the party. Although the latter was a relatively popular position, the first two were not. In the fourteenth Congress of the Communist party at the end of 1925, the faithful Stalin supporters rejected the commitments, and within two years Zinoviev and Kamenev were systematically stripped of their position of power.

The destruction of the opposition brought in abrupt reversal of the policies which Stalin had used to consolidate his power. The peasants were the first to receive the full impact of Lenin's distribution of land in November, 1917, which made the Revolution irrevocable. It had been followed during the civil war by harsh levies and requisitions of peasant grain. With the end of the civil war these policies had developed more or less to a halt. In the uneasy days of 1921, after the Kronstadt sailors' and a general strike in Petrograd and peasant uprising in Tambov, the Lenin administration abandoned the war communism, the New Economic Policy, one aspect of which had been to leave the free market to the peasants in the distribution of their food.

Stalin's desire to overthrow the Revolution in Russia had led him temporarily to advocate the continuation of the more moderate measures. This also permitted him to enlist the support of an important section of Russian opinion at a critical period in his fight for power, and it had demonstrated the crucial role of the peasant in modern revolution.

Now declaring that Russia was threatened by invasion from capitalist countries, a dogma that still persists, Stalin launched the first of a series of Five Year Plans, the first of a series of programs of forced drift industrialization the world had ever seen.

Essential to this stepped-up industrial development was the reversal of Stalin's recent benevolent policy toward the peasants. In order to tie more workers for construction and industrialization, the peasants were forced to put more of their produce into the channels of distribution to the cities at lower prices. The government undertook a tremendous drive for collective farms and the

pooling of farm machinery in Machine Tractor Stations. From Stalin's point of view the increased political control resulting from this vigorous exploitation of agriculture more than compensated for the antagonism of the peasants and even for the liquidation of several million who resisted. Although total production declined sharply the proportion which reached the cities increased.

The Five Year Plan set economic targets for the nation as a whole for each sector of the economy for each industry and even for each plant. Once the targets were set every resource of force and persuasion was employed to meet and beat them—even including ironically appeals to copy capitalist American techniques.

American efficiency and simplicity in his *Foundations of Leninism* lectures at Свердлов University in April 1974 is that indomitable spirit that neither knowledge nor intelligence deterred by no obstacles that plugs away with businesslike persistence until every impediment has been removed and the job must then have been done. It has been taken for granted that no important task without which serious consequences would befall the nation.

Stalin did not understand the meaning of the American efficiency means the restriction of decisions into narrow and unprincipled economic plan. The revolution is not of action. But his conclusion was triumphant. The communist method was Revolutionary far exceeding with American policy is the quiescence. Feminism in party and state work.

As old down tools were replaced by new machinery, workers who over-fulfilled their quotas were often rewarded by a stern command only to watch them decline. New jobs were created at levels of their previous record but the price for awards, prizes and medals of all kinds were falling even. But behind the door, there was always the risk. Everyone could see it on the horizon that the regime accepted no excuses. The price of failure could be the plan was ruin swift and absolute.

Crude in these methods were they succeeded in creating a powerful modern industrial state in the shortest time in history. Their success was attested by the massive war production of the Soviet economy during World War II. It has been even more conclusively confirmed by the post-war progress of Russia, not only in heavy

industry such as steel, but in atomic and hydrogen weapons and the production of military aircraft.

This industrial advance was achieved at brutal human cost, as well as probable disaffection within Russia. But use of human beings as machines and disregard of human feelings were justified by Stalinist doctrine which made the success and safety of the revolution the supreme and absolute objective. The engines of state power proved strong enough to override opposition.

Periodic party purges of weak or wavering members had always been a cardinal principle of Bolshevik organization. The Comintern's twenty-one conditions required it of foreign Communist parties. It was an obvious device for use against Stalin's opponents in the struggle for power. But the old purges had contemplated party and political sanctions, not governmental punishment. This was a new contribution of Stalin's, born of the growing identification of party with state.

As resistance to the forced pace of industrialization grew, Zinoviev and Kamenev were put in prison. In August 1936, the first of the public purge trials, begun to horrify the world. The charges were sabotage, disloyalty and disruption. In spectacular puzzling confessions, one by one Stalin's rivals convicted themselves.

The legal world will always marvel at Prosecutor Vishinsky's success in wresting testimony from the defendants in such exchanges as the following:

VISHINSKY: What appraisal should be given the articles and statements you wrote in 1933 in which you expressed loyalty to the party. Deception?

KAMENEV: No worse than deception!

VISHINSKY: Perfidy?

KAMENEV: Worse!

VISHINSKY: Worse than deception? More than perfidy? Would the word be treason?

KAMENEV: You have found the word.

The confessions of the leaders implicated more moderate politicians who had also been identified with the resistance to the Five Year Plan. The latter provided Stalin's next batch of victims. All levels of Soviet society were invaded. The party itself, most of whose lesser functionaries were Stalin's appointees, was racked from top

to bottom. Out of 300 army officers of the rank of division commander and above, 183 were executed.

In the end the purge fell back upon itself, clawing even at the dread NKVD, the very organization which had planned and supervised it. Yezhov, the NKVD head from whom the purge itself took its Russian name, Yezhovshchina, disappeared forever in 1938, as the insanity gradually flickered out.

Many factors have been adduced to explain the monstrous excesses of the purge. Stalin's paranoia, the need for scapegoats in the relentless pressure for economic development, and the vested interest of the NKVD and subordinate officials in plots and treason. Whatever the full explanation, the purge was another installment in the awful price of blood and misery which Russia had paid for industrial development. Yet shock over the price should not lead us to underestimate the economic strength which has been so dearly purchased.

The sheer weight of Soviet industrial development has made a deep impression on hundreds of millions of people in Asia, Africa and South America. For them, the Soviet economic accomplishment has become the symbol of what an underdeveloped nation can do to lift itself rapidly by its own bootstraps. There are many among them who are ready to conclude that for them the Soviet way is the only way, and that the bloody price is justified by the results.

CHAPTER 8

Russia and the Cold War

As he pondered his world position after V-F Day, Stalin had reason for considerable self-satisfaction. During the bleak midwar years, Russia's strength had proved far greater than expected. Russian losses had been severe, but Russia herself had survived. Stalin realized he had taken his place beside Thermopylae in the annals of heroic resistance.

Allied admiration for the Russian war effort had been almost unqualified. The prestige of the Russian people and the Red Army was at a peak. At Yalta and Potsdam, Stalin had taken an equal place in the highest war councils as one of the Big Three whose decisions moved the destinies of the globe. Eastern Europe and the Balkans had been freed of Nazi occupation by Russian soldiers. Communist partisans had played a similar role in the Italian and French resistance.

The new Soviet industrial machine had produced war materials on an immense scale. Except for one unanimously admitted movement which the Nazis failed to develop, the Soviet people had remained united in defense of their homeland.

Badly battered though they were, the Russians looked out on situations in Europe and Asia that verged on utter chaos. New misery and destruction had been piled high on generations of economic and political injustice. To the west, south and east were political and economic vicissitudes that almost seemed to beg for Soviet intervention.

In the days of the October Revolution, twenty-eight years before, while the Bolsheviks were waiting with mixed anxiety and ex-

pectancy for the supporting revolts of the proletarians of the West, Trotsky had thundered. "If . . . Germany does not rise, or if she rises too weakly then we shall move our regiments . . . not in order to defend ourselves, but in order to undertake a revolutionary offensive."

Trotsky had thought of his offensive as a series of armed moves in support of local spontaneous Communist uprisings. But the Red Army then had neither the strength nor the will to march beyond the outskirts of Warsaw, reached in 1920.

In May, 1945, the situation was much different. Victorious Red Army forces actually occupied most of the territory from the Soviet border to the Elbe. With them came Moscow-trained expatriates ready to take over governments or when necessary, to join temporarily in "United Fronts."

As the world watched the rough tactics of Soviet postwar diplomacy unfold, it became obvious that almost any contemporary problem could be turned to Communist advantage. Employing the theories of Marx, the tactics of Lenin and the armies of Stalin, and turning each on and off at will, Soviet policy was conducted with a bewildering variety of methods.

Through them all ran the impatient thread of expanding Russian imperial interests. From the blocking of the imaginative Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposals for atomic energy control to the calculated cruelty of the Berlin blockade, from the early boycotting of the UN's specialized agencies to the masked aggression of the Greek civil war, from the blunt proxy in Iran and the threats against Turkey, to the assault by proxy on South Korea.

Yet when the dust had died down, the limits of Soviet westward penetration coincided almost exactly with the limits of the wartime advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe. Beyond these limits—in Iran, Turkey, Greece, France, Italy and the city of Berlin—the thrust was blunted and turned back by a combination of resolute effort by the people and the governments, by Russian heavy-handedness, and by the resourceful responses of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and NATO. Tito's Yugoslavia, once the paragon of the satellite world, wrenched itself free of its old orbit and turned toward the West.

Tito had always professed his own adherence to Marx. Indeed, a treasured relic shown in a Yugoslav film biography of Tito released

in 1954 was the tattered copy of Marx's *Das Kapital* from which the Marshal learned his Communist theory while a political prisoner during the 1920's.

As an accepted Marxist until the break with Russia, Tito exerted a profound influence on the other Communist parties of Eastern Europe. In his Budapest office in January, 1948, Hungary's Communist strong man, Matyas Rakosi, told me that the Balkan nations would soon rally, not to Russia, but to Tito. A new federation called the 'United States of Southeastern Europe' would emerge, said Rakosi, which would be "independent but allied to Russia."

Unlike other Balkan nations, Tito's Yugoslavia had succeeded in driving out the Germans without the aid of Red Army troops on her soil. In East Europe between 1945 and 1948 the extent of Yugoslav prestige was obvious even to casual visitors.

During a two week trip through that area on United Nations business in January, 1948, for every mention of Stalin's name that I heard, there were a dozen references to Tito. Although there was a general belief that Communism was coming whether people wanted it or not, everywhere the frank hope was expressed that somehow these countries would consolidate under a Tito banner, and establish a certain independence from the Soviet Union.

In Prague Jan Masaryk told me that three years before in Moscow Stalin himself had mentioned almost casually the possibility of a loose "Soviet World Federation." Although the headquarters would be in Moscow each member nation would have control over its internal affairs. Masaryk thought that such a proposal would have had an electric effect on war-weary Europeans, who might have accepted the Communist ideology had they not been fearful of the Russian nationalism that inevitably came with it.

Masaryk guessed that Stalin was far too doctrinaire to accept his own suggestion, and his judgment proved correct. A few months later all contrary hopes were dashed when Stalin suddenly cracked down on Tito. Satellite Cominform leaders led the parade in condemnation of his 'deviationism,' and purges were launched in the neighboring Communist countries. In Czechoslovakia Rudolf Slansky and ten other 'Titoists' were hanged while in Hungary six leaders including Minister of the Interior Rajk met a similar fate.

In June, 1953, when the East German workers rose at last, they,

rose in revolt against a Soviet dictatorship. Thirty years after Trotsky, the troops of the Red Army were indeed in the heart of Europe, ironically not to assist the German proletariat as comrades in the world revolution but to shoot them down as enemies of Russia.

* * *

By 1950 the gradual weakening of the Soviet drive into Europe had prompted the Russians with the inexorable rhythm of Czarist days to turn again to the East to satisfy their ambitions. In Europe, Stalin probably got much less than he expected; in Asia, certainly much more.

There is ample evidence that the Soviet Government misjudged events in China as badly as did the United States. Certainly Moscow seemed to rest on the assumption that the Chinese Communists could not gain power by themselves and that for some years Chiang would be the only legitimate symbol of national rule. Although Russia belatedly supported the final stages of the Chinese Communist sweep to power in 1949, it raised difficulties for the Chinese or even the Soviet leaders to convince themselves that Russian endeavor, power or for a while, was crucial to the final victory.

But with Communist progress it extended all in the West and with China firmly controlled by a Communist Government Russia's own *'Drang nach Osten'* went into high gear. In June 1950 it expressed itself in the North Korean drive to the Thirty-eighth Parallel, armed and promptly timed by the Soviet Union.

In Korea as elsewhere Soviet moves were marked by an effort to calculate chances. In some ways the Korean calculation was a rewarding one for Soviet policy. It locked up a large part of the available military strength of the Western world in the remotest and least important of the threatened fronts and it confirmed the breach between Communist China and the Western world. China's need of Soviet support was boldly underlined while the day-to-day drain on Communist resources fell mainly on China.

Korea gave Soviet military leaders an opportunity to test their latest weapons without the loss of a single Russian soldier. The

drain on the Chinese economy fitted Soviet designs too, since Russia would obviously prefer a China loyal enough to provide strong support to Moscow's version of world Communism, but not strong enough to become a threat to the USSR itself.

Finally Korea gave the Soviet Union a propaganda opportunity which was used with telling effect. In an Asia still fearful of Western intentions and preoccupied with memories of colonialism, it was not difficult to label the UN armies as imperialist, even in the face of the clear evidence of South Korean aggression.

Yet on balance Moscow can scarcely consider the Korean venture a success. At least two major drawbacks for the Soviet Union clearly emerged. First it was the Korean aggression that gave new drive to the infant NATO effort in Europe, as well as to the vast increase in American armed strength. This military buildup consolidated the Atlantic nations, precluded the Kremlin with an entirely new situation, and thereby forced it to push the Soviet Union itself into a more rapid expansive arms expansion. These adverse factors alone would counterbalance any advantages accruing to the Russian from Korea.

Second, Korea may have increased prestige strength and importance for Communist China and corrected displacement of Soviet influence in the Far East, coupled with new commitments of economic support for Peking. Since the Korean War, Moscow has been acutely aware of the practical limitations on the potential reality of Communist China.

This latter point cannot be over-stressed. A well-placed Asian diplomat of the Peking government told me in the summer of 1955 that he was about to debate Plessner's 'China and China'. He argued that while China was not now becoming a threat to the Kremlin—some call for all out compliance with the room demands from Peking others fear that in the long run it would be cheaper and safer to find more useful friendship relations with Britain and America.

To me it seems unlikely that the issue in the Kremlin is already so sharply drawn, but there can be little doubt that the rulers of the Soviet Union are uneasy over the rise of Communist China. For centuries the ebb and flow of Russian policy between East and West could ignore the Chinese factor, but no longer is this true. However, to conclude the impression of common policies which

Peking and Moscow jointly give to the world: it seems likely that the tensions below the surface may already be affecting attitudes in both capitals.

* *

SINCE 1959 the increasing tensions in the alliance between Communist China and Soviet Russia have, of course, become key foreign policy factors which will have a still permanent influence on the world situation. The undeniable post-war industrial growth of the Soviet Union

Between 1945 and 1958 Russia emerged as a great industrial power second only to the United States. Despite the USSR's recurring economic problems it would be difficult to deny the considerable regression of rural Russia, especially in the backward peasant economy, to muddy our understanding of this Soviet achievement.

All the efforts of the Mlenko in 1952, the increase of industrial production in the capitalist countries, in 1953 the United States has exceeded the record of industrial development in the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of China has fallen but of all the capitalist and Communist leaders over the years our own best information is that the words remain more the least exaggerated.

Figures selected down from the Soviet reports by top American economic authorities have not depicted two world wars, civil war and revolution. The Russian economy in 1913 has increased to increase its coal output tenfold, pig iron sixfold, steel ninefold, petroleum sixfold, and electric power sixfold.

In 1954, Soviet coal production declined in American production. Soviet industry apparently succeeded for the first time in producing more than half as much steel as the United States, about 45 million tons. In 1955 Soviet coal production was approaching that of the United States.

Most competent analysts are now convinced that the recent average annual increase in the USSR's gross national product has averaged 7 or 8 per cent, while the comparable American figure historically has been between 3 and 4 per cent.

These broad figures become even more formidable when we remember the far higher percentage of Russian production that goes into heavy industry. Soviet planners with a world revolution still on their minds are not wasting their time on soft drink vending machines and milk boxes.

Russian industrial production is backed by almost unlimited supplies of industrial raw material. Indeed, the Communist nations as a bloc are wholly self-sufficient for the foreseeable future while we are already importing nearly 50 per cent of our strategic requirements.

Along with the former Communist production has also gone increasing Russian steel and lumber with the most complex and advanced special order technology. The excellent jet fighters and bombers and then unexpectedly early delivery of the H bomb are dramatic testimony.

No less significant for the future is the exchange of scientific and technical information. Soviet Union has received the help of the G. I. B. U. K. U. S. American military transferred 52,000 engineers to the USSR in 1945 and a different number of 20,000. In the USSR, according to the estimate, the trend has been in the opposite direction from 1945 to 1954, 2,000 in 1950 to 1954, and 4,000 in 1955.

The Soviet Union has received a great number of hundreds of talented young men and women from all countries. The quality of the technical and scientific work by American scientists to be not inferior to our own. In the USSR, the physicist and Dean of the School of Engineering has gone to the USSR. We have lost a lot of little for scientific matters. Russian scientists, scientists and engineers as we have met them in the USSR are brilliant.

Professor of Economics, University of California and American economic and political and social and political. To some extent, partly because of the Soviet Union's heavy production in early 1955, the United States has had a high output proportionately decline from the 1945 level of 1955. Soviet oil production is still low. The Soviet transport system is inadequate to Russia's vast distances. Soviet housing is apparently scarce and grossly low by any standards which consider Soviet national income. Both

transport and housing are sectors where, interestingly enough, the Soviet planners inherited considerable progress from the Czars.

Furthermore, the United States even during the Korean War, was working at a level much further below capacity production than was the USSR. A standard forty hour work week in the United States still contrasts with a standard forty eight hour one in the Soviet Union. A far larger percentage of Russian women are working. It can be argued with some merit that with its existing capacity of plant and equipment the United States could in a prolonged period of emergency increase its output proportionately more than the Soviet Union.

On the other hand the relatively low standard of living in the USSR may have major advantages. The Western citizen needs far more to sustain him. Moreover, as a social political entity the Western citizen is far more of a factor in any civilizational tightening process than is the regimented Russian. Of this I can testify at first hand from my experience as wartime Production and Rationing Administrator.

The Russian economy is, of particular vulnerability however, in its agriculture. The peasant whose agriculture bolstered Lenin's revolution has been in the most unproductive state in the way of steady growth and abundance, both an economic ail to Russia's future, he is still Russia's forgotten man.

In the early stages of Soviet development Russian resources were so great and the population so low that a high rate Communist planners could subject the people to a hard economic squeeze and still secure enough food to maintain an adequate though dull diet for the vast population. The production of meat, poultry, dairy products and eggs was reduced but the drastic shift made to vegetables and grain which are far more efficient producers of calories, minerals and proteins.

Yet there are limits to which any people can be pushed. A forced straight subsistence economy cannot be adhered to forever even with the propaganda help of foreign enemies in international crises. Consequently a vast effort was under way in 1955 to double the production of meat which is an accepted mark of better living.

Still from the standpoint of Soviet planners the dilemma remains easier to state than to solve: how to get more food produced by

fewer people without giving the peasant more consumer goods and greater freedom to buy and sell. Agriculture is likely to remain the 'Achilles' heel of the Soviet economy.

If the Kremlin should decide, as it apparently did for a time in 1954, to allow the production of more washing machines, motor cars and housing, a new set of problems will arise. Economic injustices will become more apparent. The appetite for higher living standards will be whetted. Even in a regimented Communist society, dissension is most likely to appear when the beginnings of economic improvement can be seen and the opportunities for further improvement are for the first time fully grasped.

In any event the condition of the Soviet economy, both its remarkable achievements and its limitations, will be an increasingly important factor in determining Soviet foreign policies. Paradoxically, as I shall point out in more detail later, both may argue for a relaxation of the Cold War.

* * *

IN this brief sketch of Russian history Marxist theory and Soviet practice we have seen that Communism as it proceeds from Moscow is a far more complicated phenomenon than mere organized brutality. The Marxist theory has given Russian policy a persuasive ideological appeal even though that appeal has often become shopworn where experience with it has elicited disillusionment. The statistics and physical evidence of Soviet economic progress exert a vigorous pull on people and countries yearning for a similar advance from backwardness. The strength of her armed forces adds further to Soviet prestige.

Set against this is a growing distrust with the fraud, conspiracy and violence which have been used to achieve these results. In Europe at least, it is fair to say that Communism's appeal to the intellectual ideologist has been dimming. In Asia, as we shall see, it is another story.

This brings us to the fundamental question. Moscow's most likely tactics in the second decade after World War II. How valid is the growing hope that Moscow is sincere in its expressed desire to relax the Cold War?

Deeply rooted in the folklore of Western thinking about Russia is the notion of a ponderous, inflexible force moving inexorably toward clearly stated goals. Yet in this brief glimpse of the origin and course of the Russian Revolution we have seen that Soviet policy is capable of extraordinary shifts in techniques, some of which are fundamental enough to affect objectives.

Let us review briefly some of the shifts which are most pertinent to the present situation. We have seen that Lenin, sensing the revolutionary opportunity in political vacuums in the heart of Europe immediately after World War I, moved the Soviet military and political apparatus into a world-wide offensive. When the Red Army offensive collapsed in Germany and Hungary, Lenin abandoned these efforts.

Stalin, following Lenin, shifted the entire focus of Soviet policy still further to assure the stability of Communism within Russia itself. This period of coexistence came to an end in 1941, when Hitler sent his armored divisions roaring into the heart of the Soviet Union. If it had not been for the war, no one knows how long the Politburo's concentration on internal development might have continued. However, the war shook the old European-dominated world to its foundations, and in line with its concept of ultimate world revolution, Soviet policy was switched to an attempt to fill what appeared to be a vast political vacuum, extending straight across Europe and into the Middle East.

Following the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe in 1948, its rebuffs elsewhere and Mao Tse-tung's unexpected victory in China the following year, another major switch in tactics toward the coexistence of the prewar period might have been expected. However, the partial success of Soviet military and political tactics seems to have persuaded Stalin to maintain his aggressive policies for a time.

By 1952, however, it had become clear to most observers that Stalinist intransigence had not only ceased to pay dividends but had become extremely risky. I remember an evening in New Delhi in July of that year spent with a dozen or more of my colleagues and associates representing six or seven governments. We entertained ourselves by listing the reasons why, from the viewpoint of the Politburo, a drastic reversal of Russian tactics might seem logical. Our list of reasons were as follows:

1. The development of nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them would soon make any major war catastrophic in its consequences for both victor and vanquished. According to Washington dope stories, talk of using any pretext to start a preventive war, before Soviet air power was fully developed, appeared to be growing among some American extremists.

2. Through the growing strength of NATO, relative military security in Western Europe had been attained, and the temptation for a quick blitzkrieg of Soviet land forces to the Channel and the Atlantic had been drastically reduced.

3. The Korean War had after two years become a stalemate, a drain on both China and Russia, and it might easily evolve into an unwanted major struggle.

4. As Europe gradually climbed to its feet economically, the ability of Moscow to precipitate a civil war by violent class revolution had also been reduced. In the new independent nations of Asia, Communist revolutions inspired by the Cominform had run into a dead end in the face of growing nationalism, except where lingering colonialism gave them an opportunity.

5. The continued threat of war had produced little but stifled Allied resistance in Europe, and had solidified the Western alliance. The West was no longer cowed by Soviet threats either in Europe or Asia.

6. Conversely, experience indicated that relaxation of tensions tended to divide the Western alliance.

7. The strain of military preparation on the Soviet economy was burdensome, and the rate of economic development was correspondingly lowered. Obvious difficulties in Soviet agriculture were now combined with the possibility of a major economic crisis in Communist China.

8. The savings from a relaxation in military preparation would enable the Soviet Union to increase its assistance to the Chinese and to the European satellites, and also to develop substantial and politically effective aid programs for neutral nations like India.

9. The development of a united China of growing strength on Russia's eastern border, even though presumably linked with Moscow through Communist ties, suggested many potential new problems for Soviet policy makers. A powerful China at Russia's back-

door would be a tremendously important geopolitical factor. It might not always be controllable

10. Marxist dogma insists that the health of capitalist economies is dependent on war preparation, and Moscow would probably assume that a slackening of the Western defense effort would plunge America into a major depression. Since 1929 America had achieved full employment only during war or in war's immediate aftermath when backlogs in civilian demand remained to be filled.

11. Finally the Soviet Union would be put in an unassailable propaganda position before the world if her peace offensive were convincingly carried but if peace resulted the Kremlin would get most of the credit plus an opportunity gradually to isolate America through diplomacy. If peace never came, the onus would have been shifted to America and her Atlantic allies, and the Soviet's position would be correspondingly strengthened.

Although it seemed to us that the logic of the arguments must be apparent to Soviet policy makers, there was no sign at that time of any relaxation in Moscow. On the contrary, American relations with Moscow were just then in a particularly firm stage.

This was reflected in every capital of the world including New Delhi. At social functions Soviet representatives refused even the most perfunctory greeting. In November 1952 Nehru's efforts to mediate in the Korean conflict through the UN were rudely buffed by Vishinsky.

However, even before the death of Stalin in March 1953, a change began to be evident. Soviet representatives suddenly began to ooze goodwill, a dozen or more members of the American Embassy in India received Christmas cards from their Soviet opposite numbers. In July 1953 a truce was finally reached in Korea on the very basis that the Soviet had rejected eight months before.

On August 8, Stalin's successor Malenkov frankly spelled out the basis for the new tactic. "If today in conditions of tension in international relations the North Atlantic block is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration."

Within a few short months the Soviet peace offensive had managed to produce some impressive departures from the rough blandishments of Stalinism. Among many other examples, Port

Arthur was returned to China, some Bulgarian industry was handed back to local control and the Trieste accord was approved. Reversing an earlier position, Russia decided to participate in UNESCO and in UN technical assistance. Claims against Turkey and the Dardanelles were abandoned. The Danube was opened to river traffic.

On February 8, 1955, Molotov stated before the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that dire consequences would be visited on the NATO powers if the Paris agreements to rearm West Germany were ratified. He insisted that an Austrian settlement depended on a satisfactory solution of the German question. Three months later, in a quick switch, Molotov made major concessions and an Austrian treaty was signed.

Soviet trade deals have been concluded with Britain, France, West Germany, Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, Greece, Egypt and Argentina. Technical and economic assistance has not only been widely extended within the Communist bloc, but substantial amount of it are reaching Africa, Asia and India outside it. In 1955 the Soviet effort to woo India was stepped up vigorously. As the geopolitical importance of Communist China increases, the Kremlin is likely to look to India more and more as a long-term counterbalance to excessive Chinese influence.

A particularly dramatic move occurred in Belgrade in May, 1955. Here Marshal Josip Broz Tito, who for the better part of seven years had been described as a doubly effeminate "wicked," Fascist, cannibalistic and a hissing Belgrade parrot, was suddenly invited back into the Kremlin fold.

After a week of spinning, an agreement signed by Tito and Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin pronounced that "different forms of Socialist developments are solely the concern of the individual countries," and advocated "cooperation and development of peaceful coexistence among nations regardless of ideological differences or differences of social order."

This new switch, accompanied by the expressions of penitence by Khrushchev and Bulganin in Belgrade, was certain to cause considerable embarrassment and some hard thinking throughout the Soviet orbit. The Italian Communist leader of Trieste, Vittorio Vidali, whose newspaper blurted out that the new Khrushchev policy toward Tito "shook our party as the bora (an Adriatic wind)

shakes our trees," was speaking, however indiscreetly, for many others.

It is likely that Tito's success may modify, perhaps in unexpected ways, other East European attitudes toward Moscow. Some of them may even be tempted to turn again to the broader Marxist tradition espoused by Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's most influential theorist. In a speech at Oslo in October, 1954, among Scandinavian Social Democrats, Kardelj attacked bureaucratic statism and disclaimed Moscow's old theory that revolution should be promoted abroad by violent means.

"History," he said, "has decided the quarrel between revolutionary and evolutionary socialism by approving both." There could be no more heretical denial of the whole basis of Moscow's control of the satellites than this.

* * *

WHATEVER the ultimate meaning of the new Soviet tactics which began to appear in 1953 and which culminated in the summit conference at Geneva in July, 1955, America and most of her Atlantic associates have learned the danger of gullibility and will not again unilaterally demobilize when Soviet leaders talk peace. At the same time it would be disastrous for Western policy makers to ignore the possibility of a long-term and profoundly important switch in Soviet tactics. It could be a dominant factor in shaping events during the next decade.

On October 24, 1957, the Russian Revolution will be forty years old. It will have reached middle age. Middle age often brings with it a growing conservatism and a desire for increased respectability. Even in a Communist nation, it may mean greater play for the many underlying differences among numerous national, cultural and skill components that make up society.

In the Soviet Union today there are potential disagreements over the distribution of income, over positions in the party, and over the social rewards among unskilled workers, middle and top management and the military whose influence, systematically de-emphasized by Stalin after the 1937 purges and the wartime victories, has increased so markedly in the post-Stalin era. Similar cleavages cut

across industry, mining, transportation and communications. The Soviet farm delegates who were welcomed to the American Midwest in midsummer, 1955, must have had their appetites whetted for improved living standards. Other lines of conflict separate urban and rural economies, national and cultural sentiments.

Reports from the USSR rarely give intimate glimpses into the lives of Soviet citizens. Perhaps the American farmers who visited the Soviet Union on the two-way agricultural exchange of 1955 had as close a glimpse as any recent observers of the actual conditions in the USSR. The most frequent reports of Western observers have suggested that the life of the Soviet common man is a constant struggle with long hours of work, high food costs, and a family life not yet re-established from the tragedy of war. Poor and crowded living conditions in the cities, primitive sanitary facilities, wearing queues for the shoppers—these have all tended to promote boredom relieved chiefly by a marked recent upsurge in liquor consumption.

The Molotov promises of greatly increased consumer goods have been repudiated under pressure of military defense, and particularly the crash aircraft program, the results of which so surprised and startled our own experts. In 1955 the increase in consumer goods production is said to amount to only 5 per cent, which is less than in any year since the war. Since Russia's population is increasing by 1½ per cent annually, this means that there can be little hope of substantial improvement under Cold War conditions.

Many changes have been noted since the death of Stalin which makes this human factor particularly relevant. Correspondents and visitors who have returned to Russia after an absence of some years largely agree in describing these changes. They report that while on earlier visits they had often been conscious of talking to Communists first and Russians second, now they feel themselves talking to Russians first, and they found them much easier to talk to than at any time since the war.

They were also impressed with how few Russians whom they met are primarily concerned with political matters. Instead, as a *London Times* correspondent recently wrote, they were thinking about the things that people think about everywhere—the office, educating the children, the daughter's young man, where to go for holidays,

whether to get a TV set, whether the butcher would have meat tomorrow."

While this let-down in political interest was not approved by party zealots, this correspondent continued, "one had the sense that the tide of revolution in Russia was spent for the time being, perhaps for a long time, and that after all the years of storm, society had taken on a settled form with its own momentum its established ranks and privileges, its traditions, both new and very old, and its growing amenities."

Those in the Soviet Union today who have a stake in the *status quo* may feel that they have a proportionate stake in a less adventuresome Soviet foreign policy. This does not mean that Soviet policy can be cast in a predictable mold of increasing moderation. It does almost certainly mean that tactics of increased moderation — even though they occur in fits and starts — are more likely than not to become increasingly evident. For a time moderation may be the theme, then a sudden rough firmness, then back again to an era of smiles and concessions.

Would such a policy of fluctuating tactics require a drastic modification of official Soviet dogma? Not necessarily. The Communist mind has, as we have seen, repeatedly proved capable of holding conflicting concepts at the same time, as well as of talking one way and acting another.

This practical Communist ability to double think is always an astounding one for observers trained in the world of fact, logic and reason. For most of us if a concept proves wrong, fallacious, or inadequate when tested by evidence we reappraise or reject it. The Communist, on the other hand, can simply deny the validity of any evidence that does not fit his preconceived master theory.

"Double think" enables a Communist theoretician to solve his problems by the way he defines them. Thus since Communist leaders by Communist definition cannot oppress their own or other peoples, or indulge in aggression critics who nevertheless charge that they do these very things must be malicious capitalist liars. Thus the official Soviet ideology sees no ambiguity in the fact that while decrying "aggression" in others, the USSR either gobbled up or forced territorial concessions from every European nation on its borders between 1940 and 1945.

Observers in Britain and America may unconsciously assume a

certain logic, in Soviet thinking that does not exist as Western observers view logic. Communist spokesmen have talked as though they want both peace and an unlimited extension of Communist power. Can they pay suitable allegiance to their dogma and keep these inconsistencies in balance? How does this unique ability of the Communists to "double think" affect our hopes for peace? Does world stability require Communist theoreticians to renounce the more aggressive of the abstract theories which they hold?

Public recantations are unlikely. Moreover, a formal renunciation of parts of the official Marxist creed is not even necessary, though it would help. Communism's diplomatic opponents must come to realize that even if "double think" concepts are deeply ingrained, what the Communists do is more important than what they say. As with other creeds, Islam's inevitable holy war for instance, some of the basic Communist tenets may continue to attract verbal allegiance but become eroded and forgotten in practice.

Meanwhile non-Communist diplomats must do what they can to push Communist leaders out of their "double think" concepts as far as they really influence policy and direct them instead to a clear choice between meaningful alternatives, not verbal ones. No one can be sure, but from the evidence we have already examined, there is reason to conclude that the new leaders of the Soviet Union want a period of peace and consolidation. Under Malenkov they showed an interest in placating the demand for consumer goods. Under Bulganin they have shown a capacity to submerge that same interest in order to conduct a crash rearmament program as if to prove that, despite rumors abroad to the contrary, the Soviet economy was not standing on "broken legs."

Having demonstrated this flexibility, the Soviet leaders went to Geneva in July, 1955, and pledged themselves to peace. Encumbered though they may be by "double-think" concepts, the Soviet leaders then faced an opportunity to follow their professions of peace by concrete action.

A relaxation of Cold War pressure, the liquidation of the Cominform, and a genuine willingness to discuss disarmament and the adjustment of present points of differences would be perfectly consistent with the above estimate of the Soviet situation. It would also be consistent with the Soviet tactics between 1920 and the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939, which presented Russia to the world as a good

neighbor who loved peace, and whose ideas, however radical, were intended largely for home consumption

If the interest of the Soviet Union in disarmament turns out to be genuine, we should remember that disarmament proposals in Russia were a long-standing diplomatic tradition years before the Communists took charge. Czar Alexander I proposed to Lord Castlereagh in 1816 "a simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of all kinds which the Powers have brought into being." In 1868 Alexander II proposed prohibiting the use of explosive shells, and six years later at Brussels suggested that weapons which "cause unnecessary suffering" should be banned. In 1899 Nicholas II gained an international reputation as a peacemaker for convening the Hague Conference.

Before gaining power in 1916 Lenin said that disarmament would be possible "only after the proletariat has disarmed the bourgeoisie certainly not before." Yet in 1927 Moscow dramatically proposed to the League of Nations "the complete abolition of all land, marine and air forces," the destruction of all existing weapons, war ships, airplanes, and arms factories, the discontinuance of all military training, and an international agency to carry out this program.

As they looked at the world of 1955, of the Geneva Conference and beyond, Russian leaders must have wondered if the time hadn't come for a revival of this tradition. Such a relaxation would—among other advantages which I have suggested, provide the basis for a far more effective appeal to the people of the critically important Middle World than the bleak and ponderous threat of the Red Army and the often heavy-handed subversion directed by the widely distrusted and discredited Cominform.

Soviet leaders have consistently sought to operate with wide margins of safety. Such a new flexible policy would not only increase their margin of safety, but to some of them it might even appear to increase the prospects of achieving their original Communist goals. We in America can ignore these broadening realities of the Communist challenge only at our peril. For despite our will, we have found ourselves in the only position capable of being an effective counterpoise to the Kremlin, whether its mood be one of aggressive expansion or competitive coexistence.

Even today no one can know what varied forms the competition between these nations and these ideas will take. But it is highly un-

likely that the principal clash will occur along the classic Marxian lines of proletarian revolution *within* the industrially developed countries.

Soviet leaders themselves seem to admit this. "The world is divided into two camps," said Stalin in his 1924 lectures on *Foundations of Leninism*, "the camp of a handful of civilized nations, which possess finance capital and exploit the vast majority of the population of the globe, and the camp of the oppressed and exploited peoples in the colonies and dependent countries, who comprise that majority." Communists, he said, must become the vanguard of the second camp.

The relatively prosperous Atlantic nations know that the Russian secret police and concentration camps have made a mockery of what Marx thought his followers would achieve. But the vast majority of underdeveloped nations, whom Stalin had in mind, suffer from a dangerous nearsightedness in their estimate of Soviet achievements—a nearsightedness caused by the strain of their own pressing problems of human misery.

The millions of Asia, Africa and South America often find it difficult to see beyond the concept of immediate welcome change to the accompanying human tragedy. They do see in the Soviet Union a nation of 200 million people that in one generation moved from backwardness to the front rank of twentieth century industrialism. They see a world political party opposing racial discrimination and professing a concern for humans and promising land, bread and peace. They see these things and are impressed.

What other promises, what other examples of rapid development, what other revolutions the majority of mankind sees may determine not only the fate of whole underdeveloped continents but also the destinies of the two great nations who presently are caught in atomic stalemate.

SECTION III

The Chinese Revolution Loses Its Way

CHINA—there is a sleeping giant. Let him sleep,
for when he wakes he shall shake the world

NAPOLION BONAPARTE

CHAPTER 9

Chinese Prologue

DURING the turbulent decade after World War II, American attitudes toward the Soviet Union underwent a dramatic change when our earlier hopes were frustrated and our expectations proved false. But distress over Russian behavior was not a new thing in history.

The emergence of Communist China was. In 1945 Americans were probably as unprepared for it as for the advent of nuclear fission. Yet, by the number of its people and the wealth of its resources, China, like Russia, has long been destined to take a leading role in world affairs.

A few farsighted men saw this clearly. As history entered the twentieth century, an American Secretary of State declared that "the world's peace rests with China, and whoever understands China . . . holds the key to world politics during the next five centuries." But its own experience with the 'celestial empire' during the previous five centuries had conditioned the snug world of Europe and America to receive John Hay's warning with mingled indifference and disbelief. Until recently that same negative reaction has remained with us stubbornly.

With the exception of some missionaries, businessmen and a handful of foreign service officers, few of Hay's American contemporaries knew anything of China. Although most high school graduates remembered that the Chinese accounted for a fifth of the human race and that their civilization was one of the two or three oldest, it occurred to very few that China could ever exert a major influence on world affairs.

Those who had read of the traditionally passive qualities of Chinese civilization and of the long sequence of foreign invaders, found Hay's prophecy all the more puzzling. Many students of Chinese history, convinced that the brilliance of the T'ang dynasty had not been excelled before or since, concluded that the complacency induced by this achievement of over a thousand years ago was not likely to blossom suddenly into dynamic change.

As one commentator said of the people of the T'ang period, "They were already old and tired and disillusioned, weary with the weariness of those who have experienced all, mellowed with the sadness of those who know the vanity of all things earthly, those for whom all questions have been answered, who have found their state of poise in the scheme of things and know there can be no other, who still have longings but no aspirations."

The Old China called itself the Middle Kingdom, confident that it was the radiating center of world civilization. Steeped in the political and social concepts of Confucian philosophy, it revered tradition and abhorred experiment and innovation. Literacy and classical knowledge were identified with the capacity to govern and the right to power. Family interests, protected as the highest virtue, often produced government by nepotism and organized corruption, and consistently discouraged the growth of national consciousness.

Social advance was likewise discouraged by the explicit class consciousness ordained by the ancient philosophy. Confucius had said that "courtesy is not extended to the commoners, and punishment is not served up to the lords." His follower, Mencius, had argued that "without the gentlemen there would be no one to rule the common people, and without the common people there would be no one to feed the gentlemen."

Highly idealized and romanticized, the virtues of this paternalistic view were still being recommended to his countrymen by Chiang Kai-shek as late as 1943. "China's own philosophy of life, developed by Confucius, amplified and propagated by Mencius," Chiang wrote, "automatically became a lofty system that is superior to any other philosophy in the world."

If China's ancient virtues of resignation and relativism were bad breeders of revolution, they were equally ineffective in the matter of self-defense. During the last thousand years, North China has been

ruled more than half the time by alien invaders. Twice the whole of China was overrun.

In the thirteenth century Mongols swept over China under Kublai Khan, after his grandfather Genghis Khan had extended his empire over all of Asia and much of Europe. So well ordered was this empire at the time of its height, that a Chinese historian once wrote admiringly that "a lone virgin with a pot of gold in her arms could ride horseback from one end of the Mongol empire to another without being harmed."

In the mid-seventeenth century the Ming dynasty was toppled by the Manchu invaders from the North. How the Manchus, originally a minor clan, were able to muster the power to conquer the Central Plains has also been told by Chiang Kai-shek in words partly prophetic of his own decline: "It was because at the end of the Ming Dynasty politics was corrupt, opinions were divided, political parties were at loggerheads, banditry was rampant, eunuchs usurped power, and the generals were disobedient."

This curious parallel continues even further. In the year 1661 remnants of the Ming dynasty, after their defeat by the Manchus, retired, like Chiang himself, to Formosa where they carried on the struggle against the mainland for another generation.

Under the Manchus, China continued to develop for more than two centuries in almost complete isolation, absorbing or exterminating the "barbarians" on her borders, but otherwise self-secluded from the outside world. This isolation enabled the Chinese to continue to convince themselves that they were a world state and their emperor the sovereign "Son of Heaven."

Two of the Manchu emperors, K'ang Hse and Ch'ien Lung, were among the great rulers of history, reigning—save for a fourteen year interval—from 1662 to 1796. Both were able administrators of exceptional intellectual attainments. With some justice their subjects attributed to them superhuman roles.

When the British Government, for instance, sent a trade mission to Peking in 1792, Ch'ien Lung sent its leader back with a message complimenting George III for his "humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization." The message concluded: "It behooves you, O King, to display even greater devotion and loyalty in the future, so that by perpetual submission to our Throne you may

secure peace and prosperity. . . Tremblingly obey and show no negligence."

The great days of Manchu administration ended with the eighteenth century in the usual decay of corruption and court favoritism. In the 1840's when the West in the form of British gunboats offered its challenge, the Manchus quickly capitulated.

It was far more than a military defeat. The prestige of the government was shattered, and its weaknesses were exposed for all to see. Not only was the emperor shown to be incapable of expelling foreign barbarians, but to be incapable even of checking the conniving between the Chinese merchants and British traders who were seeking to break the embargo against opium.

In her treaty with Britain following the Opium War in 1842, China ceded the island of Hong Kong and opened five ports to trade. She agreed to pay an indemnity for all the opium which had been destroyed and later she legalized its regular importation. The new trading-port footholds quickly became swollen with all forms of special privilege and when the British were granted the right to collect a limited Chinese tariff and to live in China immune from China's legal jurisdiction, the United States, France and Russia demanded similar privileges.

The United States was the first to write into a treaty with China the most favored-nation clause which specified that when any other foreign country obtained additional privileges in China the same privileges would immediately be granted to the United States. In 1860, after the emperor had balked at ratifying a new treaty providing for the residence of foreign envoys in the capital, Anglo-French forces from Tientsin marched overland to Peking. Here they destroyed one of its most famous palaces as well as priceless art objects. The harassed emperor then delayed no more.

It was this unprincipled scramble for trading privileges that introduced the West to China. Its repercussions are with us today, and they will be with us for many years to come.

Unhappily, Christianity is closely associated by many Chinese with this period of subservience to Western military power. Among many other privileges granted was the guarantee to foreign Christian missionaries to practice and propagate their faith without hindrance.

In the eyes of many missionaries themselves this arrangement did no more than assure the reasonable protection they had sought ever

since the great Jesuit "Apostle to the Indies," Francis Xavier, died three centuries earlier on rocky Sancian Island off the China Coast, after vainly seeking entry to the "Forbidden Kingdom." But in the eyes of a majority of the Chinese these missionary privileges, extorted by alien military and economic power from a helpless government, represented an affront to themselves and their own age-old culture.

When the privileges were extended to provide special protection for Chinese Christian converts, often releasing them from Chinese governmental and family authority, the smoldering opposition grew. Thus the missionaries, the vast majority of whom were motivated by the best Christian tradition of sacrifice and idealism, gradually came to conduct their work under an increasing burden of mistrust.

When the West entered China in the 1840's, Chinese society was still divided into a literate ruling class and an illiterate peasantry. The latter had become accustomed to drudgery and reconciled to the cruelties of bare existence. "The wind was my cloth, the snow was my blanket, and the rain was my drink," said an old and realistic Chinese proverb.

The Western intrusion jolted the most deeply rooted assumptions of Chinese society. Not only did the aggression of Western military and economic power reduce the submissive Peking Government in popular esteem, but the slow erosion of Western ideas began to undermine the core of Chinese life.

From their contacts with the West the Chinese developed a new sense of nationalism which intensified their resentment over the treaties. Thus within a few years after the Opium War, a new social ferment had begun to work through the Chinese tradition. Although observers at the time could not have foretold it, China was already entering on an era of change which the West had precipitated but which, in the end, the West could not control.

* * *

IN 1849, a full century before Mao Tse-tung's Red Armies swept Chiang Kai-shek into retirement on Formosa, crudely armed, fanatic peasant columns were starting to descend from the hills of South China. They captured villages, converted the villagers

to a new political philosophy, and then withdrew as abruptly as they had come

These sporadic raids were the beginning of the Taiping Rebellion against the Manchus. They were led by a strange dedicated man named Hung Hsiu Chuan, who considered himself the younger brother of Jesus Christ and who called himself 'the Prince of Heaven'

Although the *Communist Manifesto* had been published the year before, it is unlikely that Hung ever heard of Karl Marx. Yet it is remarkable how many aspects of the Taiping program foreshadowed the Communist program which helped Mao Tse-tung overrun China a century later.

Earlier in his life Hung had had visions convincing him that God was calling him to liberate China from Manchu oppression. A two months' stay with a Protestant missionary in Canton introduced him to Christian teachings and he set about breaking idols in the local temples. Self-baptized and steeped in Biblical imagery, Hung devised a political doctrine that combined reform, fanaticism and an often erratic interpretation of Christian doctrine. He published his own gospels and organized his followers into the God Society.

But the Manchus soon discovered that Hung was far more formidable than the ordinary religious impostor. His approach to the peasants was powerful. "We desire to build the fallen society," Hung assured them, "so that the world will become just: the strong shall not oppress the weak, the wise exploit the ignorant, or the brave impose upon the timid."

The poverty of the people had been intensified by the disease, drought, flood and famine which had reached devastating proportions in the late 1840's. Unrest had been increased by the widespread popular disgust over the quibbliness of the Peking Government in the face of Western encroachment.

Hung placed himself at the head of this simmering peasant revolt, and before long the fast-growing, fanatical armies of the Taipings were defeating the emperor's demoralized troops in battle after battle. Hung's followers swept northward from Kwangsi and established their power in the Yangtze Valley.

Before the rebellion was suppressed fourteen years later, eleven provinces had been overrun, an enormous region ravaged, and

millions slaughtered. By 1853 the Taipins had captured Hankow, Wuchang, Hanyang and finally Nanking, which was established as the new capital.

Hung's ascetic, puritanical moral code carried over into the behavior of many of his supporters. Their incorruptibility at first contrasted vividly with the demoralized Manchus and made a profound impression in the countryside. Like the Communists in the recent Chinese Civil War, Taiping leaders kept their troops from molesting villages, and their prestige rose accordingly. A British naval officer visiting the capital of the Taipings in 1853 said that they were practically a different race, an estimate not unlike the false hope with which some Westerners looked on Mao's "agrarian reformers" immediately after World War II.

Within a few years Hung had decreed preliminary agrarian reforms pointing toward future equalization of land use, dividing the land into nine classes and ranking them according to the fertility of the soil. 'All shall eat food, all shall have clothes, no one shall be shamed,' Hung proclaimed, 'and in all things there shall be equality. No man shall be without food or warmth.'

Landlords' rights were wiped out much in the manner used by the Chinese Communists a hundred years later. The land itself was to be allotted according to the number of mouths in the family, each twenty-five households among the peasants to form one communal unit. In each of these the fields were to be tilled in common. The harvest surplus was to go to the communal treasury. This system was put into effect in the areas controlled by the Taiping military organization, and the promise that it could be spread across China won hundreds of thousands of new converts to the rebellion everywhere.

Hung set about forbidding arranged marriages, slavery, concubinage, foot binding, the wearing of the Manchu ordered queue and the use of opium. He favored law to promote equality between the sexes.

But Hung's reforms were scarcely under way before the rebellion began to show signs of weakness. The Taipings suffered from a lack of stable, competent leadership. They failed to attract the scholars, the anti-Manchu secret societies, and even the foreign missionaries whose Christian teachings partly inspired their program. Foreign

powers found them amateurish in diplomatic conduct. Eventually some of the Taiping leaders even began to slip into the old corruption that has plagued China down through the centuries.

Hung's armies were steadily worn down by merciless warfare. Western military and naval mercenaries hired by the Manchus and commanded by such adventurers as the American, Frederick Townsend Ward, and the British major, Charles George "Chinese" Gordon, hastened their final defeat. In June, 1864, with his capital city of Nanking surrounded by his enemies, Hung committed suicide.

The nineteenth century wore on. The conditions in China which had led to the Taiping uprising remained largely uncorrected. Unrest, beaten back for a time, soon began to grow again.

American sympathy for Hung and his revolutionaries had been widespread, and despite the failure of the rebellion, many young Chinese students in missionary schools and in British and American universities associated the cause of Hung with the Western concepts of freedom and individual rights to which they were being introduced.

Thus the anti Manchu reform movement remained under cover, but very much alive. "The Manchus were like pet cats," one commentator has written, "and the Chinese kept them so, knowing that when the degeneration was complete, a Chinese revolutionary would come to overthrow the rotten structure."

CHAPTER 10

The Legacy of Sun Yat-sen

CHINA'S revolutionary political consciousness erupted again in articulate form under Sun Yat-sen. He was born in 1867 just after the collapse of the Taiping Rebellion, and died in 1925 just before the Communist party under Mao organized its first peasant revolts in Hunan. Sun's life thus spanned the years between these two great Chinese revolutions.

The ideals of Western democracy inspired Sun, like Hung, to revolt against oppression. "I am a coolie and the son of a coolie," he declared proudly. "I was born with the poor and I am still poor. My sympathies have always been with the struggling masses."

As a young man Sun left home to attend an English school in Honolulu. Sun probably read more Western political literature than any other statesman of his generation with the exception of Woodrow Wilson. His sympathy for American political ideals later led him into enthusiastic, if sometimes strained, efforts to apply them to the Chinese situation. More than any other Chinese of modern times, Sun symbolized the entrance of China into world affairs and the delicate and unpredictable interaction of Western and Far Eastern cultures.

It was natural therefore that, during his years of preparation for the revolution which he believed must come, Sun should rely not only on Japanese aid which was considerable, but also on Western, and especially American, moral and financial support. But at the turn of the century, before Sun was ready for major open revolt, further events were occurring that profoundly disturbed the Chi-

nese political scene. These were the years of the "Open Door" notes and the Boxer Rebellion.

'An Indian history professor once remarked to me with a smile, that at least India had done far better with its colonial exploiters than had China. India, he said, was exploited by a single power. China was exploited by almost everybody.

Despite the drain on the Indian economy under British rule, many of India's resources were developed, an able civil service was created, and a modern transportation system established. Except for the partial development of Manchuria, the same could not be said for China. In this joint colony of Western imperialism no single power enjoyed a monopolistic advantage sufficient to attract a continually expanding investment. So frantic was the competition for spheres of influence there that by 1898 it seemed quite likely that China would be formally partitioned among the trade hungry nations of the Atlantic basin and Russia.

In this situation John Hay's "Open Door" notes, which eventually requested that the great powers pledge themselves to support the territorial integrity of China, evoked an uncertain and embarrassed response from European capitals. Traditionally, these notes have been regarded as a first-rate triumph of American diplomacy which preserved a continuous measure of Chinese independence.

A later generation of competent critics has debunked the sponsors of this proud American diplomatic success as plagiarizing a doctrine of British origin, timing it politically for the presidential election of 1900, and making an abstract moral pledge for a firm guarantee of policy. These allegations are all partially true but I wonder if this criticism is not too severe.

The Open Door Policy was a reflection of our own best instincts. Its undeniable hollowness lay in the fact that Hay and his successors knew that America was unprepared to back such a sweeping commitment with all power or military power. It does not follow that diplomatic statements involving moral principles are necessarily cynical or mistaken or that we can afford to ignore the relevance of such principles to the conduct of our foreign policy. What we need is not fewer principles in our relations with other nations but a more realistic understanding of our capacities and a greater firmness once we have deliberately undertaken an important commitment.

In any event a group of Chinese called Boxers thought they had discovered a more efficient method of re establishing the integrity of China. They believed that the way to handle foreign nationals was to kill them or drive them out, and their direct action techniques were reflected in their name "Boxer"— "the righteousness of the uplifted fist."

The Boxers lacked the social objectives of the Taiping movement, and thereby lost whatever opportunity they might have had to become a broadly based movement. Instead the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 was led by fanatical members of right wing secret societies, who talked the Empress Dowager into believing that their magic could defend China against foreign guns.

In a sudden frenzy the Boxers killed 242 missionaries and other foreign civilians in North China and Manchuria. It was China's last desperate gesture of revolt against the West for fifty years. The foreign legations in Peking were besieged and for a while all Westerners lived in terror. Pearl Buck, then the eight year old daughter of an American missionary, later wrote that she had experienced "the first and primitive impact of life. . . . Because I had the fair skin, the blue eyes, the blond hair of my race I was hated and because of fear of me and my kind I walked in danger."

Years later from the perspective of a lifetime devoted to Chinese-American friendship, Pearl Buck in recalling these incidents added "A smouldering fury is lived on in Chinese hearts for more than a century and this fury, which white men could not or would not recognize is the chief reason why China has lost her country and why the Communists say it. We had have enough to do to prove to Asia that we are not as other white men have been."

The Boxers soon collapsed. By forced marches an international expedition eventually under the command of a German general—reached Peking from Tientsin, sacked the capital with customary cruelties and exacted in indemnity of \$330 million which far exceeded the damage done by the Boxers.

The Manchu court which had fled in panic 'to inspect the Western province,' returned to sign death warrants as directed by the conquerors. Later America made a sincere effort to erase the memory of our part in this military action by setting aside our share of the indemnity for the education of Chinese students in the United States.

But for ten years after the Boxer Rebellion, "peace covered China like a sheet of thin ice beneath which a river boiled."

'Sun Yat-sen specifically laid his revolutionary convictions to these successive humiliations by foreigners. In 1905 he formed his T'ung Meng Hui revolutionary society, later to become the Kuomintang. For many years, however, he was too dependent for financial support on the Chinese communities in Japan, America and Europe and friends in Western or Western-dominated countries, to attempt to rally his people against the West. Indeed it was from bases in Hong Kong and French Indochina that Sun masterminded his series of uprisings against the Manchus.

Ten such uprisings had already failed when Sun set out for the United States in 1911 to collect more revolutionary funds. While he was gone his cohorts in China suddenly overturned the dynastic representatives in the Yangtze provinces. The decadent empire fell like a house of cards. The revolutionaries declared the absent Sun to be the first President of the Republic of China. President Sun learned of his new position from an American newspaper as his train pulled into Denver.

Elsewhere in Asia eyes were also focused on events in China. Nehru later wrote of the Manchus to an Indian audience not likely to miss the analogy: "They had come in with the roar of a tiger to disappear like the tail of a snake."

Sun's new government depended on a multitude of divergent groups which had combined for temporary advantage to obtain the one objective they had in common-- the overthrow of the Manchus. The competing interests of peasants, workers, intellectuals, generals, landlords, bankers and Shanghai's Chinese and foreign businessmen, made a cohesive economic and political program impossible. Sun himself later complained that three out of four of his followers had been interested in ousting the Manchu emperor largely in the hope of becoming emperor themselves.

Sun knew whereof he spoke. He was forced to relinquish his presidency in 1912 in favor of the leader of the North China Army, Yuan Shih-kai, who thereupon spent the next four years attempting to establish himself emperor.

AFTER Yuan's death in 1916 China was again subjected to the maneuvering of generals and warlords, preparing and launching their private armies against their rivals, in aimless and bloody struggles for local advantage. By 1919 after vainly attempting to maintain some semblance of unity among the provincial military leaders, Sun became convinced of the urgent need for a broader base of public support.

The Kuomintang was still a regional party standing vaguely for Republicanism and Socialism and with uncertain influence among the younger peasants, merchants, workers and students. Lacking military strength of its own, the party was forced to flirt with corrupt military factions for support against others even more corrupt.

To correct these weaknesses Sun went vigorously to work. In the space of five years he published his *Program of National Reconstruction*, his *Five Power Constitution* and his *Three Principles of the People*. Together they constituted the economic and political platform upon which Sun hoped to revitalize the Kuomintang.

In Sun's writings strains of authoritarianism are mingled strangely with Western liberal doctrines. Sun himself likened his three principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and Livelihood to Lincoln's concept of government of, by and for the people. And yet some of his writings sound more like Lenin than Lincoln.

This ambiguity is not surprising. Indeed the lectures which Sun delivered at Canton in 1924 may have been suggested by Michael Borodin, the Soviet emissary who came to China the year before to instruct the Kuomintang in the principles of revolution, propaganda and party discipline.

Mao Tse-tung probably had this Soviet mission in mind when he recalled in his book, *The People's Democratic Dictatorship*, how before 1921 China's intellectuals vainly "looked to the West for truth." "Only once in his lifetime did Sun Yat-sen receive international aid," Mao added, "and this came from the Soviet Union."

Although Mao's statement is untrue, the full measure of moral, financial and military assistance which Kuomintang leaders expected from Europe and America in the early days was not forthcoming. In 1920 and 1921 Sun had attempted in vain to secure loans in New York, London and Paris for China's economic development.

Disappointment over this failure of Western aid certainly played a part in Sun's appeal to Moscow.

So did Lenin's shrewd voluntary renunciation of the old Czarist concessions in China in 1922. Capitalizing on its own economic impotence, Russia by a single stroke strengthened herself and hit hard at the Atlantic powers just at the time when Sun, despairing of Western help, had begun to criticize the "unequal treaties" with growing passion. Sun estimated that these treaties enabled European "exploiters" to take from the Chinese people each year the fantastic sum of \$12 billion. That he still clung stubbornly to his respect for the American people is indicated by the fact that he largely exempted the United States from these charges.

Probably no single comparison between Soviet Russia and the Atlantic nations etched itself earlier and more deeply in the developing Chinese political consciousness, however, than their contrasting attitudes toward this explosive issue of extraterritorial rights and the legalized draining of China's impoverished economy. Although the treaty positions held by European nations and America in China during the 1930's were at least helpful in offsetting Japanese designs on cities like Shanghai, this was largely a coincidence.

In any event the Chinese now look back upon an invidious comparison. For twenty lingering years after the voluntary withdrawal of the Russians from China, the West clung to its special privileges. Not until 1942 did America and her European allies officially renounce the "unequal treaties" and agree to end China's humiliating semicolonial status. By that time, the Chinese point out, the Japanese military occupation had made these privileges meaningless.

Sun Yat-sen was so preoccupied in his later years with this question of special rights for foreigners that he even used the rostrum of anti-imperialism to call for a "class war" of oppressed Asian nations against oppressing Westerners. This language is now echoed daily in far more bitter form by his Communist successors in Peking.

Yet Sun's strong nationalism obviously ran counter to the Communist objective of a totalitarian world run from Moscow. Moreover, the brutal tactics of the Kremlin cannot easily be reconciled with the theories of a man who was called by some "the kindest of revolutionaries," and who looked ahead to the time when political controls over the vast land mass of China would be exercised by those familiar tools of direct democracy—initiative, referendum and

recall. Even less consistent with Marxist dogma was Sun's adherence to the Confucian heritage of filial piety, humanity, charity and government by a scholar class.

Sun opposed capitalism in its Western form as an impossible road for China, although he offered extravagant praise for its achievements in highly developed America. In August, 1924, eight months before his death, in his first lecture on the "Social Question" he spoke with particular admiration for the exploits of Henry Ford.

Pointing out that Marx "failed to anticipate changing conditions," he said that "the prosperity of the Ford factories contradicts Marx in at least three aspects. Instead of insisting on long hours, low wages and high prices, the Ford factories have (1) decreased working hours, (2) increased wages and (3) reduced the price of their product." He considered Marx's theory of surplus value "absurd" and attacked his basic belief in the inevitability of class struggle.

Sun hoped to achieve his own "revolution of enrichment" by deliberately planned industrialization, avoiding the painful evolution of capitalism in Europe and America. "The goal of material civilization," he once said, "is not private profit but public profit. And the shortest route to it is not competition but co-operation." Planned co-operation was to take the form of state regulation of banks, communications and railways, direct taxation on incomes and distribution through co-operative societies.

To the peasant generation whose grandfathers had fought with the Taipings, Sun proposed new programs of land tenure and food production. Government was to aid the free farmer in the use of fertilizer and agricultural machinery, in the eradication of pests, in the improvement of transport, and in river conservation and reforestation.

Borrowing from the American economist philosopher, Henry George, Sun urged the taxation of the unearned increment of land values, should those values rise following political reform or social improvement. "In a nutshell," Sun concluded, "it is my idea to make capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic forces of human evolution will work side by side in the civilization of the future."

This complex Asian admirer of Jefferson and Lincoln was encouraged by the fact that in China some of the most formidable traditional barriers to democratic development were not present.

Since the breakdown of the feudal system twenty-three centuries earlier, China had had neither a hereditary aristocracy on the Western model nor a caste system resembling India's or Japan's. In spite of economic, educational and political strata, and the confining influence of the family, there had always been a substantial amount of mobility in Chinese society. Although in theory the emperor had wielded autocratic power, the Chinese people had actually enjoyed local self-government to a remarkable degree.

In the long run Sun believed, this latent democratic tradition might prove significantly helpful to China's new leaders. But he decided that it offered no substitute for the urgent political action which the disintegrating political situation demanded.

Sun's agreement with the Soviet Union was his final attempt to organize a solid political foundation. It was a marriage of convenience.

The arrangement proved to be convenient for only five years, but that would have been a foolhardy prediction in 1923 when young Chiang Kai-shek, armed with a letter of introduction from Sun to Lenin, set off for Moscow to undergo military instruction. At the same time the able Bolshevik Borodin arrived in Canton from Moscow to organize Sun's Kuomintang. This was the inauguration of Sun's last-ditch "triple policy" of special friendship with Russia, admission of Communist party members into the Kuomintang, and "political emancipation" of workers and peasants.

The joint statement issued in 1923 by Sun and Soviet Ambassador Joffe sounded blandly reassuring: "Neither the Communistic order nor the Soviet system . . . can actually be introduced into China, because there do not exist here the conditions necessary for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism."

But under Comintern guidance, the new structure of the Kuomintang soon began to take on a Soviet image, complete with party cells and a politburo. In a matter of months the Communist party seemed likely to become the dominating force in the Kuomintang.

In March, 1925, in the midst of this ominous development, Sun Yat-sen died. His alliance with Borodin left a conflicting legacy, and we can only guess what turn his revolution might have taken had Sun survived a few more years.

On the one hand, devotion to his principles was continually stressed by Sun's eventual successor, Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomin-

tang embarked on the systematic promotion of a Sun Yat-sen cult, venerating him in monument, word and song as the high priest of Nationalist China.

On the other hand, Sun's widow, the sister of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, today has chosen to live in Peking, a disillusioned democrat, a member of the Standing Committee of the People's Congress, and a useful symbol for Communist propaganda.

As a theorist Sun Yat-sen defied classification. As a personality he fluctuated between his professed Western democratic roots and a confused Marxism. As a leader, he was admired, hated, ridiculed and adored down to the last moments of his life. As the chief engineer of the anti Manchu revolution and as a post mortem prophet and lawgiver, he remains today for millions of his divided countrymen the George Washington of China.

CHAPTER 11

The Disputed Inheritance

FOR two years after Sun's death the Russo-Chinese alliance survived unscathed. Soviet propagandists spearheaded the grimaculent imperialist campaign directed principally against Britain in 1925-26, and Britain responded with major concessions at Hankow and the Yangtze ports.

Meanwhile, out of a brief round of limited entry percentage, four years of Japanese military training, relative seclusion in a Shanghai brokerage house, and emergence in the public eye through his mission to Moscow, Chiang Kai-shek moved energetically to assure his succession to Sun. Over the objection of Borodin, who advised caution and consolidation, Chiang undertook his Northern Expedition which extended the power of the central government to Shanghai and Nanking.

Once in control of Central China, Chiang broke with the Soviet mission and set up his own capital in Nanking to oppose an attempt to organize a government of left-wing Kuomintang and Communist leaders in Hankow. In April, 1927, with the help of arms from the French Concession's chief of police, Chiang ruthlessly suppressed the rising labor movement of Shanghai with thousands of executions, and crushed a Communist coup organized by a soft-spoken gentleman whom the world later came to know as Chou En-lai. The Hankow regime was disbanded by a local general, and Borodin fled to Moscow.

This turn of events was a profound shock to Stalin and the Politburo. Trotsky had opposed any effort to work within the Kuo-

mintang, perhaps sensing that it would eventually swallow up the Communist infiltrators. Stalin, however, had supported the Borodin approach on the grounds that China was too primitive for the development of an indigenous Communist movement and that the situation must therefore be attacked through infiltration. Russian Communists, he said, should ride to power in China through an alliance with the Kuomintang. Then at the right moment they could discard their allies like so many squeezed out lemons. But for the time being it was the Communist lemons which were squeezed and discarded.

After Stalin had assumed his own supremacy in the Kremlin the Comintern made a scapegoat of Chen Tu hsui, a founder of the Chinese Communist party and expelled him. Borodin himself was severely criticized and years later for offenses far more trivial, he was banished to an East Siberian prison camp where he died a few months before Stalin in 1952.

The Soviet Union had been invited to China under conditions as auspicious as any Lenin might have dreamed of. In effect Moscow was given *cart blanche* to direct the completion and entrenchment of Asia's first major popular revolution.

What were the reasons for the humiliating failure? One surely was the inability of Moscow's revolutionary theoreticians to direct from a distance the details of such a vast operation. This problem itself was compounded by the Kremlin's internal struggle which was then at its height.

But the most important reason for the debacle was the insistence of the Comintern on a narrow Marxism which simply did not apply in rural China and which indeed could not have worked in Russia. The flexible Lenin had known when to follow Marx and when to improvise. As we have seen it was not until his proclamation of November, 1917 giving land to the peasants that he considered the Russian Revolution 'irrevocable'.

But in 1923 Lenin was dying, and his shrewd understanding of the forces which move a primarily rural economy was forgotten. Clinging to the narrow Marxist doctrine of a revolutionary base among students and city workers, Borodin's Comintern advisers in China minimized the role of the peasants who because of their numbers and strategic economic role, hold the key to the success or failure of any Asian revolution.

As we shall see over and over again, it is those who understand and embrace this principle of peasant power who have ridden, and still ride, the revolutionary tide in Asia. It was China's sorrow that for two decades from 1929 to 1949 those who saw this principle most clearly were clustered in the Communist camp of Mao Tse-tung. For twenty crucial years Chiang Kai-shek either failed to grasp the principle, or else was too encumbered with contrary pressures to translate it into positive policy.

Born to peasant parents in a small Hunan village in 1893, Mao Tse-tung early became a voracious reader and a gifted writer. He was fired with enthusiasm by his reading of Marx and Lenin. When Borodin arrived from Moscow, Mao's name was among those put forward for membership on the Central Committee of the Kuomintang. By 1924 he had been introduced to Sun Yat sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and was working unobtrusively as a member of both the Communist party and the Kuomintang.

Later that year sickness forced Mao to return to his native village of Shao Shan in Hunan Province. It was here that Mao first openly questioned the validity of the orthodox Marxist theory, preached by the Soviet emissaries, that revolution must come through proletarian uprisings in the great cities. He became convinced that the seeds of successful revolt lay not among the workers of Canton and Shanghai but among the peasants in the million or more small villages like his own Shao Shan. Thus Mao learned and cherished the lesson that Lenin knew and that Stalin, reverting to pure Marx, had forgotten.

Recovering his health, Mao abandoned his organization of students, workers and miners, and instead moved out into the villages to agitate and organize among the peasants. By October, 1926, his peasant associations controlled much of Hunan Province and boasted a membership of nearly two million.

This experience confirmed Mao's conviction that the broad base of revolutionary power in China lay among the peasants. He determined to cultivate them relentlessly. "I learn from the masses," he once wrote, "and then teach them."

For a time Mao's efforts were slowed by a Kremlin directive to the Communist party warning against agrarian reforms on the ground that the Chinese peasants were not yet ready. Later Mao declared that "dogmas are more useless than cow dung. Dung can at least be

used as a fertilizer." He himself was twice expelled by the Comintern for his deviationist policies.

But soon the imported Soviet experts in revolution departed in disgrace, and Mao saw his opportunity. With less than two hundred rifles and a thousand followers, and a dynamic idea relevant and directed to China's tens of millions of peasant families, he wandered south in search of a rallying point.

On the mountain peak, of Chingkanshan on the Hunan-Kiangsi border in South Central China, the future leadership of Communist China was forged in the meeting of Mao and Chu Teh, who in 1955 was still second in command in the Peking Government.

Chu was born to wealth in the family of a Szechwan landlord. He learned the elements of guerrilla warfare as a young battalion commander on the border of Yunnan. A brigadier at thirty-three with a taste for high life, Chu was a professional military adventurer until he went to Germany in 1924. There he studied sociology at Göttingen, reformed his personal habits, and joined the German Communist party in Berlin.

From his own rural youth to the time he had returned to China over the Trans-Siberian Railroad, Chu had seen enough of village Asia to have reached a conviction similar to Mao's: "The people are the sea. We are the fish. When the sea is warm and friendly, we can swim in that sea and survive." From the day of their meeting, Chu and Mao determined to destroy the Kuomintang and establish a Communist China.

Although his soldiers still outnumbered his rifles, Chu built up the nucleus of the Red Army to a hundred thousand men in four years' time. In 1955 Chu, heading the four million man army of Communist China, still appeared to be Mao's unshakable collaborator after a quarter of a century of joint effort.

Mao and Chu were joined in those early days in Hunan by the other two ranking members of the future Communist hierarchy—the slim, tough, ascetic party theoretician Liu Shao-chi, and the persuasive, shrewd, Parisian-trained foreign policy spokesman, Chou En-lai. The relationship of these four top leaders of Red China has to all appearances remained firm and unbroken through a generation of turmoil, from bitter adversity to swollen triumph.

The leadership of the Chinese Communist party since 1928 has had the most extensive practical experience of government and

revolution of any Communist party anywhere. Pursuing their central policy of building a Red Army based on agrarian revolution, Mao and his supporters promoted peasant uprisings, many of them bloody, in the South China hills of Kiangsi and Hunan.

Their new revolutionary government, calling itself the Hunan-Kiangsi Region Workers' and Peasants' Government, began to confiscate landlords' land and to divide it among the peasants. In deference to Marx, paper legislation was adopted favoring the largely nonexistent factory workers who might someday develop as a source of political power under a future Red government.

In 1931 Mao proclaimed the Chinese Soviet Republic. With its capital at Jui-Chin in Kiangsi, it then controlled six districts. Following the Japanese attack on Manchuria, it declared war on Japan.

* * *

MEANWHILE in Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government during the decade from 1927 to 1937 was in many ways proving to be more modern and effective than any government China had previously known. Controlled by the Kuomintang on the basis of a party dictatorship, the government relied for its financial strength on the new Chinese mercantile circles of Shanghai.

Chiang could point to considerable progress. Many restrictions on Chinese sovereignty, set down in the "unequal treaties" against which Sun had spoken, were liquidated. A number of foreign concessions returned to Chinese control. The old Sino-foreign mixed court at Shanghai was abolished, and the government recovered most of its tariff and customs jurisdiction.

Improved civil and criminal codes were developed and put into operation. Under the influence of Western-trained financial administrators like T. V. Soong, efforts were made toward currency unification and the adoption of modern budgetary methods. A modest railway and highway building program went into effect. The civil service was enlarged.

Inroads were made against the old problems of opium cultivation, foot-binding and arranged marriages. In the rural areas, promising strides were made in literacy, public health, plant and animal breeding, and improved crop yields. The admirable efforts of Dr. James

Y. C. Yen brought more than twenty million people under a village development program similar in concept to that being pressed successfully today in India.

Many of these achievements under Chiang were genuine and encouraging. But somehow, measured against the felt necessities of the time, they appeared to the restless, impatient people as little more than gestures, sporadic and short-lived. In the main the grinding hardship of peasant life continued.

For many, land rents remained exorbitant, and the peasants had to pay them in labor or in kind when they could not pay them in cash. Rates of interest, from 15 to 30 per cent continued on the "loans and advances" made in default of rent. "Military service exactions" still had to be met in the rural districts. Local recruiting officers decided who should be mobilized, and who not, on the basis of "exemption rates." Often these payments found their way into the officers' own pockets.

For these reasons and because the peasants had so little sense of participation, the very real reforms that Chiang put into effect often proved unconvincing, and, as in Czarist Russia, merely whetted the demand for more sweeping change. "The problems of the Chinese countryside were so enormous," one commentator has written, "and the pressure for change so great, that reforms were always likely to set off a chain of reaction toward revolt."

China's influential student organizations also remained aloof and often hostile. The government was insufficiently awake to the necessity of inspiring and channeling into constructive progress the turbulent currents of student opinion. Several times since the "May 4th" demonstration in 1919, the students had flared up in open, mass protest against foreign influence and domestic reaction. By 1936 they were aroused over Chiang's hesitation in fighting Japan.

The gradual rejection of Chiang by a majority of the Chinese people was no less real for being long drawn-out and unspectacular. Bit by bit the Kuomintang found itself drained of popular ideas and of popularly rooted idealism.

On Chiang's part it was not necessarily an absence of will, although many of his dilemmas were of his own making. Historical accidents, political forces and personal pressures eventually engulfed him to a point beyond his capacity to arrest them. In the end events had built themselves up to a tragedy of helplessness.

Chiang was a soldier who like most soldiers gave highest priority to the creation of a strong national army. Too often neglecting the importance of ideas and the stubborn power of people caught up by their influence, he assumed, as many of our generals do today, that the defeat of Communism was primarily a military problem.

To assist in the task of building a competent army he called in expensive, professional foreign advisers. American generals who assumed this role in the 1940's and '50's; had their Russian predecessors in the '20's and their German predecessors in the '30's.

Chiang gambled that Chinese patriotism, devoid of much other social or economic content, would provide a sufficient base for the building of a strong army—a point on which Mao's judgment proved superior. Chiang hoped that a national army would help mold a national consciousness that would displace the warlords in the allegiance of the people, and thereby bolster the power of the Kuomintang Government.

Chiang knew too that his army would be indispensable against either Japanese or domestic Communist enemies. In early 1931 with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, he had to make up his mind which to fight. Alone, his forces were obviously unable to cope with both threats.

The Japanese had timed their aggression wisely. Occupied with deepening depression at home, unable to resolve their own conflicts of interest or to muster their courage, the Western powers had nothing to offer China but moral support. At the League of Nations sessions in Geneva when Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov appealed for a collective stand against the Japanese invasion, the British and French refused to do more than express their disapproval, and our State Department was content to say that it would not recognize the fruits of Japanese aggression.

The Soviet Union has consistently made the most of this failure of this failure of the Atlantic nations to come to China's aid. On July 22, 1937, *Izvestia* said "Japan succeeded in carrying out her plans in Manchuria only as a result of the passivity of the Western powers. Indeed open acquiescence on the part of England played no small part in the Japanese conquest in 1931 and 1932."

Litvinov charged at Geneva that the British had a secret agreement with the Japanese to stand aside while Japan gobbled up Manchuria, in return for their promise to stay out of Central China

where British business interests were extensive. Although the Soviet delegate had welcomed the efforts of Secretary of State Stimson to employ the Nine Power Treaty to stop Japanese aggression, he shrewdly pointed out that during the ensuing years the United States continued to make large profits as the principal supplier of oil and war material to Japan.

For American-Chinese relations, this whole episode was a costly lesson in the hypocrisy and uselessness of both the arted guarantees. Manchuria was precisely the place where the United States had overextended its diplomatic commitments by Hay's Open Door Policy of 1900 and by the Nine Power Treaty signed in Washington in 1922. The territorial integrity of China had been specifically "guaranteed" by both.

Yet far from bringing our military strength into line with these ambitious undertakings, the same Washington Conference which produced the treaty resulted in disarmament agreements rendering the United States militarily impotent in the Western Pacific.

In 1931 the Japanese correctly assumed that our reaction would be limited to the wringing of hands and the gnashing of teeth. Enfeebled, deserted and divided China was left to her own devices in meeting the first in the series of aggressions that led to the Second World War. The fact that the Soviet Union was the only nation which appeared ready to act in their behalf made a deep impression on the Chinese people.

CHAPTER 12

The Long March

FACED with two enemies Chiang first turned his attention to a series of 'annihilation campaigns' designed to wipe out the pockets of Communist strength in Hunan and Kiangsi. The type of defense he encountered was suggested by four slogans in use at the time at Mao's headquarters in Chinkangshan. They are a striking preview of the methods of guerrilla warfare which the Red Army later utilized on a large scale and which Ho Chi Minh borrowed to drive the French from Indo-China.

1. "When the enemy advances, we retreat "
2. "When the enemy halts and encamps, we trouble them "
3. "When the enemy seeks to avoid a battle, we attack "
4. "When the enemy retreats, we pursue "

For two or three years these methods enabled Mao and Chu Teh to conduct a holding operation. But by the end of 1934 their "Chinese Soviet Republic" had collapsed under Chiang's steady attack. The situation called for a major retreat, and the historic Long March was decided upon. It was an exploit which eventually turned retreat into victory.

The hard core of twenty thousand survivors who emerged two years later at their powerful new base in Yen-an, North China, had endured famine and epidemics, ambushes and battles without number. Traveling on foot for six thousand miles—twice the width of the American Continent— they had traversed twelve provinces of China, temporarily occupied sixty-two cities and crossed twenty-

four of the largest rivers and eighteen of the biggest mountain ranges in Asia. Fighting their way through hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops, this armed migration had passed through regions populated by more than 200 million people.

Between battles, the Communists had called mass meetings in every occupied town to explain their rural revolution and their anti-Japanese policy. They had staged theatrical performances, freed many prisoners, confiscated the property of traitors—Kuomintang officials, big landlords and tax collectors—and distributed their goods among the poor. For dramatic impact the feat of the Long March itself could scarcely have been excelled.

Eighty thousand men, four times as many as survived, were lost en route. The wives of Mao and Chou En-lai were two of the thirty women who lived to reach Yen-an. Three of Mao's children were abandoned to local peasants during the Long March, and efforts to locate them since have proved fruitless. The weak and uncertain fell by the wayside.

The survivors were tired and worn, but they were steelcd for future struggle. In the midst of incredible adversity, Mao had assured his own control of his forces, and the Red Army and its leadership had been given the hardest possible training. In view of the common experience of the Long March would give the eventual rulers of Red China a common bond of extraordinary strength for their longer march to power.

From 1921 to 1936, while he fought against Mao's Communist forces, Chiang gave ground before the Japanese onslaught in Manchuria and North China. By December, 1936, his troops were beginning to demand that they turn their guns on the foreign invaders rather than the domestic rebels.

At that moment Chiang was suddenly kidnaped by Chang Hsueh-liang, the commander of Manchurian forces. Out of this situation came an agreement for a united front against the Japanese, negotiated by Chiang and Chou En-lai. Chiang's life had been in jeopardy, and Chou En-lai had been in a position to pull the trigger. Perhaps this was why Chiang later referred to him as "a reasonable Communist," implying that for the time being—and at least with Chou—co-existence was possible.

The new Communist base at Yen-an was not merely a remote refuge for the survivors of the Long March. It was brilliantly

situated strategically as well. In Yen-an the destinies of China, Japan and the USSR were geographically interwoven. Aware of this, and perhaps alarmed that the united front under Chiang might awaken an even stronger national consciousness, the Japanese hastened their attack on China proper. In 1937 the Chinese-Japanese War began in earnest with the assault on the Marco Polo bridge near Peking.

As evidence of the new national unity, the Red Army was technically placed under the command of the central government, and the revolutionary Communist program was toned down. But its principles were carefully kept alive. The Long March had deepened Mao's old convictions about the basic source of China's power. "Only with an awakened peasantry can we fight the Japanese," he declared.

Until August, 1945 and the final collapse of Japan, a semblance of co-operation was maintained in China between the Kuomintang and the Communists. It was a kind of sporadic co-operation interspersed with occasional fighting, for the united front had really cracked as early as 1940. Both sides constantly maneuvered for competitive advantage.

In 1938 Japanese control of the seacoast and communications forced Chiang to move into the interior of Szechwan. Here in his new capital of Chungking, he continued to represent the official central government. Mao Tse-tung at his headquarters in Yen-an was the effective leader of a large and growing area under Communist control.

During these years Mao wrote a number of short books in which he argued that the strategy required by the war against Japan applied equally to China's postponed internal struggle. "The villages and the countryside will defeat the cities and the towns," he said prophetically. "The war of resistance is really a peasants' war. Everything we use in resistance, everything we live on, is really given to us by the peasants . . . who are our all."

As the Japanese captured the coastal cities, Chiang lost not only the customs revenue, but also his chief source of indigenous support. Many of the merchants and bankers of the coastal cities had been enlightened conservatives of a relatively modern, business-minded generation. The landlords of the Western provinces were the archaic conservatives of a dead past.

Thus when Chiang went to Chungking, he had to rely increasingly

upon people who were totally out of touch with the revolutionary march of events. This in turn brought his Nationalist government face to face with growing peasant animosity.

Despite the final victory over Japan, the Chungking interval, unavoidable in a military sense, gravely handicapped Chiang's efforts to create a unified, non-Communist China. Tax and recruitment policies further aroused the peasants. Corruption sapped the morale of the country. Inflation shattered its economic structure and undermined the Civil Service.

Caught with Communist harassment, inadequate resources, disobedient regional commanders, and chronic graft spreading through his official household, and without ideas to rally public support, Chiang became less and less capable of providing the desperately needed moral fervor. The memory and appreciation of his earlier achievements gradually were dimmed by the blight of this later weakness. The confident promises of Mao and his colleagues in the North contrasted appallingly with the doubt and disintegration among the Nationalists in Chungking.

With single minded tenacity the Communists had become identified with the revolutionary forces which Hung had set in motion nearly a century before. By war's end in August 1945, the seeds sown in their long march to power had prepared the Chinese earth for a quick harvest.

* * *

IN October 1945 Mao and Chiang issued a joint statement pledging their common desire for peace and unity. But clashes between the Communists and Nationalists had already broken out in the race to occupy Manchuria, and by the end of the month there was fighting in eleven provinces.

At first the people in the Japanese evacuated territory warmly welcomed the returning Nationalists, but disenchantment soon set in. There were few new faces among the leaders coming back from Chungking. Most of the old, ineffective Kuomintang executives had not only retained but entrenched their personal positions from 1938 to 1945. The callous graft and inefficiency which pockmarked their

resumption of power quickly dulled the luster of liberation. Inflation skyrocketed as the fighting resumed.

In December one of America's most distinguished soldiers and statesmen, General George Marshall, was sent to China as Special Representative of the President. He spent a year in patient, untiring negotiation seeking to arrange a lasting cessation of hostilities and to promote a coalition government. For a few months firing ceased. Then each side charged the other with requiring it.

Gradually it became apparent that there was no valid hope for a coalition, either under the leadership of Chiang or of the liberal moderates. As he left China in January, 1947, to become Secretary of State, General Marshall blamed mutual distrust and extremists on both sides for the failure of his mission.

As the country slipped into open civil war, a casual observer might have concluded that the Nationalists still had every advantage. They were the legally recognized government. They had more territory. They had larger armies, far better equipped. Their armies were backed by a navy and an air force, both lacking to the Communists.

The Central Government had received \$2 billion worth of supplies and financial aid appropriated by the United States Congress. In addition the Nationalists had been permitted to buy over a billion dollars' worth of American war surplus property wherever it was available at the ratio of twenty-five cents to the dollar. By the fall of 1946, American Army missions had trained and equipped forty Kuomintang divisions, in addition to the twenty which were trained and equipped during the war against Japan.

Yet by the end of 1947 Mao Tse-tung's Red Armies were generally on the offensive. Against Chiang's formidable appearing but often dispirited divisions, they threw not only bullets, grenades and shells, but explosive new ideas. The Nationalists could only answer with guns which for the most part were in the hands of men with little conviction.

Two years later, after a series of sweeping victories, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed from Peking. On December 7, 1949, eight years to the day after the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek took up his new headquarters in Formosa, and the Communist victory on the mainland was assured.

Ever since then a bitter partisan controversy has raged in America

in a futile and often emotional effort to apportion the blame for the final collapse of the anti-Communist forces. It will serve no purpose to add to that controversy here. The facts are complex and in some cases still obscure. But in all the charges and countercharges, we should strive at least to keep clearly before us those central lessons from the China tragedy about which there is little dispute.

Dr. John Leighton Stuart, American Ambassador to China during Chiang's last three years on the mainland, has himself been critical of some aspects of American policy during that period. Yet drawing on his own forty-year experience in China, Dr. Stuart wrote in 1954: "The Kuomintang had come into power largely on the negative urge of overthrowing an effete and alien imperial dynasty and then of doing the same to regional warlords rather than on the more positive aims of democracy and social reform."

Under Chiang, he continued, there had been "profiteering from public funds, primary concern over family or friends or faction rather than the cause of the country, the pressure to maintain appearances, bureaucratic red tape and incompetence . . . [all] against the background of an impoverished population and of the skillful use of tender resources by the Communists."

Whatever Chiang's personal reputation for integrity, he was surrounded on all levels by an inept officialdom which credited his leadership. Although many of his Nationalist soldiers were prepared to fight bravely and well, whole divisions were sold out by their commanders without firing a shot.

A large proportion of the American military supplies furnished to the Nationalist Armies fell into Communist hands through such defections and surrenders. As the situation deteriorated—incredible corruption and a marked increase in terrorism overtook the Kuomintang. In proportion as its problems grew, its leadership moved not toward the desperately needed political and economic reforms but toward reaction. This pushed the non-Communist reformers, moderates and intellectuals steadily . . . he left.

In the summer of 1947 General Wedemeyer had been sent on a special mission to China. On June 11, 1951 before a Senate Committee, he was asked why China fell. "Primarily for lack of spirit," he replied. "It was not lack of equipment. In my judgment they could have defended the Yangtze with broomsticks if they had had the will to do it."

Time Magazine, one of Chiang's most vigorous American supporters, quotes the Generalissimo as telling the National Assembly in Taipei after his retreat to Formosa: "I must put the blame on myself . . . the disastrous military reverses on the mainland were not due to the overwhelming strength of the Communists, but to the organizational collapse, loose discipline, and low spirits of the party members."

Many Americans had assumed confidently that the Chinese would never accept Communism because of their religious faith and close family ties. But these proved to be flimsy obstacles in the face of the stronger revolutionary power and persuasiveness of Mao and his associates.

In any event China's revolutionary drive, first exhibited in the days of the Taipings, later refreshed by the revolutionary activity and writings of Sun Yat-sen, finally passed from the hands of Chiang to the hands of Mao. This dynamism, often fostered and encouraged by the ideas of the West, had to find some place to go. The Communists were prepared to harness it skillfully to their own ends. As the political hopes of the Chinese people faded under Nationalist ineptness and corruption, they reached desperately for Communism as the only means available to bring them back to life.

Japanese aggression, of course, had helped make certain that Communism was the only means available by drying up alternative democratic possibilities. Thus in retrospect it is difficult to see how the Communist victory in China could have been forestalled by anything short of a sweeping economic and political reform program in China's one million villages, beginning not much later than 1940 when the second united front with the Communists ceased to operate.

Yet to Chiang this probably seemed impossible, for lack of funds, staff, production, railroads, will power and ideas—in addition to the adverse effect such a program would have had on his political and financial support from the landlords and provincial warlords. After Pearl Harbor, America was faced with a war on two continents, and was in no position to promote or aid such a program.

When the war with Japan was over, the only remaining alternative would have been serious, massive intervention by the United States Army, Navy and Air Force. But by 1945, as we have seen, American armed intervention was so politically impossible that we were not even called upon to debate its wisdom. Some American poli-

ticians who later sought personal political advantage from Chiang's tragic collapse were at that time among the most insistent on immediate American demobilization.

Our partisan controversy on China policy has cost America heavily. Among other things it has obscured what may be the most crucial lesson we have to learn if we are to deal successfully with the peoples of the Middle World.

Against a background of rural poverty Mao reaped his victory by appealing successfully to the peasants, who in Asia are the deep and lasting source of strength. Mao realized that by firing their enthusiasm he could create a force capable of defying and eventually defeating sizable, well-equipped armies. He placed his principal faith in the history-shaping power of ideas in the hands of a dedicated, organized, skillfully led minority, and he won.

As we shall see later, our persistent failure to understand the implications of his victory contributed heavily to another dramatic and predictable defeat at the hands of new peasant Communist forces five years later in Indochina.

CHAPTER 13

China and the Cold War

THE new regime was hardly installed in Peking before Mao and Stalin announced the signing of a thirty-year treaty of friendship in Moscow in February, 1950. Four months later the Korean Communists drove across the Thirty-eighth Parallel, the Seventh Fleet sealed off Formosa, and the United Nations forces went into action. In October, the Chinese Communists themselves struck across the Yalu and American and Chinese soldiers found themselves face to face across bayonets for the first time in history.

All of this was disconcerting to those who had hoped that Moscow and Peking would be unable to develop a common basis for action. Mao's emphasis on peasant reforms, and his moderate statements on economic policy favoring maintenance of private ownership in certain areas, had encouraged wishful thinking. There were some who thought that once in power he might reject Marxist dogma, and even refrain from identifying his international policies with those of the Soviet Union.

But such hopes turned out to be naive. In setting aside doctrinaire concepts when they failed to fit the Chinese scene, Mao had always been able to quote Lenin himself. "Obviously," Lenin once wrote, "the Chinese Communist Party had to make an independent study of the complex problems with which it was faced, basing its decision on the universal truth of Marxism, *and on the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution.*"

There was nothing rigid about such standards, and while pursuing flexible policies, Mao had continued to stress his verbal devotion to Leninist principles on every possible occasion.

Nor had Mao ever hesitated to accept Stalin as the leader of the world revolution, despite ample cause for remorse over Kremlin policies. Thus Mao had apparently forgiven Stalin for a typical Moscow zig-zag when, in April, 1941 the Kremlin switched from vigorous opposition to Japanese aggression in Asia to an apparent acceptance of its consequences. While the Japanese Armies were preparing for their invasion of Southeast Asia and for the strike at Pearl Harbor, the Soviet Union signed a pact of friendship and neutrality with Japan that *Izvestia* hailed enthusiastically. "Having passed through a multitude of difficult experiences, there is no doubt that Soviet Japanese relations are now entering a new phase which promises to bear fruit."

A sampling of the fruit quickly followed. Within sixty days, Nazi Germany, Japan's ally, invaded the Soviet Union. Within eight months, the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and launched their armies into Southeast Asia, thus diluting the efforts of Russia's new Western allies in Europe.

Mao had an even more personal reason to be distressed by Soviet tactics. Stalin had been so sure of China's supremacy in China at the end of World War II, that the Soviet note accompanying the Sino Soviet Treaty of Friendship signed in Moscow in August, 1945, agreed that moral and material support from the USSR should be "entirely given to the National Government as the central government of China." As late as October, 1947 Stalin still seemed unaware of the forces which Mao was organizing so skillfully. But Mao, a realist, could afford to praise and wait.

It cost him nothing to say, as he did on Stalin's sixtieth birthday: "Marx is dead and so are Engels and Lenin. It is a great thing that mankind has Stalin. Had there been no Stalin, who would there be to give directions? Since we have him, things can do well." This was extravagant but well-timed flattery to a man who had so consistently misjudged the power of the Chinese Revolution.

The Korean War brought Russian and Chinese policies together again with a thud. The reasons for the Chinese Communist entry into that war have been the object of considerable controversy. Plausible explanations include a combination of the following: genuine Chinese alarm at the possibility of an American Army established along the Yalu, Russian pressure to keep the Chinese embroiled beyond their borders, an opportunity for Peking to divert

popular attention from domestic difficulties to a patriotic unity against a foreign foe, the need to control Manchuria as an industrial base and avoid Russia's domination of it, and a chance to build up Chinese military and political prestige throughout Asia.

Unreasonable as it appears to us Americans, most non-Communist observers in Asia are inclined to think that the Chinese, largely cut off from all outside contacts except those with Moscow, acted on the assumption that we were determined to destroy them. Whatever the real reason or reasons, the Communists used the war effectively to consolidate their hold on China itself.

By late 1952, however, the fighting had probably become a liability to the Chinese Government. In October, 1952, while I was in New Delhi, Chou En-lai indicated to the Indian Ambassador in Peking, that the Chinese Government looked with favor on the truce resolution offered by the Indian delegation to the United Nations.

The leaders of the Indian Government, and most of the other ambassadors in New Delhi, were, like myself, convinced that the Chinese rejected this truce offer only under heavy Soviet pressure, dramatized by Vishinsky's attack on the Indian proposals concerning the prisoners of war issue as a "rotten resolution."

Stalin's death itself, of course, helped to equalize positions at the Russo-Chinese bargaining table. While Stalin was alive, Mao could hardly be placed on the same pedestal as the "great leader of all mankind." But Malenkov and Chou En-lai walked side by side behind Stalin's coffin, and mounted the podium of the mausoleum step by step and shoulder to shoulder.

Pravda published an arranged photograph, ostensibly showing Stalin, Mao and Malenkov in Moscow at the time of the Sino-Soviet pact in 1950. Mao's birthday in December, 1953, was an occasion in Russia for more pomp than had been accorded any of the present Soviet rulers. Mao's selected works were published simultaneously in Moscow and Peking. The appearance of the fourth volume in 1955 gave Soviet papers a new opportunity to outdo one another in praising their illustrious Asian ally.

Mao reciprocated by pledging his confidence and continued friendship to the new Moscow leadership. In a special article in *Pravda*, he stated that the new rulers "will unquestionably be able

to continue the cause of Comrade Stalin, to move forward brilliantly the great cause of Communism."

In both China and Russia the great instruments of indoctrination—the radios and newspapers, the public speeches, the school program—have presented a solid picture of Russo-Chinese unity. Whatever the ordinary man could see and hear brought him to the conclusion that there is complete agreement in thought and action.

Between the two countries there has been an expanding two-way traffic of personnel exchanges. Not only Soviet machinery but Soviet planners, technicians and skilled workmen are being sent to China. Chinese specialists and students in turn are being sent to Russia for training and education. The largest group of foreign students in Soviet universities is now Chinese.

In China there is an energetic campaign to teach the Russian language to as many Chinese as fast as possible. "Russian is the tongue of Lenin and the key to socialism," declares Chuen Tsun jui, secretary general of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. "With Russian mastered the language barrier and the greatest obstacle to Sino-Soviet friendship will be removed."

In those areas where Soviet experience is relevant to Chinese needs, Soviet models will undoubtedly continue to be used. Thus in September, 1954, the deputies to the National People's Congress, the Communist equivalent of a legislative assembly meeting in Peking, approved a law under which the country would be governed by a state council composed of thirty-five ministers. Available details show that sixteen of these ministries are to follow a Soviet pattern of administrative procedure. The Chinese Five Year Plan strikingly reflects its Russian model, not only in its techniques, but its heavy primary emphasis on industrial development.

Because of such parallels, many Americans have seemed to look on China as a larger satellite version of Communist Albania. This is a profound mistake. The Kremlin must deal with Peking as an equal or near equal, and the Chinese Communists are hard bargainers. The extent to which the Moscow Government is willing to placate Chinese ambition is shown in the return of Port Arthur and in other concessions given by Bulganin and Khrushchev in their visit to China in the fall of 1954.

Should the natural pull of common enemies and a common

ideology weaken, Moscow has for the present at least one important means of keeping Peking reasonably in line. China is still critically dependent on Russia for arms, raw materials and technical help in her ambitious program of industrialization.

The success of this program is crucially important, both for the domestic success of the Peking regime and for the prestige it seeks in Asia. Aware of all this, the Kremlin may be expected to pursue a delicately balanced policy which will p'licate the Chinese hunger for industrial expansion while trying to keep that expansion within bounds which could not menace the position of the USSR.

* * *

BETWEEN 1951 and 1955 I have had the opportunity to talk to scores of people who have visited Communist China. They include British, Indians, Pakistanis, Burmese, Indonesians and Japanese. Among them have been government officials, educators, social workers, clubwomen and engineers. Most of them have been conscientious, moderate people, for these, not the fellow travelers, are the visitors whom the Communists have been most anxious to convince.

Their reports show a surprising amount of agreement. Most of them say that the old laughter, gaiety and charm have disappeared from Peking and have been succeeded by a drab, dedicated uniformity. Soldiers in the streets look well fed and husky. Workers put in an eight hour day, six days week, without holidays, to earn an average monthly wage equivalent to about twenty three dollars.

Strategic positions of responsibility, from the civil service to factory supervision of the precious Soviet built machines, have been given for the most part to very young men and women. With their new responsibilities go a major vested interest in the continuation of the present regime.

From the walls of offices and factories, innumerable propaganda posters look down. Some of these show grotesque caricatures of "Wall Street imperialists" being swept off "Taiwan" (Formosa) by the stout bayonets of the "liberators of the People's Army."

America is the enemy. Anti Western animosities generated by a century of subservience, are now deliberately directed at the United States. Once China's great Western friend, the educator of thou-

sands of Chinese youths, the announced protector of Chinese territorial integrity, the United States has been transformed into a "paper tiger," the symbol of everything a proud and ancient race should resent and lampoon.

Most mainland Chinese probably still believe that America started the Korean War and used germs in an effort to start country-wide epidemics. Indeed the germ warfare hoax is smilingly credited by Chinese officials with having promoted everything from new interest in public health to anti-Western solidarity. Foreign visitors are told how grateful China is to America for her "barbaric methods of making war." The popular fear of American-dropped, germ-laden insects, it is said, is responsible for the obvious cleanliness of the cities, and for the dramatic new interest in exterminating vermin.

Both hatred of America and the military requirements of the Korean War helped the Peking Government to fasten its grip on its vast territory, to smash the ancient family system, to create the world's largest fighting army, and to secure a measure of acceptance for the rugged steps required to change an agricultural nation into a formidable industrial power.

A systematic effort has also been made to exterminate the Christian missionary movement in China. In April, 1953, at the Hong Kong border station I watched some of the six thousand expelled missionaries cross over the steel railway bridge on their return to the West. By 1955 probably no more than four hundred still remained in China, with most of them in jail or under house arrest.

For years the Christian missionary movement had been a principal vehicle for the introduction of Western technology and values into Chinese society. Thirteen Christian colleges and universities had made valuable contributions to Chinese life and development. Mission schools had led in introducing scientific agricultural methods, public health, literacy and handicraft industries. Modern medicine and hospitalization in China had been primarily missionary contributions. Converts to Christianity had included the Methodist Chiang Kai-shek.

But as we saw earlier, Christianity had always been handicapped by its identification with Western domination—as well as by the unhappy competition among its various branches, and by the corruptibility of many of the Kuomintang leaders who professed it. Perhaps it was too much to hope that Christianity might have stimu-

lated a dynamic program of workable answers to the stark problems of mass poverty, to the archaic pattern of rural property ownership, and to the accumulated injustices which Christianity itself had helped so mightily to expose.

At any rate during the last thirty years, a large and growing number of Christian-educated, idealistic Chinese, who rejected the *status quo* and saw the need to build a "New China," became disillusioned, drifted away from the Church, and joined the Communist party, or like their many counterparts in Italy and France, saw no inconsistency in belonging to both.

By 1945 hundreds of China's Christian-educated youths had braved danger and "eaten bitterness" to reach Yen-an. Many former students of Christian universities joined the Red guerrillas, developed a loyalty to Mao Tse-tung, and are now important officials under the new regime. Some have assisted not only in the current expulsion of foreign missionaries, but in the persecution of Chinese Christian clergymen who have had the courage to stand out against the new Communist-oriented puppet churches, which Peking has created for propaganda purposes.

For the atheists who now run China have not hesitated to use religion when it fits their needs. "If it does not interfere with the People's Republic," said Mao Tse-tung, "the People's Republic will not interfere with it"—except, of course, to induce it to serve state purposes.

There are probably many reasons why Buddhism has been a particular object of Communist blandishments. The seat of Lamaism, an outgrowth of Buddhism, lies in the heart of uneasy Tibet. There are millions of additional Buddhists in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. There are many more among China's strategically situated, rice-rich neighbors to the south.

Today the newly repaired and ornamental Lama Temple of Peking is a spectacular showplace, and the officially sponsored All-China Buddhist Association calls on members of that faith to work for "the unity of all Buddhists to support the Motherland and world peace."

Such manipulation of religion hardly disguises the fact that the government has set out deliberately to change the ethical and moral basis of Chinese life and to establish the "new morality." Article 42 of the Common Program provides that "love of the fatherland, love

of the people, love of labor, love of science, and care of public property shall be promoted as the public spirit of all nationals." These "five loves" are now the basis of citizenship in the People's Republic.

The individual is subordinated to the state by a constant emphasis on collective action. The family is directed to serve the state's interests, and class consciousness has become the basis for all political action. There is one standard of behavior toward the friends of the revolution, and a different one for its enemies who must be destroyed.

In various ways the status of women has improved. However, everything possible is being done to destroy family loyalties, and children are expected to testify against parents. In August 1951, according to reports in Chinese Communist newspapers, the young Communist daughter of one of Chiang Kai-shek's former military comrades demanded that her father be put to death to set an example of what happens to all enemies of the people." Similar instances are frequently reported over the Chinese radio. Mutual spying and talebearing is encouraged. The *People's Daily* of Peking calls on party members to watch strictly, systematically, regularly" every other member "including even the most responsible ones."

Mao's one-time assertion of modest friendship for free enterprise has been belied by a calculated effort of party agitators to turn the ire of the people against businessmen, large and small. And in the countryside the lynch spirit has been carefully nurtured. Squads of professional demagogues were sent into the villages to select landlords for widely attended public execution, in the "Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign." New techniques of brain washing were adopted.

During the Korean War the number of newspapers was reduced from two thousand to fifty-three, each of which was ordered strictly to follow the party line laid down by the *Peking People's Daily*, the official Communist party organ. The Soviet Communist practices of eliminating unpopular paragraphs in history books were borrowed. Millions of books were confiscated, either to be burned or ground into new paper. The majority of Westerners in China underwent either forced repatriation or imprisonment, or quietly disappeared.

The instrument of this program of regimentation is, of course, the Communist party. During the Korean War while these events were

at their height, the party was increased to six million carefully indoctrinated members, spearheaded by three million fanatical young Communists, the "shock troops" of the party organization.

In February, 1951, twenty-one articles of new legislation were adopted providing for death, life imprisonment or confinement. Forced labor camps were organized as a means of "rehabilitation" for those who were fortunate enough to escape the mockery of political trials and frenzied public executions.

Frank Moraes, editor of the *Times of India*, estimated after a visit to China, that there were two million executions by mid-1952. I have heard other Indian observers guess them at five million.

When Communist Chinese spokesmen are asked for explanations, they reply with straight faces that the people have merely exercised their righteous revenge against the counterrevolutionary forces, and go on to talk about other things. Mao in an essay written in 1949 frankly explained this aspect of his political philosophy: "Democracy for the people of the revolution, and dictatorship for the reactionaries, when combined, constitute the people's democratic dictatorship."

CHAPTER 14

Peking Balance Sheet

MOST Westerners are likely to ask what manner of men can be attracted to a program that rests on such terror. Yet the magnitude of the appeal of this new force in world affairs is undeniable. Unhappily it is least understood by Americans, although they have been selected for special animosity by Peking and therefore have the most reason to be attentive.

China's current accomplishments are being built in blood, but they are being built nevertheless. China today is showing unmistakable signs of emergence as a major world power. Five achievements stand out in bold relief:

1. The Communist regime is providing the first unified and efficient government in modern Chinese history. The administration of the country is carried on by men who live under strict discipline, whether civilian or military. Many are paid no salaries, but are given only board and lodging, a bare minimum of clothing, some cigarettes, free education for their children and medical attention. Selfless young Chinese have returned from abroad to lead hard and austere lives.

"The administration is absolutely honest," writes a recently expelled Catholic priest who warned against underestimating the strength of the Peking Government. "I imagine that under the present regime it would be more difficult to buy a Chinese official than an official in the Western countries."

Where salaries are paid, they are extremely low. Mao Tse-tung is said to receive less than the equivalent of \$150 a month, and the

earnings of his subordinates are proportionately lower. An awed Indian official once said to me, "Mao himself has only one suit, and his wife works for a weekly wage."

Among the by-products of this austerity are unity, order, cleaner streets and reasonably honest tax collection. The abolition of flies, bandits, prostitutes and opium smokers has been widely heralded by the press. Dispassionate foreign observers have reached the same conclusion.

To one Indian official who expressed his admiration for this new organization, cleanliness and enthusiasm, I asked, "Precisely how would you say Peking in 1955 differed from Berlin in 1939 just before Hitler launched his attack on Poland? Wasn't Germany then equally impressive to the foreign visitor? What makes you feel that China isn't equally dangerous?"

He agreed that I had a point, but he urged me earnestly not to underrate China's material progress, or the grip that its government has on the people.

2 China is moving steadily ahead with industrialization under the first Five Year Plan (1953-57), despite vast inexperience, the difficulties involved in absorbing Russian techniques and unpredictable disasters like the 1954 floods. I shall compare the prospects of this critical Chinese program with its Indian competitor in a subsequent chapter.

3 Rapid, even spectacular, progress is being made in the modernization of Chinese military forces. Universal military training was introduced in 1954. Red Army units are rapidly being equipped with standardized modern weapons. New tactics are being introduced.

General Maxwell Taylor, now Army Chief of Staff, once said to me in his office in Seoul, Korea, when he was serving as Commander of the United Nations Armies: "One of the by-products of the Korea campaign will not soon be forgotten—we have taught the Chinese the art of modern war." It would be fair to add, of course, that the American forces in Korea were also introduced to a new kind of warfare.

In addition to their gigantic army, the Chinese Communists have now built up by far the strongest air force of any Asian nation. General Nathan Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, has concluded that it is the fourth largest in the world. Estimates in 1955 put Chinese

strength of over 850 Russian-made jet fighters, of which at least 650 are MIG-15's. They were credited with having more than 100 IL-28 jet bombers.

Chinese pilots are reportedly now training with a squadron of TU-4's, the early model Soviet atomic bombers. Other old types of planes bring the total up to about 2 000 aircraft. More than enough pilots—now training at the rate of 2,400 a year—are ready to fly them. Under combat conditions, of course, the effectiveness of the Chinese air force would depend not only on the willingness of the Russians to provide replacements of aircraft, but on the ready availability of trained Chinese pilots.

4 With unflinching perseverance, the Communists are engaged in a gigantic educational program in a two-pronged effort to end illiteracy and replace it with indoctrination. Culturally beneficial programs are all tightly coordinated with political propaganda and economic construction plans.

The training of technicians and scientists is also being stepped up drastically. Today more than half of China's 250 000 university undergraduates are reportedly studying engineering.

The Voice of Peking reports China's achievements, often in highly exaggerated form, in daily broadcasts throughout Asia in numerous languages and dialects. Such propaganda has won considerable support for the new regime far beyond China's borders. The fourteen million Chinese in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia and elsewhere have been a special target. Some ten thousand are now said to be students in China.

A study of contemporary China, as of contemporary Russia, leads pointedly to the conclusion that national power is a complex sum, not only of crude military might, strategic geography and industrial capacity, but of the psychological and ideological ingredients that go to make up a nation's internal morale and its appeal to its neighbors. Today in Communist China these important factors, so frequently underestimated by many American policy makers, are being diligently and skillfully used to give China formidable unity and dynamism.

5 This consolidation of Chinese national power is being effected within a new governmental framework. At the National People's Congress in September, 1954, to the applause of special Soviet and Communist satellite guests, the new Chinese Constitution was

adopted along with new administrative measures designed to facilitate the "transition to socialism"

The new Constitution describes Communist China as a "people's democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants." Middle-class elements significantly are no longer even listed in the Constitution's basic definition of the state.

During the first four years of Red rule, the country was divided into regional provincial groups whose administrative committees were run by Communist generals of the civil war field armies. In June 1954, however, the government council abolished this regional division and re-established a direct link administratively between the central government and the provinces. In 1954 the tough and powerful Liu Shao-chi, Secretary General of the party, remarked ominously that the provincial administrators were "growing too big for their britches."

In March 1955 came the Peking announcement that two top members, Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, were traitors to the party and had been removed in disgrace. Kao Kang, who was boss of the industrial base of Manchuria and leading figure in the development of the Five Year Plan, was said to have committed suicide. He had originally been a guerrilla leader in Shensi Province when the survivors of the Long March first set up headquarters there. When I left India in March 1953, he was said to be a major power in China and a possible successor to Mao. His removal was the first major shakeup in the Communist Chinese hierarchy.

In the summer of 1955 the rather independent-minded literary circle of Hu Feng also came in for severe governmental denunciation and discipline. The regime itself has apparently become increasingly doctrinaire. Chinese Communist history, for instance, has been rewritten to eliminate all reference to the failure of the Borodin mission and to Mao's fundamental disagreement with the official Soviet approach at that time.

Despite the designation of the National People's Congress as the "highest organ of state power," control remains wholly in the hands of the party. High ranking Communists now hold all the top government posts—chairman of the republic, vice chairman of the standing committee of the People's Congress, premier of the state council, president of the supreme court and procurator general.

Mao Tse-tung, re-elected Chairman of the Republic for a four-year term, remains in control as the unchallenged leader of the party. He is also formally chairman of the National Defense Council and of the Supreme State Conference. General Chu Teh has been selected for the sole post of deputy to Mao, and, at least for the time being, seems to be heir apparent to Mao.

* * *

ONE enormous hurdle, however, must be overcome by these new leaders. Eventually it could be the undoing of them and their gigantic national transformation. That hurdle is the Chinese peasant, who carried Mao to power and who might someday destroy him.

Some 470 of China's 582 million people live in villages. Today they have land, not because Peking is anxious to create a Jeffersonian rural economy of small peasant owners, but because by dividing the land Mao knew he could demolish once and for all the power of the rural landlords and more prosperous farmers, and attract immediate, massive peasant support on his march to power.

With this accomplished, Mao now faces a dilemma. A rural society free of tight political and economic controls in a nation where the bulk of the people live on the land, sooner or later means a free nation. In the case of China this would spell the end of the present centralized Communist Government.

Moreover, a free rural society would provide additional grain for the growing industrial population and the military only if it were paid for that grain by increased health and welfare services and increasing supplies of consumer goods. Since China's productive capacity even with Soviet help is severely limited, this would drastically slow down the rapid expansion of heavy industry called for by the Five Year Plan.

This situation requires Mao to break the fundamental promise which earned for him the decisive support of China's peasants during the Civil War. Instead of more freedom, rural China must be subjected to even more rigid political and economic controls. The specific method chosen is the rapid development of collectivized producer co-operatives. By 1960 plans call for covering all of China

with a vast organization which tightly controls the production, pricing and marketing of all agricultural goods

For Mao's new government the risks are even greater than the kind of risks which Stalin himself barely surmounted in Russia a generation ago and which still constitute a major weakness of the Soviet Union. In 1917 the Bolsheviks took over a Russian agricultural system which, with all its injustices, had before the war regularly produced large quantities of grain for export. Even if, as happened in the 1920's, production under Stalin's centrally controlled collectives should fall off sharply, the Kremlin knew that there would still be a minimal margin on which to feed the Russian people.

By contrast China is in no position to suffer the drop in food production that historically has followed the imposition of similar controls in the past. At best China is barely able to raise enough food for her people. Her population is growing by more than the total population of New York state every year.

Nor does her rice or grain production offer much margin for increase. Already she produces an average of two thousand pounds of rice per acre, twice that of India. In much of China the colder climate makes two crops per year impossible. This means that the steady step up in production per acre necessary to feed her growing population would face strict limits even if incentives could be offered in the form of larger supplies of consumer goods or improved services. The amount of new land which may be opened for cultivation is strictly limited.

Yet the Chinese Five Year Plan requires at least a 10 per cent increase in food production if the goals of industrialization are to be met. If this increase does not occur, what then?

A police state can handle considerable unrest without straining itself. But there are the inevitable years of drought and even the long-suffering Chinese peasant has his limits of endurance. Moreover, there is the question of China's Asian prestige. A breakdown, or even a first-class crisis in China's agriculture would be a poor advertisement of Communism in India, Japan and elsewhere.

It is interesting that none of the many Asians who have visited China, and with whom I have talked, have had more than a cursory look at the rural areas. They report that what they saw there appeared impressive but they agreed that model demonstration projects are easy to set up. I once asked the Ambassador to China

from a non-Communist Asian country how much he had seen of rural China. "Very little," he admitted. "Are regional and national peasant groups being organized?" I asked "Of course not," he answered with a smile "Mao has read too much Russian history. He remembers the kulaks."

In India, as we shall see, the welfare of the peasant is a first consideration of a democratic government that has also read its revolutionary history. Industrial development receives high priority, but it is widely understood that free stable villages are essential to a free stable society and that they come first.

In any event the Chinese peasant who brought the Communists to power remains the major question mark against China's future. Today through the maze of slogans and excitement he must be examining China's New Look with considerable wonderment. In his village teashops the emerging policies of Chairman Mao must sometimes seem a far cry from the promises of the revolution. What the peasant ultimately decides will go far to decide China's future.

Not unnaturally we who favor democracy and fear the aggressive implications of Communism may hope that increased peasant discontent will moderate Peking's policies, but the situation is complex. Would a desperate and harassed government in Peking turn toward moderation or toward expansion?

A military advance into the rich and relatively empty lands of Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaya and Sumatra would be sorely tempting. If that could come a world conflict would certainly follow. Or heavy political pressure might be brought to bear on China's Communist ally to the West much of whose vast Siberian lands have scarcely known the plow. Is this a new source of potential concern for Moscow policy makers?

One thing is certain the dilemma which Mao faces goes to the very heart of the question of China's future role in world affairs, and indeed to the validity of Communist theory in Asia. If Mao speeds up his program of rural controls, he runs the risk of peasant unrest which eventually may burst into flames, and which at the very least will gravely tighten his already tight food supply. If he slows down, his whole mighty gamble in planned economics may be lost.

This question is unlikely to be resolved without considerable pulling and hauling within the Communist hierarchy. Professor Hu Sheng of the Marx-Lenin Institute in Peking stated in a well-pub-

licized article in 1955 that China has "entered the transition period"; that in spite of the "capitulators and renegades," the task is now to press forward with the industrialization of the country and "step by step accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture" "Whoever forgets this," he added pointedly, "is no Communist" Here obviously is a Marxist in search of a proletarian.

Others, perhaps including generals concerned about the danger to the morale of China's vast peasant-born armies, may view such doctrinaire talk with alarm and charge that the continued existence of the revolution is being threatened by those who cling to outworn Marxist textbooks.

But this is speculation and only one thing is certain. China is now controlled by a unified, confident and ambitious group of men who are willing to use tyranny and force regardless of human cost to secure the basic economic construction which people in all the underdeveloped world are now demanding.

Clearly Mao and his supporters are not thinking in short-range terms. The People's Congress of 1954 closed with a tumultuous ovation thundering from the hall: "Wan sui, Wan sui — Ten thousand years, ten thousand years."

SECTION IV

Gandhi Provides a Choice

AS I look to Russia . . . the life there does not appeal to me. To use the language of the Bible: What shall it avail a man if he gains the whole world and lose his soul? It is beneath human dignity to become a mere cog in a machine. I want every individual to become a full blooded, fully developed member of Society.

MHATNDAS K. GANDHI

CHAPTER 15

Indian Prologue

THE outcome of the struggle' Lenin said in March, 1922 'depends in the end on the fact that Russia, India and China contain a mighty majority of the population and precisely this majority is with unexpected rapidity in recent years being drawn into the fight for its own freedom. So there can be no doubt of the final outcome of the world struggle. In this sense the final victory of socialism is fully and unconditionally secured.'

Twenty-six years later Russia and China had been drawn together in a united Communist front but India, although professing friendship for her two formidable neighbors and a certain degree of admiration for their material accomplishments had insisted on going her own way. Even more significant, a new species of revolution has occurred in India to challenge the very core of the Marxist-Leninist creed with the message that violence is not essential for change, progress and development.

How has such a revolution been possible and why, of all places, in India? To answer that question as President Rajendra Prasad and countless of his countrymen told me when I first went there in 1951, one must know something of India's tremendous past. One lives with it still every day in India.

Of course East and West have been meeting for centuries, Kipling to the contrary notwithstanding. Most Americans at so it point in their academic careers learned that one prominent European Alexander the Great, reached India in 325 B.C., extending his world empire from Alexandria in Egypt to Amritsar, northwest of Delhi,

and that he is reported to have wept because there were no more worlds left to conquer.

I had not been in India long before I heard some lines which I was to hear again many times. They are known to most Indian schoolboys, and suggest a provocatively different reaction to Alexander's visit.

The East bowed low before the blast,
In patient, deep disdain
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again

A latter-day imputation of nonviolence? Perhaps. A glossing over of India's own ancient warlike tradition? Possibly. But nevertheless this popular and typical symbol of Indian attitudes seemed striking.

Long before Alexander came to India a common racial link had been established between India and Europe following the early Aryan invasions. The Caucasian features which sometimes surprise Western visitors in India today though irrelevant except as a matter of history and curiosity, remain as evidence that Indians and Pakistanis are far closer to us in physical appearance than any other Asians.

The two thousand years of Indian history between the arrivals in India of Alexander and the British have largely escaped the history books of the West. Yet today many Indians are looking back to the earlier periods of Indian history, aware that many of the rudimentary ideas of Indian religion, philosophy and morality were developed and enunciated prior to, say, the third century A.D.

Thus in the first century after Alexander, Emperor Asoka's vast domain extended from Afghanistan to Mysore including the Deccan in Central India and most of South India. 'More living men cherish his memory today,' H. C. Wells once wrote, 'than have ever heard the names of Constantine or Charlemagne.'

But Asoka is revered not so much for the extent of his empire as for the extent of his example. Among the four ancient orders of Hindu society, the existence of the fighter-Kshatriya class as second in rank after the priestly Brahmins, testified to the importance of warfare as an institution in ancient Indian society.

In this context Buddhism appeared in the sixth century B.C. as a reform movement which attacked the caste system and the growing

decadence of Hinduism. Strongly opposed to bloodshed, it steadily spread its influence throughout India, coming in Nehru's words "like the fresh wind" In language reminiscent of Mohandas Gandhi 2,500 years later, Buddha said "Not by hatred is hatred quenched. This is an eternal law. Let us overcome anger by love, deceit by truth, evil by good, greed by liberality."

Under Buddhist influence, Asoka renounced war. Vegetarianism was adopted at court. Asoka was so serious a Buddhist that he became a monk, and so serious a missionary that he had 64,000 Buddhist priests on his personal payroll. They were ordered never to convert by the sword, but to continue peacefully in foreign countries, teaching better things.

Buddha himself, three centuries earlier had told his disciples what to teach: "Go unto all lands and preach this Gospel - to the poor and the lowly, the rich and the high, are all one and that all castes unite in this religion as do the rivers in the sea."

Long before he became India's Prime Minister, Nehru wrote that the test of a nation's cultural background is to what kind of leaders has it given its citizens? More than two thousand years before Gandhi, millions of Indians gave their allegiance to Buddha and Asoka.

After Asoka came centuries of invasion, conflict and division, until India rose again in the magnificent age of the Gupta Empire from 320-480 A.D. A hasty sketch of the succeeding centuries would show that India's culture and influence spread widely through Southeast Asia, and "Greater India" eventually extended east and north into what is now Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Thailand, where it met and halted the expanding power of China. Offshoots even reached the Philippines.

India's historic relations with China except where their competing economic and cultural interests met in Southeast Asia, were always limited. Although much is now made in both New Delhi and Peking of early cultural contacts, these consisted largely of visits by Indian Buddhist monks to China and considerably fewer visits by Chinese Buddhist monks to India. Gradually over a thousand-year period religious and trading contacts increased, but they were far from the "long and intimate" relations sometimes claimed.

By the thirteenth century the dominance of the Hindu emperors and kings had been broken by successive waves of conquering

Moslems During this period many of the evidences of earlier glory were largely destroyed—Nalanda University in Bihar, for instance, which once housed thirty thousand students, was burned. The long period of Moslem domination itself came to flower in the reign of the great liberal Mogul emperor, Akbar (1556–1605)

Five years before Akbar's death, however Queen Elizabeth gave a charter to the East India Company and the period of British penetration, bolstered by superior military techniques was under way. Before long English, Dutch, Portuguese and French traders and adventurers were fighting for footholds in India. By the middle of the next century, Britain's supremacy was assured

"You Americans won your independence at about the time we lost ours. Indians have said to me sadly. By a curious coincidence, the same Lord Cornwallis who surrendered his sword to Washington at Yorktown later became the British Governor General of India.

Under his astute direction and that of his successors India became the classic example of colonialism. It was later the basis for many of Lenin's theories on the subject—a vast agricultural appendage of industrial England, the producer of the raw materials for English factories as well as the dependable and profitable market for finished English goods.

It is no more than human that the considerable good which was done has often been forgotten and that for the vast majority of Indians their recollection of two centuries of experience with British colonialism consists of the accumulated resentments of economic subservience, the exported misery of the English Industrial Revolution, the inevitable conflict of cultures and the scars of white racial superiority. This residue of bitter memory helps explain why for Indians today, and for Asians generally, colonialism stirs a greater sense of resentment than Communism, with which relatively few Asians outside of China have had direct experience.

In the perspective of India's recent and successful nonviolent struggle for independence, it is important to remember that her first attempts to throw off British rule were violent and bloody. In 1857, seven years after the Taipings began their rebellion in China, the Great Indian Mutiny broke out among the Sepoys of Bengal, Britain's mercenary troops.

Clive had won England's great victory at Plassey in 1757 with but nine hundred European troops and two thousand Sepoys. Within

seven years. However, small Sepoy mutinies had already begun. Later in 1824, when the Forty-seventh Bengal Infantry refused to march into Burma, it had been decimated by British artillery. But repression had only increased the dis-sension. In 1844, seven Indian regiments had rebelled and again been vigorously subdued.

In the 1850's Indian nationalists began to feel their strength. The 36,000 British soldiers in India then were outnumbered by 257,000 British-officered Indian troops. The dethroned Indian princes were watching with interest the course of the Crimean War and hoped that Russia, the traditional enemy of Britain, would help end British rule in India.

When Lord Canning, the new Governor-General, sailed for India in 1856, he was uneasy. "In the sky of India," he said, "serene as it is, a small cloud may rise no larger than a man's hand, but which, growing larger and larger, may at last threaten to burst and overwhelm us with ruin."

One year later the cloud exploded in Bengal when Hindu Sepoys discovered that their cartridges were greased with the fat of cows and pigs, a gross violation of their religion. While on maneuvers, the Nineteenth Bengal Infantry refused to fire the new greased cartridges, which they believed were part of a British plot to force all Indians to become Christians.

From this spark, all Bengal was soon inflamed. Other Indian troops in North Central India rebelled, marched on Delhi and proclaimed the ex-Mogul king as the new sovereign of India. Indian troops sent to quell the rebellion joined it instead. For a while it appeared that the outnumbered and isolated British might be overwhelmed. But only in a few sections of North Central India did the Indian peasants and small bazaar keepers feel any sense of common cause with the rebels. When reinforcements arrived in the form of Sikhs and tough Gurkhas from Nepal, the tide changed sharply in favor of the British.

Many Indians call this their First War of Independence, and hail as patriots such leaders as the Rani of Jhansi, a young princess who led her small state into the rebellion and died fighting at the head of her troops. Nehru, however, in his *Discovery of India*, saw the revolt essentially as "a feudal outburst headed by feudal chiefs and their followers, and aided by widespread anti-foreign sentiment. . . . The feudal chiefs had the sympathy of the masses over large

areas, but they were incapable, unorganized, and with no constructive ideal or community of interest. They had already played their role in history and there was no place for them in the future".

From the unsuccessful rebellion of 1857 Indians began to learn, as Nehru later said, that "not by fighting for a lost cause, the feudal order, would freedom come". Unhappily in 1857, the British had not yet learned that not by violence and vengeance would loyalty come. Nehru tells how in his city of Allahabad British soldiers and civilians held "Bloody Assizes," or executed Indians by the hundreds without any assize at all.

"Some frank and honorable English historians," he writes, "have occasionally lifted the veil and allowed us a glimpse of the race mania and lynching mentality which prevailed on an enormous scale. One would like to forget all this for it is a ghastly and horrible picture showing man at his worst even according to the new standards of barbarity set up by Nazism and modern war. If we protested we were reminded of the tiger qualities of an imperial race."

"As an Indian," the future Prime Minister concluded, "I am ashamed to write all this, for the memory of it hurts, and what hurts still more is the fact that we submitted for so long to this degradation. *I would have preferred any kind of resistance to this whatever the consequences.*"

But the resistance that was eventually offered was a special kind of resistance and it made the Indian Revolution when it came a special kind of revolution.

CHAPTER 16

Out of Africa, a New Kind of Revolution

TWELVE years after the 'Mutiny' of 1857, and eight years before Victoria became Empress of an empire on which the sun never set, Mohandas Gandhi was born in Western India within two years of his revolutionary contemporaries, Nikolai Lenin and Sun Yat-sen.

Gandhi was born of a family of lawyers and government servants and like Lenin was trained as a lawyer. Like Lenin's, Gandhi's ideas had a mixed parentage including many strains from the West. Gandhi's legal studies had taken him early to England, and later he often paid homage to the English influences of these formative years.

Also like Lenin, Gandhi found it difficult to adjust to a professional career amidst dispiriting poverty. While Lenin was sent to Siberia by the czar's police, Gandhi in 1893 voluntarily went to South Africa to counsel for some Indian merchant there.

He had been flushed out of court in India when in pleading a ten-dollar case, his first, his shyness had suddenly left him speechless before the judge. After being thrown out of a British agent's house where he had reluctantly gone to ask a favor for his brother, he had resolved never again to ask favors, nor to remain as a fawning sycophant of the British.

Courage to live by one's own beliefs became for him the Golden Rule. 'There is no room for coward in a society of men like me in a society which loves freedom,' he said.

In South Africa his courage was promptly tested by the racial discrimination which the white Europeans were imposing on brown Indians and black Africans. Arriving in first-class style, wearing Western dress, Gandhi insisted upon traveling in a railroad compartment reserved for Europeans. When he refused to leave, he was physically ejected.

Sitting on the platform in the cold night as the train pulled out without him, he asked himself, "Should I fight for my rights or go back to India? Late at night I came to the conclusion that to run back to India would be cowardly."

Within a week of his arrival Gandhi invited all of Pretoria's Indians to a meeting. He wanted "to present a picture of their condition."

At twenty-four, in his first public speech, his shyness now gone, he gave a novel kind of advice for one who said he wanted to fight for his rights. He suggested that the first step of the Indians should be to meet the legitimate criticisms of the Europeans and to correct their own faults. He specifically urged them to adopt more sanitary habits to overcome caste and religious divisions, and to tell the truth even in business. From this solid foundation they should begin to stand up peacefully but firmly for their rights.

"This country is not for men like you," a rich Indian merchant told him sadly. "For making money we do not mind pocketing insults and here we are." But Gandhi's new boldness and fresh approach stirred the Indian community.

By the end of the year Gandhi's business had been successfully completed. Through patient negotiation he had helped bring about a reconciliation of the parties out of court which he came to believe was the true task of the lawyer. As he was preparing to sail for India the European legislature suddenly passed a law withdrawing even the limited voting franchise from the Indians. Gandhi, who alone seemed to have ideas about how such discrimination could be resisted, was asked to help. He agreed to stay a month and remained twenty years.

Because of the enormous power which his ideas generated in Africa, India and elsewhere during the next fifty years it is important that we seek to understand at least in general terms what they are and how they evolved in a very practical way out of his philosophy and experience.

In 1894, Gandhi organized the Natal Indian Congress and later similar bodies in the Transvaal and Capetown. At first it appeared that his program was to repeat in Africa the kind of annual petitioning with which the organization known as the Indian National Congress was then fruitlessly bombarding the British in India.

But soon new ingredients appeared. Along with his appeal to the Europeans for democratic rights for the Indians, Gandhi commenced an unprecedented kind of constructive service among his own people.

The Natal Indian Congress organized lectures and courses on domestic sanitation, personal hygiene, and the need for better housing. The shanties and filth of many Indians, which the Europeans used as an excuse for segregation, Gandhi said, could be removed by the Indians themselves. To accomplish this they must learn to work together. For the children of the illiterate, low caste laborers who comprised the bulk of the community, he organized the Natal Indian Educational Association, financed by contributions from the newly organized congress.

Gradually this emphasis on constructive service and on personal, immediate responsibility for injustice led Gandhi to revolutionize his own life. He gave up his aristocratic habits, adopting the dress and the austere standards of the poor. He abandoned his city home for a farm in the country to which all Indians, regardless of their station, were welcome.

Gandhi said that most democrats and liberals, as well as believers in violent revolution, thought that their reforms must wait until they had obtained control of the government by the ballot or by force. But he doubted that those who were not ready to sacrifice for the small reforms within their reach now, would do so for the bigger ones later on. He asked, 'Why wait till the advent of *Swaraj* [freedom] for the necessary uncleaning?'

In addition to this new means of democratic constructive service, Gandhi was seeking a different and more difficult goal than that sought by earlier revolutionaries. Not only did he have no desire to conquer his adversaries by force, but he had no wish merely to swamp them in a flood of ballots. He wished to convert them, or rather, he wished to communicate with them, to persuade them, or to be persuaded by them, of the truth.

His objective was to create out of the oppression of colonial rule and economic exploitation, not a dictatorship of the proletariat, or

even a democratic tyranny of the majority, but a community of equal citizens joined in the pursuit of the common good. His argument sounded novel indeed to those revolutionaries who believed that violence was the only realistic way.

A good community, he insisted, requires faith in one's neighbors and respect for the processes of persuasion. Pursuit of Truth requires a recognition that no one man, no one party, no one class, no one race has the whole Truth, that since all human views are partial, every view should be given free expression, should be considered and respected, even as it should often be rejected and resisted. Men must be free to seek the Truth he said, and the Truth shall make men free.

From this concept of Truth he derived the corollary, which he called Nonviolence or Love, which was named Passive Resistance. For him the Biblical injunctions, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," "Whoever smiteth thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also," "Love thy neighbor as thyself" — were not mere slogans to be repeated by religious leaders, but essential and practical principles for political action. By living the Sermon on the Mount one could hope to bring out the best in one's opponents, and thus move closer to the union of minds and hearts necessary for a good human community.

That one could not fully achieve this ideal in practice meant no more to him than the fact that in practice we are unable to draw Euclid's line on a blackboard. "The straight line exists only in our conception but we have always to postulate it. We have always to strive to draw the true line corresponding to the ideal imaginary line."

Following the principle, he deliberately refrained from taking advantage of his enemies. When he was nearly lynched by a white South African in 1897, he refused to prosecute the leaders, although the government was ready to do so. When the British were hard pressed during the Boer War in 1900, Gandhi called off all agitation and organized a volunteer ambulance corps of eleven hundred Indians, many of whom he led into service on the front lines. For this he and thirty-six other Indians received Imperial war medals.

As part of the process of persuasion, Gandhi believed that honorable compromise must always be sought, that objectives must be limited to specific ones within the power of the opponent to grant, and that trust in the word and motives of the opponent must be

maintained despite all reachery. "The underlying belief," he said, ". . . is that even a Nero is not devoid of a heart."

When Gandhi asked Indians to accept a settlement which depended on the unwritten word of South African Prime Minister Jan Christian Smuts, militants among them argued that Smuts had already betrayed them too many times. Gandhi replied that a believer in nonviolent action "bids good-by to fear."

"Even if the opponent plays him false twenty times," Gandhi said, the nonviolent soldier must be "ready to trust him for the twenty-first time—for an implicit trust in human nature is the very essence of his creed."

Along with his willingness to compromise, however, Gandhi also believed that there are eternal principles which admit of no compromise, and one must be prepared to lay down one's life in the practice of them. But because of his commitment to a society based on the consent of the governed, Gandhi rejected the usual violent way of laying down other people's lives in the name of principles.

He agreed with Tolstoy, who wrote after the unsuccessful Russian uprising of 1905 that what was going on in Russia was "proof of the futility and harm of using violence as a means of uniting men." Although there had been countless revolutions and revolutionaries in the Christian world, Tolstoy noted that "the domination of a few over the majority, corruption, lies, the tears of the oppressed, servitude, anger and the brutalizing of the masses—all these things remain as they were, and even spread and develop."

Gandhi, seeing in Tolstoy's works a "reasoned basis" for his non-violence, regarded Tolstoy as his teacher. But nevertheless Gandhi felt that Tolstoy's denial of violence was only a first step. He saw the need for some kind of collective and revolutionary struggle against injustice. "Truthfulness is even more important than peacefulness," he wrote.

Gandhi preferred a fight and failure to merger and acquiescence. He could tolerate even bloodshed in preference to retreat and non-resistance. "I do believe," he said, "that where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence."

It was because Gandhi had discovered a new way of fighting for truth and for justice, a way which he thought might escape the corruption of the violent revolutions, that he saw no need to make such a choice. "The nonviolence of my conception," he said, "is a more

active and more real fighting against wickedness than violent retaliation whose very nature is to increase wickedness."

Gandhi had come to this new concept of nonviolent struggle because of the failure of his persistent efforts to win Indian rights in South Africa simply by constructive service among the Indians and by petitions to the Europeans. Since they outnumbered the Indians ten to one the door was closed, as a practical matter, to effective violence, as it was also closed to the usual democratic hope of ultimately outvoting the opponent. Out of this dilemma came a new response

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IN 1906 when the new anti Asiatic legislation was imposed by the Europeans Gandhi asked his followers to disobey the law openly and peacefully. More than three thousand promptly took an oath to do so. Mass civil disobedience was born and Gandhi for the first time went to jail.

He explained why he had adopted this new sanction: "Up to the year 1906 I simply relied on an appeal to reason. Nobody has probably drawn up more petitions or espoused more forlorn causes than I and I have come to this fundamental conclusion that if you want something really important to be done you must not merely satisfy the reason, you must move the heart also."

"The appeal of reason," he continued, "is more to the head, but the penetration of the heart comes from suffering. It opens up the inner understanding in man. Suffering is the badge of the human race, not the sword."

Aware that he was adding several new dimensions to the traditional democratic view of political action, Gandhi noted that, "A superficial study of British history has made us think that all power percolates to the people from parliaments. The truth is that power resides in the people."

In 1894 he had begun to demonstrate that the politics of petitioning required organized nongovernmental efforts in the service of human needs to give it substance. Now in 1906, he decided that the other side of the coin was peaceful resistance to injustice. "Civil disobedience is the storehouse of power," he wrote. He incorporated

Thoreau's term into Hindi with a new word "*Satyagraha*"—roughly translated "soul-force"—which he formed from the Sanskrit word "*satya*" for "truth," and "*agraha*" for "steadfast grasping."

Satyagraha, he explained, "does not mean meek submission to the will of the evil-doer, but it means putting of one's whole soul against the will of the tyrant." Through *Satyagraha* he believed, "it is possible for a single individual to defy the whole might of an unjust empire to save his honour, his religion, his soul, and lay the foundation for that empire's fall or its regeneration."

As a result of Gandhi's first experiment in deliberate mass civil disobedience, Smuts's jails soon were overflowing with thousands of Indians. Gandhi said free men should learn to enter prison "as willingly as the groom goes into the bridal chamber." By courting jail whenever a law violated his conscience, a man could resist the unjust law while affirming respect for Law.

What more respect, he said, could be shown than for a minority to say to the majority, "We cannot obey your law which we consider unjust, but we recognize your right to make laws. Until we can persuade you to change this law, we belong in prison. We hope our presence there will cause you to reconsider."

When Smuts did reconsider, release his prisoners, and promise to amend the law, Gandhi's new techniques of struggle seemed triumphant. But then the pressure of the Europeans led Smuts to repudiate his promise, and Gandhi promptly invited his followers to another course of suffering. Again the jails filled, but this time the course lasted several years.

Gradually the early enthusiasts found reasons not to invite further terms in prison, and the majority deserted Gandhi. In 1912, he reported sadly to friends in India, where his exploits were being followed with excitement, that he estimated that there remained a maximum of only sixty-six and a minimum of sixteen who would fight on even if it meant life imprisonment.

However, harsh new racial ordinances were soon put into effect which aroused new readiness for the ordeal of *Satyagraha*. Gandhi sent his women disciples into the coal mines to court arrest by calling on the workers to strike. His earlier magic seemed to return, and thousands of miners struck.

He then summoned all Indians to leave their homes and proceed with him across state borders without their "Asiatic" passport papers.

in violation of the law. Again the response was far better than he had expected.

On October 28, 1913, when Gandhi's peaceful army of over five thousand started across the plains of Natal he had more men at his command than Clive had at Plassey, Washington at Valley Forge, or Bolivar at Boyaca. At the border of the Transvaal Gandhi encountered a wall of armed police. He walked straight into their guns, his unarmed thousands followed, and the police withdrew without shooting.

Although Gandhi himself was arrested the march continued with disciplined nonviolence. Finally the government arrested the marchers, and sent the workers back to mines which were declared out-stations of the Newcastle rails.

A few weeks before the outbreak of World War I, Smuts again yielded, appointed a commission of inquiry, released the prisoners, and promised to meet most of Gandhi's terms. This time he lived up to his word. The Indian Relief Bill, subsequently passed by the South African Union Parliament, guaranteed some of the specific rights for which Gandhi had fought.

Gandhi's program of struggle and suffering had had a profound effect on many Indians and some Europeans. "I do not like your people, and do not care to assist them at all," one of Smuts's secretaries explained, "but what am I to do? You help us in our days of need. How can we lay hands upon you? I often wish you took to violence like the English strikers and then we would know at once how to dispose of you. But you will not injure even the enemy . . . And that is what reduces us to sheer helplessness."

In the early days of the struggle, Smuts had said, "The Asiatic cancer which has already eaten so deeply into the vitals of South Africa, ought to be resolutely eradicated." Yet before the struggle had ended, Smuts sent books for Gandhi to read in prison, and Gandhi reciprocated by sending him a pair of sandals made on his Tolstov Farm outside Johannesburg.

Later on Gandhi's seventieth birthday, Smuts sent these sandals back to him in India, to show that he, an "old friend," had cherished them. In the accompanying note Smuts said, "I am not worthy to stand in the shoes of so great a man."

In the harsh judgment of the history of power politics, Gandhi's nonviolent efforts were not a clear cut success in Africa. Forty years

afterward racial discrimination in the form of *Apartheid* constituted a growing and disfiguring blight on South African society. And even while Gandhi was experimenting with his new nonviolent kind of revolutionary effort in Africa Sun Yat sen's followers had, by contrast, forcibly overthrown the Manchu dynasty. Lenin, after participating in the ill-fated revolution of 1905, was reorganizing his Bolshevik party on the paramilitary basis which was destined to capture the Russian state.

Still Gandhi always looked on South Africa as the best demonstration of his techniques of nonviolent resistance. Since his efforts had been limited to the Indian minority, which was outnumbered ten to one, the obstacles were far greater than he would later find in India. There, with a vast and potentially controlling majority of his countrymen with which to work, he was to demonstrate convincingly the massive power of his new approach. Meanwhile the very fact that the Gandhian Revolution originated in Africa was advance notice that its ultimate scope would not be limited to India alone.

CHAPTER 17

India Tries Gandhi's Way

MUCH had happened in India since the bloody terror after the Mutiny of 1857. The very extremes of that repression had led the British Parliament in the following year to pass "An Act for Better Government in India." This act formally transferred ruling power from the hands of the East India Company to the crown.

Then by act of Parliament the company's armies were absorbed into the royal service. Its Governor General became the Queen's Viceroy, and in a fabulous Durbar in Delhi in 1877, Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India.

This brightest jewel in Victoria's crown, however, was hardly secure. In the period of her accession, an English civil servant, Allan Octavian Hume, concluded from the study of seven volumes of reports that the growing political discontent in India was going underground. An alternative to violent rebellion, he decided, was urgently needed.

Some Indians still insist that Hume wanted merely to open a safety valve for discontent, the better to preserve British rule. If so, he inadvertently helped forge the mechanism for the revolution that eventually set India free.

In any event in 1883, to the graduates of Calcutta University, he proposed that leading Indians from all over the subcontinent gather together in an annual unofficial parliament, an Indian National Congress. "If only fifty men, good and true, can be found to join as founders," he said, "the thing can be established . . . Men know how to act."

The first session of Congress convened in Bombay, with Hume on hand to say the opening words to the gathering of editors, lawyers, professors and business leaders. According to a British historian, the "ill-starred measures of reaction combined with Russian methods of police repression" in the years following the Mutiny, had brought India "within measurable distance of a revolutionary outbreak, and it was only in time that Mr. Hume was inspired to intervene."

But Congress found that it could not solve the problems and conflicts of India merely by petitioning the crown. When Gandhi returned in 1915, the cult of violence had grown again, and Congress itself had become increasingly militant in its demands for home rule. With Gandhi's return, Congress was gradually to become the vehicle for the new kind of revolution which he had introduced into Africa.

Of course, Gandhi was by no means the only important Indian revolutionary of the period. His views were rarely accepted without challenge. But if the Indian Revolution was anyone's, it was Gandhi's, and it is his story which is important for our survey of revolutions.

Gandhi started his first small *Satyagraha* in India in the spring of 1917, a few months before Lenin arrived in Petrograd for his final effort to capture the Russian Revolution. China was then in the midst of the unresolved struggles of the warlords into which Sun's revolution had fallen.

By the time Gandhi took over the Indian National Congress and molded it into an instrument for nonviolent revolution. Communists were claiming that the new Soviet state had finally proved that they had made a science out of class struggle. The first Indians were already making their way over the old caravan route to Moscow to see if Lenin really had discovered how to release the energies of feudal peasants and to catapult a backward society into the twentieth century.

Gandhi saw that Communism might find a ripe field in India. The poverty and exploitation of the people made the whole subcontinent one of the weakest links in the chain of Western imperialism, the kind of link which Lenin thought he knew how to break.

The growing revolutionary temper among the educated young people, particularly of Bengal, provided a natural base for a party like Lenin's. In 1912 a fanatic had hurled a bomb at the viceroy as

he entered Delhi on a regal elephant Subhas Bose, who later during World War II was to escape from a British prison to fight alongside the Japanese, had attracted some attention when he participated with a gang of fellow students in attacking and badly injuring an English teacher who had allegedly insulted India

To increase the tempo of unrest World War I had drawn thousands of Indian troops to assignments in the Middle East and Europe. The developments in Western science and technology that these men actually saw combined with their highly colored reports, further increased revolutionary ferment in India.

Gandhi knew that Communism in India called for far more than a British exodus and the establishment of an Indian government. It would be a highly organized fundamental social revolution in which the peasants would be called upon to break their feudal bonds, kill the landlords and seize the land. As such he knew that it would have much more appeal and potential power than earlier outbursts of diffused violence like the Mutiny of 1857.

But he was unalterably opposed to the dogma of violence on which Communism was based. Someday he prophesied in speaking of Communism, "this ruthlessness will create an anarchy worse than we have ever seen."

To hope that a good society would emerge from such violence or from the party dictatorship which Communism proposed as a first step, was to him like "saying that we can get a rose through planting a noxious weed." Communism, he said, "forgets that the remedy that it seeks to employ is worse than the disease."

Yet in a sense Gandhi saw Communism as a welcome challenge to those who believed that revolutionary change could be achieved without bloodshed. "The cat chism that is sweeping over the earth today is a great sign," he said. "As a chaotic force it is pernicious, but it has at its back a noble object . . . it desires reform, it seeks the reign of equity and justice."

It was encouraging he felt that all over the world men were ready for revolution and that the exploited and oppressed and forgotten were demanding an end to the old order. He agreed with the Communists that there was a disease for which a cure was necessary. He agreed that a change of government was not enough. There must be a complete revolution extending into every village and com-

munity. Yet on the nature of that revolution he disagreed with the Communists with all the vigor he could summon.

Gandhi's personal acceptance of responsibility for the fight against injustice everywhere, and his resolve to do something about it, were not new. Religious leaders in all ages have decided that they should be their brothers' keeper. But modern science and technology had now provided the means by which a far larger measure of responsible action to end poverty and injustice was politically and economically practicable.

Although he, himself, was suspicious of many aspects of modern technology, Gandhi's first efforts in India were nevertheless designed to bring about an awareness of the practicable opportunities for justice. To identify himself with the poor of India, he adopted the simple dress of the peasant; he spoke Hindustani, he traveled only third class (because there is no fourth class), and he made his home in village huts. "On to the villages" was his message to the educated young people and to their leaders who were living aloof in the great modernized cities, as separate from the life of the 600,000,000 villagers of India as though they were on a different continent—as separate as the Christ nobility had been from the Russian people.

Gandhi was distressed to find the Indian National Congress largely a party of the educated and well born. It had almost no roots in the villages, and indeed no program except the goal of self government, *Swara*, which was to be achieved by the usual kind of liberal agitation, parading and petitioning. "The contrast between the palaces of New Delhi and the miserable hovels of the poor laboring class near by cannot last one day in a free India in which the poor will enjoy the same power as the richest in the land," Gandhi warned the Congress.

On his first visit to an annual Congress session, he had found the camp's latrines uncared for. When his fellow Congress workers told him this was the outcastes' or untouchables' work, he found a broom and did the cleaning himself.

The revolution which he proposed had to begin first in the life of the revolutionary. The voluntary acceptance of austerity and disciplined village service by the creative educated people would combine with the power of the awakening peasants and workers. Out of

this association would come a democratic and peaceful revolution that would achieve *Ramaraj* as well as *Swaraj*, that is good government as well as self-government.

Gradually Gandhi persuaded Congress to add the two new dimensions to political action which he had developed in South Africa. constructive service and nonviolent struggle. He introduced a fourteen-point program which included the removal of untouchability by direct acts of association, tolerance of all religious beliefs, sanitation, improvement of the position of women, the encouragement of village industries, the use of only homespun 'khadi' cloth, and the daily democratizing discipline of spinning. Such a program, he believed, was necessary for the complete revolution.

Gandhi thought that by carrying out this program personally, and introducing it to every village, Indians rich and poor would begin to acquire the habits and the institutions of democracy. "The English have not taken India, we have given it to them," he said. "It is *Swaraj* when we learn to rule ourselves. It is, therefore, in the palm of our hands."

Nor was he long in introducing civil disobedience. In Bihar, when exploited indigo plantation workers called their plight to his attention, he decided to make a careful investigation. The authorities served an order on him to leave the district. He disobeyed it, was arrested, and pleaded guilty at the trial.

Then with the whole district on the verge of eruption because of his arrest, he was released. After he had gathered statements from twenty thousand landless tenants, the British agreed to appoint a committee of inquiry, and eventually the worst grievances were met.

In 1919 brushing aside the promises of sweeping reforms made during the war, the British imposed new restrictions on civil liberties. Gandhi promptly asked the country to join him in this pledge: "We solemnly affirm that . . . we shall refuse civilly to obey these laws . . . and we further affirm that in the struggle we will faithfully follow truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property."

The Congress itself voted to join the experiment. The national fervor grew, and the British replied with violence. In Amritsar a mass meeting refused to disperse. The British general in command ordered his troops to open fire, and over a thousand were killed.

Gandhi then called for complete non-cooperation with the British, including a boycott of British titles, jobs and goods. To the militant,

and many Bengal terrorists he said, "I invite even the school of violence to give this peaceful nonco-operation a trial."

As Gandhi's first civil resisters began to court jail, the news of India's surging struggle began to reach Russia, where it awakened the imagination of Leon Trotsky. In a memorandum to the Communist Central Committee in the summer of 1919, Trotsky pointed to the promising revolutionary situation in India and suggested that the pressure of Russian Communism should be shifted from West to East.

The Red Army, Trotsky thought, might find the road to India even shorter and easier than the road to what was then Soviet Hungary. He forwarded to the Central Committee a plan by a fellow Red officer for the formation of an expeditionary cavalry corps to move across the center of Asia to assist colonial India to rise against the British.

But Gandhi seemed to be doing quite well with his own strange methods. From his cell young Jawaharlal Nehru sensed that the country was ready to rise in one strike for independence. More than fifty thousand Indians had received jail sentences for their non-violent disobedience.

Then a Congress procession in the United Provinces ran amuck, killing twenty-two policemen. Gandhi, deeply disappointed, suspended the whole campaign, undertook a fast, and directed Congress back to the constructive program of village service. He said he had made a "Himalayan miscalculation" in believing that Indians were ready for the discipline of nonviolent struggle.

In jail Nehru and his colleagues angrily resented the suspension, but Gandhi remained in good spirits. Sentenced to a six-year term, he gaily reported from prison, "I am happy as a bird"—signed, "M. K. Gandhi, Number 827."

"I knew I was playing with fire," Gandhi had told the court. "I ran the risk, and if I am set free, I will still do the same again." When he was released in 1924, however, Gandhi decided that the country needed some more years of constructive service in the villages before a second course of struggle and suffering. Such service, he believed, provided the same essential training for his soldiers of nonviolence as parades and maneuvers provided for the military.

Gandhi rejected the criticism of his tactics by Congress leaders who wanted an all-out struggle for immediate independence. Gandhi's

objective was not simply to drive the British out, but to drive them out in a way that prepared Indians to govern themselves as well. He wanted something more than "English rule without the Englishman," which he said was "the tiger's nature, but not the tiger."

He sought a "moral, nonviolent revolution in all the departments of life of a big nation, at the end of which caste and untouchability and such other superstitions must vanish, differences between Hindu and Muslim become things of the past, enmity against Englishmen or Europeans must be wholly forgotten. A social revolution must be designed to produce a 'casteless and classless society,' with decentralized, democratic 'village republics'."

"We will not be able to leave India happier than when we were born," he said, unless in seeking freedom Congress practiced the principles of nonviolence and service to which many of its leaders gave only lip service. He did not think Congress would suddenly learn how to practice those principles while in the corrupting position of power. For him, there was "no road for hinging about a social revolution except that we should represent it in every detail of our lives."

* * *

By 1926 the revolutionary temper of the people again was steadily growing. An organizing mission of British Communists had established the Communist party of India, and it had gained a foothold in the labor movement. Its leaders, including some of the British Communists who settled in India, had been tried as conspirators and sentenced to long prison terms.

Gandhi saw that the very respect for jail-going, which he had created and encouraged was now adding to Communist strength. Furthermore, Gandhi's way was now being challenged by militants in the Congress itself, young men like Subhas Bose who were courting jail on their own. As a political master, Gandhi knew that in his alternating rhythm of service and struggle the time had come for another struggle.

On January 26, 1930 Congress adopted a Declaration of Independence which began with a ring familiar to any American: "We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people . . ."

With its phrases taken from the American Declaration of 1776, it was read to vast mass meetings throughout the country "If any Government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or abolish it."

India awaited Gandhi's word on how to launch the new battles. His minimum demands were laid down in a letter to the viceroy. They included the discharge of all political prisoners, the reduction of the land taxes on peasants, the lifting of the ban on village salt production, and abolition of the salt tax which impinged on village life.

"I regard this tax to be the most iniquitous of all from the poor man's standpoint," Gandhi wrote. "As the independence movement is essential for the poorest in the land, the beginning will be made with this evil." Unless the viceroy agreed to his demands, he would violate the salt laws and ask all Indians to do likewise.

City bred Congress party leaders for whom the salt ban meant nothing at first expressed their skepticism. "We were bewildered," wrote Nehru, "and could not quite fit it to a national struggle with common salt."

Then Gandhi announced that on March 12, 1930, he would leave his *ashram* at Ahmedabad and march two hundred miles to the sea at Dandi, where regardless of British law he would make salt. Then, said Nehru, "Salt suddenly became a mysterious word, a word of power."

On the appointed day Gandhi busily stepped into the narrow lane, vowing never to return to his beloved *ashram* until *Swaraj* had been achieved. "We act on behalf of the hungry, the naked and the unemployed," he said. "We are marching in the name of God."

For twenty-four days, the country almost held its breath. En route to Dandi, two hundred Indian village others resigned their prized government posts to join the struggle. Hundreds of thousands from all walks of life lined the road most of the way to see the Mahatma swimmer, but quick stride, wearing his long walking stick, joking only with his strange kind of fellow revolutionaries.

On the night of April 5 the band reached the beach. Gandhi said: "God willing, I expect with my companions to commence actual civil disobedience at six-thirty tomorrow morning." At sunrise, after his usual prayer meeting, he bathed in the sea and then reached down on the salt beach and raised up a handful of salt.

This simple act of taking salt from God's ocean in defiance of one of man's greatest empires said more to the peasants of India about freedom than any number of readings of the recent Declaration of Independence. "It seemed as though a spring had been suddenly released," Nehru said. "As we saw the abounding enthusiasm of the people and the way salt-making was spreading like a prairie fire, we felt a little abashed and ashamed."

Although thousands were arrested, including Nehru, Gandhi remained free. He wrote the viceroy that he intended to lead a non-violent raid on a government salt depot. His arrest two days later only increased the disobedience. Soon nearly 100,000 Indians, including 12,000 Muslims, were on their way to jail and far more than that had peacefully borne up under ruthless lathi charges by mounted police.

The salt raid which Gandhi had planned was carried out in his absence in prison, and remains one of the historic feats of the Indian Revolution. Twenty-five hundred volunteers, pledged to absolute nonviolence, participated in the mass attack. Advancing in small groups into the barbed-wire area where armed police guarded the salt, each human wave was struck down by police lathi charges.

Soon the unconscious bodies lay strewn on bloody ground. Still the Gandhians marched straight into the forbidden area, not even raising their hands in protection. By the end of the day, three hundred were seriously wounded and two died. The discipline of absolute nonviolence had been maintained, and Gandhi in his prison cell was overjoyed.

What pleased him most was the news that Gaffar Khan, the "frontier Gandhi," a tall Muslim leader of the Northwest Frontier Province, had successfully led large numbers of fierce Muslim Pathans into disciplined civil disobedience. Despite their brutal treatment at the hands of the police, these men whose heritage was military violence had not raised a hand in retaliation.

The London *Daily Herald's* correspondent in India reported: "Incalculable disaster may yet be avoided by the frank recognition that the imprisoned Mahatma now incarnates the very soul of India."

Then the Viceroy, Lord Irwin who later became Lord Halifax, unconditionally released the Congress leaders, and invited Gandhi to confer with him. Winston Churchill was not pleased by the news.

"It is alarming and also nauseating," he said, "to see Mr. Gandhi,

a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, now posing as a fair of a type well known in the East, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceregal palace, while he is still organizing and conducting a defiant campaign of civil disobedience, to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor."

Gandhi reached an agreement with Irwin, a deeply tolerant and religious man himself. The struggle was suspended, and Gandhi accepted an invitation to attend the second round-table conference in London on Indian self-government, a first conference having been held the year before without representation of the Congress leaders.

This time the British proved ready to take further steps toward Indian participation in the government of India, but they were not ready to meet Gandhi's minimum terms. In the end he had to announce his failure, and return to India for more struggle and service. Lord Irwin had been replaced with a viceroy who lacked his vision, and soon the official policy was to try Churchill's prescription of firmness. When Gandhi arrived home, he found many Congress leaders already in jail.

The British then announced separate electorates for untouchables. In London Gandhi had vowed that he would resist this measure with his life. He grasped the opportunity to shift the country once more from the frontal assault on colonial rule back to the steady task of political and social construction.

He embarked on a "fast unto death," to be ended only if the British withdrew their plan which, he believed, would permanently divide India and forever establish the untouchables as outcasts. Such a fast, he said, was the nonviolent revolutionary soldier's last resort in place of the sword.

For six days the nation responded again with a fever of activity. Hindu temples were opened to untouchables for the first time, and high caste and untouchable leaders came to a solemn agreement for the end of discrimination.

Nehru, who had first greeted Gandhi's suspension of the political struggle with his "heart sinking" and who had said he was "annoyed with him for choosing a side issue for his final sacrifice," noted "the tremendous upheaval" and wrote. "What a magician was this little man sitting in Yerwada Prison, and how well he knew how to pull the strings that move people's hearts."

Gandhi's life now depended solely on the decision of the British

cabinet. At the end of a week without food and shortly after the jail doctors announced that their patient had entered the danger zone, the imperial cabinet saved the life of its chief foe by suddenly reversing its solemn decision.

"Fasting," Gandhi remarked, "stirs up sluggish consciences and fires loving hearts to action." He named the untouchables "Harijans" or "Children of God" and said that his life had been in their hands. After his release from jail some months later, he commenced walking tours on their behalf which took him into every corner of India.

The Salt March had not achieved independence, but Gandhi was cheered by the increasing self reliance of the Indian people and by the growing evidence of widespread understanding and support in England and the West. He experienced this at first hand in the warm reception given him by many Englishmen during his trip to the London conference in 1931, and, in the British agitation to save his life during his epic fast.

The father of Jawaharlal Nehru, lying on his deathbed at the height of this second great struggle, was thus prophetic when he said to Gandhi "I am going soon, Mahatma, and I shall not be here to see *Swaraaj*. But I know that you have won it and will soon have it."

CHAPTER 18

Freedom for One-Fifth of Mankind

SUBHAS BOSI, the advocate of direct militant action, called Gandhi's suspension of the struggle in 1933 a 'confession of failure'. Yet not long after the suspension, the British enacted the Government of India Act of 1935 granting a large measure of self government in the provinces. While this was not in any way viewed by the British as a concession to Gandhi, few doubted that it was a response to the powerful national movement Gandhi had been leading for nearly twenty years. In 1937, elections on a limited franchise were actually held in the provinces, and the Congress entered victorious in nine of them, including the Muslim-majority province of the Northwest Frontier.

Although Gandhi would accept no office, his Congress party formed provincial governments, and for the first time felt political responsibility. Ten years later, the British left India altogether, and the anticolonial stage of the Indian Revolution was completed.

The Communists, of course, always considered Gandhi an obstacle to their kind of class revolution. Their 1939 International instructed party members to combat strongly tendencies 'like Gandhism in India' which was said to 'preach passivity' and 'repudiate the class struggle'. For the Communists, Gandhism was "a reversion to . . . backward forms."

As recently as 1954, the new edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* attacked Gandhi as "reactionary, a descendant of

"traitor," an "exploiter of religious prejudices," who "aped the ascetics in a demagogic way," and "actively helped British imperialism" against the Zulus in South Africa.

Perhaps this bitterness reflects the fact that the Communists in India never succeeded in winning any mass support as long as Gandhi was alive, and they have had very little solid support there since. The appeal they did have stemmed largely from their claim to qualities associated with Gandhi: a concern about injustice, identification with the poor, and a readiness to suffer.

In 1947 when the British decided to quit India, it was hard not to conclude that this little man weighing scarcely 110 pounds, armed only with a tall walking stick and the weapon of *Satyagraha*, was in large measure responsible. Nor was there any doubt that the friendship between India and Britain, on which a reconstituted Commonwealth was based, owed much of its foundation to the weapons with which Gandhi had carried on the struggle.

What a strange and magnificent climax for an anticolonial revolution! The massed bands of the colorful Indian Army regiments side by side with that of the Scottish Highlanders, playing "God Save the King." The white ensign of the King-emperor descending slowly from the flag staff. Then the saffron green and white flag of free India, with Gandhi's spinning wheel in the center, rising proudly. Together the bands playing the Indian national anthem once sung only by the revolutionaries.

In many parts of India the scene was repeated. Everywhere British governors, administrators, officers and men were cheered by enthusiastic crowds, and no one seemed more popular at that moment than the viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, the cousin of the King-emperor, who had announced when he came that he would be the last viceroy. Mountbatten invested Nehru with the prime ministership, and Nehru requested the King to appoint Mountbatten as the first Governor-General of Free India.

The continuing friendship of Britain and India, which now contributes so much to the stability of the non-Communist world, reflects profound credit to the generosity and decency of the peoples of both nations and their leaders. When the colonial government was at its worst, the first voices raised in protest were often in the House of Commons. From the English, Gandhi himself said he learned among other things, "punctuality, reticence, public hygiene,

independent thinking and exercise of judgment." Indians today are frank to recognize Britain's role in establishing a united nation under one law.

The very success of Gandhi's nonviolent techniques was probably an equal tribute to the British conscience. "A terror that never relented, that never compromised, that was always free of doubts," a Congress party veteran of the revolution once told me, "might have crushed us. British terror was never relentless enough to succeed."

The British people have often achieved greatness, but they were never greater than in the dignity and decisiveness with which they relinquished their control in South Asia. In the wake of Indian freedom, the British left Burma and Ceylon with similar good grace and brought to birth Pakistan. In India, because of the demonstrated strength of the Congress, the 584 princes agreed to merge their states, large and small, in the new Indian Union, accepting in return only the promise of a pension—a promise which Nehru's Government over strong opposition has meticulously kept. There were armed clashes in Hyderabad and Kashmir, but the wonder was that there were not fifty Kashmirs.

Yet despite this extraordinary success, Gandhi was far away from the scene of celebration on Independence Day, August 15, 1947, spending his time instead in fasting, spinning and in prayer. For him the partition of India, and the terrible fratricidal riots which succeeded it, had meant failure. "Visisect me, but not India," he had cried. But in an effort to avoid further Hindu-Muslim riots the Congress party leaders had reluctantly decided to accept the British proposal for the creation of Pakistan.

In the early Gandhian struggles the Muslims had played a large role. Hindu-Muslim unity had then gradually disappeared as a result of the creation by the British of separate electorates for the two religions, determined Muslim efforts to create a religious state of their own, and mistakes of the Congress itself when in office under the limited self-government of 1937.

After the first riots started in Calcutta in 1946, the combination of police action and pilgrimages by Gandhi into the scenes of trouble served to bring the fighting under control. Partition, however, brought a new wave of riots in the Punjab where a great province was divided along artificial lines, and where millions of Hindus,

Muslims or Sikhs on the wrong side of the line were left in fear or driven out.

Gandhi realized that his principles were far from being fully understood or accepted. As early as 1925 he had said, "I know that I am unable to carry with me the bulk of educated India." Thirty years later an old Gandhian, now chief minister of an Indian state, said to me, "To many of us *Satyagraha* was a religion, but to others it was no more than a successful technique."

In 1942, when the nonviolent methods appeared ineffective in the "Quit India" campaign, the militant young Socialists had turned to direct action, not against the British as individuals but against British property. They created a spectacular underground which for several months established and maintained armed home rule in many villages.

Subhas Bose, who had been re-elected president of the Congress in 1938 over Gandhi's explicit opposition, organized a Indian National Army for the purpose of liberating India, just as, he said, George Washington had liberated America. After a long march up from Singapore, this army actually entered India briefly, during the high tide of Japanese advances.

In prison Gandhi was profoundly disturbed over this growing cult of violence. When the leaders of Subhas' army were hailed as nation-wide heroes on their return to India after the war, Gandhi felt that his hold was slipping. When Congress chose partition instead of his own proposal for more wandering in the wilderness in search of a united India, Gandhi could see no reason to celebrate any victory. There were many ingredients in the Indian Revolution, and at times the non-Gandhian ones came rudely to the fore in some of the worst examples of bloodshed and forced movements of people which our unhappy century has seen.

Gandhi's last act of *Satyagraha* was in part against his own followers. Four months after independence he went on a fast unto death to quiet Muslim-Hindu bitterness and to require India to divide its treasury with Pakistan in spite of the outbreak of fighting in Kashmir.

"If I survive the struggle for freedom, I might have to give non-violent battle to my own countrymen," he had said. After six days, the new government granted to Pakistan the \$250 million of the United India treasury which had been assigned to it after partition, and the Hindu and Muslim leaders pledged their goodwill toward

each other's faiths. So successful did the fast seem, that Gandhi began to show renewed confidence and promised to live to be 125.

First he had set independence as his goal. Next he had concentrated with considerable success on putting an end to Hindu-Muslim strife. Now he said he would soon turn to social and economic matters, applying his techniques of action to the establishment of the kind of equality and decentralization which for him would give flesh and blood to *Swaraj*. "Where is the independence," he asked "with all this poverty? If I live my task will be to reform politics."

On January 30, 1948, ten days after he had broken the fast, he was shot three times and killed while walking unguarded to his regular prayer meeting. Despite threats from fanatic Hindus, and a bomb thrown at him a few days before, he had refused police protection.

Jawaharlal Nehru, the new Prime Minister, sat on the ground at the foot of Gandhi's flaming funeral pyre. Beside him sat Mountbatten, the ex-viceroy, and Lord Mountbatten. Around them pressed a gigantic crowd like a river of tears. When Gandhi's ashes were later emptied seaward into the Ganges, more than four million people were gathered there on the river bank. Some say more human beings assembled on that day than on any other occasion in history.

The king's representative in the United Nations, in mourning the death of "the friend of the poorest and the loneliest and the lost," predicted that Gandhi's "greatest achievements . . . are still to come."

General MacArthur, then the supreme Allied military commander in Japan, said "In the evolution of civilization, if it is to survive, all men cannot fail eventually to adopt Gandhi's belief that the process of mass application of force to resolve continuous issues is fundamentally not only wrong but contains within itself the germs of self-destruction."

Gandhi had believed in the people and had demonstrated their power. He had proved the possibility of peaceful change by non-violent direct action. He knew that not just a change of government was needed, but a fundamental change in the relationships of men to each other. The fact that the people could not live up to all of his demands was only to say that they were human.

It may be argued that Gandhi exercised power more successfully, with more lasting effects, than any of his revolutionary contemporaries. Did he not stake out the best and most complete revolution the twentieth century had seen? Was it too much to hope that in the age of the hydrogen bomb Gandhi's revolution might become the model for the remaining revolutions of the century?

CHAPTER 19

A Young India Emerges

TO what extent the Gandhian ideal of a complete democratic revolution will be embraced by the people of South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and some parts of South America, who are still challenging the *status quo*, depends to a considerable extent on how well the 370 million Indians carry on their Mahatma's work

As we have seen, Gandhi demanded more than the driving out of a colonial power, or the switch from a group of foreign leaders to indigenous ones, or even economic development. Gandhi's revolution had insisted on national freedom and economic development, but with the crucial additional dimension of human dignity, grounded in a fundamental moral and spiritual regeneration of the Indian people.

With Gandhi's death, Gandhism in India seemed to go through a prism, coming out of the other side split into many beams of light, each carrying some quality of Gandhi, but none having the concentrated power which had overthrown an empire. India is still engulfed in an inner struggle of soul-searching for the right way.

The fight for national freedom has been won when the British troops withdrew, but mighty barriers remained to the development of a sense of national unity. Of the many problems besetting free India let us look more closely at the two most relevant to the hopes for a complete revolution—human dignity and economic development.

After partition the Nehru Government worked feverishly and with

much success to build a secular state, in which the 45 million Muslims in India might be safe and enjoy full rights of citizenship. More than six million Hindu refugees were peacefully absorbed. Today many high posts in the Indian Government and universities are held by Muslims.

In 1950 the new Indian Constitution was adopted which, drawing heavily on American and British experience, established a parliamentary form of government with a Bill of Rights comparable to our own.

The untouchables, Gandhi's "Children of God" have been granted full legal rights. Legislation passed in 1955 states that anyone who practices discrimination against them in any form may be punished by a fine and up to six months in prison.

Women, whose economic status in India has always been low, were emancipated and now legally at least have the full rights enjoyed by women in all democratic countries. Although child marriages were formerly the rule and the average girl was married by her thirteenth birthday, marriage is now illegal for Hindu girls under fifteen or Hindu boys under eighteen.

Soon after I arrived in India in late 1951, the young republic conducted its first nation-wide election on the basis of a universal franchise. Over 100 million people went peacefully to the polls in democracy's largest election. A higher proportion of the electorate voted than in most American presidential campaigns.

Nehru's Congress party, bearing the legacy of the Gandhian struggle, won 45 per cent of the votes and roughly 73 per cent of the parliamentary seats. The opposition was divided among the Praja and Socialist parties (now combined as the Praja Socialists), with 16 per cent of the votes but a poor showing of seats, the Communists, with only 5 per cent of the votes but with a strong showing of seats in the Telugu-speaking area, part of which is now the State of Andhra; the extreme right wing and orthodox Hindu parties with another 5 per cent; and scattered independents and local parties dividing the rest of the vote. Nehru's Congress party was able to continue its strong hold on the central government and on almost all of the states.

A generation of violence, armed uprisings and underground stealth such as occurred in China would have made such an election impossible. The effect of British law combined with Gandhi's technique

of nonviolent action, had strengthened faith in persuasion, and established for the people the habits of self-government.

* * *

In the economic sphere, too, progress has been increasingly reassuring. A Five Year Plan of economic development was initiated in 1951. The target date was set for April 1956.

At the time I left India as Ambassador in March 1953, there were many who felt that the plan's objectives were too ambitious. There were many envious comments on the Communist Chinese development program to the north, where there was no need to slow down for the democratic practices of persuasion and compromise, and no fear of antagonizing a free electorate.

When I revisited India two years later, the change was considerable. Almost everywhere I found a sense of assurance born of the knowledge that most of the goals of the first Five Year Plan were being surpassed, that in a special election in Andhra the Indian Communist party, which had based its campaign on economic issues, had met a shattering defeat and that even the skeptics were admitting that so far, at least, Indian democracy was a success.

Not that there weren't problems and questions in abundance. More than half of all Indian families were still living on less than \$250 a year. Indian factory workers were receiving on the average less than a dollar a day; a primary schoolteacher in a state such as Madhya Pradesh only twenty dollars a month. There were millions partly or wholly unemployed. Although food was much more plentiful, the average Indian villager still had an inadequate and badly balanced diet.

When we consider the distance India has left to go, there is sober reason for concern. But when we consider the distance she has covered since independence, there is reason for measured confidence. This is particularly important because in the field of economic development India today is engaged in what history may consider the battle of our century. The two giant underdeveloped countries, China and India, with 40 per cent of the world's people between them, have embarked on a fateful competition in the pace and methods of industrial growth. The contrasts and consequences of

democratic as opposed to totalitarian economic development are being demonstrated in practice

Most students of Asian affairs have recognized the immensity of this contest and the stakes involved. More than any other single event short of war, the outcome may determine the path which the rest of the underdeveloped world ultimately chooses to take.

Democratic India by definition faces certain problems that totalitarian China can to a large extent ignore. Of primary importance is the fact that the Indian Government must woo its peasant voters or forfeit its largest political constituency. Within certain elusive limits, the Peking Government, not dependent on votes, can depend on sterner measures.

We have seen that in Russia and China, the peasants are harshly exploited in an attempt to provide the maximum food for the city workers at the lowest possible cost to the state in consumer goods and amenities. The emphasis of the Communists is placed primarily on industrial development.

Even under totalitarianism this approach involves risks. In a democracy like India it would lead straight to a political explosion. Seventy-five per cent of India's millions live in the villages, and without their support any democratic government would be doomed. In order to build the foundation for a free Asian society, the first Indian Five Year Plan placed heavy emphasis on rural development.

This contrast between the democratic and totalitarian approach is also implicit in the planning process of the two countries. In March, 1950, India set up a Planning Commission with Prime Minister Nehru as chairman. Consultation with various state and central government agencies, advisory boards and special experts continued for fifteen months, at the end of which a draft of a Five Year Plan was circulated throughout the country.

Modified by widespread discussion and debate, the plan was adopted some months later by the Indian Parliament as the blueprint for the country's economic effort. It proposed what is undoubtedly the greatest democratic rural revolution of our time.

By contrast, although we know little of the actual mechanics of the planning program in China, we can draw some inferences from the fact that the Five Year Plan announced from Peking in December, 1952, was as nearly a carbon copy of Russia's first plan as circumstances would permit. As the Soviet planners neglected the

grain-producing but uneasy Ukraine, so the Chinese put little emphasis on Southern China, presumably the best rice-producing and least loyal section.

In the Chinese plan stress was placed on the development of the secure inner provinces like Sinkiang and Manchuria much like the Russian trans-Ural build-up. Instead of the detailed precise targets of the Indian program by which progress could be judged and criticized, broad objectives are set down for the five year period which are then modified to fit the changing requirements of the central government as dictated by political or economic expediency.

The contrast is equally visible in the methods by which these plans are carried forward. Basic to all economic development in totalitarian and democratic countries alike, is the process of capital formation. Any economically healthy nation must consume less than it produces, so that the surplus will be available to create new plants and other productive facilities. Here the Chinese with the tightly controlled apparatus of a totalitarian government, seem to have an advantage over the Indian leaders responsible to a democratic public opinion.

India relies almost entirely on taxation to limit the amount of productive activity that goes into consumer goods. The Indian farmer operates under free market conditions. Tax income, plus capital secured by deficit financing, foreign loans and grants provide the revenues for the essential building of railroads, docks, factories, hydroelectric plants, irrigation dams and for malaria control and other essential services.

Of course, taxation is an important source of revenue in China as well. But it is supplemented by substantial profits on government-owned enterprises which now cover some 80 per cent of the heavy industry, 60 per cent of the light industry, 90 per cent of the banking, 50 per cent of retail trade and 80 per cent of wholesale trade. As in all Communist states, "borrowing" and "voluntary contributions" which usually mean requisition of savings or forced labor, are also substantial.

Reliable figures are hard to obtain, but it appears that China's internal surplus for investment purposes raised by these methods has approached 16 per cent of her national income annually, while in India the best level that has yet been attained by democratic means is about 7 per cent.

As we have seen in a previous chapter, the Chinese economic program is designed to turn China into a modern industrial power regardless of the sacrifices required from the people. Both agriculture and consumer goods industries are forced into a secondary role, with heavy industry taking priority.

The first Indian Five Year Plan by contrast is geared to a moderate increase in living standards and is committed to the priority rather than the postponement of careful agricultural development. Both economies desperately need a steady increase in food and other agricultural production. In order to get it India is encouraging her peasants in every possible way while China is placing her peasantry under stringent regulations.

The Indian plan calls for an additional investment of about \$2.2 billion in agriculture and irrigation by April, 1956. Comparable figures for China with 600 million more people are only \$1.6 billion. In industry and power the emphasis is reversed with India adding \$2.3 billion while China claims to be on her way to a record \$6.2 billion.

Can the Indian Five Year Plan with its essential focus on human welfare still afford the industrial boom necessary for generating long term economic growth? Can the Chinese carry on their rapid pace of industrial expansion without at some point bursting the effective limits of police controls and popular endurance among the 450 million rural Chinese in the vast underdeveloped countries throughout Asia, Africa and South America which are urgently seeking answers to similar problems? Are we watching this Chinese-Indian competition intently?

* * *

ONE thing seems clear. India's progress by 1955 was greater than one could have expected at the beginning of the Five Year Plan. Although land reform so utterly essential to a healthy rural society is still by no means complete, it has gone forward. Many of the large land holdings have been abolished, and today a much higher proportion of Indian peasants are small owners working their own lands. The total compensation to the landlords will eventually reach \$1 billion.

The gains in agricultural production have been heartening, amounting in 1955 to a 20 per cent increase since 1953. Blessed by good rains, India was at long last self-sufficient in food in 1954. As a result foreign exchange amounting to between \$250 million and \$500 million a year which was formerly earmarked for overseas purchases of wheat and rice, was made available to buy foreign built factory equipment, railroad rolling stock, trucks and other essentials. Increased irrigation that will become available in 1956 may assure maintenance of adequate food production levels regardless of the monsoons.

Because water is the lifeblood of India, the Five Year Plan gave irrigation a high priority. The increase in irrigated land by the target date for the first Five Year Plan—April 1, 1956—was expected to reach the extraordinary total of 167 million acres. This is more than the total amount of all land now under cultivation in Japan, and is only slightly less than all the irrigated land in the United States.

The progress of the Indian village development program involving not only food production but also public health and education—a program in which I had invested much time and hope at its founding—has been perhaps the most encouraging.

In February, 1955, I visited the Mulug Community Development Project, which includes some 75 villages and 65,000 people and is located in the Telengana section of eastern Hyderabad. Here in 1948 the Communists staged their bloody revolt timed to coincide with Communist uprisings in Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It was an area where a few landlords owned vast holdings, while the majority of the people had tiny plots—were landless. Several thousand persons were killed and many villages burned while the Communists drove out the landlords and divided the land. Two divisions of the Indian Army and thirty thousand state police finally restored order. As late as 1952 I had been warned to stay out of this area because it was still unsafe without armed escort.

Reminders of the revolt are still evident everywhere. The jungle, for instance, had been cut back five hundred yards on both sides of the road to prevent ambushes. Where visual reminders were inadequate, a running commentary was supplied by the project director:

"This village was completely destroyed by the Communists."

"Here the landlord and all of his family were murdered."

"In this place, just two years ago, our workers were told to get out within twenty-four hours or they would be assassinated."

"Throughout this district there was a Red hammer and sickle flag in front of every house."

In an area of 130 square miles, 72 villages and 68,000 people, instead of Red flags and surly scowls, we found friendliness, enthusiasm and solid achievements. Eighty per cent of the land was now owned by those who till it. Malaya had dropped from an incidence of 60 per cent to 2 per cent. More than half the children between the ages of six and eleven were already in schools. The village streets were neatly graded, with drains at the sides. Three new villages had been built from the ground up. All the work had been performed by the residents for their own betterment and without pay.

Altogether, the Indian village development program in the spring of 1955 covered more than 100,000 similar villages with about 80 million people—by far the greatest effort of its kind in the world. Modeled after our own rural extension service, it offers each community advice on modern agricultural methods; on better seeds and the use of fertilizers; on rudimentary public health malaria control and cleaner water; and on building schools through voluntary labor.

A trained worker is assigned to every five or six villages to organize these projects. Specialists in agriculture, public health and education are available to help him in special situations.

Aware that man does not live by bread alone, these projects now include a social education director who organizes dances, village art and other cultural activities. Plans call for every village in India to be covered by this many-sided extension program by 1961.

The burden of training and administration is tremendous. Forty-six well-equipped schools have been established with the help of Ford Foundation funds. From them come five thousand trained village development workers each year—plus several thousand administrators and specialists in public health, agriculture, irrigation, engineering education, social work, midwifery and cultural activities.

Major progress has also been made in the field of public health.

The village development program includes DDT spraying twice a year in all areas affected by malaria. But, because of the devastating effect of malaria on human life and productivity, it was decided to attempt to eradicate the disease as far as possible from all of India by 1957, four years in advance of the target date for the rest of the village program

The need was clearly urgent. Up to 1953 there was an average of a hundred million cases of malaria each year. Several million acres of good land were so infested with malaria mosquitoes that they could not be tilled. Because malaria usually strikes at the harvest season, the annual production loss was estimated at roughly 6 per cent of the total Indian crop.

In 1953 the areas affected by malaria were divided into 190 districts with one million people in each. A nation-wide organization of 18,750 people was trained, and DDT spraying was started, house by house, and village by village.

In 1954, one hundred districts with a total population of a hundred million people were completely sprayed two or three times with DDT provided by American Point Four. In 1955, the coverage was increased to 136 million. By 1957 all 190 districts will be included. By 1955 the average of 100 million cases of malaria each year had already been reduced to 25 million.

Although a principal focus of the first Five Year Plan has been on food production and village development work, the industrial section has also shown substantial gains. Between 1952 and 1955, industrial output rose 37 per cent.

Indian railroads are being rapidly modernized. By 1955 the annual production of railroad cars in India had been stepped up from six thousand to twelve thousand. Two thousand locomotives were also being added, about one third of them produced in Indian factories. Plans also call for an increase of 51 per cent in hydro-electric production by April, 1956.

Ninety-three per cent of this development program is paid for by internal Indian financing, primarily by extremely heavy taxation. The remainder comes from World Bank loans and grants from the Colombo Plan and the Point Four program. To the surprise of the economists and fiscal experts, up to 1955 there had been no infla-

tion beyond the postwar period. Indeed in 1955 the consumer price levels, chiefly because of the large grain crops, were slightly lower than in 1952.

It seemed likely that, with few exceptions, the goals of the Five Year Plan would be met or surpassed by April, 1956. The second Five Year Plan, with the competitive Chinese effort clearly in mind, will call for increased emphasis on industry as well as a steady expansion in rural development and improvement. Indeed it is expected that India's already significant industrial output may be doubled by 1961. It is hoped that by then steel production will have reached five million tons, approximately that of Japan before Pearl Harbor.

This is an ambitious program. Even given the impressive new atmosphere which I found there in 1955, can India meet her goals? In 1955 India was forced to consume 93 per cent of her meager production to provide a bare existence for her people. This left only 7 per cent for expansion and development.

By 1961, as a result of steady expansion and continued heavy taxes, consumption is expected to amount to no more than 88 per cent of production, which would leave a remarkable 12 per cent for investment in increased facilities. Can this drastic belt tightening be sustained by a democracy without a political explosion?

This is only one of many equally pertinent questions which I believe will occur to any objective observer. Another is this, can the present able Civil Service be expanded to administer within six years a village extension effort covering every village in India with nearly double the entire population of the United States? More than 400,000 trained men and women will be required.

Furthermore the period of greatest political stress on any society, as I have suggested earlier, may not come when people are hopelessly sunk in poverty, but at the moment when they sense the possibility of an expanding and better life and feel that their progress should be faster. What are the political implications if their growing expectations, however unreasonable, remain too long unfulfilled? There will be no dearth of demagogues to under score the failures.

Each year Indian universities graduate fifty thousand young men and women, most of whom have liberal arts degrees and a gentlemanly reluctance to tackle the grueling work of raising a nation by

its bootstraps. Can the means be found to involve these young college graduates emotionally and physically in the work that needs to be done in the villages, factories and slums? Or will they remain on the sidelines as an intellectual elite, frustrated, resentful and tempted toward the politics of violence? Revolutions are often led, not by hungry peasants, but by frustrated middle-class intellectuals who may never have had a hungry day in their lives.

India's land reform program has made gains. Will the present progress continue over the opposition of the politically powerful landlords? If not, the rewards of increased production will go, not to the many, but to the few, and Communist agitators will have a new opportunity.

India's industrialists, with some notable exceptions, have concentrated on quick, speculative profits, rather than long-term expansion with small unit profits. Some of them have not hesitated to falsify their tax returns. Such attitudes have helped to put private capitalism in India in bad repute. Can India's system of private ownership be revitalized to play an improved part in the development program?

Rapidly increased employment opportunities are vital, and here the task is dangerously great. Industrial progress is essential, but this is not the final answer. (Sixty per cent of the world's motor cars are made in American factories by only 1.3 million workers.) The employment of India's unemployed or partly employed millions depends primarily on village housing construction, road building, crafts and village industries. Present plans seem inadequate.

Perhaps most important of all, can a sense of national pride and of individual participation in the process of development be maintained and expanded? There must be a mutually recognized partnership between government and people that welds the nation together and gives a sense of spiritual drive and excitement to the job at hand—a particularly relevant challenge in the land of Gandhi.

What, indeed, about the spirit of Gandhi? Was his success only an exciting but passing phase in India's long history? Was Gandhi's program merely a technique to secure freedom? Or did Gandhi leave something dynamic, lasting and deep rooted, a driving force for India's future development?

As an American with high hopes that India might not only solve

her own critical difficulties but through her example offer a new way to a materialistic and often cynical world, I confess that I have often had my periods of disappointment.

One example involves Kashmir. As Ambassador to India it had been my responsibility to study carefully the legal and political aspects of the Kashmir question. It was my belief that on this issue the Indians have always had a justifiable legal claim.

Yet in November, 1947, the Indian Government promised that a plebiscite would be held as soon as "all foreign troops were removed from Kashmir soil." In 1955 this plebiscite had not yet been held, and there appeared little likelihood that it would be held.

In the summer of 1953 I had been disturbed to see the appearance of what appeared to be a carefully organized, anti-American propaganda campaign, following the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir Prime Minister. Casual American tourists were charged with being spies. Even Adlai Stevenson, who went to Kashmir for a few days' rest, did not escape abuse. Responsible Indian newspapers alluded to him darkly as an agent of the Pentagon, plotting the building of secret air bases in the Kashmir mountains.

Not unreasonably India has often called on American policy makers to be flexible in dealing with Moscow and Peking. Does not India also carry a responsibility to make a more determined effort to reach an understanding with her neighbor, Pakistan?

Although Indian leaders may be correct in saying that they have met Pakistan halfway, is that enough? India has been blessed with a great national leader, a unifying political party, and the benefit of a far stronger government than that of Pakistan. Under such circumstances would Gandhi have been content to "go halfway"? His last fast on behalf of Muslims and better treatment of Pakistan suggests its own answer.

Moreover was Gandhi's India not obliged to give the world an example of full respect for civil liberties? In 1955 Sheikh Abdullah, an old friend of most Congress party leaders, was still confined without trial, although India for years had criticized Pakistan for a similar confinement of the "Frontier Gandhi," Gaffar Khan.

Before my return visit to India in 1955 I also had heard more talk of corruption than in 1951-53—this time allegedly reaching officers of cabinet rank in some of the Indian states. The activities of the

landlord lobbies in several state legislatures in India were described as scandalous.

In her long struggle for independence and in the principles laid down by her leaders, India had set a high standard for herself. Should her friends be blamed if they judged her by those standards?

* * *

THESE questions were on my mind when, in February, 1955, I visited a village training center at Gandhigram in Madras State in South India. Here some three hundred young men and women were working to prepare themselves for the kind of village work which Gandhi understood and encouraged. We attended the sunset service and heard the hymns sung with feeling and beauty. Some were modern, and others were drawn from the old Vedic literature. There were readings from the Bible, the Koran and the Gita, each stressing the oneness of all people and the all-embracing importance of the individual irrespective of his race, his creed or his color.

That night we talked with a group of men who had been close to Gandhi, and who had shared his failures and successes. I told them how deeply impressed I was with the spiritual dedication that we had sensed there at the school, and I asked them how they interpreted its relevance for the future.

"India will see her most glorious days in the years ahead," one of them commented. "If it had not been for Nehru we could not have survived as a nation. His devotion and political skill pulled us together and gave us leadership. His courage drove back the religious extremists whose passions might have devoured us."

"But for India," he continued, "Nehru, for all his greatness, is a halfway house. When Nehru retires or dies, India will become not less Gandhian, but more Gandhian."

I remembered that the two men most frequently mentioned as Nehru's probable successors were both among Gandhi's most dedicated followers—Morarji Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay State, and Jayaprakash Narayan, former head of the Socialist party and a graduate of the University of Wisconsin. I had known ~~him~~

for several years and my visits with them had been memorable experiences.

I also remembered my recent conversation with the new president of the Congress party, U N Dhebar, an earnest, able Gandhian follower who had told me of his determination to root out party corruption and renew in the Congress the Gandhian devotion to the public welfare.

There was also my wife's vivid account of her day in Orissa with Vinoba Bhave "India's walking saint," to whom landlords have voluntarily contributed four million acres of land for distribution to the landless. She described his early start at 3:30 A.M., the morning prayers, and the rapt adoration of all of the thousands of people who saw him and talked with him during the day.

In Hyderabad, after Gandhi's death, the Communists had seized and distributed thousands of acres of land. Vinoba, an ascetic who had once been chosen by Gandhi as the number one example of nonviolence, visited Hyderabad in 1951, and resolved to try to solve the problem of the landless through Gandhian means.

In a Hyderabad village he called on the landholders, large and small, to recognize the landless as their brothers and to share the land with them. One landlord responded and *Bhoodan*—the land gift pilgrimage—was born.

Vinoba decided to ask that everyone begin by giving one-sixth of his land, as if to a sixth son. With this message he began in 1951 to walk the length of India, collecting acres for the landless. The several thousand Gandhian workers throughout India, who had been working in isolated centers, rallied to the idea.

In 1955 we sensed that the *Bhoodan* movement was giving expression to a moral revival throughout India. In a country as vast and full of contrasts as India, one must avoid hasty generalizations based on isolated personal experiences, no matter how vivid. Having said that, I must still state that from our own knowledge and life in India, we were greatly heartened. The glowing promise of a deeper and richer spiritual life, which had dimmed somewhat in the years after the first major accomplishment of independence, seemed to be reawakening. Indians were thinking more and more of moral values.

Every night at the end of a ten- to fifteen-mile walk through the villages and countryside, Vinoba Bhave wielded a spade as a symbol of his community of spirit with those who till the land. He showed

the landlords, as Gandhi showed the British, that it is they, not their victims, who suffer most from their own acts of injustice and oppression.

Vinoba's moral influence can be judged partly by his converts. Jayaprakash Narayan, the Socialist leader, has dedicated his life to *Bhoodan* and the nonviolent development of a modern democratic India. As Vinoba's deputy, he is bringing many young Indians into the work—particularly the work of distributing the millions of acres collected and of reorganizing the several hundred villages where all the land has been given.

Neither he nor Vinoba sees *Bhoodan* as a substitute for land reform legislation. On the contrary, they both argue that this movement among villagers will create the necessary atmosphere to ensure the proper legislation by releasing the storehouse of Gandhian power—the power of a convinced people.

Those who accept the thesis that eventually Communism can only be defeated by a more powerful idea, will recognize in this frail, elderly man one of the greatest democratic forces in all of Asia. "We do not agree," Vinoba says, "with the Communists in their view that there can be no revolution without violence. We believe that in a country like India and in a democratic setup of government, it is quite possible to bring about a revolution through the ballot box, without resorting to violence.

"Having proved its worth by securing *Swamy* [freedom] for us," Vinoba continues, "Gandhism may no longer be dubbed visionary and impracticable. And Communism, too, has for the moment proved its virility by rejuvenating the lorry old China. This tempts some workers to seek a reconciliation of the two systems. The fact of the matter is that these two ideologies are irreconcilable; the difference between them is fundamental . . . It is as clear as day that they are deadly opposed to each other."

On our last night in India in 1955 we were invited to a private showing in the President's House of a film of Gandhi's life and efforts in 1929 and 1930. It showed dramatically the great, powerful crowds, the disciplined nonviolence in the face of police charges, the English textile workers of Lancaster, unemployed because of Gandhi's boycott of British manufactured cloth, cheering warmly as Gandhi walked among them during his visit to the United Kingdom.

With the exception of ourselves, the audience of forty or so con-

sisted of members of the working committee of the Congress party, Gandhi's instrument of liberation. Many of them had appeared in the picture as young, dedicated leaders working under the guidance and inspiration of their Mahatma. Later that night at dinner Nehru talked intently about the heritage that Gandhi had left and the responsibilities that had been passed on to him and his associates.

I remember now the earnest look of the village workers in their schools at Gandhigram and Hyderabad and at their work in the villages. And I wonder if the spirit generated there may not only assure the development and freedom of India's people, but serve also as a guide for many hundreds of millions of others across the seas.

Could Vinoba's words be prophetic? "What can be a more fascinating study to us," he asked, "than that of a comparison between the ideologies of Gandhi and Marx? Lenin is ingested in Marx. And the shadow of Tolstoy spreads over Gandhi. The two ideologies stand face to face, each bent on swallowing up the other.

"On the surface it might seem that the two contestants occupying the arena are the Communists led by Russia and the capitalists . . . by the United States. But ideologically the latter has lost all vitality and though it might appear doughty on the strength of its military force, I do not regard it as really existent as a rival against Communism. I believe that ultimately it will be Gandhism with which Communism will have its trial of strength."

Americans will not accept Vinoba's harsh charge that we have lost our democratic conviction; but it should press us to re-examine how well we are practicing the principles of our revolution, to see why a man like Vinoba would find us wanting. Meanwhile, if Gandhism has created a new revolutionary alternative to Communism, it is a vital sign, for it is an alternative based on the idea of human dignity.

CHAPTER 20

India and the Cold War

MOST Americans react with sympathy and admiration to the story of Gandhi's epic leadership of the Indian struggle for freedom and to the recent social and economic progress of the new Indian nation. But they are likely to have strong misgivings about India's role in international affairs. They want to know whether India is isolationist, neutralist, anti-American or just plain pro-Communist. They are especially concerned about India's attitude toward her two massive Communist neighbors—China and Russia.

Often this concern is directed to the attitudes of Prime Minister Nehru. This is a relevant point, since Nehru's views have largely dominated the foreign policy thinking of most Indians since 1925 when the Congress party, meeting in Kanpur, set up its Foreign Department to study international questions and to make its recommendations to the parent body.

Perhaps an even more significant date is 1927. Speaking at a press conference in Madras on January 15, 1955, Nehru himself said that the 1927 session of the Congress in Madras was a parent of the foreign policy that India had been pursuing since independence. "India's foreign policy of nonalignment and friendly relations with all nations, as well as our general outlook about freedom of all countries and anticolonialism, started from that period," Nehru said. "It is well to remember this, because it means that our foreign policy is not a sudden growth, but a natural outcome of our thinking for many years past."

Although the resolutions of a party out of power are not always

identical with the foreign policy that party might have conducted had it had governmental responsibility, it is fair to say, as Nehru said, that the present Indian Government has had a foreign policy for at least a generation.

Consistently through the years the themes of anticolonialism and antiracialism recurred in Congress party resolutions. In 1928 the Congress offered its somewhat premature congratulations to the China of Chiang Kai-shek "on having attained full and complete nationhood and having ended the era of foreign domination."

In 1936, Krishna Menon, who in 1955 was India's special roving ambassador, was author of a report to the Congress which stated that "imperialism is a continuing cause of war, and its elimination is essential in the interest of peace."

The Congress was outspoken in its opposition to Fascist aggression, expressing in 1936 its "deepest sympathy and anxiety" for the people of Spain who were fighting "a military group aided by foreign mercenary troops and Fascist powers in Europe." A year later, following the landing of Japanese troops in Shanghai, the Congress called upon the Indian people to boycott "the use of Japanese goods as a mark of sympathy for the people of China." In 1938 the preparations for "an imperialist war" in Europe were deplored, and after fighting began, a similar stand was taken against Nazi aggression.

But even while Indian troops fought at Britain's side, the stress on ending colonialism was never forgotten. In March, 1946, seventeen months before the British left India, the Congress demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Indonesia, Manchuria, Indochina, Iran and Egypt, while asserting that "India still remains the crux of the problem of Asian freedom and on the independence of India depends the freedom of many countries and the peace of the world."

At a New Delhi press conference in September of that year Mr. Nehru laid down the policy India would follow as an independent nation in terms to which he has adhered ever since with remarkable consistency. "In the sphere of foreign affairs," he said, "India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from the power politics of groups aligned one against another. She will uphold the principle of freedom for dependent peoples and will oppose racial discrimination wherever it may occur. She will work with the other peace-

loving nations for international co-operation and goodwill without exploitation of one nation by another."

Nehru went on to pledge India's "wholehearted co-operation and unreserved adherence to the United Nations," and to offer India's vigorous participation "to which her geographical position, population and contribution toward peaceful progress entitle her." The Indian delegate, he said, would at all times "make it clear that India stands for the independence of all colonial and dependent people and their full right to self-determination."

This is still as clear a general statement of India's foreign policy as can be found anywhere. With but one addition, India's voluntary adherence to the British Commonwealth, it might have been issued any time in the last decade. In the context both of this Indian foreign policy background and of events and attitudes in the Soviet Union and Communist China, India's policies toward her Communist neighbors over the years come into clearer focus.

In the final stages of the independence struggle during World War II, the Indian Communists won the enmity of most other Indians by throwing their weight behind the British on orders from Moscow to give all-out support to the viceroy. While Gandhi and Nehru were leading Indians in great nonviolent strikes, the Communists served the British as strikebreakers. Thus in India the Communists actually opposed the nationalist movement at a crucial juncture, and were consequently discredited.

Anti-Communist sentiment throughout much of India was reinforced when, shortly after independence, Indian Communists staged their violent uprising which centered in the Telengana area of Hyderabad. We have already seen that this revolt, which was part of a world-wide tactic of international Communism, was suppressed only by the use of the sternest military measures, and at great cost. When I arrived in India in 1951, an official said to me wryly that his government "had more Communists in prison than any country except Russia."

Since those days the Indian Communist party, although still taking its direction from Moscow, has sharply modified its tactics. On occasion it even professes respect for nonviolence. This claim, however, suffered somewhat from Communist activities in the Andhra elections in February, 1955. The property of Congress party leaders

was burned, and threats of personal violence filled the air, as the Communists went all out in a distinctly non Gandhian effort to win the State Assembly

For such excesses most Indians are inclined to blame Soviet leadership which it is assumed still directs the Indian Communist party. That direction was clear enough even up to the final months of the Communist victory on the Chinese mainland. The Indian Communist Party shared the indifference of Moscow and the satellites to Mao's early successes. Thus as late as July, 1949, after Mao's forces had overrun most of China, Indian Communist party papers were still referring to him scornfully as an "agrarian reformer". "The Communist party of India" in an official announcement issued in that month "accepts Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as the authoritative source of Marxism. It has not discovered new sources of Marxism beyond these."

It was not until January, 1950 just before the United Kingdom, India, Burma and Pakistan recognized Mao's government, that the Indian Communist party on Moscow orders accepted Maoism as a valid form of Communism. The fact that in June, 1955, two days after Nehru concluded a state visit to Moscow, the Indian Communist party abruptly announced the reversal of its anti Congress position and recent credence to the theory that Moscow still directs Indian Communist party activities, although in my opinion the dramatic defeat suffered in Andhra left the Indian Communists no other immediate alternative.

To balance these generally adverse factors, the Soviet Union has had at least three advantages over the years. One of these is the traditional Marxist-Lenin position on colonialism which made an early impression on the minds of Indian leaders. In almost every international conference on imperialism between the great wars, when the struggle for freedom was uppermost in the minds of Indian leaders, Soviet delegates appeared as outspoken opponents of colonialism. And this consistent vocal endorsement of the cause of anticolonialism, as we have seen, came at a time when the traditional pressures which the Czars had exerted against Russia's neighbors, were being relaxed temporarily by the Kremlin.

Another Kremlin advantage, on which I touched briefly in a previous chapter, is the extraordinary ignorance of most educated Indians of the factors which led up to the Cold War impasse. Dur-

ing the decade 1945-55 while the West was experiencing the harshness of Stalinist policies, India was preoccupied with the final withdrawal of the British, the religious riots and the monumental tasks of launching the new state. The lessons America learned as the Soviet Union pursued its Cold War tactics in Poland, Iran, Greece, Turkey, Germany and Korea were only casually read in India or not read at all.

In 1955 I made a speech before the Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi in which I listed fourteen major issues on which American foreign policy had, I felt, been demonstrably right in this postwar period. Most of the ground that I covered was almost totally new to my audience.

The third factor, partially resulting from this same widespread ignorance of Soviet action, is the stubborn conviction that Moscow, whatever its faults, earnestly seeks peace. Many non-Communist Indians, for instance, believe that the present atomic competition is an American creation, which we will not relinquish. Even among the leaders, there are few who remember the Acheson-Liahtenthal-Baruch plan for atomic control. The professed efforts of the Soviet Union to further disarmament and a lessening of tensions has made a profound impression, and Moscow's past refusal to demonstrate a genuine willingness to compromise are quickly forgotten or ignored.

It will be surprising, indeed, if we do not see a greatly stepped up Soviet effort to woo India during the next decade. Moscow understands the new dimension of power and hence recognizes India's vast importance in the present world context. India's potential role as a counterbalance to a more difficult-to-handle China must also be obvious to the Kremlin. How New Delhi will react to these blandishments to come is an open question.

There can be no doubt, however, that it took the emergence of Communist China to make Communism itself appear more respectable among Indians. As a newcomer to the world stage, China largely escaped responsibility among Indians for the unpopular record of the Indian Communist party during recent years.

Although I was aware of these Indian attitudes in 1951-53, by 1955 they had taken firmer root. Not only among government leaders, but among most educated Indians as well, I sensed a surprising degree of tolerance if not a kind of enthusiasm for the "New China."

Most Indians recognize the violence with which Mao and his associates have eliminated their opposition, and their un-Gandhian contempt for moral principles. But in China they also see a fellow Asian people, who were long exploited and humiliated by Westerners, who belligerently opposed colonialism under Sun Yat-sen and Chiang, and finally ousted it under Mao, and who are now struggling to develop a modern economy. When these elements of mutual interest are placed in a close geographical context, India's policy toward China is more easily understood.

"I imagine myself," said Nehru in 1940 while visiting Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking, "as one of a long line, yet another link joining together these two ancients in history and civilization." When he visited Peking in 1954 Nehru spoke in much the same vein.

In spite of the profound differences in ideology, Nehru and his associates and most educated Indians instinctively look to the Chinese with far more hope than most Americans feel is justified by the facts. Indeed, what may almost be regarded as Indian courtship of China in the hope that she can win her to a more moderate approach is at the very heart of India's foreign policy and by all odds Nehru's greatest gamble.

* * *

A AGAINST this complex and often emotional background, we must also consider Indian attitudes toward America and American policy. Like his impression of China, the Indian's impression of America is blurred. From the earliest days of his own struggle, he set America apart from his general indictment of the Western colonial powers.

He knew America as the first major nation to throw off the grip of an imperial European power. For a hundred years America, with a few notable exceptions, had supported the efforts of subject people to govern themselves. In April, 1940, Nehru wrote of America that "more and more" India's thoughts were attuned to "this great democratic country which seems almost alone to keep the torch of democratic freedom alight in a world given over to imperialism and fascism, violence and aggression and opportunism of the worst kind."

During the war America's support for the cause of Indian independence had been taken for granted by most Indians. Two top American government representatives were said to have been withdrawn from India on British insistence because of their open support of Congress party demands for freedom.

Yet today America appears to the educated Indian as an enigma. After liberating East Asia from Japanese rule, living up to her promise to free the Philippines, and finally supporting Indonesian freedom, America has seemed to him to drift further and further from the principles which inspired India's democratic spokesmen.

Indians never cease to point out that most of the Asian nations with whom we are allied do not have freely elected governments, while many of our NATO associates have colonial possessions in Africa and even in Asia to which, for the most part, they firmly cling.

Brought up in the British tradition which discourages all public statements by military men, Indians have been startled at the barrage of often belligerent speeches, press conferences and news handouts of the Pentagon.

Nor do the political and military vacuums of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, left by the departure of the British, or the resulting neutralization of the British-led Indian Army, apparently worry most Indians. When America seeks to fill these vacuums, they look upon us not as friends holding off Communism so that they can remain free to develop their own nation without interference, but as intruders following a new colonial tactic.

When we express our resentment at this charge, they are reminded of the arrogance of the colonial British. When we scold them and their leaders for not taking our side and accepting our leadership, they are resentful and ask if our failure to support the British in the 1930's indicated that we were pro-Nazi.

These ambivalent sets of attitudes toward the United States and Communist China, when taken together, present a complicated pattern from which it is difficult to draw easy generalizations.

The leaders of modern India have long since established beyond reasonable doubt their personal and political devotion to democratic freedom. This is confirmed in events we have already discussed—in the story of the Indian Revolution, in the liberal democratic Constitution of the new state, in the vigor of her political and parliamentary life, and in the manner of her economic development.

Where India's national interests have been unmistakably involved, she has been forthright in asserting her determination to protect them. Thus she has guaranteed the integrity of the Himalayan border states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan—and no one doubts that the purpose of this guarantee is to discourage Chinese intrusion.

It seems equally clear that India's forces would support those of Burma, and I believe Pakistan, in the event of military attacks from the north. The conquest of Tibet by China, although ultimately accepted, was a profoundly unsettling event in New Delhi.

If Chinese policies become clearly expansionist, India and her neighbors will be forced to take their stand. I believe that the most probable point at which India would draw the line would be where the high tides of Chinese and Indian culture and political influence met in Southeast Asia between 600 A.D. and 1200 A.D.—close to the northern border of what is now Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Burma.

On military problems in Asia farther from her own borders, India's position is likely to remain neutral except in the face of a clear and blatant aggression. This, however, need not reflect "pro Communism." Indeed from hindsight India's judgment on some of the most crucial of these problems turns out to have been more nearly right than most Americans think.

One example is the question of a truce in Korea. In June, 1950, India voted in favor of the United Nations condemnation of the initial Communist attack on South Korea as an aggressive act. Three months later, following MacArthur's victory at Inchon, the Chinese Government warned the Indian Ambassador in Peking that if the UN forces crossed the Thirty-eighth Parallel, China would enter the war.

New Delhi urged a cease fire at that line. Disregarding the warning, we plunged north. The Chinese Red Army promptly crossed the Yalu. Three years later we finally decided to accept a truce at roughly the same Thirty-eighth Parallel. In the meantime 96,000 additional Americans and no one knows how many more Chinese and Koreans had been killed or wounded.

Indian leaders point out that they supported the principle of defending non-Communist South Korean territory from Communist aggression and broke with us only when we embarked on what they

considered to be a violation of that principle by seeking to unify Korea by force.

India also warned repeatedly of the futility of supporting the French colonial regime in Indochina. In January 1954 when Nehru urged a truce, responsible Americans accused him of "Communist sympathies" and charged that he was striving to save Ho Chi Minh from imminent defeat. Three months later Dienbienphu fell and the entire French Army was faced with a military catastrophe in the Red River Delta.

In April, 1955 India strongly urged American moderation over the issue of Quemoy and Matsu—a policy which ultimately prevailed by the wise personal decision of President Eisenhower. India also helped to mediate with China to secure the release of the captive American flyers. Although she has supported China's legal claim to Formosa, she has taken a consistent position in favor of a peaceful settlement of this issue in the face of Chou's warlike statements.

Over many years and against a complex and often emotional background these aspects of India's foreign policy have taken shape. Rightly or wrongly but earnestly, Indian leaders believe that these policies accurately reflect their nation's needs and objectives. One of the most important of these needs of course grows out of her economic dilemma. India desperately needs a period of peace in which to develop her resources, and prove the effectiveness of her democratic techniques.

"If the Communists should take over India from where do you think they would come?" Indian leaders often demand. "If you think they would come from Russia through the Khyber Pass or from China through the mountains of Assam you are mistaken."

"If the Communists defeat the forces of democracy in India, that defeat will occur in the slums of Calcutta and the backward villages of Hyderabad," they continue. "Indian democracy will stand or fall, not on the size of its army, but on what we do or fail to do in India."

Whatever conclusions we may draw from these and other Indian attitudes, I think it would be a mistake to judge Indian foreign policy by our own national objectives and our own analysis of the Cold War. It would also be a mistake for Americans to associate the "neutralist" position exclusively with India merely because

Nehru is one of its chief advocates. In the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and South America, this position in greater or lesser degree is widespread, and it is not by any means confined to them. In Japan, Italy, France and Germany substantial minorities openly advocate the "neutralist" view as an explicit political program.

If this general pulling away of the Middle World from the two poles of nuclear power continues, India's role will become increasingly important. Consequently, India should be judged in terms of her own claims—not as a candidate for membership in either of the Russian or American blocs, but rather as the second largest nation in the world, the largest democracy, and a prominent leader of the newly independent and soon-to-be-independent nations of Asia and Africa.

Most thoughtful Indians understand China's potential strength, and they are uneasy about it. But because they have had no direct experience with the Communist brand of imperialism, they worry far less about it than we think they should. They are convinced, moreover, that the bonds which hold Russia and China together are by no means indestructible.

"Your policies," they say, "seem almost designed to push Moscow and Peking together. That is defeatist and shows an ignorance of historical forces which sooner or later will show themselves. By keeping our lines of communications open to Russia and China we also help ease the tensions which may otherwise result in war. Who knows? Communism may fail in rural China. Then perhaps Mao Tse-tung will be forced to borrow some very different ideas from us."

Here we return to the fact above all others which reasserts its commanding importance: the likelihood that India and China will emerge through the fog of public statements and goodwill visits as real competitors for leadership in Asia, a competition which more and more is being recognized in India itself. That the competition may be accompanied by professions of friendship and that it may be expressed in economic and social, rather than in military, terms may be all to the good.

In any event, such statements of goodwill cannot erase the underlying logic which makes India and China inevitable rivals for the leadership of the underdeveloped continents of Asia and Africa. When we survey India's position and attitudes on major questions

involving the underdeveloped and colonial nations in the postwar world, it becomes clear that she has accepted the challenge

In the United Nations, she has stood out as a militant and uncompromising foe of colonialism and a champion of the rights of still subject peoples to independence. This position has brought her into conflict on occasion with American views that the principle of self-determination must give way to the pressures of contemporary *Realpolitik*. On the whole, however, I think it has been to our advantage to have another democratic nation stating the case for freedom, on those occasions when, rightly or wrongly, we have felt we could not, rather than to leave this field to the Communists.

Again India took a leading part in the organization of regular meetings of the Colombo powers—Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, Indonesia and India—for consideration of problems of mutual interest. She was one of the sponsors of the Bandung Conference of Asian and African powers, whose consequences may be momentous. In 1955, at our suggestion she took the initiative in calling a meeting of Asian governments at Simla to discuss the question of co-operative regional use of American aid funds, as contemplated by our foreign aid program.

In these ways and others India has played a significant role in the development of stable self-confident intergovernmental relations among Asian and African countries. Her population, vast resources, and the long training of her leadership insure that that role will continue. It cannot continue to be played except at the expense of Communist Chinese leadership in the same fields.

Indian policy can draw upon a vast population and rich resources, a magnetic Gandhian heritage, an undeniable record of peaceful progress since independence, and a steady adherence to democratic ideals. The many African students now studying in India have already felt some of that influence. In 1954 they listened intently as Nehru spoke to the African Students' Congress in Delhi on the relevance of India's experience to the new Africa.

"Even revolutions eat up their own children," he warned. But he thought India might have found a way to end that vicious circle. "When the time came for an agreement between India and England, we parted peacefully, and no trail of bitterness was left behind. That is the virtue of doing things in the right way."

"Gandhiji always said that means are more important than ends. . . . Because of Gandhiji's insistence and example all the time, an Englishman could walk through an Indian crowd without anybody touching him. That was part of the discipline and habits of mind he inculcated. I do not think you will find an example anywhere else of a national movement being conducted with so little animus."

"I should like you to think of this, because I am frightened at the prospect of Africa going through a welter of blood and thereby losing, I do not know, a generation or two of lives in this business before it starts on its constructive and creative career."

Nehru recognized that conditions differed in Africa, but he was convinced that 'even as these peaceful methods were right and proper and exceedingly practical for India, far more so are they practical and useful and should yield results in Africa, and any course of violence is likely to lead to grave difficulties'.

Violence, he said, would be wrong morally and practically. He did not believe that the larger unity and the 'constructiveness and creativeness' of Africa could be achieved unless one adopts method which will help to unite and not separate.

Thus did her Prime Minister voice India's conception of her own relevance to the remaining colonial and underdeveloped nations. These gentle and measured words may seem out of place in our time of faring conflict. But it is a rash man who will say that they, or any nation that holds true to them, are without power to move minds and men.

SECTION V

Challenge from Bandung

THE success of this conference will be measured not by what we do for ourselves but by what we do for the entire human community. Our strength flows out of our perception of history and out of the vital purpose we put into the making of tomorrow. If that purpose is stained by resentment or the desire for revenge, then this conference will turn out to be a fragile and forgetful thing.

Let us therefore not seek to draw strength from hurt or heartbreak, but from our common hopes. And if the test of that strength should be our ability to forgive, then let it be said that we were the giants of our time.

CARLOS ROMULO
Philippine Delegate
to the Bandung Conference

CHAPTER 21

A New Asia Meets a New Africa

THE bloody revolutions that turned Russia and China upside down, and the peaceful revolution that is steadily changing the face of India, are only the largest and most dramatic manifestations of the world-wide upheaval through which we are living. Throughout the Middle World that stretches from Manila to Capetown, an awakening has been taking place that has already drastically revised the maps of Asia and Africa and which promises more revisions in the years ahead.

An excellent vantage point from which to examine the nature of this awakening was the conference that took place in April, 1955, at Bandung in Indonesia. In this lovely mountain city, spokesmen for twenty-nine nations and a billion and a half human beings, gathered to discuss the state of the world from the perspective of Accra, Addis Ababa, Cairo, Baghdad, New Delhi, Karachi, Kabul, Bangkok and other capitals of Asia and Africa.

For the occasion the name of Bandung's main thoroughfare was changed to Asia-Africa Street, and that of the scene of the conference sessions from the old Concordia Club—formerly reserved exclusively for Dutch officers—to Gedung Merdeka or Independence Hall. In his keynote address, the conference host, President Sukarno of Indonesia, cited as the inspiration of Asian and African

independence struggles not the Russian or Chinese, but the American Revolution.

His quotations came not from the Buddha, the Prophet or the Vedas, but from Longfellow's poem, "The Midnight Ride of Paul Revere." Sukarno reminded his audience that the opening day of the Bandung meetings marked the 180th anniversary of the firing of the "shot heard round the world," the beginning of the American Revolution.

"That battle which began 180 years 'ago," the Indonesian President told the delegates, "is not yet completely won, and it will not have been completely won until we can survey our own world and say that colonialism is dead . . . Vast areas of Asia and Africa are still not free." He called upon the conference to "give evidence that Asia and Africa have been reborn, nay—that a new Asia and a new Africa have been born."

At Bandung, two of the three great revolutions of this century met on one stage, watched attentively by the rest of the vast African-Asian audience now also striving to shape its own pattern of change.

One revolution was represented by the Communist Chinese Premier, Chou En-lai. Representing the Gandhian revolution on the Indian subcontinent were not only Prime Minister Nehru, but also in a sense the prime ministers of Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma, whose independence was in a large part a corollary of the British decision to leave India gracefully. U Nu of Burma, an ascetic Buddhist with rare competence in the humdrum techniques of administration, has especially imbibed some of Gandhi's faith in non-violence, and also has led his country in a significant spiritual revival.

Although in 1947, when an unofficial Asian Relations conference was held in New Delhi, the Soviet Asian republics were invited and sent representatives, this time the Soviet Union was not invited at all. By the very emergence of Communist China, the Soviet Union seemed less of an Asian power.

Much of the uninvited white world of Europe and Asia looked to Bandung with apprehension. The bitter resentment against colonialism in Africa and parts of Asia, and the rise of Asian Communism, suggested how explosive those two issues might be at this first general meeting of the world's nonwhite people.

When the war ended in the summer of 1945, colonial empires

still covered most of Asia except China, Japan and Thailand; most of Africa; and parts of the West Indies and Central and South America. In a world of 2.3 billion people, 850 million still lived under European colonialism and only 180 million under Communism.

Ten years later in a world of 2.5 billion people, these figures had been reversed. The combined populations of the Soviet Union, Communist China and their satellites had grown to a total of well over 850 million. As a result of violent or nonviolent revolt, 650 million ex-colonial people had emerged under fiercely independent, and generally democratically minded regimes. The emergence of others was imminent. The remaining subjects of European colonialism had shrunk to only 180 million.

The impact of these figures was an awesome one, and there were many in Western capitals who feared that Bandung would further dramatize the march of Communist power. There were fears that Chou En-lai might enflame anticolonial memories and turn the gathering into an anti-Western, anti-American demonstration of cosmic proportions.

Some warned that it might take a blatantly racial form. Since one local racial war was already going on in Kenya, and the skies of South Africa were dark with racial thunder, this seemed a good possibility in a nonwhite conference covering most of two great continents.

Perhaps as a result of this nervousness, the American Government failed to send direct greetings to the conference, and one State Department official, in a letter to an inquiring Congressman, described our official attitude in the ill-chosen phrase "benevolent indifference." We were, however, far from indifferent. The American press correctly foresaw the importance of the conference and more American newsmen traveled to Bandung than had ever before covered an Asian event.

Many Asian and African delegates closely associated with the West, shared the fears of Washington and London. General Romulo of the Philippines stated that one of his primary aims at Bandung was "to prevent the nurturing of a racial alliance which could develop into an enormity that would convulse the earth."

But no such enormity developed. Indeed anxious observers from the Atlantic nations were treated to several tough anti-Communist

speeches and even one vigorous reminder that the United States had kept its promise to free the Philippines

President Sukarno's keynote talk asked the ex-colonial world to recognize that its revolution had entered a new stage "I beg of you not to think of colonialism only in the classic form which we Indonesians and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa knew," he said "Colonialism has also its modern dress in the form of economic control, intellectual control and actual physical control by a small but alien community within the nation. It is a skillful and determined enemy and it appears in many guises. . . . Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil which must be eradicated from the earth."

His elaboration of colonialism under varying conditions appeared to fit not only European economic exploitation but also domestic feudalism and international Communism. Speeches by delegates from Turkey, Iran, Libya, Iraq, Pakistan, Ceylon, Thailand and the Philippines pointedly included the Communist variety among the new forms of colonialism to which they were opposed.

The Minister of State of Iraq, Dr. al-Jamali, reviewed the history of Communist aggression in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and said that the Communists "confront the world with a new form of colonialism much deadlier than the old." The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, asked the delegates "If we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?"

Although these speeches comforted many Western observers, we should not blind ourselves to the fact that even the most ardent friends of the West could not find a kind word to say about European colonialism as it still exists in Asia, Africa and South America. Anti-Communists, pro-Communists, neutrals and independents joined in the final unanimous communique from Bandung to say that "colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end."

More specifically the delegates "supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian" (Dutch New Guinea), and urged the Netherlands Government to reopen negotiations as soon as possible to implement their obligations "under its agreement with Indonesia." Pointing to the "persisting denial to the peoples of

North Africa of their right to self-determination" the resolutions continued, "the Asian-African conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay." The conference also resolved its support of Yemen's position in the case of Aden where Britain maintains a base at the mouth of the Red Sea.

In spite of the eloquent indictments of the new and less familiar Communist imperialism and lingering fear of colonialism in its classic form still remained the largest single common denominator at Bandung, and it would be dangerous to minimize this fact. This fear showed itself not only in direct attacks on the colonial powers but also in the instinctive way in which racial discrimination and lack of economic development were associated with colonial relationships, both past and present.

The ways and means of meeting these and other problems were various and the conference represented a sharp diversity of political views. There are many Asias and many Africas: the Asia and Africa of violence, the one of peace, the one of Communism, the one of democracy, the one of feudalism, the one of neutralism, the one of Gandhism, to name a few, and these overlap.

Yet it is perhaps significant that the Asia of Communism and the one of feudalism both felt it necessary to give at least lip service to the ideas and forces of democracy. Not only was respect for fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations the first principle agreed upon but more specifically the statement supported the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Why is it that when the "voiceless ones" of the world finally find their voices they join in a statement which, as we will see in more detail, is a basic affirmation of the positive democratic goals which we have been striving to reach since the birth of our nation? Why is it that Chou En-lai felt it necessary to acquiesce in full support of the very body which led the fight against Communist aggression in Korea and which still excludes his government? Why is it that even the representatives of authoritarian feudal regimes professed support for a bill of rights whose implementation would mean the end of their present form of government?

The answer, I believe, lies in the history and nature of the anti-

colonial revolutions. That history has consisted chiefly of the colored world's encounter with the nations of the North Atlantic basin. Somewhere in that encounter were engendered the basic democratic aspirations which are at the heart of the African and Asian revolutions. And in that story lies the key to whether the future of these incomplete revolutions will be one of chaos and Communism, or of peace, law and democracy.

CHAPTER 22

Colonial Revolutions in Review

ASIA'S encounter with the West began on a large scale with the Crusades, when great numbers of Europeans first went East. There they found civilizations of far greater wealth than their own, and the riches of the Orient soon became a magnet for a myriad of adventurers and royal explorers.

In the thirteenth century Marco Polo's reports of the fabulous China of Kublai Khan further stimulated the pressure of the West toward Asia. Before long, venturesome sailing ships were competing with the overland camel routes. It was the legendary wealth of India which Columbus was seeking when he stumbled by chance on America.

Religion and trade were still ostensibly the motivating forces when Vasco da Gama reached India around the Cape of Good Hope and across the Indian Ocean a few years later. "We come," he said, "in search of Christians— and spices." Between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, South America, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, the Malay Peninsula, the Indies (now Indonesia), indeed most of the southern half of the world fell under Western colonial domination.

By 1874 when Stanley traveled down the Congo into the heart of Africa, opening one of the last unconquered domains for Western colonization, most of the non-European world had been split among a half-dozen Western empires. In pink, blue, green, red, orange, yellow—the maps of that time showed a good half of Asia and

almost all of Africa apportioned neatly among Britain, Spain, Belgium, Germany, France, Portugal and the Netherlands.

This race for colonial spoils provided the raw material for Lenin's theory of imperialist war, which we have already discussed. Indeed, for many, it seemed to confirm it. It also gave rise to the proud boast that the sun never sets on the British Empire.

But eventually the sun did begin to set, and today Africa remains the only continent where old-time colonialism, Western style, has more than a foothold. Except for Malaya, Hong Kong, Macao, North Borneo, Goa and Western New Guinea in Asia, and the Guianas in South America, the rest of the old colonial belt has, by the second half of the twentieth century, extricated itself by one means or another from Western rule.

The story of how one-third of the world's people won independence—a story that includes South America—is no less important than what happened in Russia and China. Of course in terms of numbers and present ideological impact, the revolution of the Indian subcontinent was the major event. As we have seen, the Gandhian struggle was an example of mass, nonviolent, direct action totally new to the history of colonial revolt and, indeed, of the world.

Syria, Lebanon, Libya and the Philippines are other examples of once-conquered nations freed without substantial bloodshed. Egypt and, to a degree, Iraq have secured their release from Western colonial restrictions through compromise at the conference table, but not without struggle.

In the Gold Coast, Sudan and Nigeria, freedom is coming without violence through Britain's enlightened policy of "creative abdication," stemming from its successful experience in leaving India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. In Nigeria and the Gold Coast, as a matter of fact, the slogan "We must go Gandhi" has been widespread among Africans, and the nationalist struggles there have been largely copied from the experience of the Indian struggle.

But peaceful techniques have not been the tradition among revolutions generally inside or outside the colonial world. Our own revolution in 1775 for instance was hardly nonviolent. A few years ago when Governor Luis Munoz Marín of Puerto Rico was testifying before a Congressional Committee, he was asked whether he advocated freeing his country by violent means. He smilingly re-

plied that while he was hesitant to imply any disrespect toward General Washington and the Revolutionary Army, he hoped that in the case of Puerto Rico peaceful techniques would suffice. They have..

But the pattern of armed insurrection in the colonial world has persisted to the present. Seven years before Bandung, the Indonesian countryside itself had been the scene of costly violence. Indeed the new republic won its freedom only after bitter fighting on two fronts.

In Indonesia as in India, nationalists had been systematically imprisoned and a jail sentence had become a credential. Sukarno, Sjahrir and Hatta, the new Indonesian Republic leaders, wished to reach agreement peacefully with the Dutch, but it became apparent at the end of World War II that the Dutch, unlike the British in India, were determined to hang on by any available means.

Just at the moment when the Republic forces, armed in part by the surrendering Japanese, and the returning Dutch forces, armed by the United States, were facing each other warily, the Indonesian Communists seized the initiative, organized an army, and in September, 1948, suddenly launched their own attack on the new revolutionary government. If the Dutch forces had struck at the same time, they might have presented themselves effectively to the Atlantic nations as protectors of Indonesia against Communism.

But the Dutch hesitated; the loyal army of the new Republic went into action, and the Communist rebellion was promptly crushed. Some nine thousand Communists and their followers were interned by the Republican government in prison camps. When the Dutch finally attacked a few weeks later, the Republic forces promptly executed some two hundred Communist leaders, to remove any temptation to liberate them.

With the lines clearly drawn, and with the Dutch leverage through NATO not yet effective, American support at last swung decisively behind President Sukarno and the Indonesian nationalists. Dr. Frank Graham, former United States Senator and President of the University of North Carolina, took a leading part in the negotiations which finally led to the Dutch withdrawal in 1949.

IN Indochina the rumbling anticolonial revolution erupted into a far more costly civil war. As in Indonesia, local nationalists proclaimed an independent republic when the Japanese left. Although American misgivings were strongly expressed by President Roosevelt when he said that the Indochinese people deserved their independence, French troops re-entered the area in the fall and winter of 1945-46.

During the war against the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow-trained Communist who also presented himself as an ardent Vietnamese nationalist, had led the guerrilla forces. Shrewd and dedicated, he had been considered by the American OSS one of their most reliable associates in harassing Japanese occupation troops.

Even at that time, Ho Chi Minh ("He who shines") had had a remarkable career. A frail, stooped wisp of a man with a legendary endurance of body and soul, Ho had traveled around the world, lived as a French cabin boy, a London cook and a Montmartre photographer. In 1919 wearing a rented dress suit, and inspired by Woodrow Wilson's plea for the self-determination of all people, he had showed up at the Paris Peace Conference seeking to deliver an appeal for Vietnamese freedom. The allied powers refused to hear him, and he became convinced that Wilson's Fourteen Points were not intended for Asians.

In 1922 Ho Chi Minh met Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin in Moscow where he attended the International School of Marxism. In 1925 Ho accompanied Borodin to Canton as interpreter. Returning to Moscow in 1927, he organized the Indochina Communist party which joined the Comintern.

But despite this Soviet tutelage, many informed people believe that Ho Chi Minh remained a passionate, proud, supremely individualistic Asian nationalist, who considered his primary goal to be the establishment of an independent Vietnam. In pursuit of this objective he had had his taste of Western jails. In 1931, at French behest, the British imprisoned him in Hong Kong; after eighteen months behind bars, he had nearly died of tuberculosis.

In 1945, Ho demanded immediate independence for Vietnam. During the negotiations that followed in Paris he charmed those he met in much the same manner as Chou En-lai later won the reluctant

admiration of his adversaries at Geneva in 1954 and Bandung in 1955.

Yet Ho did not hesitate to threaten civil war. To Marius Moutet, the French Socialist Minister of Overseas Territories he said: "If we have to fight we will fight. You will kill ten of our men, and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who will tire of it."

Before 1946 was over, a French cruiser had fired on the city of Haiphong killing four thousand people, and the fighting had begun in earnest. By 1954, eight years later, Ho's prophecy had come to pass. The French were tired of it. Dienbienphu had fallen, and soon enormous pictures of President Ho were to decorate the streets of the former French Northern capital of Hanoi.

Here was the first successful anticolonial revolt led and dominated by Communists. Why had the Communists been able to do in Indochina what they had failed to accomplish anywhere else? There were several reasons.

From the outset, the French were determined to cling to the last vestiges of their former glory and in their effort to do so even relied on the discredited former Japanese puppet emperor of Vietnam, Bao Dai. This stubborn refusal to face up to the new Asian facts of life helped to make Ho's task of consolidating the nationalist movement relatively simple.

Four years after the fighting began, with a French Union Army of over 300,000 men short of equipment and sorely pressed, and with able French officers being sacrificed at a rate faster than the French military academies could replace them, the pressure for American assistance built up steadily.

Americans were cruelly torn. Indochina was a colonial possession, and throughout our history we had been opposed to colonialism as an institution. But we were anxious to re-establish France as a major power in order to strengthen the balance in Europe. We were also desperately concerned over the march of Communism in Asia. With vivid memories of Japan's rapid conquest of the rest of rich Southeast Asia after capturing Indochina, we reluctantly moved in with strong direct support for the French.

While France herself was spending more on the Indochina war than she received from America under the entire Marshall Plan, the United States between 1950 and 1954 added close to \$3 billion

in military equipment for French use. When I last visited Saigon in April, 1953, an average of ten thousand tons was being landed daily from American freighters.

Once the French succeeded in defeating the Communists and re-establishing order, we hoped that they would agree to set Indochina free. To most Asians and to many of us Americans then working in Asia, it seemed clear that this gamble was certain to fail. There was only one way in which the war could be won: the essential, long-promised economic and political reforms in Indochina had to be put through in a hurry, together with a clear-cut promise of total independence and the development and training of a strong Vietnamese Army to win and maintain that independence.

But French concessions to the anti-Communist nationalist leaders, made at American insistence, were grudging, belated and inadequate. Because almost invariably these concessions followed Communist victories over French Union troops, they tended to underscore Communist strength rather than French sincerity.

The stubborn French refused to support even the most rudimentary village reforms, thus further weakening their case. In August, 1952, in his Saigon office the French-controlled Vietnamese premier frankly admitted that Ho had won the support of most of the village people. When his forces captured a village, he told me, they canceled all debts and gave the land to the tillers. If the French recaptured the village, they re-established the landlords and moneylenders in power. Thus the peasants had every incentive to support the Communists.

Finally the French, because of their own insecurity, were reluctant to create a major Vietnamese defense force. This meant that the tough indigenous fighting units that helped stop Communism in Greece and Korea were not available, and the burden of the struggle was carried by foreign troops.

Ironically the political slogans which in a large sense enabled the Communists to defeat the French were those born in the French Revolution itself. From the fall of the Bastille to the fall of Dien-bienphu, the course of those slogans has often been stormy, bloody and sad. Their corruption by Communism is probably worse even than by the terror of the Paris guillotine, but it is perhaps a species of the same genus.

Most observers who witnessed the fierce desire for independence

among Indians, Burmese, Ceylonese, or Pakistanis agree that this pattern of violence, whether under Communist or other leadership, would have spread straight across South Asia if Gandhi's way had failed.

On several occasions I have discussed this point with Asian leaders such as Nehru and U Nu. All are convinced that if their own peaceful effort to reach agreement with the British had failed, they would have been ruthlessly brushed aside by men with more violent answers.

CHAPTER 23

Africa Awakens

IN the conference corridors of Bandung African delegates and observers, like their Asian colleagues, knew that peaceful solutions to their own formidable problems were not assured.

Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, who went to Bandung as an observer, quoted South African Negro representatives there as saying: "We cannot wait much longer. Guns are being offered to us now. If we accept them, the biggest massacre in the history of modern times will result."

Moses Kotane, from Johannesburg, South Africa, representing the African National Congress which so far has adopted the Gandhian strategy of nonviolence, was ominous in his warning to the conference: "We are drowning, and will grasp at any straw that is offered us."

While these spokesmen were seeking and finding sympathy for their people at Bandung, the *Apàrtheid* program was proceeding apace in South Africa, with the beginning of the forcible removal of tens of thousands of Johannesburg Africans to ghettos twelve miles outside of the white city.

Already South African laws prohibit the African from following any profession that brings him in contact with the white population, or from owning any business except within the areas allotted to nonwhite people. No African may migrate from his province. Nor may an African be employed by whites in any position of respon-

sibility or in skilled occupations. These restrictions apply equally to a primitive tribesman straight from his kraal in the bush or to a British-educated African doctor.

In April, 1955, when the delegates convened at Bandung on the other side of the world, the South African Bantu Education Act was also beginning to be enforced. Under it the Nationalist Government intends to take over the church schools which once carried on most of the education of African children, and to replace this liberal arts instruction with training in simple skills and in the old Bantu culture—limitations designed to keep the Africans from ever receiving more than an elementary education.

The teaching or expression of opinion deemed by the Minister for Native Affairs to be "subversive" will be a penal offense without right of appeal. Perhaps it is because the South African white Nationalists realize that from the standpoint of their objectives the most subversive book in Africa is not *Das Kapital*, but the Bible, that the church schools are being banned.

Delegates at Bandung were mindful of these ominous trends in South Africa, and they knew that the strong racist convictions of Ex-Prime Minister Malan were being redoubled under his even more extreme successor, Prime Minister Strydom. The resolution on South Africa, which they accepted unanimously, bluntly termed the situation there "not only a gross violation of human rights, but a denial of the fundamental values of civilization and the dignity of man."

Although in a strict sense the South African question may not seem to us part of the anticolonial rebellion, since it is not foreign but discriminatory local rule which is being opposed, this rule by a small minority of former white colonists appears to Asians and Africans as one of the worst "manifestations" of colonialism. Events in South Africa will mightily affect the prospects for violence or peaceful change in the solution of the world's remaining colonial problems.

Gandhi's son, Manilal, has helped to lead the campaign of non-violent resistance there, just as the Mahatma himself first invented the techniques of *Satyagraha* on South African soil a half-century earlier. So far, unfortunately, the Gandhian resistance has been crushed by police brutality. If South Africans in desperation turn away from such peaceful means, then all of Africa may be inflamed

with the spirit of violence, and the forces of moderation in the more hopeful parts of Africa will be seriously weakened.

West African students have even talked of a war of libetation against the South African Government. In Africa and in India I met young Africans who told me gravely: "We just cannot sit by much longer and watch this barbarism go on in South Africa." Indeed I know of no informed outside observer who does not view the coming decade in South Africa with deep pessimism.

* * *

IN all of Africa there are only 5.5 million whites. In South Africa 10 million Africans outnumbered 2.5 million whites, who are themselves divided with increasing hostility between those of Dutch and British origin. The Afrikaners in their steady movement toward a totalitarian state have not hesitated to ride roughshod over British as well as African and Asian sensibilities.

At the northern extreme of Africa, French North Africa with another 2.5 million Europeans and 22.5 million Arab-Berber population, is seething with unrest, and the French colonial administration is faced with problems ominously reminiscent of Indochina.

The dramatic initiative of Premier Mendes-France in the summer of 1954 eventually led to the signing of an agreement under his successor the following spring which granted internal autonomy in Tunisia. It was a remarkable testimony to the power and self-restraint of the nationalist Neo-Destour party in Tunisia. Its leader, Habib Bourguiba, who has advocated a Gandhian kind of struggle and who had not allowed his exile in France to embitter him, negotiated the agreement with Premier Faure.

But even this long-postponed achievement occurred in an atmosphere of sporadic terror in Tunisia, and the continuing opposition of both extremes—French settlers and nationalist Arab extremists. No sooner was the new agreement proclaimed during the very week of the Bandung meeting, than a protest meeting of French residents in Tunisia called the agreement "void."

Announcing that they would not "solemnize the abandonment by France of her sons in the Regency . . . nor the rapid and total ruin of the French-Tunisian community," the French residents

"affirmed with force their unshakable resolution to fight by every means . . . so that Tunisia may continue to live in French peace."

At the other extreme of Tunisia politics, the agreement was opposed with equal vehemence by the Old Destour party, which has traditionally repudiated any agreement with the French. A faction of Bourguiba's own party, the Neo-Destour, under the leadership of its exiled secretary-general, Salah Ben Youssef, supported them.

The day the agreement was announced in Paris, Ben Youssef was in Bandung castigating French policy as "torture and murder," condemning the United States for its failure to back United Nations action in North Africa, praising Russia for its support in the UN, and demanding "Tunisia's only goal: total independence."

However, on his return to Tunis, after three years of exile, Bourguiba was hailed tumultuously as the father of his country. Even the old Bey of Tunis dramatically rose from his throne to greet "my son, my well-beloved child."

Bourguiba told his people that internal autonomy was "only a step toward independence," but that it called for patience and moderation. "Our new liberty brings us face to face with great new responsibilities," he said. "Beware of race prejudice and xenophobia. All Tunisians are brothers. Moslems and Jews must be considered as equals and must behave like brothers."

Even toward the French he urged the kind of friendliness which Indians adopted toward Britain after the struggle was over. "Our tradition demands that we be hospitable. We must respect all our guests in this country."

No one knows whether the trend toward killing in North Africa, in Algeria and Morocco especially, will be restrained in time to prevent mass bloodshed. But the recurring threats of violence there seemed to underline Bandung's plea that the French Government bring about "a peaceful settlement of the issue *without delay*."

* * *

IN between the explosive northern and southern rims of the African Continent lies a vast area nearly twice as big as the United States with rich resources, a total white population of one-half million—fewer than the city of Providence, Rhode Island—and 160

million Africans. Here a visitor can find a variety of shadings of colonialism, in both vigorous and dying stages.

The four free multiracial nations of Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt and Libya naturally provide the greatest contrast. Here, as elsewhere, there are plenty of problems, but no colonial whipping boy to blame for mistakes and delays.

During the next few years these independent nations will be joined by three former British colonies—the Sudan, the Gold Coast and Nigeria—now all on their way to freedom. Italian trusteeship over Somaliland is scheduled to end in 1960.

In French West and Equatorial Africa and in the Belgian Congo, colonial areas which together are bigger than the United States, the pace of political development is slower. In Mozambique on the east coast and in Angola on the west, the Portuguese, who were the first to come to Africa, still confidently assert that they will be the last to leave.

Finally there is the remainder of British Africa. In British West Africa, where there is no competition between Europeans and Africans, the situation is highly encouraging. Because this low-lying area was so infested with deadly tropical diseases, it became known generations ago as the "white man's graveyard." The Europeans came here chiefly for the lucrative trade in slaves and gold and, paradoxically, to make Christian converts. As a result there are now no British settlers to lobby for special privileges.

With their extraordinary talent for government and their willingness to face difficult situations, British officials are now working earnestly to turn these West African colonies loose as soon as possible. Their attitude was typified by George Sinclair, a British Regional Officer in the Togoland United Nations Trusteeship, with whom I spent two days in the winter of 1955.

"I am sitting on a limb of a tree," he told us cheerfully, "and every day it is my job to saw a little further through the limb. Eventually, if I am successful, the limb will be cut through, my African assistant will be ready to take over, and I will be out of a job."

In both the Gold Coast and Nigeria the heads of all government departments are Africans, and there are combined British-African civil services. In the Gold Coast the Prime Minister is Kwame Nkrumah, a graduate of Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, and

for several years a member of an American labor union. In early January, 1955, Nkrumah told me confidently that freedom would come within two years. Nigeria is also headed for independence, at a somewhat slower pace.

In both countries the chief remaining obstacle is not die-hard British colonial opposition, but native regional differences, often complicated by disputes between the Westernized African intellectuals and the tribal chiefs. It was reassuring, however, to find that very few knowledgeable West Africans still question Britain's desire to set them free.

In British East Africa the situation differs fundamentally. Although the British territories here stretch for hundreds of miles on both sides of the Equator, most of the land is high, and the weather is excellent throughout the year.

During the last fifty years this ideal climate has attracted thousands of European settlers. Second-generation families have grown deep roots and developed a financial stake in this rich and lovely country. With a few exceptions, they are determined to cling to their uniquely favorable economic and political status at almost any cost.

In Southern Rhodesia 50 million acres of the best land is owned by 25,000 Europeans. I was told that less than 10 per cent of this land is actually tilled. Thirty-six million acres, much of it sandy and unproductive, is assigned to the 1.7 million Africans who live in the rural areas. "When the white man came," runs an African saying, "he had the Bible and we had the land. Now he has the land and we have the Bible."

The resulting situation is politically explosive. An African farmer, viewing from his meager sandy holdings the great, rich, red-soiled farms of the Europeans, quite naturally says: "This is because his skin is white and mine is black." Just so an African worker in the Northern Rhodesian copper mines, paid on the average less than one-twentieth of what the European miner is paid, blames his inferior position on the sense of racial superiority of the whites.

In Kenya in 1955 we felt the sense of violence and bitterness that filled the air. Three years before, a substantial minority among the Kikuyu tribe had joined fewer numbers from two other tribes in horrible bloody rebellion under the auspices of the secret Mau Mau society. As a result 40 thousand Europeans and 120 thousand

Asians were living among 5 million Africans in a land of fear and death.

One Sunday noon in the town of Nyeri in the heart of the Mau Mau country, ninety-five miles from Nairobi, we watched a stream of European settlers move in and out of the near-by restaurant and bar. All of them carried automatic pistols and many had rifles. As an elderly couple of perhaps seventy-five passed by, we saw that the man carried a carbine and that the lady packed a .45 automatic.

The European settlers had learned to keep a gun in hand or within reach during every waking and sleeping moment. There were hideous stories of trusted African servants who had taken the Mau Mau oath and then helped terrorist bands to wipe out the families whom they had served for as long as twenty years.

The Mau Mau movement is reaction gone wild. In 1955 it seemed to be slowly petering out, not because the essential reforms had yet been put into effect, but because the Mau Mau had overplayed their hand and shocked their own fellow tribesmen with their bloody excesses.

However, the basic problem remained, and that problem, as in most parts of the world where revolution threatens, is *land*. In Kenya the choice land is in the hands of no more than seven thousand European families, and much of it remains idle.

"We have no quarrel with the European who tills a thousand acres as long as he produces good crops," an educated young Kikuyu told me. "But we Africans do object when he tills only a small fraction of his good land, while we remain limited to a few rocky acres. The Europeans actually forbid us to raise the profitable crops like coffee and sisal, except under strict limitations."

This African was typical of the young, earnest and largely moderate educated elite. Will the Europeans come to an understanding with him and his kind while there is still time? If not, he will be replaced within a few years by others who will talk a far tougher language

No one can deny that progress has been made throughout East Africa in public health, housing and education. In both Kenya and the Central African Federation, multiracial universities are in the process of development. But the pace has been dangerously slow in the political arena where the explosions are most likely to occur.

Fortunately British officials seemed aware that far more drastic

measures of reforms are called for. "The situation is no longer purely military," a British Army officer said. "The army has no answer to white-black tension. . . . Bullets alone, will not settle the issues raised by the Mau Mau."

"There must be reform, sweeping reform, or the European is finished," an able colonial administrator told me. "An enlightened few among the European settlers see this clearly and they do their utmost. But so far the majority have refused to budge. Unless they wake up soon to the age in which we are living, they will eventually bring all of Africa tumbling down about our ears."

In June, 1955, a British Royal Commission boldly advocated land reform on a multiracial basis in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, suggesting the leasing of available land free from color bias to anyone who could make the best use of it. Let us hope that the government will provide the necessary action and that the white settlers will relax their bitter opposition while there is still time for constructive action.

French Africa south of the Sahara presents a situation that falls between the enlightened liberalism of British West Africa and, to a growing extent, Uganda, on the one hand, and British Kenya and the Central Federation on the other. In this vast French territory the situation is eased by the fact that there are few European landowners to create the conflicts which led to the tragedy of Indochina and which have helped bring French-African relations in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria to the explosion point.

No one can say that in Equatorial Africa the French haven't been trying. In education, self-government and public health, their record is steadily improving. For instance, twenty-five years ago 60 per cent of the Africans were said to be affected in some degree with sleeping sickness. By 1955 French doctors had reduced this figure to 3 per cent.

The French administrators hope to develop a permanent and freely chosen relationship of the colonies to France. The avowed French policy has been one of gradual but total assimilation into French culture. When an African has received French education and French professional standing, he becomes a full citizen of the French Overseas Department. As such he is said to be treated with full social equality.

Yet there are grave doubts whether "full citizenship" will be

made really meaningful, and no one can say that the future of this French policy is in any degree assured. For one thing the grant of citizenship would give Africans from Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Madagascar and French Equatorial Africa nearly 40 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris. There are few who take this possibility seriously.

* * *

IN the Belgian Congo the colonial administrators are seeking to develop their own unique pattern of an African colonial society. The economic resources of the Congo seem almost limitless, and the Belgian Government has been developing them with skill and vigor. The African has been offered excellent opportunities for advancement in the cities, including all kinds of specialized technical training. He has been given increasingly good medical care and housing, and at least in the urban areas, a sense of economic security.

If an African acquires a good education and a high enough income, he has also been given most of the social advantages available to the Belgian. In 1955 this status had been granted only to a few hundred, but theoretically, at least, there is no limit to those who ultimately may be eligible. The authorities have not allowed the African to vote, but in order to diminish the racial overtone, they have not allowed the eighty thousand Belgians to vote either.

Nevertheless there is clearly something missing. One could say of such efforts, as I did in January, 1955, to a group of Léopoldville newspapermen who asked me for my frank impressions: "Before the war, most colonial governments in Africa did things *to* the people. Now you are doing things *for* the people. This is a great advance. But I wonder if you can establish the essential co-operation with the African until you start to work *with* him? Will he settle for anything less than dignity, and self-respect and a sense of partnership?"

Everywhere Africans themselves have been demonstrating growing interest in the outside world. Educated Africans have been looking to Asia, for instance, with avid interest, and not only in formal conferences like Bandung.

One night in the winter of 1955, we sat with several African

members of the Gold Coast cabinet and their wives, watching three Indian movies in the home of the Indian Commissioner in Accra. The first was a telecast film of a London press conference in which Nehru answered questions from three British newsmen. One of them asked Nehru if he felt that he was "helping matters in Africa, as the Prime Minister of India, by constantly stirring up the question of African freedom?" Nehru's face clouded. "I refuse to be silenced by your appeal for the *status quo*. If I were not the Prime Minister of India, I would speak with far more emphasis."

The Gold Coast cabinet members looked at each other and smiled. Here at last was the leader of an Asian nation who understood their deepest aspiration: self-government.

A second film was shown. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo of Indonesia was arriving at the New Delhi airport. A self-assured, smiling Nehru stepped forward to greet him. Bands blared. A full regiment of crack Indian troops snapped to present arms.

The African audience was obviously impressed with this glimpse of the new India, confident of her position and strength. Here was the achievement of their second fondest objective: human dignity and equality.

The third film opened with the Damodar River in the northern state of Bihar flooding its banks, sweeping away villages through the "Valley of Sorrows" as it had done for a thousand years. The scene shifted. Huge dams were under construction. As the alert, confident Indian engineer described the results in terms of flood control, electric power, irrigation, he was dealing with the third major objective of the colonial world: rapid economic development.

When the lights went on, a sense of excitement filled the room. In faraway Asia a new nation had supplanted colonialism and was bringing benefits to her people. Africa applauded. Following the conference at Bandung, these ties will surely grow closer.

The momentous fact about Africa today is that its 200 million people are waking up. After a long night the sleeper is stirring, blinking away his drowsiness, and stretching his limbs with all the eager, impatient spirit of a youth approaching manhood. This means that Africa will continue to rumble with explosive problems, conflicts and headlines.

Whether the mounting revolution in Africa will lead to construction or destruction is, as with all revolutions, an unanswered ques-

tion. In fact, that question is not yet wholly answered on the earlier revolutionary continents of South America and Asia. For, as we will see, the victory over colonial rule is never the end of the struggle. Unless a positive social and economic revolution in depth also occurs, and civil liberty is also achieved, the vacuum left by the retreating colonial administrators is merely a chaos that invites Communism or other corruptions of the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity.

This unwritten but fundamental question was the most important of all before the delegates at Bandung.

CHAPTER 24

The Complete Democratic Revolution

OUR broad survey of revolutions in Russia, China, India, and the colonial world has already suggested that the word "revolution" connotes different things to different men. Before we examine the ideal of a complete democratic revolution, it is time to consider the meaning of "revolution" and the sense in which we use the term.

The most spectacular revolutions in the past have been violent ones, and for many people revolution is exclusively associated with organized hatred and brutality, rampant killing and burning. Some violent revolutions have been righteous uprisings against oppression, while others have been senselessly negative and destructive. In widely scattered parts of the world this age-old pattern of revolutionary violence continues.

At the other extreme are the quiet, but comprehensively revolutionary ideas of a man like Gandhi—ideas which, if implemented in practice, would produce a peaceful, but complete and radical transformation of the society that adopted them. Revolutions seeking other political, social, and economic objectives have been pursued with degrees of violence somewhere in between these two extremes.

These variations suggest others in the revolutionary spectrum. Just as revolutions need not be violent, so they need not be sudden.

Revolution and evolution both involve change, the former term usually implying faster change than the latter. But the pace of change is not the only, nor the decisive, mark dividing them. Comparative importance is also relevant.

Thus the changes that accompanied the introduction of mass production were so profound that we have always spoken of the Industrial Revolution even though the process itself extended well over a century of economic growth. We speak of the religious revolutions of Christianity in the fourth century, Islam in the seventh, and Protestantism in the sixteenth, not because of the speed involved in their achievement but because of their significance once achieved. Many historical changes, *evolutionary* in the sense that they have been comparatively devoid of the abruptness and sensationalism of violence, nevertheless in their impact and implications have been so disruptive and *revolutionary* that they deserve this broader and more active description.

In this sense in supporting "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations," the majority of the delegates at Bandung set themselves a revolutionary target far bigger and more difficult than merely driving out the white foreigners.

Most of them were well aware that the colonialism against which they had battled for so long, and which was now rapidly melting under the sun of an awakening world, was only the small, visible surface of the iceberg of their real problem. For the United Nations Bill of Rights sets the standard of full political democracy, economic welfare, and equality of opportunity for all—high standards indeed for continents full of hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance.

"Is freedom achieved," asked Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, "when the national banner rises over the seat of government, the foreign ruler goes, and the power passes into the hands of our own leaders? Is the struggle for national independence the struggle to substitute a local oligarchy for the foreign oligarchy?"

At Bandung the answer was unanimously no, although since many of the delegates represented just such local oligarchies, some of the "no's" must have been distinctly halfhearted. Nevertheless out of the Bandung resolutions emerged a set of four democratic objectives which should serve not only to reassure the people of the Atlantic

nations, but even more important, to challenge them to a re-examination of their own patterns of society:

1. Democratic self-government, free of foreign influence;
2. A full measure of human dignity regardless of race, creed or color;
3. Rapid economic development, broadly shared;
4. The abolition of war and the creation of expanding areas of goodwill.

These goals, added together, amount to no less than a complete democratic revolution. Has such a revolution ever been achieved in history? The answer must be no, if we limit our inquiry to a single country in a single generation.

Over a period of time, however, some nations have come decidedly closer than others to the ideal of a complete democratic revolution. The American Revolution, as we shall see in the next section, accomplished the first three of these goals in large measure: it overthrew British colonialism, established a democratic government with a bill of rights, gradually released forces which proceeded to develop a virgin continent into the capital of industrialism, and provided the framework for a rough kind of equality of opportunity. At the price of a civil war, it also succeeded in creating a permanent area of peace among forty-eight states that might have remained competing sovereignties.

Almost as important as the revolutionary achievements of American experience have been the permanently revolutionary implications of what has been called the American Dream. Historically each generation of Americans has been suspicious of the *status quo*. The leaders whom Americans have always respected most deeply have been the liberal exponents of the continuing American Revolution for ever larger democratic opportunities in all walks of life.

To most Asians and Africans, of course, the Indian example must appear to have even greater pertinence. Merely to replace the white sahibs with brown sahibs, said Gandhi, was to get rid of the tiger but to keep the tiger's nature. "*Swaraj*," or self-government, he said, must be the substitute for the British Raj. A "casteless and classless society" was his description of the ideal social order.

Village improvement was his passion. Nonviolence was his con-

tinuing method, both in the struggle against a foreign ruler, in the struggle against elements of his own people, and even, he threatened, against a free Indian government. The means used in all these struggles, he insisted, had to be consistent with the ends of democracy, equality of opportunity and peace.

As we have seen, Gandhi pressed his fellow revolutionaries to identify themselves with the poor, engage in village constructive service, to accept individual responsibility for injustice even before they came to power instead of waiting for it to be remedied in some millennium, and to remain loyal to truth and nonviolence throughout. Obviously India has not succeeded in achieving this complete revolution as Gandhi conceived it, but its living Constitution, its great free elections, its village-oriented Five Year Plan, all testify to the potential power of a revolution which tries to combine all these goals in one integrated program.

What happens when a revolution settles for less than these objectives must have been painfully clear to many of the delegates at Bandung, who were familiar with the several frustrated revolutions scattered pathetically at half-cock through various parts of the world. Standing in testimony to the peril of such incomplete revolutions is much of Latin America, south of our border.

* * *

ALTHOUGH South America was not invited to Bandung much of its early history is instructive. Simon Bolivar, South America's "liberator," was born in 1783 of a noble family in Venezuela and educated in Europe. Bolivar was an eyewitness of some of the last scenes of the French Revolution in Paris. He also watched the degeneration of the Revolution and the rise of Napoleon.

Returning to Venezuela by way of the United States in 1810, he soon identified himself with the cause of independence from Spanish rule, and participated in an armed insurrection. On the fourth of July, 1811, the South American insurgents issued their own Declaration of Independence.

Temporarily defeated and driven into exile, Bolivar in 1812 decreed a "war to the death" against colonial Spain. Leading his tiny army over the great Andes Mountains into Venezuela, he entered Caracas in 1813. "Where a goat can pass, so can an army," he said.

He convened a revolutionary Congress of New Granada, and in 1814, with two thousand men, captured Bogotá. By 1820, after long guerrilla warfare he decisively controlled Venezuela, New Granada and Quito (now Ecuador) which he united as the Republic of Colombia, with himself as president.

In another two years he had joined with San Martín, the Argentine who had freed Chile by much the same means, and together they drove the Spanish out of Peru. When Upper Peru formed a free state in 1825, it called itself Bolivia and declared Bolivar its "perpetual protector."

This militant new revolutionary spirit called forth by Bolivar and such contemporaries as San Martín and O'Higgins, inspired most of the rest of South and Central America to throw off European rule. In 1821, after years of fighting, Mexico ended three centuries of Spanish domination.

Although freedom from foreign rule was thus achieved, it was not followed, as in the United States and to a growing extent in India, by the release of creative and constructive social energies. In Bolivar's own territory and in his lifetime, his moderate efforts to modify the old feudal order came to naught.

As he saw what was happening, Bolivar wrote to a friend: "I am old, ill, disappointed, slandered, and ill-paid. I have never approved revolution, and in the end I even regretted our revolution against Spain."

The mass of people continued in feudal exploitation, governed by local despots instead of foreign rulers. A few days before his death, Bolivar commented with the irony of despair: "There have been three great fools in history—Jesus, Don Quixote, and I. . . . To serve a revolution is to plow the sea." Even in his lifetime Bolivar's success had thus become his failure.

For generations Latin America continued to be racked by a series of internal upheavals, most of them military and based on a struggle for power. *Coup d'état*, assassination and civil war seemed to be the only methods anyone knew to usher in a change of government.

Between 1821 and the rise of the Diaz dictatorship in 1876, Mexico had two emperors, two regencies, several dictators, and enough provisional executives to make no fewer than seventy-four governments. Despite these internal divisions, all attempts to re-impose Spanish rule were defeated. While America was embroiled in civil war the French puppet, Emperor Maximilian, protégé of Napoleon III, attempted to renew a colonial tie with Europe. But eventually he came to his own violent end.

Mexico and some South American countries such as Uruguay have established stable governments with vigorous democratic roots. Economic development, often with United States private and governmental aid, is now proceeding rapidly in many Latin-American countries.

Yet elsewhere there is still ample social and economic as well as political evidence that in democratic development much of Latin America is several generations behind where it could have been.

The single year 1954 saw a small-scale war between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Bolivia all announced suppression of revolutionary attempts. The President of Brazil committed suicide in an atmosphere of plots and alarms. The President of Panama was assassinated, and the Vice President was charged with complicity in the plot.

In Guatemala, an independent nation, and British Guiana, a colony, Communist-oriented regimes had come to power. The first was overthrown by a military rebellion which most South American nations thought was masterminded by the United States. The second was suppressed from London by the withdrawal of the newly promulgated constitution for British Guiana.

The raw material for social revolution is also found in the history of Peronism in Argentina. Although Peron and Evita based their power on espousal of the cause of the "shirtless ones" and in promises of social justice for all, the methods chosen were reminiscent of European Fascism in the 1930's.

The democratic economic and social measures advocated at Bandung will have an obvious relevance for any visitor who goes outside the great modern South American cities to find many of the peasants still living on a level only a little higher than the lowest in India.

Another factor that makes for instability stems from the fact that most Latin-American economies depend on one exportable cash crop or mineral resource, such as coffee or oil. If the price of the leading commodity tumbles in the international market, the result is tragedy for the tens of thousands of local families whose incomes are tied to that product.

It was to overcome just such a disadvantage that the Bandung Conference recommended that Asian and African countries "diversify their export trade by processing their raw materials, whenever economically feasible, before export."

* * *

IF the remnants of feudalism and the lack of comprehensive economic development for the benefit of the people as a whole have dulled the effectiveness of the anti-colonial revolutions in Latin America, much the same may be said of the Middle East. There, too, formal freedom from foreign rule has seldom meant more freedom for the majority of the people. Where local tyrants have not imposed their rule by force, the functioning of the democratic process too often has been limited to a small, privileged, educated minority.

The Arab world, home of 60 million Arabs and the spiritual center for 360 million Muslims, is, for its own people, wretchedly poor. A region of ancient and glorious history, today over 90 per cent of its 3.5 million square miles of territory is desert. There is about as much land under cultivation in the whole Arab world as there is in the state of Iowa.

Part from land, the area offers only one major resource—oil. But the vast resources of this crucial commodity plus the Arab world's strategic geographical position astride the intercontinental sea, air and land routes has long made this area of key importance in world diplomacy. By 1939, only the deserts of Central Arabia and the mountains of Yemen were "unprotected" by European powers.

America for a generation had a special place in the hearts of Middle Eastern young people. Wilson and Roosevelt fired their enthusiasm. American University in Beirut educated a high percent-

age of Middle Eastern leaders. Today, however, American prestige, for a variety of reasons, has slumped.

In much of the Middle East, Arab society still consists of a few thousand immensely wealthy landowners and merchants, a narrow layer of middle-class professionals and technicians, and then the vast mass of landless or nearly landless peasants. The gap between the body of the people and its leaders seems almost unbridgeable and yet it also is beginning to be unbearable. Before the reforms were launched in Egypt in 1952, for instance, the country's big landowners—less than one per cent of all owners—owned more land than the lower 94 per cent. This system promoted a life of incredible sloth and ease on the top, and at the bottom, incredible misery.

At Bandung, Egypt was represented by its new Premier Nasser. Ever since 1952 when the Egyptian Army group came to power promising a complete democratic revolution, it has been wrestling with the dilemma presented by political democracy versus feudalism in an underdeveloped land.

Premier Nasser and his colleagues on the Revolution Command Council seem sincerely convinced that restoration of the freedom of political parties to contest elections would soon produce a parliament in which special interests could buy their seats and the interests of the Egyptian people would again be neglected.

So important is the question of economic reform, that these earnest and, I believe, democratically minded rulers, are now relying on a period of benevolent authoritarian rule in which to lay solid foundations. "We see no advantage for Egypt," Premier Nasser declared in Cairo on May 18, 1955, "in the establishment of a parliament in which men serving the interests of big landlords, or of Iraq, or of London, Washington or Moscow, would sit masquerading as Egyptians. We will not restore freedom only to have it exploited for selfish ends as it was in the past."

Consequently Egypt will have its "freedom in trust" for the "predictable future," while the educational system expands, a new civilian leadership is trained, a class of independent small farmers is developed through land reforms, and living standards are raised by economic development.

"Freedom in trust" is a risky concept, no matter how high-minded its guardians. But it is indicative of the lingering political

strength of feudalism that Nasser, like Ataturk in the 1920's in Turkey, finds it necessary to use undemocratic methods to root it out. The problem of getting a once frustrated revolution back on the road through essential democratic reforms is surely as difficult as any ever presented to statesmanship.

That the task of statesmanship, in this respect, has been easier in India than in Middle Eastern countries may be one credit to balance against the many debits of the long British colonial rule in the sub-continent. Initially, British law and, later, growing Indian participation in parliamentary bodies and the civil service were a school for responsible self-government before Indian independence.

In Pakistan too a group of able, democratically minded men have been striving to create foundations on which a free society can be trusted to grow and sustain itself. Divisions between orthodox and modern-minded Muslims, the original fragmentation of West Pakistan, the separation of the country into two distinct halves, the loss of much of the region's former industrial production through partition, the lack of both trained civil servants and a popular, nationally recognized leader, have all helped to make their task more difficult and their democratic process somewhat slower.

Ironically some of the greatest strides in democratic economic development in an Asian land and in creating an egalitarian social system are now occurring in the Middle East, but outside the confines of the Arab world—in that sturdy little country which is the target for such bitter Arab animosity: Israel. This state, constructed out of the desert by Jewish pioneers from the Diaspora, and bolstered by massive goodwill and capital from the West, might have achieved a complete revolution but for one terrible missing factor—peace, which the very events giving birth to the state still keep out of reach.

* * *

AT the other end of Asia there is another instance of the enigma of the incomplete revolution. Japan was the only nation present in Bandung which was obviously not underdeveloped. Only a few years ago this powerful industrial nation was

able to introduce her own brand of colonialism over some 500 million people in China and Southeast Asia, before American military power could bring about her defeat.

Japanese vitality and skills will continue to make their heavy impact on Asia and the world for a long time to come, hopefully this time in a more peaceful context. Together with India, Japan constitutes for the foreseeable future by far the greatest potential source of non-Communist Asian power in the broad sense of the word.

The Portuguese "discovered" Japan in 1542. Jesuit missionaries led by St. Francis Xavier arrived in 1549, and the Dutch, Spanish and British quickly opened up trading stations. Yet by 1673 they had all been driven out by a wave of antiforeign Japanese nationalism.

For nearly two hundred years, until Commodore Perry with his small American fleet broke down the bars in 1853, Japan was off bounds for the West. In the following two generations economic and political changes based on European and American concepts occurred there at a rate rarely equaled in history.

When Mutsu-Hito became emperor in 1867 he took the title of Meiji meaning "enlightened government," and with the vigorous support of a young group of political reformers and administrators, rapidly changed the face of Japan. A national Parliament was set up in 1881 and a cabinet on European lines appointed in 1885.

Economic development was equally swift. Japanese engineers, scientists and managers went to America and Europe for training and returned to create an industrial nation. As usual, in any crash economic development, a heavy burden fell on the peasants who worked under great pressure and with few compensations to provide food for the growing city population of city workers.

But the habits of peace were not part of this picture of emerging nationalism. In 1895 Japan turned her attention to foreign adventures. She declared war on China and emerged with the new territory of Formosa. In 1902 Japan signed a military treaty with Britain and four years later, to the amazement of the world and the delight of Asia, defeated the considerable power of Czarist Russia. In 1910 she absorbed Korea. For the next generation Japan's military power, in alliance with Britain, served to discourage Russian expansion into Asia and thus to relieve the pressure of Asian affairs on London.

But Japan began to overextend herself. The Chinese War, begun briefly in Manchuria in 1931 and resumed at Peking in 1937, had been only partially successful when Japan launched her drive into Southeast Asia and simultaneously struck at Pearl Harbor. In 1945 when her leaders finally surrendered to General MacArthur on the deck of the battleship *Missouri*, Japan's future was unpredictable.

Because of the concentration on economic development and war, and the failure to carry out basic social and economic reforms establishing a broad popular base, democracy in Japan had never taken root. Convinced that Japanese society needed thorough reform, we used our authority in a radical effort to rebuild Japan from the ground up. We tried to eliminate the great business monopolies, imposed heavy taxes on the remaining rich, gave the land to the small farmers who tilled it, and established equal rights for women.

But this was a revolution imposed by alien rulers—a kind of benevolent colonialism in reverse. Although some of the actions of the MacArthur administration were ill-advised, they included the best land reform program in Asia, one of the most sweeping in all history, which brought new hope for Japanese democratic life. If a disgruntled peasantry were still paying heavy tribute to the landlords, their inevitable political alliance with the restless city workers and students by now might have plunged the Japanese political scene into chaos.

The new Japanese Constitution, at our insistence, renounced war and agreed that armed force would “never be maintained.” The subsequent reluctance of the Japanese people to rearm is consequently a product, not only of their horror of the very idea of atomic war and their concern over the high cost of maintaining an adequate military establishment, but of their confusion over being asked to reject the idealistic new attitude toward war which our occupation policy had so recently prescribed for them.

In referring to his agreement to accept this constitutional provision General MacArthur quotes Prime Minister Shidehara as saying to him, “The world will laugh at us and mock us as impractical visionaries, but a hundred years from now we shall be called prophets.” Whether democracy can be introduced by military “democratization,” even with sweeping land reforms, is an open question. One thing that is certain, however, is the danger in carry-

ing out economic reforms and development without a parallel effort to create a solid democratic base.

Japan and Germany are two recent, non-Communist examples of the consequences for world peace and stability of rapid industrialization unaccompanied by democratic institutions. Each of these countries amassed the economic power to plunge the world into chaos, without developing the traditions and institutions which restrain the exercise of that power.

Europe watched complacently while the process of industrialization was under way in Germany and Japan. Yet these two nations became the major opponents of the Atlantic powers in World War II, and their rampaging might was overcome only at a fearful cost.

The natural resources of India or of colonial Africa south of the Sahara now exceed by far those of either Germany or Japan. Moreover, their populations are larger, and they carry a deep and insistent sense of grievance. The beckoning example of Communist Russia and China is not the basic reason for concern about what course their economic development will take but only gives it a special urgency and immediacy.

Industrialization and economic development have always meant large-scale political and social transformation of the countries in which they occur. But it cannot be repeated too often that, contrary to Marx, the form of the change is not determined by the fact of industrialization.

The opposite is usually true: the character of the industrial society that emerges is shaped by the nature of the social and political changes that have accompanied economic development. And these are matters of choice. Each phase and step of the development process may be accomplished by means which serve either democratic or undemocratic ends.

The reorganization of agriculture to increase farm productivity; the education and training of farm and city populations; the spirit and traditions of the civil service and private leadership groups; the allocations of capital as between heavy industry or decentralization—all these may be used in either of two ways: either as instruments for the progressive subjection of the people to the will and power of a ruling few, or as means of building habits of initiative and self-reliance, institutions of co-operation and democratic com-

promise, and a broad base for political power and economic advance.

Even the energy and enthusiasm which any development program needs to gather momentum may be generated either destructively, by arousing class, race or foreign hatred, or constructively, by creating a sense of participation in the positive adventures of national, community and individual development.

* * *

INDEPENDENCE, human dignity and economic development replacing feudalism: can these three aspects of the colonial revolution be successfully combined, or must one or more be sacrificed to achieve the others? At times they seem inconsistent.

Yet a concentration on one or two of them alone leaves a revolution at best incomplete, without deep roots among the people and subject to change without notice. Combining all these aspects of a complete democratic revolution is a staggering assignment which even a Gandhi sometimes feared could never be carried out.

Different degrees of emphasis on various ones of them were obviously represented at Bandung. Saudi Arabia preaches militant anti-imperialism and practices undisguised feudalism. Thailand has high literacy and health standards and has long enjoyed self-government, but aspects of dictatorship in her politics are difficult to deny—although announcements in 1955 of a planned move toward democratic participation were reassuring. The Chinese Communist Revolution was based on the elimination of an unjust *status quo* by methods which destroyed in the process the Chinese people's hopes for political liberty.

Perhaps the greatest promise of Bandung was the evidence that much of the leadership of the Asian-African world is concerned in spite of the obstacles with achieving a complete, four-pronged revolution. The negative slogan of anticolonialism was replaced with the positive goal of full democratic self-government. Nor was the antiracialism of Bandung limited to the old concept of white discrimination against colored people. The resolutions, of course, "deplored the policies and practices of racial segregation which form

the basis of government and human relations in large regions of Africa and in other parts of the world." Such racialism they saw as a kind of "cultural suppression."

But the delegates acknowledged that racialism is a universal disease. Concerned perhaps that some delegates, like the Japanese Tatsunosuke Takasaki, had spoken of the "racial kinship among Asian and African nations," and aware of Western fears that such concepts reflected the spirit of Bandung, the conference expressly denied that the African-Asian co-operation envisioned was "from any sense of exclusiveness or rivalry with other groups of nations." It made special overtures for increased co-operation with Australia and New Zealand which had received no invitation.

It was the wartime experience with Japanese domination that perhaps had most alerted the region to the dangers of exchanging white imperialism for brown, black or yellow imperialism. The deepness of the racial wounds inflicted by centuries of deliberate humiliation at the hands of the European had left the mass of people in Asia and Africa ready to welcome the Japanese invader who came in the professed role of liberator.

The myth of Western military invincibility had been exploded in the pounding guns of the Japanese Army as it moved down the Malay Peninsula toward Singapore. The mighty naval base, twin symbol with Hong Kong of Britain's proud rule throughout Asia, fell easily before Asian armies. Chou En-lai at Geneva was not the first to preach Asia for the Asians. That was the slogan under which Japanese armies marched from victory to victory through the Far East.

Everywhere, the Japanese were welcomed by local populations anxious for freedom from the long wave of white oppression. Had the Japanese been flexible enough to capitalize on this goodwill, they might have attained a more lasting success in Asia. But like the Nazis in the Ukraine they missed their chance.

Within a few weeks it became apparent that they intended to substitute a more brutal and exacting domination for that of the old European rulers. As the Japanese posed as a new master race, early enthusiasm turned to sullen and often bitter resistance. In the Philippines, the only Asian colony where the people had been clearly promised independence after the war, this resistance reached its peak of effectiveness.

In addition to the Japanese lesson, Asian countries were sensitive to the various kinds of caste and class discriminations prevailing inside their own borders. In India, for instance, which has so eloquently championed the claims of the darker races to equal treatment in international forums, there is the deep scar of untouchability. *Varṇa*, the Sanskrit word for caste, means "color."

As we have seen, Gandhi dedicated some of his most important struggles to the removal of untouchability. His work bore fruit in the Indian Constitution of 1950 which officially bans discrimination against outcastes and which in 1955 was spelled out through specific legislation, carrying heavy penalties. Yet habits and social institutions yield slowly and the caste system remains a lingering drain on India's vitality, particularly in the rural areas.

Therefore the delegates "reaffirmed the determination of Asian-African peoples to eradicate every trace of racialism that might exist in their own countries, pledging to use their "full moral influence to guard against the danger of falling victims to the same evil in their struggle to eradicate it."

* * *

NEXT to the colonial friction the Bandung Conference placed its greatest emphasis on the constructive problems of economic development. "Besides the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedom," said Prince Wan of Thailand, "man has material needs to satisfy. Economic well-being is the most pressing need of Asia and Africa, and there is an imperative necessity to raise the standards of life of the Asian and African peoples if only to protect them from the threat of hunger and poverty and disease."

Prince Wan knew that of the 2.5 billion human beings in the world, more than three-fifths lived in economically underdeveloped countries, and that most of them were represented at Bandung.

In large measure their economic predicament was closely associated in their minds with colonialism. Rightly or wrongly, imperial rulers were blamed for deliberately hindering their economic growth, for their lack of local industry and regional trade, for their lopsided dependence on raw material exports to uncertain Western markets—jute, tea, cotton, tin, manganese, copra, kapok and other items—and

for their lack of skilled training. Asian and African delegates at Bandung could not forget the old saying that every European colonial power built more jails than schools.

Thus the very first section of the Bandung communique recognized the "urgency of promoting economic development in the Asian-African region." Thoughtful leaders in Asia and Africa knew that old criticisms of colonial misrule were no solution for the difficult problems they themselves now faced.

As a beginning of the new kind of positive thinking required, detailed proposals for mutual Asian-African technical assistance were adopted. The establishment of a special UN fund for economic development was also requested, along with a larger allocation of resources to Africa and Asia by the International Bank, and the stabilizing of commodity trade and prices. The delegates stressed the "particular significance of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes for Asian-African countries."

Of course, the fact that the new demands for economic progress occur in the context of strident new nationalism and anti-colonial racial consciousness means that neither the growth of true regional co-operation nor the growth of new and better economic roles for Europe and America in the underdeveloped world will be easy.

Contrary to some expectations, however, the Bandung resolutions expressly recognized both the "desirability" and the "need for [economic] co-operation with countries outside the region, including the investment of foreign capital."

The emergence of Asia's and Africa's long-delayed nationalism at just the time when science and technology have made unlimited nationalism an anachronism is perhaps the greatest irony of all these revolutions. A higher level of political unity, a world organization able to enforce peace, seems essential, for peace itself is now necessary to the success of any major program of democratic development and reform. Yet both peace and aggressive national sovereignty, which these vigorous young nations of Africa and Asia now claim, have so far in history been a contradiction in terms.

The United States had the advantage of a century of independence during which she could avoid entanglement with alliances and world organizations, during which she could concentrate on her own internal affairs, advise the world on how to behave, and avoid responsibility for the result. Yet such isolation is clearly impossible

for the new African-Asian nations. Perhaps the very coming together at Bandung is evidence that they recognize their fate requires some degree of submergence of their new nationalism in a greater regional or world unity.

'Freedom and peace are interdependent,' the conference resolved, presumably meaning that the lack of freedom anywhere is a threat to peace, just as without peace, freedom everywhere is hindered in its growth.

As steps toward world peace, the conference called for the "reduction of armaments and elimination of nuclear weapons under effective international control." Atomic energy should then "be used exclusively for peace purposes," which, by helping to raise the standards of life everywhere, would make possible "larger freedom."

Support for the United Nations was one of the first principles endorsed. No very imaginative proposals were made for the strengthening of the UN into a body better able to enforce peace, but several points which seem obvious to most Asians and Africans were made. Membership in the UN, the conference resolved, should be universal, and therefore Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Nepal and a unified Vietnam should be admitted.

Representation of the Asian-African region on the Security Council was held to be inadequate. Asians never tire of pointing out that the two-thirds of the world's people who live in the Asian-African regions are represented permanently on the Council only by the delegate of Nationalist China, a government which governs only nine million people and which was not invited to Bandung.

The conference recognized "the right of each nation to defend itself, singly or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations," but warned against letting such arrangements for collective defense "serve particular interests of any of the big Powers."

This gave a kind of recognition to those nations which entered the South East Asian Treaty Organization set up at Manila. But it was hardly a sufficient answer to the problem of the common defense of the region. With the presence of Communist China, perhaps no fuller answer was possible at Bandung. But a regional organization for regional defense, composed of all those powers such as India who are not associated with either of the two blocs, could be a real contribution to peace.

The Bandung resolution to establish Institutes of Asian-African Studies in universities throughout the region suggests of course another valuable step toward closer regional understanding and more effective research into the past.

But at Bandung a persistent effort was made to maintain a world view. As General Romulo said in his closing speech, "The success of this conference will be measured not by what we do for ourselves, but by what we do for the entire human community."

Many of the non-Asians and non-Africans who went to Bandung to observe came away with a new understanding of the impact Bandung could have on the wider human community. An American journalist who attended the conference has told of later visiting Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, India, Burma and Thailand. He reports that customs difficulties were overcome when officials saw the Bandung credentials in his passport. Even at the Khyber Pass crowds gathered when the magic word spread that he had been at Bandung.

If a large proportion of the people of Asia and Africa can perceive from history how to complete their revolutions so as to achieve a full measure of democratic development, and if they can build not from hatred nor from fear but out of faith and hope, and with friendliness toward the Atlantic nations, then even the skeptics in the West would I believe, agree that Bandung carried a message of hope to a world suffering from cynicism and lack of faith in its own greatest ideas.

CHAPTER 25

Bandung and the Cold War

THE very presence of Chou En-lai in a sense sidetracked the Bandung Conference from the consideration of the common problems of the region to an undue emphasis on the problem of China's relations with the Atlantic nations.

"If Communist China had not been ostracized by the West, if it had been a member of the United Nations like several other Communist dictatorships, I do not believe that Chou En-lai would have been invited to Bandung," an Asian diplomat told me sharply. The determination of other Asians to bring China into an international gathering was in large part, he believed, caused by America's refusal to recognize a big, if unpleasant, Asia revolution. To work and to talk with delegates of the Peking Government carried something of the excitement of tasting a forbidden fruit.

Certainly it is a fact that Chou made an immense personal impression at Bandung. He achieved this triumph not only by his own undeniable charm and moderate approach, but most particularly by the skill with which he identified himself with the deepest aspirations of the billion and one-half people represented there.

On each of Bandung's four key issues—colonialism, racism, economic development and peace—Chou was eager to profess his agreement. "Suffering from the same cause, and struggling for the same aim," said the Chinese Premier, "we Asian and African peoples have long had deep sympathy for one another."

Was the conference concerned about colonialism? "Most countries of Asia and Africa," said Chou En-lai, "have been subjected

to the plunder and oppression of colonialism and have thus been forced to remain in stagnant poverty and backwardness. Our voices have been suppressed, our aspirations shattered, and our destiny placed in the hands of others. Thus we have no choice but to rise against enslavement by colonialism."

Was the conference concerned about self-government for dependent peoples? "The Chinese people extend their full sympathy and support," said Chou, "to the struggle of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia for self-determination and independence, to the struggle of the Arab people of Palestine, to the struggle of the Indonesian people for the restoration of Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian."

Was the conference concerned about racial discrimination and human rights? "Not a few of the Asian and African peoples are still subjected to racial discrimination and deprived of human rights," said Chou. "People irrespective of race or color should all enjoy fundamental human rights and not be subjected to any maltreatment and discrimination. Human rights in the Union of South Africa and other places have not yet been respected."

Was the conference concerned about economic development and the effects of feudalism? "The majority of our Asian and African countries, including China," said Chou, "are still very backward economically owing to the long period of colonial domination. That is why we demand not only political independence but economic independence as well."

On peace, Chou not only presented the Communist slogan of coexistence, and pressed the Soviet appeal for disarmament, but even agreed to the resolutions endorsing collective defense pacts under the UN. In so doing he swallowed much that was contrary to the hopes, practices and principles of Communist China.

Chou even endorsed the UN Bill of Rights. He agreed to the resolution supporting outside aid and capital investment. He did not publicly press China's claim to the seat held by Chiang in the UN, and the Peking government was omitted from the list of those whose admission to the UN was advocated at Bandung.

Chou announced that he was ready at any time to negotiate with the United States the tensions arising from the Formosa question. As for the charges of a bamboo curtain and a police state, he invited the delegates to come and see for themselves. He even sought

out the most anti-Communist delegates such as Prince Wan and General Romulo and personally invited them to visit China and go anywhere they chose on the mainland without escort. "He told me that he would like me to see the good, the bad and the in-between," Romulo said later.

Few of the delegates at Bandung would be fooled into ignoring the wolflike features of the New China, despite Chou's sheeplike clothing. From their diplomatic representatives in Peking those Asian countries which recognize Communist China, such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia, realize that for the Chinese people the Communist Revolution has been a costly affair. The price for full-speed-ahead in wiping out feudalism and in commencing economic development has been regimentation, forced labor, mass killing and the loss of all civil liberty. In this sense, the Chinese Communist Revolution cannot remotely be called a complete revolution, since despite its public professions abroad, it has curtailed, not promoted, the establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Similarly, the non-Communist Asians have had enough experience in their own lands with the violence of revolutionary Communism not to take Peking's avowal of peace at its face value. They know that despite the vocabulary of peace, the textbook of Communism has so far been not peace but violence and subversion.

In the first years of their new independence most free Asian nations faced armed insurrections led by Communists. The decision for the wave of increased Communist violence which spread through South Asia in 1948 was reached in Moscow and relayed through a Communist conference in Calcutta and the pages of the Cominform weekly newspaper. When the new governments in India, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, armed by the power of their new nationalism had largely crushed these revolts, the Communists decided henceforth to attempt to manipulate the stream of Asian nationalism to their advantage rather than to attempt to row against it.

The free Asians know all this and they still remember it, but in the bewildering tempo of our age, time is obliterating the sharpness of their memory. And since this period of debacle, the Communists have been careful to come to terms with the ideas and objectives of the peoples they hope to win.

It is ironical that the Communists, supposedly dedicated to economic determinism, have played most adeptly on noneconomic factors in their political agitation throughout the colonial world. American policy, on the other hand, has seemed to show far too little appreciation of the all-important psychological and political realities.

Thus, in the UN General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council where on many occasions the spotlight of world attention has been focused on colonial problems, the United States, in the judgment of Africans and Asians, has on balance shown up poorly. In 1954, for example, colonial problems in Cyprus, Morocco, Tunisia and Dutch West New Guinea (Irian) were pressed for General Assembly consideration. Against the views of most of the ex-colonial Arab and South American nations, the American delegation, on a number of grounds, successfully opposed General Assembly debate on the claims of these peoples still without self-rule. Such actions, as Senator Walter George warned us in July, 1955, "too often have seemed to put the United States on the side of colonialism."

The Soviet Union, however, has been a vigorous anticolonial spokesman at the UN. Indeed at every international conference since the early 1920's Soviet representatives have persistently associated Russia with the cause of anticolonialism.

Many of the African delegates at Bandung must have heard, as I did in the winter of 1955 in Africa, skillful Communist radio broadcasts from East European stations, beamed into colonial Africa in several different languages. For the moment, these broadcasts are aimed particularly at the Arabs of French North Africa, but they are likely to expand in coverage and effectiveness. The Russians, although vulnerable themselves to the charge of a new colonialism, have not been effectively challenged on this point by our own information program. This has left them free to champion the anti-colonial cause with great effectiveness.

Closely related to Moscow's well-established opposition to European-style colonialism, is its stand against racialism. For instance, when the question of whether the UN's three-man observation commission on racial conditions in South Africa should be continued in spite of South African refusal to co operate with the UN, the Soviet bloc supported the motion of the Asian and African countries.

Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand opposed, and the

United States abstained. We objected to the first report of the commission on the ground that it "accepted at face value the assertion that the Soviet Union had banned race discrimination." But this did not satisfy the underdeveloped world, which was concerned with racialism in Africa, not in Russia.

As the *Indian Express* said on April 5, 1955: "If the suppression of people for their opinion is wrong in Russia or China, far worse is the suppression of people for their color in Africa. . . . The fact is that Western powers, by their obsession with Communism and their collusion with racialism are yielding a great moral advantage to the enemies of freedom."

Moreover, Moscow has succeeded in convincing most of the world that its record on racial equality is good. It may be equality of suffering, equality under tyranny, but at least until the brutal anti-Semitism of Stalin's last days and some of the more drastic dispersals of national groups after the war, Russia seemed relatively free from systematic persecution or discrimination on racial grounds.

On this issue the world Communist movement has been vastly fortified by the emergence of Communist China, for now the largest Communist country in the world is a colored, Asian country. Probably the greatest asset Chou had at Bandung was the simple fact that he was a fellow Asian.

This advantage can perhaps best be measured by the suspicion which an American faces because of the discrimination still practiced in our own country. Over and over again while I was in India, I was confronted with the startling question whether we atom-bombed the Japanese because they were yellow, while we refrained from atom-bombing the Germans because they were white. No explanations ever quite seemed to silence doubts on this question.

In the long run our progress in coping with discrimination in America will have a major influence throughout the world. In this sense, it may well be that the most important American foreign policy document of recent years was issued not from the White House or State Department, but was spoken in the measured tones of the Chief Justice of the United States reading the Supreme Court's decision that the Constitution forbade segregation in public schools.

Communism appeals perhaps most significantly to the Asian-African desire for economic development. The very emergence of Russia as a great industrial power able to threaten the whole of the

Atlantic area, after two generations of Communist development, excites the imagination of Asia. If China succeeds in mastering her very formidable problem of peasant organization and food production and also moves toward rapid industrialization, her appeal as a fellow Asian nation will be even more persuasive.

* * *

WHILE most of the nations represented at Bandung have rejected these various appeals of Communism and of China, they knew that the real power of the appeal was being exerted not on the leaders of the Asian and African countries, and not even on the often hungry peasants and workers, but primarily on the young and sometimes frustrated intellectuals who are invariably the revolutionary leaders.

The Communist appeal to the young student who graduates from a Western-influenced liberal arts university into a world of poverty in which all too often there is no adequate job for him—this is one of the most ominous aspects of contemporary underdeveloped societies. For centuries young people in both Asia and Africa accepted the old ways almost without question. Long-established family systems, tribal customs and religious patterns set the limits of thought, action and opportunity. Into these static, regimented societies, the ideas and ideals of Western democracy and individualism came like a mighty wind.

Christian missionaries spread across Africa, ultimately to win twenty million converts. College professors from Europe toured the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. The sons of thousands of higher income families from Capetown to Shanghai started their long trek to Europe and America for a Western education.

There these young people had been persuaded by their Western teachers that the individual is all-important, that he has the right to think and act for himself and to forge ahead to the limit of his capacities. In Asia and Africa these essential principles of life which the West took for granted constituted a revolution in themselves.

But these young people, having responded with enthusiasm to the exciting new ideas of the West, soon found to their dismay that outside of Europe and America, most Europeans were only willing to

see these ideas applied under strict limits set by them. These limits were defined in the colonial world of Asia and Africa in terms of color, race and national origin.

Because this discrimination repudiated the very teachings which had just taken root, it has resulted in frustration and resentment. In the eyes of most young Asians and Africans it has meant that Europe and America, too, had rejected their own democratic revolution.

Most of these young people have also faced strict limitations of financial opportunity. Many of them are idealistic, eager to serve their country, shocked at the misery all about them, and sincerely anxious to remedy it. To them the Communist agitator appears not as a totalitarian brute wielding the blacksnake whip in our familiar cartoon style, but often as a dedicated individual who offers them a shining new vehicle for active organized service to mankind.

In this new pattern of discipline many young idealistic Asians find at least for a time a satisfying sense of security and purpose. The party tells them what to like, what to hate, and what to do in terms of the all-inclusive Marxian ideology. The young Communist feels a quickening sense of importance, of participation, of working shoulder to shoulder with others of his generation in a mighty movement, presumably dedicated to the creation of a united class-free world.

He reads that Lenin once said, "We are marching in a compact group along a difficult path firmly holding each other by the hand." Over and over again he is reminded that however grim and discouraging the outlook may now appear for the ultimate triumph of Communism in his country, the prospects looked even less likely in Russia in 1906 or China in 1927.

To the young people of Asia one of the most appealing things about the Communist movement is the fact that its leaders seem to take no graft, and appear to seek nothing for themselves. In such honestly governed countries as the United States, Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom this would scarcely set a man apart, but in Asia, which has seen so much corruption and abuse of the poor by the rich, the effect is often explosive.

In Indochina Joseph Alsop wrote that what impressed him most was "the moral fervor [the Communists] inspired among non-Communists . . . and the stout support they had obtained from the

in 1949 that the Soviet-dominated and doctrinaire Cominform reluctantly adopted the rural approach of Mao Tse-tung as a model for Asia.

Since Mao's victory in China in 1949, the influence of Peking in Asian Communist affairs has been growing so steadily that by 1955 the organization and direction of the Communist parties in Asia and Africa appeared to be a source of potential conflict. In Moscow the pictures from Bandung of Chou En-lai in earnest conversation with key Arab and African, as well as Asian leaders, must have created a mixed reaction.

But it cannot be said too often that the future of Communism in Asia is less likely to rest on what is decided in Moscow or Peking than on the abilities of the non-Communist nations represented at Bandung to carry out their promises of a complete democratic revolution.

That Communism has little chance in a country which has freed itself of Western colonialism and is moving ahead independently with the reforms and construction of a democratic revolution is evident in the recent history of Burma, which is the very opposite of the experience in Indochina. The future history of Asia and Africa, and thus perhaps of the world, can be read in the contrasting story of these two Southeast Asian nations.

Superficially they have much in common. Each is rich in natural resources, with ample rainfall, good land and rice surplus for export. Neither nation is overcrowded. Burma, larger than France, Belgium and Holland combined, has a population of 19 million. Vietnam, roughly the size of Italy, has 24 million.

The similarities are more than physical. Each of these nations has a long history of colonial occupation. French power was firmly established in Vietnam in the mid-nineteenth century, and the British wiped out what remained of Burmese independence in 1886. During World War II each nation was occupied by the Japanese.

During the war anti-Japanese guerrilla movements developed in both countries with American and British support. Communist leaders were prominent among the guerrillas. When the Japanese were finally driven out, there was in both countries a similar and widespread demand for complete independence.

But here the similarities end. In Vietnam and the two associated states of Cambodia and Laos, the French, as we have seen, hedged

and hesitated, and the result was an exhausting eight-year civil war, a shattering military debacle and the uneasy truce of a divided country.

In 1946, Burma was also on the verge of a civil war with armed opposition to the British. But in 1947, instead of sending more troops to subdue the growing Burmese surge of nationalism, the British wisely recognized the power of the Asian revolution and agreed to a complete withdrawal.

In 1948 the Communists, although disappointed that British withdrawal had deprived them of the "down-with-colonialism" slogan which the French had so conveniently provided in Vietnam, went into open, armed opposition to the wobbly new government. In 1949 they were followed by the Karens, a tough warlike people of eastern Burma who were determined to set up an independent state. By 1951 the fighting had spread throughout Burma, and the future of the free Burmese Republic looked grim indeed.

In that same year the difficulties of the new government were further increased when eight or ten thousand Chinese Nationalist troops, which had been driven by the Communists across the border into Burma's northern Shan provinces, decided to join the general nation-wide melee.

By late 1951 the American Government, sensing the armed weakness of the new government of Burma, had about decided it was doomed. Equally convinced that the government was on its last legs, the Chinese Nationalist Government began to fly in American equipment from Formosa to assist General Li Mi's Nationalist insurgents, and thereby complicated still further the problems of the struggling young republic.

Yet according to reports reaching New Delhi from Peking, the Chinese Communist Government, with a keener sense of the real sources of power in Asia, had at about this same time written off the Burmese Communist revolution as a lost cause. In spite of the apparent weak position of the new Burmese Republic, no Chinese arms or military equipment, as far as is known, were sent to the relief of the Communists in Burma. The Peking Government apparently decided that such interference would enable the free Burmese to claim that the Communist insurgents were being financed by the Chinese and thus awaken old fears of foreign domination.

Gradually Prime Minister U Nu and his associates have suc-

ceeded in establishing the government on a relatively solid basis. By supporting economic and political reforms which were well timed and honest, they cut the ground out from under the Communists.

In 1954 the last major Communist leader to surrender stated plaintively: "U Nu put through the village program which we Communists had been promising the people, and there was no way for us to gain their support."

This story points a mighty moral in contrasting Communist and Western appreciation of the strength of indigenous nationalism in Asia. The Chinese Communists, recognizing the power of nationalist sentiment among the people of Burma and Vietnam, refrained from challenging the popular, free Burmese Government, but confidently supported the Vietnamese national revolt against the French. America, apparently unappreciative of the power of nationalist sentiment, was so pessimistic about Burma's chances for life that we despaired of its future just as it was winning its fight for life.

As late as March, 1955, when I visited the Burmese capital of Rangoon, no American ambassador had been accredited there for nine months. During these years when we were largely ignoring Burma, we were spending nearly \$3 billion in a desperate losing effort to shore up a dying French colonial regime next door.

The contrast between Burma and Indochina was undoubtedly very fresh in the minds of the leaders of the nations that met at Bandung. They knew that if their countries, like Burma, moved ahead toward a vigorous democratic development and reform they would have considerably less to fear from Communism.

The shadow over Bandung was not so much Communism as the fear among the non-Communists that they might lack the courage and capacity to meet this challenge. This fear was compounded in part by concern that America and the West, having failed to take to heart the lesson of Mao's victory in China, might now ignore or misinterpret the equally devastating lesson of Vietnam, and the growing crisis of North Africa.

In terms of political and economic aid everyone knew that America's judgment might be decisive in determining whether against all the awful obstacles of poverty, ignorance, disease—and Communism—the democratic way might prevail. As Sir John Kotelawala, the Prime Minister of Ceylon, has said, the most funda-

mental competition in Asia is in economic development, between China and free Asia. Democratic development in Asia, he said, had to be speeded up "with almost supersonic speed."

"If the poor countries of Asia are not assisted to their feet by the richer countries of the world with the least possible delay," he continued, "the spectacle and the example of China will be simply disastrous. Democracy will meet its Waterloo in Asia."

But Sir John would no doubt agree that the test is not just how the Atlantic nations respond, but how the Asians and Africans themselves respond. If the leaders of free Asia and Africa, and their colleagues in the West, can respond to the needs and hopes of their peoples, then this hour could turn out to be not democracy's Waterloo but its Valley Forge.

"We have a chance to make good and we must, rapidly," said Prime Minister Nehru in his closing remarks at Bandung. "If we don't, we shall fade away, stumble, and fall, not to rise again for a long time."

The Bandung delegates resolved that there should be a "next meeting" of the Asian-African peoples, to be convened again by the sponsoring powers, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan.

When this next meeting occurs, we can only hope that America will be in closer touch with the fears and aspirations that are shaping this great region of over half the world. "Benevolent indifference" or unfriendly apprehension is hardly a proper American posture, when more than a billion human beings are striving in their own way to march to the battle songs of our Republic.

In opening the conference, President Sukarno cited the American Revolution as the forerunner of the present revolutions in Asia and Africa. For us to understand these twentieth century revolutions we might begin where he did, by trying to understand why the shots at a rude bridge in Concord were heard round the world. To do this we need only shift the scene from Independence Hall, Bandung, to Independence Hall, Philadelphia.

SECTION VI

The Revolution of Jefferson, Wilson and Henry Ford

*There are certain words,
Our own and others', we're used to—words we've used,
Heard, had to recite, forgotten . . .*

Liberty, equality, fraternity.

*To none will we sell, refuse or deny, right or justice.
We hold these truths to be self-evident.*

*I am merely saying—what if these words pass '
What if they pass and are gone and are no more?*

*They were bought with belief and passion, at great cost.
They were bought with the bitter and anonymous blood
Of farmers, teachers, shoemakers and fools
Who broke the old rule and the pride of kings.*

*It took a long time to buy these words.
It took a long time to buy them and much pain.*

STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT

CHAPTER 26

Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death

IN much of Asia, Africa and South America, where more than a billion people are living under nearly intolerable conditions, revolution is a word of hope. We have seen that their revolutionary objectives have at least four dimensions—demand for independence, insistence on human dignity without regard to race, creed or color, rapid economic progress for the benefit of the many as well as for the few, and peaceful conditions under which to live.

These are the very concepts on which America was built. If the day ever comes when they sound strange or radical to the average American, it will be a sad day for human freedom.

That the ideas which powered our own revolution have finally spread out to the whole world is the most significant fact of our time. That the Communists are constantly seeking to take over those concepts and twist them to Communist ends is the greatest tribute that could be paid to their continuing dynamism.

Nehru, U Nu, Magsaysay, Nasser, Nkrumah and Ghulam Mohammed often speak the language of Jefferson, Lincoln and Wilson. If their words sometimes sound strange to our ears, it is a measure of our isolation from our own past and from the hard facts of survival with which they and their people are contending.

Speaking at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on July 3, 1955, during his visit to the United States, the Burmese Premier reminded

us that the ideals of the American Revolution are more explosive than "B-52's or even atomic bombs. In all parts of the world where man lives under tyranny, or under foreign domination, or in feudal bondage," U N continued, "those who dream and plot and fight for freedom do so in the name of the eternal principles for which your Revolution was fought."

The declarations of independence and the constitutions of colonial nations the world over, often borrow from the great documents of our own history. The declaration of the Indian National Congress in 1930 repeated the very words of Jefferson which the revolutionary American Congress had proclaimed at the first Fourth of July.

"We the people of Burma . . ." says the Burmese Constitution, and these words are echoed in a dozen others: "We the people of India . . ."—"We the Japanese people . . ."—"We the people of the Commonwealth of Liberia . . ."—"We the Filipino people . . ."—"We the people of Korea . . ."—"We the representatives of the people of Libya . . ."

The promise of freedom and a better life which these words introduce surge through the hearts of Asian and African men and women, who in the vortex of their own struggles for independence, have turned naturally and with new and ringing emphasis to the slogans and battle cries of our own history. In 1945 American-armed Dutch soldiers, clanking in their American-built Sherman tanks into Batavia—soon to be renamed Jakarta—to re-establish their colonial power in what they still hopefully called the "Dutch East Indies," found painted on the walls of the city rebel slogans familiar to every American schoolboy: "All men are created free and equal" and "Give me liberty or give me death."

These ideas can be heard returning to America in the insistent pleas of the newly free and the still subject peoples of Asia and Africa—young now, as we once were—that we stand firm for the ideals that fed our own growth.

Even Stalin knew the power of our words and tried to appropriate them. In the Soviet Constitution of 1936 appears the incredible promise—"Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Press, Freedom of Assembly."

Once reclaimed by their American authors, these words can form a tie between the revolutions "out there" and our own revolutionary past. May we not advance our understanding by taking a fresh look

at that past, by trying to grasp anew the power of the words, thoughts and deeds that have literally been heard round the world?

The American Revolution, we must not forget, was the modern world's first successful revolt of a colony against an imperial power. For half the world, 1776 did not come until the twentieth century, and for many it still constitutes a dream for the future. How ready are we now to hear and accept the ideas which the men in Independence Hall a century and a half ago held to be self-evident?

To secure the unalienable rights of men, we said then, governments are instituted among men, "deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

"Whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends," according to our Declaration of Independence, "it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it. . . ." And to these principles our Founding Fathers pledged their lives, their fortunes and their sacred honor.

"Government is instituted for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men," said the Massachusetts Bill of Rights in 1780. "Therefore the people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government, and to reform, alter, or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it."

Nor were the founders of America talking about mere theory. They meant what they said when they said revolution. The consequences of the rights they proclaimed, they knew, might even mean blood and suffering. "Let them take arms," said Thomas Jefferson. "The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."

On the right of revolution our sixteenth President was as explicit as our third. "This country with its institutions," said Abraham Lincoln, "belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they may exercise their constitutional right to alter it, or their revolutionary right to abolish and overthrow it." This latter right, Lincoln added, "is a most sacred right, a right which we hope and believe is to liberate the world."

The fathers of the American Revolution themselves deliberately

intended that their revolution should arouse subject peoples throughout the world. Benjamin Franklin prescribed his own "Rules By Which A Great Empire May Be Reduced To A Small One." Tom Paine wrote on a drumhead in the light of General Washington's campfires, "From a small spark kindled in America, a flame has arisen not to be extinguished."

The flame was seen abroad and drew men to it like Lafayette from France and Kosciusko from Poland. From 1776 on lovers of freedom came from the old world to share in the birth pangs of the new. The young America welcomed them, claiming to be the homeland of freedom. "The preservation of the sacred fire of liberty," said Washington in his first inaugural in 1791, "and the destiny of the Republican model of government are justly considered as deeply, perhaps finally, staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American people."

Washington's successor, John Adams, echoed him in saying: "I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and wonder, as the opening of a grand scene and design in Providence for the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth."

"I join with you in the hope and belief," said Jefferson in his first year as President, "that the inquiry which has been excited among the mass of mankind by our revolution and its consequences will ameliorate the condition of man over a great portion of the globe."

In the early years of the Republic, this spirit of our first three Presidents knew no bounds. In his eulogy of Adams and Jefferson, Daniel Webster expressed the ambition of a young continent with a confident ring of world mission. "With America and in America, a new era commences in human affairs," Webster proclaimed. "This era is distinguished by free representative government, by entire religious liberty, by a newly awakened and unconquerable spirit of free inquiry, and by diffusion of knowledge through the community such as has been before altogether unknown."

"Our country is the world, our countrymen all mankind," echoed Webster's Massachusetts contemporary, Edward Everett. In his famous speech on "Liberty" in 1826, he said: "There is an element of popular strength abroad in the world. Springing into existence on the shores of our own continent, it has grown with our growth and

strengthened with our strength.] . . . Formed and nourished by our example, three wonderful revolutions have broken out in a generation." Everett referred to those in France, Greece and South America.

In Europe nervous guardians of the *status quo* recognized and feared America as a force for positive change. Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich complained: "In fostering revolutions wherever they show themselves, in regretting those which have failed, in extending a helping hand to those which seem to prosper [the Americans] lend new strength to the apostles of sedition and reanimate the courage of every conspirator."

To those other revolutionaries went not only the American Revolutionary appeal, but the American revolutionaries themselves. For many of them America was not a place but a state of mind, an idea. "Where liberty is, there is my country," said Benjamin Franklin. But younger men replied with Tom Paine, "Where is *not* liberty, there is mine."

In this spirit Paine himself went to France, to join the revolution which began there in 1789. Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—this was the new trinity proclaimed with the storming of the Bastille. The French Revolution's affinity to the American was nowhere better demonstrated than by the act of the new assembly in voting French citizenship to George Washington and to Tom Paine.

* * *

BUT the French Revolution soon came to resemble the later Russian one, at least in its excesses. Paine was shocked by the execution of Marie Antoinette. Jailed under suspicion by Robespierre, he escaped the blade himself only by accident. Other Americans were repulsed by the militant atheism which rechristened Notre Dame the "Temple of Reason" and which persecuted churchmen for their faith. Disillusion increased after the hardening of the National Convention into dictatorship by guillotine. Eventually the French Revolution was taken over by Napoleon and turned to purposes still more inconsistent with its radical democratic beginnings.

Nevertheless what the American and French revolutions had accomplished, the former in its lasting success and the latter in its

passion, was to give birth to the democratic nation-state. Thus they combined two of the most powerful ideas of the age, democracy and nationalism—ideas which lie at the very heart of the African-Asian revolution championed so fervently at Bandung. Let us examine for a moment the roots of these two forces in Europe.

The nation-state itself is still a young political creation, barely four centuries old. When the French and American revolutions occurred in the eighteenth century, feudalism still prevailed in parts of Western Europe, and estate had not dropped its first syllable to become the state.

But with the growth of industry, the once weak monarchies were finding new support from merchants, tradesmen and artisans, demanding a strong central government to erase the little lines of divided feudal sovereignty, the states within states, the petty tariff walls, the competing taxes. The process of wiping out the manors, monasteries, and fiefs large and small, consumed several centuries of Western history. At its end, the unified nation-state had been born, and the monarch was left face to face with his people.

If the King and the Individual were the only great contestants who began the modern age, it was to be expected that the theory of the Divine Right of Kings should be answered by the Sacred Rights of Man. "I am the state," Louis would say. But two short generations later the answer came back as the French Revolutionary assembly, equating the state with itself, proclaimed, "All sovereignty resides in the nation."

Democracy had been growing in the West for several centuries before it took over the nation-state in 1776 and 1789. In England in 1215 the barons at Runnymede had forced the king to sign the Magna Carta. If the rights won there were limited, the winning of them had had unlimited effects. The charter itself had remained to stimulate the English legal and political imagination for the next seven centuries.

The charter's revolutionary clause had granted to the barons the right of rebellion whenever the king violated the terms of the settlement. Fortunately this did not become as much a part of English tradition as the habit of timely compromise. Quietly, and for the most part peacefully, the English Parliament gradually grew from a committee of the king to become the king's high court, then his chief competitor for power, and finally to rule itself in the king's name.

But Cromwell was one who did invoke the ancient right to revolution when his Puritan Army of God marched against Charles I in 1642, and his methods were not gentle. In 1649 the Russians were so shocked over the beheading of Charles I by the Puritans that they dismissed the English ambassador, just as the British recoiled in horror when the Russians executed their Czar in 1918.

In 1781 the Russians were just as quick to grasp the implications of the American Revolution on Old World politics and the European *status quo*. An Indian historian once chided me on our modern devotion to the established order by comparing us to Czarist Russia, which for thirty-three years after our Revolution refused to recognize the existence of the United States.

It must be said that these early fears of the Russian aristocracy were amply justified. From the centers of democratic liberalism in the West, with America as the most dramatic symbol, the political revolution spread first around the North Atlantic community and South America, and finally in the twentieth century to Asia and Africa.

By the 1850's Garibaldi would be crying to his ragged Italian volunteers assembled before St. Peter's, "I offer neither pay nor quarters nor provisions. I offer hunger, thirst, forced marches, battles and death." By the 1880's Parnell would be telling the Irish that there was only one way to treat an Englishman, "Stand up to him."

Within a hundred and fifty years the ideas and the passions that fired the revolutionaries of Concord, Valley Forge and Philadelphia have been recreated on every continent. In retrospect they clearly amounted to a world-wide revolution.

Some latter-day critics would restrict the American Revolution to the period of its anti-colonial revolt. They imply that its unfolding revolutionary significance for the world, important as it has proved to be, was bounded by the events between Concord Bridge and Yorktown.

- But the American Revolution has not been so one dimensional. It grew into a broad, continuing revolution, rarely ceasing to be animated by the dream of a complete, democratic revolution involving the expansion of human rights and opportunities in their broadest sense. We have already noted that a complete democratic revolution has never been fully achieved. But few will deny the

strength of this ideal, or the continuing validity of the claim of those who hold it to be revolutionaries.

Evolutionary in its practice since 1781, American history has continued to be revolutionary in its implications. After winning their independence from foreign rule, Americans went on to upset the *status quo* at home and abroad with, as we shall see, a practical search for ever larger political, economic, and social democracy. When we later found our goals threatened by the calamity of world-wide war, it was not surprising that we should expand our dream to all mankind.

Thus when Gandhi, another proponent of a complete democratic revolution, threw British clothes into a huge bonfire, began his boycott of British goods, and demanded that freedom was his birthright and he would have it, he was initiating for India an experiment which Americans had begun but not ended in their own Boston Tea Party: that good government is no substitute for self-government, and that Lincoln's "government of the people, by the people, for the people" is indeed the last best hope on earth.

CHAPTER 27

From Cotton Gin to Automation

SEVENTEEN-seventy-six, the year America declared her independence, was also the year of another revolutionary event: James Watt's steam engine really worked for the first time. It sparked a sudden amazing momentum in economic development—evolutionary, it is true, but nevertheless known by the middle of the nineteenth century in terms still accepted today, as the Industrial Revolution.

Even before this dramatic introduction to industrialism, the Protestant Puritan morality of thrift and hard work had helped give rise to capitalism. And before that the medieval monastery had introduced scientific agriculture, corporate organization, business accounting and division of labor, with production and group life geared to the regular bells of a clock.

What was it that began at the end of the eighteenth century to so change the techniques of production that men would call it revolution?

Some would say that the new forces created by the gradual growth of commercialism inside the old feudal order finally broke through the feudal strait jacket, emerging as the modern industrial democratic state. Others would give more credit to the intellectual ferment established by the Renaissance and the political freedom which was developing in many parts of the North Atlantic region.

Others would ascribe the West's economic development to the invention of the corporation. Justice Brandeis called the corporation the "master institution of civilized life," and a considerable case can

be made that it was this institution which has been the carrier of modern technology.

The corporation was able to mobilize vast amounts of capital, and to organize workers and technicians. Although the corporation originated in England under the tutelage of John Locke, its greatest flowering was in America. In one year of the nineteenth century it is said that more corporations were created in one state of our Union than in the whole previous history of the world.

Without trying to solve the chicken-egg riddle of which came first, industrialism or democracy, the new technology or the new freedom, we can say with assurance that the combination produced a new civilization, and today its explosive implications are felt in every corner of the world. Something had started a chain reaction that began in London and Lancashire and Liverpool and has since been spreading with geometric progression throughout the Atlantic community and, in our century, beyond it to all mankind.

The new inventions of England in the eighteenth century seemed as magical in that day as atomic energy does in ours, and British lawmakers then were as eager as our own today to keep the new "secret" as England's private preserve. A law was enacted prohibiting taking any machine out of England. Men who knew how to make these machines were forbidden to go abroad.

Parliament had earlier been alarmed by the efforts of Peter the Great, foreshadowing those of his Communist successors in the 1920's and 1930's, to hire Englishmen to teach industrial techniques in Russia. In 1719 Parliament enacted a bill to "prevent the Inconveniences arising from seducing Artificers in the Manufactures of Great Britain, into foreign parts." Undaunted, in 1776 Russia offered Watts a thousand pounds a year, a fabulous salary at the time, if he would come there and build his steam engine.

Until 1824 the law prohibiting the emigration of skilled mechanics remained in force. But by then England realized that she had no real secrets, only a head start, and that the science and technology to which she had committed herself were the common property of all men everywhere who had the will to know.

By this time, too, a fledgling Industrial Revolution was testing its wings in our own country. A nineteen-year-old English lad had smuggled plans for a textile factory out of England, hidden in his clothes, to start the industry here.

Yankee ingenuity, compounded of the old Puritan virtues and the knack for tinkering which was essential for existence in a frontier economy, lent fresh impetus to the spread of the machine. Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin provided an adequate source of raw material for the hungry looms and shuttles of England and the New England states. Whitney also laid the foundation for assembly line production when, later on, he demonstrated before astonished officers of the War Department the assembling of twelve rifles from a mass of interchangeable parts produced at his Springfield, Massachusetts, factory.

If Watt or Whitney were to visit the assembly line of one of today's giant American automobile companies, the expressions on their faces might convey to us the revolutionary character of our industrialization. Moving at the rate of perhaps a finished car a minute, the belt brings the completed chassis toward the final stop. Converging at this point from the ceiling on hooks come the fenders, wheels and other parts, timed precisely to fit the right car at the right moment.

From a hole in the floor above a hood descends, of just the prescribed color, landing in time for the car to be driven to the testing ground by a team of men who shuttle back and forth. Along the line, time and motion experts are studying each operation to find new labor corners to cut. Producing about six million cars a year, the American automobile industry has been in the vanguard of this continuing Industrial Revolution, employing every known technique to increase efficiency.

Even in its early nineteenth century beginnings, it was not only in the vastly increased production of goods that the Industrial Revolution showed itself. Canals and macadamized roads were built. Then with the locomotive came the first railroad line from Liverpool to Manchester.

Again America took up the challenge with Fulton's steamboat, the transcontinental railroad, and eventually Henry Ford's tin lizzie. The world was drawn together first by a network of wires and then by the invisible wires of radio. Man learned how to send his ideas around the world without moving from his chair. In the end the Industrial Revolution realized one of man's oldest myths—that he would someday fly.

In the production of energy to transport man and his goods, to

warm himself and light the dark, Watt's engine was put to a myriad of uses. Horsepower became a measure instead of a force, as the water wheel gave way to the coal mine and the energy of the horse was multiplied a millionfold by electricity. Then man discovered the secret of the sun itself, and harnessed atomic energy to human will.

In the hundred and seventy-five years since the start of the Industrial Revolution, the ordinary American family has traveled a road to riches undreamed of by the mightiest a few centuries ago.

* * *

IF the process of industrialization had exceeded the dreams of those who contributed to it, it had also exacted a high price in human suffering. To accumulate the vast sums of capital needed to mechanize a feudal society, at a time when little commercial capital existed, required primarily cheap human labor and forced savings.

The skilled workmen of the English medieval guilds thrown out of work by the new machines, and the English peasants dispossessed of their small plots of land by the Enclosure Acts and the modernization of agriculture, were offered jobs in the new mills at pittance wages or left to starve. A working day went from sunup to sundown.

It is of course debatable whether the Industrial Revolution actually lowered the living standards of working people, for the poor were badly enough off before in eighteenth century England. Probably the introduction of machinery improved life for some, and worsened it for others.

Nevertheless it is certain that much of the price that was paid for Western industrialization was paid by women and children. Under England's Poor Relief laws, the parishes were empowered to "apprentice" the children of parents on relief. Factory owners made full use of this new source of labor, even carting away children five or six years old to work for twelve or more hours a day and then to be locked in workhouses. Some parishes stipulated the proportion of idiot children an employer was required to accept.

Often the midday meal had to be eaten while working, and machinery had to be cleaned while in motion. In the winter when the

children left the mills, bathed in sweat, their clothes sometimes froze to their bodies. The documented toll in accidents, deformity, tuberculosis and utter degradation stands as a memorial to the generations who gave birth to industrial civilization, and as a warning to new countries about to go through its birth pangs.

The price was not all paid by the suffering of Europeans, however. England's colonies supplied her with their raw materials on the cheapest possible terms, produced by labor exploited even more severely than in England, and then served as a captive market for the manufactured goods. America rebelled against such terms of trade and won her freedom in 1776, but India was forced to succumb.

Moreover, India supplied a direct source of capital in the form of "loot," a Hindustani word introduced into English at the time of the plundering of Bengal. After Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757, the treasure of Bengal began to flow in to London, adding considerably to the nation's cash capital at just the time the first great industrial inventions were appearing. The men who made great fortunes in India provided much of the corporate investment which turned the inventions of this era into factories.

America did not depend on foreign colonies, but America had a virgin continent to exploit. Our raw materials lay westward and free for the taking, except for what was callously assumed to be the problem of dispersing or containing the Indians. America also had its own kind of exploited colonial population, the slaves in the South, upon which one major sector of our economy depended.

British investors supplied some of our crucial capital requirements through massive loans, particularly for railroad building, a basic step in our economic development. Moreover, America had all of Europe to turn to for cheap new labor. It came in plentiful supply.

Often when immigrant workmen arrived, they found factory conditions here only slightly better than those of the old country. In our Connecticut cotton industry in 1831 men were earning \$5.00 a week, women \$2.50, and children \$1.50. Eleven years later a Connecticut law forbade the employment in textile mills of anyone under fourteen years of age for more than ten hours a day. The fact that this was a landmark of liberal legislation in its time suggests what conditions prior to this law must have been.

Connecticut history also shows that even America occasionally

benefited directly by the English imperial connection in India. In 1717 Elihu Yale, former governor of Madras, one of the earliest English outposts in India, sent a shipload of East India goods to Boston, which were sold on auction for £562. Mr Yale donated the proceeds as the first endowment of the new college in Connecticut, which later gratefully took his name.

* * *

BUT America was endowed by nature with more than colonies could have given. Never has industrialization had a better opportunity. A rich underdeveloped continent. A hard working, pioneer people. A flood of invaluable immigrants, some with the latest skills, some with the cheapest labor. A federal union which created a single free trade, common money area. A democratic political society which permitted free association, free enterprise, and the formation of business corporations, with the constitutional rights of persons.

Probably with less agony than any other country which has undergone industrialization, America thus became the world's foremost industrial nation.

Industrial pre-eminence today, however, assures no more exclusive use or control of dramatic new inventions, than when Britain attempted to hide her 'secrets' in the eighteenth century. America's staggering achievement in unlocking the atom accomplished in great part under the urging and by the skill of eminent foreign-born scientists like Einstein, Szilard, and Fermi, can never be isolated or saved for American benefit alone.

By 1955 American atomic scientists were frankly saying that we have no secrets from European scientists. Like the British in the Industrial Revolution, all we have is an advantage in know-how and technique—a head start. Indeed there is more than a possibility that from now on we may lag in industrial atomic development behind others like the British and the Japanese. They have an urgent, special incentive for the rapid utilization of atomic energy if they are to maintain their own relative industrial position. For them nuclear power may be the essential long term substitute for their coal and water-power sources of energy which are already proving inadequate.

Under such circumstances the economic waste and unnecessary delays caused in the development of nuclear power in friendly Europe make our past restrictive policies seem particularly unimaginative—so much so that American atomic scientists have advocated that we should declassify the entire field of nuclear power now. In August, 1955, at the Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy the partial easing of our restrictions was widely applauded.

What makes this new American Industrial Revolution so awesome, however, is that it has scarcely begun to run its course. Just as the full impact of two centuries of Western industrialization is being realized in the promise of atomic energy, a new technological revolution called automation is also beginning to appear. Machines had become the servants of men in many ways, spinning thread, weaving cloth, hewing wood, pumping water, pulling loads, tilling soil, harvesting crops—doing the things men until then had always done by themselves by the sweat of their brows. But in the mid-twentieth century, automatic factories entered the realm of the possible.

Walter Reuther, president of the CIO, described the awe he felt when he first visited one of these strange new plants which he says represent the Second Industrial Revolution. He watched the great machine bore cylinders in a matter of seconds, electronically measure its work, reject those that for some reason were wrong. About all the few workers had to do was watch the panels of red, yellow and green lights that indicated if the machine was getting tired.

A Ford executive asked: "How are you going to get them to pay your dues?" Reuther replied, "How are you going to get them to buy your cars?" But for all their doubts, no labor leaders today were ready to fight the machines as displaced working men once did. Instead they have confidence that a way will be found for the new benefits of science and technology to be made available, not simply to the fortunate world aristocracy of the West, but for all mankind.

This confidence itself has its roots in the continuing American Revolution. For the fact is that in the last generation man has learned to use the tools of democracy to master the machine which many once feared would become the master of men. Powerful and extraordinary as the Industrial Revolution has been, human needs, interests and principles have, in the main, also triumphed in a democratic American Revolution for equality of opportunity.

CHAPTER 28

All Men Are Created Equal

LIBERTY, meaning political independence, was the first battle cry of the American Revolution, just as it is the first demand of the people of Asia and Africa today. Pushed by the forces of industrialism, the demand for human dignity, for equal opportunity regardless of race, creed or color, was soon to follow.

The conservative Alexander Hamilton had told the Constitutional Convention: "All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. . . . The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. . . . Give, therefore, to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of 'he second.'"

Thomas Jefferson later countered: "Men are naturally divided into two parties. (1) Those who fear and distrust the people, and wish to draw all powers from them into the hands of the higher classes. (2) Those who identify themselves with the people, have confidence in them, cherish and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not the most wise depository of the public interest."

Thus, at the very beginning, these two great antagonists staked out the lines for the first battle in America's continuing effort to give meaning to its Declaration that "all men are created free and equal"—the battle over the vote.

As has always happened since in our form of government, these two ideas became important elements in the practical, down-to-earth organization of political parties for electing candidates to office.

Thus the Federalists, led by Hamilton and Adams, represented principally the Northern business interests who believed in a strong central government and rapid industrialization. Jefferson's Democratic-Republicans drew their strength from the small farmers and artisans as well as the Southern planters.

Distrusting the central government and staking its faith on the ability of people to manage their affairs in their local communities and states, Jefferson's party won a smashing electoral victory in 1800. Universal white male suffrage was established in the next few decades; the limitation to whites was erased in the Civil War; female suffrage eventually came early in the twentieth century.

As in the case of political independence from foreign rule the worldwide implications of the struggle for individual rights was grasped by many American leaders. "All eyes are opening to the rights of Man," Jefferson prophesied two weeks before his death. "The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God."

Nothing gave more promise of this continuing extension of political power to the whole people than did Andrew Jackson's election as President in 1828. To Jefferson's democratic coalition, Jackson added the new frontiersmen of the West and the workers of the Eastern cities. On his inauguration day his followers by the tens of thousands descended upon Washington, some of them ragged, many of them uncouth, very few of them rich and well born.

They drank, they took over the White House, they cheered for their favorite who was now the President. "The reign of King 'Mob' seemed triumphant," noted Justice Story. "They were his blood relations," said Martin Van Buren referring to Jackson, "—the only blood relations he had."

Schlesinger's excellent book on this period, *The Age of Jackson* recounts too well for repetition Jackson's great war against the commercial interests behind the United States Bank. Old Hickory vetoed a new charter for the bank, saying that when a law undertakes "to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors

to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their Government."

Nearly one hundred years later Franklin Roosevelt remarked about Jackson, "An overwhelming proportion of the material power of the Nation was against him. It seemed sometimes that all were against him—all but the people of the United States."

The head of the United States Bank, Nicholas Biddle, said that Jackson's veto message was a manifesto "such as Marat or Robespierre might have issued to the mob of the Faubourg St. Antoine." Jackson replied that he stood for no narrow class interest. The farmers and workers he stood for, he said, "form the great body of the people of the United States: they are the bone and sinew of the country."

Progress was not in a straight line, of course. The moral decay of slavery, at odds with all America stood for, ate steadily into the vitality of the Union. Jefferson had brooded over it. "I tremble for my country," he wrote about slavery, "when I reflect that God is just and His justice cannot sleep forever."

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W HETHER or not it was the wrath of an avenging God, the blood and suffering of the Negro slaves, which in one form or another had been accepted by almost all Americans, North and South, was paid for in the blood and suffering of Americans, North and South. The Civil War proved slavery to be the single question in America's history that was incapable of resolution within the constitutional framework erected by the Founding Fathers

A new party, the Republican party, organized to battle against this great challenge to America's democratic ideal. In the end the slaves were freed, and that party gave to America, in Abraham Lincoln, the closest personal embodiment of the American ideal.

The Republican party gave us too, in the stately clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, a new affirmation of the old ideal of equality, worthy to stand beside the words of the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

By applying these precepts, at the staggering cost of a Civil War, America had strengthened its determination to go on testing "whether any nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal, can long endure."

Further tests were not long in coming. Soon it became apparent that man's right to freedom must include the right to work and the right to personal achievement commensurate with ability. As the arena of struggle shifted from political rights to economic opportunity, the political rights already won proved a potent weapon. With the vote, the people in every state established a system of free public education, the greatest program against inequality of opportunity ever designed. Throughout most of the country children went in the same doors, were seated not by origin but by alphabet, and succeeded by their own efforts.

The other solvent of injustice was the frontier, to which industrious and pioneering Americans could always turn during the nineteenth century. Andrew Johnson, a Jacksonian Democratic Congressman who became a persecuted Republican President, introduced in 1846 a Homestead Bill to open the federally held lands of the West to settlement on family-sized farms.

Under this bill as finally passed, 285 million acres were distributed. For the next fifty years, any American family, when opportunity lagged in the cities, was free to carve out a new life on a farm of its own at little cost beyond its own labor and perseverance.

Thus in the frontier and public education the American people were given a combined alternative to the class struggle which Marx did not foresee. The city worker, denied a fair wage in the factory, could create a full and expanding life in the West. And the very existence of this alternative gradually aided the growth of industrial democracy for workers who remained in the cities. The vote, won and used by all the people, made possible the extension to all the people of the benefits of the new science and technology of their Industrial Revolution.

In other Western lands the same battle for the extension of the suffrage to all the people was fought, and in time won. In England, during the 1840's, the "People's Charter," demanding equal electoral districts, vote by ballot, no property qualifications, and annual Parli-

aments, was signed by more than three million people, and supported by massive public demonstrations never before seen on such a scale.

Even Karl Marx, who was already turning to his theory of violent revolution, was momentarily swept into the growing enthusiasm for the possibilities of peaceful democratic action. The moment the people of England carried their Charter, he said in 1847, "the road to liberty will be opened to the world." In words which believers in democracy would later throw back at Communists, Marx said fervently of the Charter and universal suffrage: "Effect this grand object, you workmen of England, and you will be hailed as the saviors of the whole human race." But the Charter did not carry immediately, and Marx returned to the Continent to write the *Communist Manifesto*, convinced that peaceful action was doomed to frustration.

Marx was correct that the Industrial Revolution presented a new crisis in human affairs, but he was wrong in largely abandoning hope that it could be met by the democratic process. For within twenty years the substance of universal franchise had been achieved in Britain as it was being achieved in America, by the very methods which Marx had in his impatience discarded. By the end of the nineteenth century, Socialist parties in Europe and America were finding their platforms taken out from under them by liberal and even conservative governments—an indirect tribute to the position of the Democratic Socialists, even though it sometimes, as in America, left them with little to do.

* * *

THIS relationship of Democratic Socialism to the main stream of the Marxian tradition is highly important to an understanding of world affairs even today. Indeed it is so important that even before we conclude the related story of America's considerable achievement of equality of opportunity, I feel it warrants a digression and further comment.

That "Democratic Socialism" and "Marxism" mean different things to different people is clear enough at the outset. The Kremlin trumpets its own achievements as the sole fulfillment of Marxism and Socialism. Some prominent, but poorly informed, American poli-

ticians echo part of this sentiment by proclaiming that Socialism and Communism are "two peas from the same pod."

The highly respected dean of American Socialists, Norman Thomas, replies that not only is Communism "certainly a betrayal of true Socialism" but that Communism is also a "subversion of true Marxism." Communism and Democratic Socialism may be from the same Marxist pod, but they are very different now, and the difference is in kind, not in degree.

The difference goes back centuries before Marx was born. Socialists through the ages have been divided by basically different attitudes toward the state, and toward the methods appropriate for the attainment of their goals. Their oldest maxim—"From each according to his capacity; to each according to his need"—stems not from Marx, but from the Bible and from Greek philosophy.

But ideas about whether it is to be achieved by force or by persuasion, by democratic and peaceful action or by violent revolution and proletarian dictatorship, have been affected by the society in question, by the leadership which evolved from it, and by the philosophy of the particular Socialist.

Out of the economic misery which enveloped much of sixteenth century England, the great Catholic statesman, Sir Thomas More, wrote his *Utopia*. He described an ideal community, and called for a division of labor and distribution of goods in terms which many sober citizens today would describe as alarmingly Communistic. But he did not advocate violent revolution to attain it.

Much of pre-Marxist "Socialism" was indeed inspired and written in a religious, often metaphysical atmosphere. Hence Norman Thomas was the heir of a lengthy tradition when he made his pilgrimage from the pulpit of New York's Brick Presbyterian Church into the American Socialist Party.

The public career of this six-time candidate for the presidency has been so far from conspiratorial and subversive that editorial comment on his seventieth birthday indicated that Norman Thomas is widely regarded as one of the foremost keepers of the American national conscience, just as he was one of the earliest and most militant anti-Communists.

Western Socialists, especially those who adhere to Marx minus violence, differ sharply on the practical problems of Socialism. For

a professed Marxist to devise a working program for Socialism in democratic countries like Sweden, India, Burma, Great Britain or the United States, he must consciously or unconsciously read a great deal into Marx which has little or no logical connection with Marxism.

It was in America, of course, where history most clearly proved Marx's prediction of class struggle to be fallacious. Here the combination of free political institutions, an expanding economy, an ever widening diffusion of wealth, and an absence of rigid class lines have given the idea of an armed proletarian revolution a fairly absurd aroma.

During the past century of gradual reforms this progress was not always as clear, of course, as it is today. Thus the speeches of the fire-eating American Socialists of two generations ago would sound less quixotic now if we remembered that as late as 1900 an American tycoon was able legally to tack away \$25 million in a single year on which he paid not one cent of income tax.

But in America today the change has been recognized on all sides. "The idea of a great struggle between the workers and the capitalists made sense in the time of Eugene Debs, but not now," Norman Thomas has said. "What goes on under the Laborites in Britain and under so-called capitalist parties in America differs only in degree. We have gone through an unadmitted revolution."

Several years ago when I was called upon to introduce Norman Thomas to a Public Forum meeting of our Congregational Church in Essex, Connecticut, I pointed out that of the fourteen planks in the Socialist platform on which he first ran for President, only one—national ownership of the banks—had not been enacted into laws which now have the support of both major political parties. The direct election of Senators, an income tax, social security, the eight-hour day, and other one-time "radical" Socialist demands have long since become respectable.

It probably can also be said that one of the main postwar defenses of Western Europe and South Asia against Communism has been found in Democratic Socialism, both directly and through its profound influence on conservative parties generally. Recent experiences have inclined Democratic Socialists to emphasize the democratic processes, to stress voluntary co-operative enterprises at least as much

as public ownership, and to warn against excessive statism as an expression of Socialism.

"The Good Society," says Norman Thomas, "will be achieved by a process each stage of which must bring blessing to those who live in that era. It will not be achieved in America by the violence commonly associated with the word, revolution. Systematic violence in our modern complex civilization wherein the weapons of violence are so deadly and indiscriminate in their effects, will defile and corrupt by its very nature the kind of society which allegedly it may seek."

As we have seen in New Delhi and Bandung, most of the leaders of the new democratic nations of South Asia fully accept this thesis of peaceful and Democratic Socialism. Burma has a Socialist government and the policies of India, Ceylon, and Indonesia are deeply affected by the concepts of Democratic Socialism. Spokesmen for the new governments of Pakistan and Egypt have referred to their countries as examples of "Islamic Socialism."

Indeed not only is "socialism" a thoroughly popular word in Africa, Asia and South America, but most articulate indigenous people in these continents approve of Socialism and try to talk and be Socialist. If America is to make its point that progress must be peaceful and democratic, it must not insist that there is no distinction between Socialism and Communism. Instead it must stress the distinction: that democracy is the way to achieve the ideals which many millions of non-Communists throughout the world associate with Socialism.

Having said this, it is appropriate to turn once more to the story of the development of equality and human dignity in America, probably history's single most effective answer to the Marxian concept of violent class struggle.

* * *

THE growing power of American corporations in the first decades of the nineteenth century gave rise to labor unions and started the process of the gradual unfolding of economic democracy.

In 1840 an eighty-hour week was common in textile factories,

when the Democratic administration introduced the ten-hour day for Federal workers. In 1868 the Federal Government again took the lead under the postwar Republican administration by instituting the revolutionary eight-hour day, which in 1890 Engels in a new introduction to the *Communist Manifesto*, announced as the one great immediate aim of the Communists. In 1900 the American unions had not yet achieved a ten-hour day in industry generally, but they were on their way.

An even more powerful immediate challenge to the monopolies came from Populism, a new political movement of farmers and small traders which rose out of the Western prairies to grapple with the Eastern business combines. The Sherman Anti-Trust Act came onto the books in 1890 and has remained ever since, a charter of business freedom.

The force of the new liberalism was felt in the Republican party itself, as Theodore Roosevelt, Robert LaFollette and other Progressives resolved that the free enterprise system required the destruction or regulation of monopolies and giant combines. These twentieth century Progressive Republicans had not forgotten the maxim of Lincoln that "the legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or cannot do so well, for themselves in their separate and individual capacities."

In 1912, Teddy Roosevelt, alarmed over the drift toward conservatism, led his Bull Moosers in revolt out of the Republican convention, and a revitalized Democratic party took up the torch. The same Populist clamor that had produced William Jennings Bryan had welded a powerful new political combination out of immigrants and workers in the cities, and small farmers of the South and West. When the Republicans split, Bryan's successor Woodrow Wilson was ready with a concrete program, the New Freedom, which asserted that the democratic political rights of Americans could and should be boldly exercised to insure their economic welfare.

Wilson made an impressive start by strengthening the antitrust laws, stabilizing credit with the Federal Reserve Act, and putting into effect the master instrument of democratic development—the progressive income tax which had been adopted by a Republican Congress in 1909. But in 1917 Wilson's domestic program was

brushed aside in the crisis of World War I, and seemed all but forgotten in the orgy of "normalcy" that followed in the 1920's.

The reckoning, however, could not be delayed forever. When the Great Depression of 1929-33 brought the economy almost to a halt and threw fourteen million men out of work, the question was raised whether the promise of America was to be honored in its performance. A few despaired and jumped from high buildings. A larger number, but still only a few, believing that America had come to the end of the road in its effort to work out the problems of equality through the exercise of liberty, turned toward Marx's counsel of violent class struggle. But the deep commitment of the American people to democratic ways of dealing with their problems soon asserted itself.

Once again a man and a political instrument arose to call the people back to their historic faith. Graphically and sympathetically demonstrating how far America had defaulted on its obligation to provide equality of opportunity for the third of the nation's ill-fed, ill-housed and ill-clad, Franklin Roosevelt mobilized not only the resources of the government but the enthusiasm of the people for a new assault.

The New Deal was an inevitable way station along the road upon which America had set its feet 150 years earlier in Independence Hall. For though Roosevelt and his supporters began by trying to fight a depression, they soon found that the Great Depression could not be ended, or a relapse prevented, without a thorough-going social change.

"Since the beginning of our American history," said Roosevelt later on, "we have been engaged in change—in a perpetual peaceful revolution—a revolution which goes on steadily, quietly adjusting itself to changing conditions—without the concentration camp or the quicklime in the ditch."

In the spirit of America's continuing peaceful revolution, the government took steps to add these economic rights to the political Bill of Rights:

The right of farmers and workers to adequate pay for honest work;
The right to look forward to an old age free from want;
The right of workers to organize in unions of their own choosing,
and to use these unions to better their lot;

The right to a decent place to live;

The right to a fair share in the benefits of the nation's resources.

This first national "war on want" including emergency relief, public works, TVA, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Social Security, the National Labor Relations Act, and a farm program to put a floor under farm income.

In one major sense the New Deal fell short of its objective—the full employment of all of our people. In 1939 there were still eight million out of work. It took World War II to teach us that the wartime full production and good jobs for all might be readily obtainable in peacetime too if government and business showed the necessary leadership and if the people had the necessary will.

The universal military service of American men of all ranks and the GI Bill of Rights, which provided higher education for millions of Americans who might not have afforded it—these all worked to establish a new kind of mixed economy and something close to a classless society.

In pointing to this remarkable record we must, however, face the fact that not since 1929 have we employed all of our people without war, the need for fulfilling the backlogs of civilian production left by war, or massive defense programs. This does not suggest that full production and peace are mutually exclusive. If in the coming years the Soviet Union convinces us that it will actually accept a tamperproof disarmament program including inspection, it would be folly indeed for America to draw back because of domestic economic pressures. The schools, the highways and the hospitals are waiting to be built; our lingering slums are waiting to be demolished, our cities need to be modernized; the frontiers for American production at home and abroad are still without limit.

* * *

EVEN inside the private corporations, something has been happening which would have surprised Marx and which gives our economy added dynamism. Capitalist development, it is true, has led to several hundred giant corporations controlling the dominant section of the economy of America and the whole of the West.

Some of the billion-dollar corporations possessed greater financial resources than many states of our Union.

However, Marxian predictions on the implications of this development have failed to materialize. Somewhere the dialectic of corporate development took an unexpected turn. Perhaps it was when Henry Ford announced the eight-hour day, and decided that the mass consumption necessary for mass production required lower prices and higher wages. Or perhaps it was when General Motors signed the first contract with the United Automobile Workers, CIO.

Most corporate boards now weigh the stockholder's interests along with others including the good of the corporation as a going concern and the good of its workers. In 1954 when business started to sag, one major corporation promptly announced a vast multibillion-dollar expansion program as an investment in the common good. Some of the major corporations now vote large appropriations for the support of American colleges and for university research.

One of the most surprising developments of our continuing American Revolution is that workers have moved toward "ownership of the means of production" not through the instrument of an all-powerful state, but through the purchase of large blocs of corporate shares by union pension and welfare funds, established since the war. And the labor contract, once a one-sided affair dictated by the "boss," is now in most industries the result of a bargaining process by no means one-sided. The beginning of the guaranteed annual wage, agreed to by Ford and General Motors in 1955, is another sign of the times.

America and the West have not, of course, solved their economic problems. Automation will raise many new ones. Depression is still a potential threat. slums still exist, and in spite of great gains promised by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the economic effects of racial discrimination are still with us.

But one thing is clear: the American people have learned that this production of plenty represents not disaster but opportunity for us and for the world. There is no reason to believe that our political institutions will not be flexible enough to handle whatever economic and social problems may arise. Although the gap between our principles and our performance remains, it has steadily narrowed, and

we have probably come closer toward achieving social and economic justice than any past civilization.

Marx was right that the new technology of capitalism could not be contained within the old system of human exploitation. But he was profoundly wrong in believing that mass purchasing power and an economy geared to the general welfare were impossible through peaceful and democratic methods.

America, the progenitor of political freedom in 1776, the world-wide example of industrialism in 1955, has succeeded in reconciling the potential opposition of these two great forces, through manifold forms of practical compromise.

CHAPTER 29

America Experiments with Empire

FOR Americans the end of the Western frontier probably marked more of a crisis than they realized at the time. For several generations Oregon and California had been eternal destinations. Once they had been attained, settled and admitted to the Union, Americans began to feel restless and contained.

In the twentieth century for the first time a generation of Americans went by without adding a new star to the flag. Where did Manifest Destiny go now? The Pacific Ocean faced America with the fact that the edge of the continent had been reached just at the moment when America's industrial power was expanding at a rate never known before.

With the Spanish-American War of 1898 America came of age. Its continental saga over, its era of world power began. American support of the Cuban rebellion against Spanish rule was natural for a neighboring people conscious of their own revolutionary past. Yet an unexpected result of the war was the substitution of American imperial rule for Spanish rule over the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico. In the irony of this transition from an anticolonial tradition to imperial power, is found one of the twentieth century dilemmas of American policy.

The reading of history makes it appear that the temptation toward imperialism is almost an original sin for people with power.

Even in America's most revolutionary moments, even while supporting South American rebellions against foreign rule, or sending aid to faraway Greek rebels, Americans at home were handling their relations with the great domestic Indian tribes in a frankly imperialistic manner. For most of three centuries after the landing at Jamestown, white Americans systematically and ruthlessly uprooted the original Indian inhabitants. Those who survived were forced into guarded reservations. In the haste of new Americans to sweep westward, the rights of the original Americans were frequently ignored.

Similarly, in the days of our boisterous youth as an independent nation, we did not hesitate to develop some soldierly quick-shooting wits in dealing with our neighbors to the North and South. In 1812 Henry Clay and his War Hawks blandly stated their determination to annex Canada. Within a few years General Andrew Jackson was foraging in Spanish-held Florida.

A generation later when our ambitions had turned beyond the Mississippi, we did not hesitate to wrest the great Southwest from Mexico through war in 1846 nor to stake out an ambitious claim against Britain for part of Canada with the popular slogan "Fifty-four forty or fight."

The question of historical proportions was whether on our prodigal return to the world from isolation, we would emerge in our imperial or our democratic revolutionary character. That was why our actions in the Spanish-American War and our debates about those actions should be recalled and reviewed as we enter ever closer relations with anticolonial peoples.

"The truth is I didn't want the Philippines, and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do about them," President McKinley later explained in telling how he made his decision.

"One night late," he said, "it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and

uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly."

Other Americans did not sleep as soundly as the President. When the Senate took up the question of ratifying the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the war with Spain, there were many who reaffirmed American revolutionary ideals with great eloquence.

The opposing arguments which rang through the halls of Congress at the turn of the century were championed by two of the most powerful Republican Senators of the day. One of them was George Frisbie Hoar of Massachusetts, a leader in the Senate for twenty-seven years, whose daughter married my uncle Samuel Bowles of Springfield. The other was Albert Beveridge of Indiana. It was a debate worth our consideration in some detail, because its issues are still pressing in upon us today, and because the vigor with which President McKinley was opposed reflects the strength of our anti-colonial traditions.

Before the Senate in January, 1899, Senator Hoar, leading the fight against annexation, charged that the forcible appropriation of island territories was clearly contrary to the Declaration of Independence.

In language that Jefferson and Lincoln would have applauded, he posed the fundamental question: "Is it true all men are created equal? Or is it only true of some of them? Is it true that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights? Or is it only true of some of them? Is it true that among these rights are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? Or are those for some of them only? Is it true that governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed? Or, is it only from the consent of some of them?"

The Massachusetts Senator answered his own questions emphatically: "When you raise the flag over the Philippine Islands as an emblem of dominion and acquisition, you take it down from Independence Hall."

Senator Beveridge's rejoinder was frank: "The Declaration of Independence . . . was written by self-governing men for self-governing men. . . . It applies only to people capable of self-government. How dare any man prostitute this expression of the very

elect of self-governing peoples to a race of Malay children of barbarism, schooled in Spanish methods and ideas?"

Hoar replied by reminding Beveridge of Lincoln's great speech on the Declaration, in which the martyred President had warned of the future possibility that "some men, some faction, some interest, should set up the doctrine that none but rich men, or none but white men, or none but Anglo-Saxon white men, were entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Lincoln had advised his fellow Americans to "look up again to the Declaration of Independence and . . . return to the fountain whose waters spring close by the blood of the Revolution."

Senator Hoar then concluded: "The doctrines I stand upon are the doctrines of the most practical statesmen, of the most practical generation that ever lived on the face of the earth. Abraham Lincoln said, 'No man was ever created good enough to own another.' No nation was ever created good enough to own another. I do not agree that the lesson of our first hundred years is that the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution are a failure, and that America is to begin the twentieth century where Spain began the sixteenth."

But Senator Beveridge retorted with at least one thrust which made the opposition wince. "You who say the Declaration applies to all men, how dare you deny its application to the American Indian? And if you deny it to the Indian at home, how dare you grant it to the Malay abroad?"

"Fellow Americans, we are God's chosen people," Beveridge exclaimed in language that sounded like an American echo of Rudyard Kipling. "Yonder at Bunker Hill and Yorktown, His providence was above us. . . . His power directed Dewey in the East and delivered the Spanish fleet into our hands on the eve of Liberty's natal day.

"His great purposes are revealed in the progress of the flag, which surpasses the intentions of congresses and cabinets, and leads us like a holier pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night into situations unforeseen by finite wisdom. . . . We cannot retreat from any soil where Providence has unfurled our banner."

AS the historic controversy merged into the election campaign of 1900, Beveridge announced, "Where the flag leads, we follow—for we know the hand that bears it onward is the Unseen Hand of God." But this time his arguments in favor of an American imperialism were met by a presidential candidate.

"We have reached another crisis," declared William Jennings Bryan, who wished to make imperialism the key issue of the campaign. "The ancient doctrine of imperialism, banished from our land more than a century ago, has recrossed the Atlantic and challenged democracy to mortal combat upon American soil. . . . Are [the American people] now willing to apologize for the war of the Revolution and force upon the Filipinos the same system of government against which the colonists protested with fire and sword?"

"Those who would have this nation enter upon a career of empire," Bryan warned, "must consider, not only the effect of imperialism on the Filipinos, but they must also calculate its effect upon our own nation. We cannot repudiate the principle of self-government in the Philippines without weakening that principle here."

But ambition, pride and the "smell of empire" prevailed in our final decision in 1900. A motion to promise the Filipinos ultimate independence resulted in a tie, which was broken by the negative vote of the Vice President. The day before, the Filipinos had launched a new revolution against their latest imperial masters, and the news was thought to have resulted in the last-minute switch of several Senators.

During succeeding decades there were other sporadic instances of American imperialism. The Marines were occasionally used as an instrument of foreign policy in Mexico and Central America.

In 1911 Theodore Roosevelt, who prided himself on speaking softly and carrying a big stick, spoke loudly about the way he had carried it at the time of the Panamanian revolution against Colombia, a revolution which had his enthusiastic concurrence and which opened the way for our building of the Panama Canal. "I took the Canal Zone," he said, "and let Congress debate."

Yet even in the heyday of our flirtation with imperialism, the opponents of such practices continued to remind their countrymen of the American revolutionary tradition, and to oppose every policy

which departed from that tradition. As in England, where the growth of a democratic conscience brought about drastic reforms in India and led to sympathy for Indian freedom, so in America the idea of complete independence for the Philippines steadily gained ground. In 1934 Congress formally promised the Philippines such independence, and on July 4, 1946, that promise was fulfilled.

In Puerto Rico, full self-government for island affairs has been granted under the new Commonwealth relationship, although foreign policy and defense remain in American hands. The island itself by a free vote chose this ambiguous relationship in order not to lose the benefits of its American association.

The imperial answer had gone against the American tradition and within a generation America's experiment with it had largely run its course.

CHAPTER 30

Wilson Expands the American Dream

THE real test of America's world intentions came not during its first preliminary encounter with Asia after the Spanish-American War, but during and after World War I, when in full force America returned to Europe, the war-torn center of Western civilization. Just as America quietly shifted from a debtor to a creditor nation during that war, so the fact of American industrial and military might marked a continental shift of power, from the Old World to the New.

How America met her new test of world leadership on the morning of her return to world affairs is of great relevance to what is now happening when America's world power is at high noon.

Woodrow Wilson, moved by the same mystic cords of memory which led Lincoln to see the principles of the Declaration and the Federal Constitution as the last best hope on earth, called Americans back to the great vision without which this free people would perish.

"America was created to unite mankind," Wilson believed. But if, as he thought, the time had come for America to begin to fulfill this mission, if the oceans were no longer limits but invitations to America's return to the world which had created her, neither straight imperialism nor an imperial balance of power was the American way.

"Humanity," he said, "can be welded together only by love, by

sympathy, by justice." America should understand this because she was "the only country in the world which has experienced a constant and repeated rebirth."

To a meeting of naturalized citizens in Philadelphia in 1915 he elaborated this point: "Other countries depend upon the multiplication of their own native people. This country is constantly drinking strength out of new sources by the voluntary association with it of great bodies of strong men and forward-looking women. And so by the gift of the free will of independent people, it is constantly being renewed from generation to generation by the same process by which it was originally created."

The President may have had in mind the inscription which Emma Lazarus had written for the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me—
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

To such new citizens Wilson's "urgent advice" was for them not only to think of America but, in order to be truly American, "always, also, to think first of humanity."

Wilson expressed his distress over his country's lapses into conquest. "If we have had aggressive purposes and covetous ambitions," he said, "they were the fruit of our thoughtless youth as a nation and we have put them aside. America has a great cause which is not confined to the American continent. America will have forgotten her traditions whenever on any occasion she fights merely for herself under such circumstances as will show that she has forgotten to fight for all mankind."

In similar vein the President told the graduating class at Annapolis that "the idea of America is to serve humanity, and every time you loose the stars-and-stripes to the wind, you ought to realize that it is in itself a message that you are on an errand which other navies sometimes have forgotten—not an errand of conquest but an errand of service."

President Wilson's revival of the American spirit was all the more dramatic, because it came at a time when the navies, armies and

statesmen of the other powers were engulfed in a fierce struggle for power. From the murder of an Austrian archduke by a Serbian fanatic, a chain reaction had surged through the intricate alliances comprising the European balance of power. More than eight and a half million dead, more than twenty-one million wounded, Northern France, the Lowlands and much of Eastern Europe in ruins—this had been the memorial.

There was every reason for people to be cynical. A grim readiness to defend one's homeland and hatred for the enemy were qualities any war could generate. To reasonable men, however, a world war of these new dimensions was intolerable without some far greater purpose.

Wilson eloquently provided the greater purpose which men so desperately required. It must be a war to end wars, he said. "The world must be made safe for democracy." Wilson's wartime leadership and his struggle for the League of Nations came to symbolize the worldwide appeal of American revolutionary principles. It also marked America's first major encounter with world diplomacy.

In a world ridden by imperialism and oppression in all its various forms, the words Wilson used when he asked Congress for a declaration of war on April 2, 1917, were electrifying. "We have no selfish needs to serve. We desire no conquest, no domination. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind.

"It is a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war. . . . But the right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free."

Not only did the American people respond to this appeal with fervor, but a wave of new enthusiasm swept the Old World. Wilson's words became a spectacular moral offensive, and in the minds of millions of people they transformed the war into a worldwide democratic crusade for human rights. American soldiers found shrines to

their President in French peasant huts. Eager students meeting one another on the streets of Warsaw spoke almost reverently the magic word, "Wilson." Collections of his speeches became best-sellers in China and the Middle East and textbooks in Spain.

Wilson fought to make the Allied war aims clear. Although his Fourteen Points ran counter to much of what the European statesmen had in mind, they aroused such universal enthusiasm that few dared criticize them in public. His explosive democratic ideas, so thoroughly in the American tradition, turned out to be worth armies of men.

When German morale finally cracked, it was on the basis of the Fourteen Points. In October, 1918, the German Government requested Wilson to arrange an immediate armistice on these terms. The Allies agreed, except for two reservations: they excluded the freedom of the seas clause, and they demanded compensation from Germany for war damage.

When Wilson went to Europe, he found an adoring population ready to hail the champion of world democracy, and tough old statesmen determined to restore the old order, the new champion to the contrary notwithstanding.

The other members of the Big Four were less than enthusiastic about Wilson's vision: Clemenceau—gruff, precise, his interests and his life bounded by France, who referred to Wilson as "Jupiter" and "Jesus Christ," ridiculed the "Fourteen Commandments," and sought limitless retribution against the "Boches." Lloyd George—the skilled scintillating improviser, and nimble-witted politician who favored a new balance of power favorable to Britain. Orlando—an Italian nationalist who distressed his colleagues by his legalistic approach.

To add to their concern was the fact that Wilson's words had been heard far beyond the confines of Europe: African students followed reports from the peace conference with avid attention to see whether the principles of self-determination were to be applied outside of Europe. Asian nationalists like young Ho Chi Minh came to Versailles in person to demand on French soil an end to French colonialism on the soil of Indochina.

Against such a background the saga of Woodrow Wilson during the ten months after the Armistice gave mixed impressions to a watching world. It still behooves Americans today to study it for

evidence of the American dream's explosive ability to stir men into action, as well as of the complexities of American political leadership.

* * *

WILSON left behind him in America increasing signs of popular weariness with Europe. The weariness had political overtones. The Republicans had won control of Congress in the 1918 election, and one of Wilson's most bitter personal enemies, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was in a key position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Others like Theodore Roosevelt were insisting that we had not been fighting to make the world safe for anything, but only to beat Germany because she had attacked us.

A number of leading Republicans, however, led by Ex-President William Howard Taft and Elihu Root, were deeply committed to a League to Enforce Peace which had become Wilson's chief aim. Critics were later to say that Wilson's first mistake was to refuse recognition to such influential and internationalist Republicans in the composition of the Peace Commission.

In February, 1919, after long weeks of secret deliberations in Paris, Wilson returned on a brief trip to Washington. Already the shape of the peace treaty was becoming clear, and he wished to prepare the way for American ratification. In an effort to ease the growing resistance to his views, he invited the members of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign Affairs committees to a dinner at the White House. Wilson talked with candor about the unavoidable compromises he was making and about the Covenant of the League of Nations which he was achieving as a result.

With America taking the lead in the League for "the rights of all people," Wilson believed that the temporary wrongs which resulted from these compromises could gradually be remedied as bitterness eased. By, in, and through the League, America could work for those cherished purposes which had now moved out far beyond her own shores.

But the President's effort to convince his Congressional critics failed. When Senator Brandegee of Connecticut left the ill-fated

White House conference, he said, "I feel as if I had been wandering with Alice in Wonderland and had tea with the Mad Hatter."

On the eve of Wilson's return to Paris, Senator Lodge presented his famous "Round Robin," drawn up by Republican leaders, which announced to the world and to Wilson that the undersigned did not find the League Covenant acceptable "in the form now proposed." There were thirty-nine signatures of Senators or Senators-elect—all Republicans. Only thirty-three votes were needed to defeat the treaty.

But many Republicans offered their support, and Wilson was reassured. The very March night that the ominous "Round Robin" was published, Woodrow Wilson and Ex-President Taft walked arm in arm onto the platform of the packed Metropolitan Opera House in New York.

Enrico Caruso led five thousand people in singing "The Star Spangled Banner." Al Smith introduced the speakers, Taft spoke effectively for the League, and Wilson in the spirit of George M. Cohan's wartime song assured the cheering crowd that he would not "come back till it's over, over there."

Wilson counted most of all on his ability to win support for the League by such direct appeals to the people. Ignoring the demands of the Republican "Round Robin" that he weaken the League Covenant, Wilson said that he had already made enough compromises, and returned to Paris.

On June 28, 1919, the treaty was finally signed with glittering ceremony at Versailles, and the President returned to plead before the Senate for its approval. He emphasized that the League Covenant was not only the most important part of the treaty but was inseparable from it. "Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty?" he asked. "Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world?"

Republican Senators Medill McCormick of Illinois, Brandegee of Connecticut, and Harding of Ohio immediately accepted the dare. Others, including small but influential liberal magazines, such as the *New Republic*, opposed ratification on the ground that the treaty was too harsh.

Several powerful Senators who were liberals in domestic policies became members of the "Battalion of Death" that vowed to destroy

the treaty and the League. Among other motives, it happened that many of them—including Johnson, Borah, Norris and LaFollette—represented sizable blocks of the seven million Americans of German birth or parentage. They bitterly condemned Germany's vast territorial losses, the staggering indemnity and the "unnatural" Polish Corridor, which fulfilled Wilson's Thirteenth Point for giving Poland "a free and secure access to the sea."

The leading spokesman of German-Americans, George Sylvester Viereck, denounced the "League of Damnations" and promised three million votes for the presidential candidate in the 1920 elections who agreed to oppose the treaty.

Italian-Americans deeply resented the President's efforts to remove the Yugoslav port of Fiume from Italy's control. Fiorello H. La Guardia, the future great "Little Flower" mayor of New York, then president of the New York City Board of Aldermen, was instrumental in organizing Italian-American opposition to Wilson and the treaty.

Nor did centuries of bitterness between Ireland and England help the prospects for what William Randolph Hearst called the "British-spawned League." The period of debate was an especially turbulent time in Ireland, and reports of murders, rioting and retaliation hindered Wilson's cause among Americans of Irish descent.

Irish prisoners of the British went on "hunger strikes," and in October, 1920, Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, died as a result of the seventy-four-day fast. De Valera toured the United States in the spring and summer of 1919 championing Irish independence. Many of his mass meetings booed Wilson for his failure to secure self-determination for Ireland.

The tenth article of the League Covenant obligated each member to assist its fellow members against "external aggression." Some opponents of the treaty even asserted that this would require us to send American boys of Irish descent to help England crush a future Irish revolt.

One of the few Democratic Senators to oppose the treaty, James Reed of Missouri, sought to appeal to racism by pointing out that colored peoples might outnumber whites in the League. His colleague Senator Sherman made an equally sordid appeal to religious prejudice by charging that the League would be managed by Catho-

lics and ruled by the Pope. Senator Borah, the Senate's leading orator, declared that he would not alter his opposition to the Covenant if Christ himself should appear on earth to plead for it.

Finally there were millions of Americans who had not yet fully broken with their traditional isolationism. The League was denounced as a prime example of the very "permanent alliances" against which Washington had warned us in his Farewell Address. Despite the fact that the League was no more than a loose confederation similar to the weak League of Friendship which preceded our own Constitution, the charge was made that it would force us to yield the sovereignty which we had won at Yorktown to a super-state controlled by aliens.

My father together with many other high tariff New England businessmen belonged to this isolationist school. As a young boy in Springfield, Massachusetts, I remember the conviction with which he espoused the embittered anti Wilson viewpoint of the magazine *Harvey's Weekly*, which in issue after issue, as election day drew near, hopefully stretched across the bottom of each page "Only ——— more days of Woodrow Wilson."

In the face of such opposition, some of it sincere, some of it political, and some of it outrageously demagogic, the outlook for the treaty appeared grim. But human hopes were too centered in the League for its advocates to give up in despair. And its chief advocate was a man of courage who at a time of crisis had embodied the very soul of America. He carried the fight to the people, and they responded with their old enthusiasm and fervor.

In presumably isolationist St. Louis, he received a thunderous ovation when he said that if he lost his fight for the League he would have to call together the men he sent to France, and say to them: "Boys, I told you before you went across the seas that this was a war against wars, and I did my best to fulfill the promise, but I am obliged to come to you in mortification and shame and say that I have not been able to fulfill the promise. You are betrayed. You fought for something you did not get. And the glory of the armies and navies of the United States is gone like a dream in the night. . . .

"There will come sometime," he continued prophetically, "in the vengeful providence of God, another struggle in which not a few hundred thousand fine men from America will have to die, but as

many millions as are necessary to accomplish the final freedom of the peoples of the world."

When the presidential party reached Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25, Wilson was tired to the point of exhaustion. Behind him were twenty-two days and eight thousand miles of cross-country travel, thirty-six formal speeches averaging an hour or more, a dozen wearying parades, and innumerable railroad platform appearances.

Although this crowded schedule left room for only the briefest breathing spells, the President's near exhaustion was now mingled with growing confidence. A satisfying reaction from unexpectedly large crowds in the Midwest had grown to a tumultuous response on the Pacific Coast.

When the President walked onto the stage of the crowded new auditorium in Pueblo, he was cheered to the rafters with a ten-minute, standing ovation. Minutes before, he had seriously doubted his ability to speak at all. He had a splitting headache, and never before had he felt so utterly, oppressively ill. He would drastically trim his speech, say a few suitable words, and return to his train.

Now as the eager enthusiasm of his audience dinned in his ears, Wilson determined to go through with it after all. Drawing on his last nervous and physical resources he poured into his speech all of his eloquent conviction and passion.

He described his Decoration Day visit three months before to the American military cemetery at Suresnes, near Paris, and he asked his hearers: "What of our pledge to the men that lie dead in France? We said that they went over there not to prove the prowess of America or her readiness for another war, but to see to it that there never was such a war again."

Mothers who had lost their sons in France had come to him, taken his hand, and shed tears upon it as they said, "God bless you, Mr. President."

"Why, my fellow citizens, should they pray God to bless me? I advised the Congress . . . to create the situation that led to the death of their sons. I ordered their sons overseas. Why should they weep upon my hand and call down the blessings of God upon me? Because they believe that their boys died for something that vastly transcends any of the immediate and palpable objects of the war. . . .

"Now that the mists of this great question have cleared away,"

the President concluded, "I believe that men will see the truth, eye to eye and face to face. There is one thing that the American people always rise to and extend their hand to, and that is the truth of justice and of liberty and of peace. We have accepted that truth and we are going to be led by it, and it is going to lead us and through us the world, out into pastures of quietness and peace such as the world never dreamed of before."

For a moment after Wilson finished, the hall was hushed. Then there burst forth a deafening roar of applause, the greatest ovation of his tour. No one there knew that he was cheering both the close of a speech and the close of a career.

Later that night insomnia and the racking headache returned to confirm the worst fears of the President's physician. Before the train reached Wichita, the rest of the tour was canceled over Wilson's pathetic protests, and only after he had been assured that his great mission had succeeded and the treaty was safe.

No one could know then that with the collapse of the President died the hope that America would approve the treaty, adhere to the League and work with other democratic nations to avoid the future "struggle" which he assured his audience in St. Louis would surely come "in the vengeful providence of God" if America retreated into isolationism.

* * *

ON March 19, 1920, came the final defeat of the treaty in the United States Senate. It came on a resolution of ratification with the Lodge reservations attached. Although the treaty had the majority of 49-35, it lacked seven votes of the necessary two-thirds.

Twenty-one Democrats had voted to get some kind of treaty even at the price of the reservations. Twenty-three Democrats held out against the reservations and thus voted the treaty down completely. If seven of the last twenty-three had finally compromised, the watered-down treaty would have carried. Instead they joined the twelve extremist Republicans and the last hope of the treaty expired.

The semiparalyzed Wilson himself hoped that this fight could go

on and that the presidential campaign of 1920 would be a "solemn referendum" on the issue of the treaty and the League. The Democratic candidate James M. Cox promised that if elected the United States would enter the League as soon as he could bring it about.

At Hyde Park on August 9, 1920, Cox's running mate for Vice President, the young Franklin D. Roosevelt, said: "Even as the nation entered the war for an ideal, so it has emerged from the war with the determination that the ideal shall not die. . . . Success on land and sea [can] be but half a victory—we must add this: It shall not occur again."

A month before the voting, a remarkable public document was issued bearing the names of thirty-one influential Americans, mostly internationalist Republicans, including Elihu Root, Charles Evans Hughes, and William Howard Taft. It inspired new hope by expressing the belief that if the Republicans won, the United States would enter a revised League.

But the Republican candidate himself was busy appealing to what he believed to be a widespread craving for a less adventuresome existence. "America's present need," Warren G. Harding asserted, "is not heroics, but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not experiment, but equipoise; not submergence in internationality, but sustinment in triumphant nationality."

For the next decade America tried to retire into Mr. Harding's normalcy, while a disappointed world went its way without her.

In retrospect Wilson himself may be criticized for striking too unbending a pose. By refusing to compromise in Washington as he had compromised in Paris, he lost the support of those whose relatively minor criticism might have been met.

Wilson has also come to symbolize for some critics an open-ended idealism which avoided defining its concrete goals. To a degree this criticism is undeniably valid, but it is dangerous if it leads to the assumption that in this revolutionary age a foreign policy based on meaningful human values is *per se* unrealistic and unworkable.

Others charged that Wilsonian self-determination had inspired a narrow nationalism that led to the replacement of large workable economic and political units with small quarreling states that could not possibly stand on their own feet.

Although scholars will continue to argue over such questions and

particularly over how the Wilsonian tragedy itself might have been avoided, his own and future generations will remember Wilson for two major achievements.

The first, as we have seen, was undoubtedly his sponsorship of the League and his historic recognition that the time had come for the world to organize itself against war. The second was his exposition of a free world society.

To the non-American world, Wilson left the League as a growing institution, handicapped by America's failure to join, but nevertheless capable of many constructive achievements in the interwar period. To his own countrymen, his fight for the League has itself seemed to be Wilson's major legacy—one that would be vindicated by the following generation.

America had begun the twentieth century with a flirtation with imperialism. Then in the agony of world war, one of American democracy's historic spokesmen had proposed a democratic world organization which might in time have made world war impossible. This was a development for which American history had been the great rehearsal, and which Western civilization desperately needed for its own survival.

When America retreated into isolation, some of her glory was gone, like a dream that disappears in the night, never to return. But the revolutionary concepts which America had culled and developed into world-shaking principles out of the crucible of her own experience—these were not fated to disappear with Wilson's defeat.

Whatever the reservations of his critics, no one can deny that Wilson demonstrated the power of ideas on men, the tremendous vitality of American leadership when harnessed to the ideal of a complete democratic worldwide revolution. From the days of the social welfare measures of the New Freedom in his first administration, to the end of his public career, Wilson was aware of the human dimension of politics and deeply committed to the pursuit of meaningful, democratic goals, not only in America but abroad.

Before long the ideas of world organization and world democracy—Wilson's twofold legacy—were again the major issues of the day. The second war which Wilson had predicted if America turned its back on the world came within a short two decades. The Great Debate in which Wilson's career had ended was thus renewed.

This time, by a series of actions familiar to most of us now living—the destroyer-for-bases exchange, the Lend-Lease Act, the Atlantic Charter, the peacetime draft—America reversed its earlier judgment. When the bombs fell on Pearl Harbor, most of our lingering doubts about our world responsibilities were swept aside. In the Four Freedoms Franklin Roosevelt, drawing from the same ideals which Wilson had proclaimed, gave voice to what was now the conviction of the vast majority of Americans.

At the war's end, the American people were firmly committed to joining the kind of international organization which its leaders had rejected in Wilson's time. Indeed the United States took the lead in organizing the United Nations, its Charter passed the Senate with only two dissents, and its home was built on American soil.

The world then waited to see whether America had really recaptured the substance of Wilson's appeal, to see what America would do with her new instruments of power, to see what goals she would seek in the new international organization.

No one would have been more aware than Wilson that the United Nations, like his League, would only be a procedural vehicle for policies, enlightened or unimaginative. It and the nations within it would have to address themselves to the substantive problems vexing mankind. "There must be some real ground for the universal unrest and perturbation," Wilson wrote in his last article in 1923. "It is not to be found in superficial politics or in mere economic blunders. It probably lies deep at the sources of the spiritual life of our time. It leads to revolution."

After examining contemporary economic practices at home and abroad, Wilson suggested that "the blame for the present discontent and turbulence" might not be "wholly on the side of those who are in revolt."

"Democracy has not yet made the world safe against irrational revolution," Wilson continued. "That supreme task, which is nothing less than the salvation of civilization, now faces democracy, insistent, imperative. There is no escaping it unless everything we have built up is presently to fall in ruin about us, and the United States, as the greatest of democracies, must undertake it.

"The road that leads away from revolution is clearly marked," the dying statesman concluded. "It must include sympathy and

helpfulness and a willingness to forego self-interest in order to promote the welfare, happiness, and contentment of others and of the community as a whole."

Would America, having helped to accomplish part of Wilson's dream for a world organization of peoples, muster the strength and conviction to give it the content of democratic world policies which Wilson also symbolized?

Only if America had that strength would she affirm in substance the truth of Wilson's words spoken when he was still the nation's leader. "There have been other nations as rich as we. There have been other nations as powerful. There have been other nations as spirited. But I hope we shall never forget that we created this nation, not to serve ourselves, but to serve mankind."

SECTION VII

Assessing the Challenge

I CANNOT say that I am, in the slightest degree impressed by your bigness, or your material resources as such. Size is not grandeur, and territory does not make a nation. The great issue, about which hangs a true sublimity and the terror of overhanging fate, is what are you going to do with all these things?

THOMAS HUXLEY
at Johns Hopkins University, 1876

CHAPTER 31

New Hopes and Bygone Choices

IN resumé the theme of this book may be simply stated. During the past two generations while Europe was suffering from self-inflicted wounds and while America was coming of age in world affairs, there have occurred elsewhere on earth revolutions whose roots are powerful but whose destiny is as yet unknown. America's own revolution is relevant to them.

In a single decade, 1911-21, three men, Lenin, Sun Yat-sen and Gandhi, awoke a billion people from centuries of inertia. We have had a hasty glimpse of Russia, where in 1917 the Czarist heritage of poverty, illiteracy and oppression proved too strong for a brief, weak-willed, social democracy and provided fertile ground instead for the strenuous onslaught of Lenin's militant new Marxism. In less than forty years through a combination of ruthlessness, able organization and sacrificial zeal, the Soviet state has catapulted ahead in power and prestige to become the world's second industrial nation and to challenge the future of Western civilization.

In China the heritage of the Taiping peasant rebellion was preserved by the moderate but fragmented program of Sun Yat-sen, only to be ultimately diverted into the Communist camp by the new techniques of Mao Tse-tung. Today China, with a vast and hard-working population, strives to emulate Russian success.

We have also examined the Gandhian revolution which set 450

million Indians and Pakistanis free and which now seeks to create a modern democratic India. Lacking the dogma and deceit of Communism, it is in many ways far more complex and even less well understood.

Elsewhere in Asia, in Africa, and even in South America, the revolutionary demand for change is producing comparably strong passions. The questions on much of the world's agenda are revolutionary questions.

From the platform of the Bandung Conference, the speeches of African-Asian leaders echoed the four leading revolutionary demands: for nationalism and against foreign domination, for human dignity and against racial or caste discrimination, for rapid economic development and against the lingering feudalism which perpetuates poverty, misery and hunger, for peace and against the perpetual fear of war.

The Colonial Revolution, as we have seen, is operating with the same raw material that the Communist revolutions have used. That raw material has reappeared often enough now for us to understand it: in essence it is the raw material of human hope.

Most of mankind has always been poor and oppressed. But now the word is out and spreading like wildfire across a dry prairie that no longer need any people be resigned to poverty and injustice.

Even in remote parts of the world, man today sees before him the possibility of universal plenty for the first time in history. Often he is prepared to grasp at the doctrine, the party and the men who appear to offer him the best prospects for the fulfillment of that hope in his lifetime.

In Russia and China the strategists of the world Communist party, who are in possession of those two giant states, are seeking to present Communism as the answer to these revolutionary questions, and thus to turn the world-wide ferment into one centrally directed, world revolution. They can be expected skillfully to employ alternating tactics of force and persuasion to reach their goals. As a part of this process they hope to divide the Atlantic nations and to isolate America from the world.

The chief concern of the West has been to deal with this program of expansion and subversion without bringing down on our heads the ruin of atomic war. But this is a negative approach. For us self-righteously to demand that Communism change its nature, without

ourselves laboring to satisfy the need to which Communism professes to provide an answer, is to offer the world not bread, but a stone.

If we are to have any real share in shaping the solutions that are ultimately adopted, we must, of course, uproot once and for all any lingering nostalgia for our comfortable isolationist past. In this we are fortunate, for however much the hazards and costs of a world policy may tempt us occasionally to rebel against them, the painful lessons of World War II and its aftermath are now recognized by most Americans.

Science has made the world a community smaller than the United States a hundred years ago. An American radio listener can now hear daily, eyewitness reports of happenings in most distant areas of the globe. He can fly to those areas in a fraction of the speed that our Founding Fathers took to travel from New York to Boston. Most Americans now accept the implications of these facts. It is an illusion to believe that in such a world we can isolate ourselves in any meaningful sense from the needs, hopes and fears of other people without inviting disaster.

The United States with 5 per cent of the population of the globe uses about 50 per cent of all the world's output of raw materials. The Paley Report to the President showed that in 1952 America consumed 9 per cent more raw materials than it produced. Of the thirty-two most important minerals of industry and defense we were already deficient in twenty-three. Even with full access to the resources of South America we still have to go to Africa and Asia for chrome, tin, cobalt, manganese, mercury, uranium, asbestos, graphite, tungsten and other essential materials of growth and defense.

Taking account of our economic growth curve, the Paley Report calculated that by 1975 the American consumption of industrial raw materials will increase by another 60 per cent. These additional imports must come increasingly from Asia and Africa.

Thus American farms, factories and Main Street stores become steadily more dependent on the men who produce copper in Northern Rhodesia, oil in Iran, and manganese in Bihar, on those who operate the complex trade mechanism of London, and who load the dingy freighters at the docks of Bombay, Accra, Rangoon and Port Said.

An isolated America in this nuclear age would also be difficult

to defend. The deterrent striking power of our Strategic Air Command is still largely based on the homelands and territories of our allies. If in the absence of a workable disarmament agreement those bases are ever denied to us, our retaliatory striking power against possible Soviet or Chinese aggression will be dangerously reduced.

From this great, new political fact retreat is impossible. In a new and total sense, we live in what Wendell Willkie described as One World. Even though it is dangerously divided into eighty competing nation states, two armed camps, and the variety of seemingly irrepressible ideologies, empires and revolutions which we have been examining, it is the only world we have, and somehow we must learn how to live in it.

One of the first lessons we must learn if we are to live in it successfully is that there are very real limits to American policy. At times we will find this essential fact very difficult to grasp.

"As a people, we have never encountered any obstacle that we could not overcome," Adlai Stevenson has warned us. "We never came across a river we couldn't bridge, a depression we couldn't overcome, a war we couldn't win. So far, we have never known the tragedy, frustration and sometimes defeat which are ingrained in the memories of all other peoples."

Our traditionally engaging and self-confident approach to life, despite its great attractiveness, is likely to frustrate us increasingly from now on. We have now emerged on a world stage in a revolutionary situation where our admitted strengths are bounded by obvious limitations of national size, resources, population, geography and experience. In this new situation we need humility, and most of all we need what President Eisenhower has called "the courage to be patient."

But while we must recognize our limitations, we must beware of using them as an excuse for inaction. The future itself is unpredictable. Freedom may survive even though we Americans do all the wrong things. It may be destroyed even though we do all the right things. As far as we can measure, however, America possesses the marginal means which may spell success or failure in the world-wide democratic revolution for bread, freedom and peace. Moreover, America's is the policy, after all, which Americans can do most to determine.

How shall we strive to shape it? Does our present world strategy

measure up to the revolutionary challenge? Clearly it does not. What then can we do to correct it?

Among the first and most important things we can do is to get our bearings within the framework of sound historical perspective. Unquestionably we are at one of those rare crossroads in history which may be even more dramatic than the breakup of the Roman Empire or the emergence of the Renaissance.

CHAPTER 32

The Perspective of History

IT may help us to remember that ours is not the first to call itself a "modern civilization," and to face the kind of questions haunting us now. Rome and many others once considered themselves world societies and faced revolutionary challenges.

Professor Arnold Toynbee says that no fewer than twenty recorded civilizations before ours of the West have tried to climb up the face of the cliff of history. Each in its turn stirred out of the peaceful slumber of a static primitive society, left safety behind, and sought to reach the next great ledge of a universal civilization based on the consent of the governed. Sixteen have already perished in the attempt, and all others but our own have already seriously faltered.

Our Western civilization, says Toynbee, has now entered its time of troubles, and the question facing us all is whether we will be able to succeed where so many others have failed. In each of these earlier attempts, Toynbee suggests, the ship of civilization has crashed on the reef of one or both of two central human problems which he calls War and Class.

Among separate parts of the great societies which tried to become universal civilizations, warfare—with the militarism and reliance on force that comes in its wake—emerged as one of the main causes of the breakdown.

By Class, Toynbee refers to all those economic inequalities and racial or religious discriminations which perpetuate the domination and exploitation of one group over another and sow seeds of dissension in any community. In this sense, Toynbee believes, Class has

comprised the second main cause of the breakdown of civilization.

"War and Class," he writes, "have been with us ever since the first civilizations emerged. . . . When we diagnose each case, *in extremis* and *post mortem*, we invariably find that the cause of death has been either War or Class or some combination of the two."

But each time the cause of death was also suicide. If something inside the civilization had not weakened it, given it a fatal failure of nerve, and robbed it of the ability to attract and hold the loyalty of its people, no outside force would have been strong enough to stop it.

The historian-coroner of ancient Greece, according to Toynbee, would lay his finger on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. as the time of suicide. It did not matter whether Athens or Sparta won, because Greece never recovered from the fratricidal war between the city-states and among the classes within each city.

How to put an end to war and establish a rough equality of opportunity? That has been the life and death question for all previous civilizations. It is no less a question for ours, and the essential aims of our policies must be defined in its terms.

The Problem of War

History shows us that previous generations have sought to solve the problem of War by three different approaches: the domination of the world by one power, a balance of power between nations and combinations of nations, and voluntary union. Since each of these approaches is being advocated in one form or another as the solution to our present dilemma, it may be worth while briefly to examine their careers in Western history.

Empire has been the oldest of the three. After the mutual destruction of the Greek city-states, the new republic of Rome attempted to unify by military power the whole known, civilized world. Although the phrase "a Roman peace" implies a peace imposed by force, for centuries the Roman Empire did give the world the fruits of peace: roads, aqueducts, bridges, canals, irrigation systems, enlarged harbors, drained swampland, uniform systems of taxes, a great free trading area, a common money, a common army or police force and, above all, Roman law.

Rome eventually fell, but the ideal of universal Roman law, of peace under a common government—indeed of a restored Roman

Empire—persisted throughout Christendom and has had a profound influence on Western history.

The West has seen many other attempts at an imposed imperial solution. A Revolutionary France, at the moment when its republican forces began to turn the counterrevolutionary tide in Europe, embarked on a mission of empire. The nineteenth century Caesar from Corsica talked of a United States of Europe. But the growing military dominance of France, and his crowning in the tradition of the Holy Roman Empire, demonstrated that this was a conscious attempt to rebuild the glory of Rome. Napoleon's Code which for a time brought most of Europe under one law, and his free-handed manipulation of European monarchies, etched the European Idea on continental minds in a way that no exile could erase.

Later Hitler in alliance with Japan was to make a new attempt at world domination. For forty years the Soviet Union has also made no secret of the objective of a world empire which it seeks to advance through the Communist movement. Even in America there have been a few who guardedly asserted that the only practical way to assure peace is for us to play the role of Caesar.

The second traditional method of avoiding War has been through a balance of power. With the dimming of the Roman imperial dream, Renaissance political theorists discovered in the balance of power among states a beautiful design, the kind of "natural balance" or "just equilibrium" that they were finding everywhere else in life. If the virtue of empire is in its unity and universal law and order, the virtue of a successful balance of power is in an equilibrium which permits a kind of liberty and diversity.

A balance needs a balancer, capable of shifting its weight from one scale to another. The most successful balancer ever known was industrial, island England, which for nearly 250 years made it her purpose to see that no one continental power or group of powers became sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the rest of Europe, which until 1914 was almost the sole key to world stability.

From 1815 to 1914 in her "splendid isolation," Britain was able to preside over European society without the exhausting expenditure of men and money required by most previous empires, and without the stultifying effect of constant resorts to coercion. Nineteenth century liberalism and humanitarianism were some of the fruits.

Ironically, Britain obtained the power to achieve this balance from

an industrialism that had built an empire. The British Empire, armed and guarded by the British fleet, brought law and order and a kind of peace directly and indirectly to nearly half the globe. Pax Britannica which prevailed for most of the nineteenth century was therefore a combination of the two ancient methods, an empire in the colonial world, and a balance of power in Europe.

But history demonstrates convincingly that empire has within it the seeds of its own destruction, and that balance of power is inevitably precarious. By definition empire means peace by force, unity by compulsion. An empire ends when the people being subjugated gain the strength and will to throw off their rulers, or when the rulers lose the strength or will to continue the effort of subjugation, or when internal awakening and weakening makes the empire an inviting target for outside attack.

Thus Rome fell from internal class dissension which made it vulnerable to barbarian invasion. Britain's days as a world-wide empire were numbered when democracy took root inside Britain and when colonial revolt spread inside the British Empire from America to India to Africa.

Balance of power in its turn depends on the possibility of keeping the powers that be in balance. New forces either within or without may emerge to upset the equilibrium. The feudal balance collapsed when dynamic economic forces within feudalism, such as the cities with their new industries and businessmen, upset the harmony.

The nineteenth century European political balance began to waver with the rise of industrial Germany, an imperial continental power not easily contained even by the world's greatest fleet. In 1870 Britain remained on the sidelines of the Franco-Prussian War in the hope that a unified Germany might act as an effective counter-balance to France, which had been the chief threat to this power balance for the previous two hundred years. Forty years later, Britain entered the first modern world war, this time on the side of France, to prevent domination of the Continent by the united Germany which Britain herself had allowed to develop.

"I trust your country will not fail to support France and Russia in fighting to maintain the balance of power in Europe," Nicholas II wired to George V in August, 1914. But no matter how well Britain fought, the European balance of power in its traditional sense would never be restored, let alone "maintained." Indicative of the tumultu-

ous new forces at work to upset it was the revolution which three years later unseated the Czar himself and which turned Russia under Communist leadership into a dynamic new world force.

Experience with the inadequacies of empires and balances of power as guarantors against war has led to a third general approach to peace—the idea of a voluntary union of nations, cemented by common institutions of government.

The city-states of ancient Greece attempted to unite to prevent war, or at least to undertake collective action against aggressors, but the Greek leagues never amounted to much more than meetings of ambassadors. However, voluntary union to put an end to war has explicitly been in the Western mind since the fall of Rome.

In the Middle Ages the Church was seen as the keystone of such unity. In 1514 Erasmus in Holland advocated a system of world arbitration by popes, abbots, bishops and wise men. In 1518 Pope Leo X and Cardinal Wolsey actually negotiated a "Treaty of Universal Peace," based on the principle of collective action against aggressors.

In 1625 Hugo Grotius, the Dutch jurist known as the father of international law, published his famous treatise, *The Laws of War and Peace*. Sovereign states, he argued, should be bound by international law in the same way that individuals are bound by national and local law. He proposed that an assembly of Christian princes be convened to deliberate and impose sanctions enforcing the Law of Nature. In the century that followed, nine such international conferences were held to fix the "public law" of Europe.

A score or more of peace plans equally well known were devised in the subsequent three centuries. Not all of the plans came from kings, statesmen and famous philosophers, however. In 1779 a French schoolmaster, Pierre-André Gargaz, who had been falsely accused of murder and sentenced to twenty years as a galley slave, sent an ingenious plan for union to Benjamin Franklin who had long been urging a continental union of the North American states.

Signing himself "Convict No. 1336," Gargaz proposed not only the then current ideas of arbitration and an international police force based on quotas, but also a world-wide public works program, to be paid out of the sums to be saved by the abolition of war. Road building, storing of surplus food for use in famine areas, irrigation

and flood control were on his list, along with the building of canals over the Isthmus of Panama and at Suez.

After his release in 1781 he walked all the way to Passy where Franklin, then the first ambassador from the New World to the Old, printed his plan. In 1786, despairing of European leadership, he wrote to Thomas Jefferson, the new American Minister to France, urging that the New World initiate the union.

On its own territory, the New World was doing just that. After the former American colonies achieved independence, the rivalries became so intense that the history of European disunion and conflict seemed certain to be repeated on North American shores. Not only did each of the thirteen states have its own little army, but some of the states had staked out vast colonial claims with overlapping boundaries in the Northwest. "There are combustibles in every state which a spark might set fire to," Washington wrote to Jay.

Among those who came to the Constitutional Convention in 1787 in Philadelphia, were many who assumed that any fundamental revisions of the Articles of Confederation were politically impossible. At a critical moment at the Convention, Washington is said to have broken an ominous deadlock with these solemn words:

"It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted. Perhaps another dreadful conflict is to be sustained. But if to please the people we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterward defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair. The event is in the hand of God."

The standard was the Constitution, and the event was an expanding federal union. In other areas, too, where vast size or cultural, religious or linguistic differences made a centralized state impracticable, genuine federations were forged with equal success and timeliness. Switzerland, Canada and Australia were examples.

Their success in addition to that of our own earlier model has led many people, including the statesmen of a number of European countries, to advocate federation as a solution to the problem of international anarchy, whether in Europe alone, among the North Atlantic democracies generally, or in the world at large.

In 1787 Benjamin Franklin wrote to a European friend: "I send you enclosed the proposed new federal constitution of the United States. If it succeeds I do not see why you might not in

Europe, form a federal union of all the different states and kingdoms by means of a like convention."

In certain limited fields, regional groupings of nations are already moving in this direction, most notably in the European coal-iron-steel community. This organization is already wielding political and economic authority transcending the jurisdiction of its members.

But the long history of these three competing methods of war prevention—empire, balance of power, and union—and the elements of each which remain in our total world picture today, suggest that neither a world empire by one power, nor a stable balance of power, nor a full-fledged world federal government is likely to appear soon on the diplomatic agenda.

Interestingly enough, for over a century Russia and the United States respectively have represented two of these competing symbols—empire and union. With the steady addition of new states to the Union and new liberties for the people, nineteenth century Americans moved westward to establish peace, law and free trade from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Save for the fratricidal years of the Civil War, their slogan, "liberty and union, one and inseparable," went with them.

Simultaneously another great folk migration was under way in the Eurasian heartland. Great Russians were moving eastward into Siberia, creating another continental empire. As the nineteenth century wore on, the world began to speculate on what might happen when these two giants expanded to their natural geographic limits.

In 1835 a distinguished French visitor to America, Alexis de Tocqueville, made an extraordinarily accurate prediction of things to come:

There are at the present time two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans.

The principal instrument of the latter is freedom, of the former, servitude. Their starting point is different, and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

The military meeting of the Union of the Free and the Empire of the Eurasian Heartland came peacefully in 1945 on the Elbe in the very center of Europe. Their relations would have been uneasy

in any event. But to complicate matters further, a conflict was developing between the white, industrialized, colony-possessing nations grouped around the North Atlantic basin, and the colored, awakening, raw-material-producing peoples of Asia and even Africa.

This conflict raised anew, with greater world-wide insistence, the second age-old problem which Toynbee calls Class. Russia, once an outlying province of the West, offered the West a formidable challenge, not merely because it possessed a Red Army which might at any time embark on the old imperial Roman mission to pacify the world by forcible unification, but even more because it possessed an ideology which offered its own violent solution to class struggle.

The Problem of Class

Class can involve race, color and religion as well as economic status. It is more comprehensive and less identifiable than the problem of War. It can also be more personal and more embittering. It offers none of war's peculiar relief in glory or glamour. Yet it is deep enough to cause a resort to devastating civil strife and even to war itself.

In a sense our society, as Aristotle said of ancient Greece, has always consisted of two cities, the City of the Rich and the City of the Poor. Today this division has been transposed to a world plane. The nations of the Atlantic basin—America in particular—constitute almost by definition the City of the Rich. The rest, the majority, of mankind largely constitutes the City of the Poor.

Unfortunately in 1920, just when America slumped from the world-minded idealism of President Wilson to the plodding normalcy of President Harding, Lenin offered the world's first program designed consciously and deliberately to end the division between the two Cities of the Rich and the Poor. Class inequalities would be ended by the massive and planned use of modern science and technology.

Lenin's was history's most ruthless attempt to do away with Class, and the promise he held out for a classless society created a mighty stir throughout the City of the Poor. His avowed concern with ending injustice, and his readiness to upset the *status quo* by any means fair or foul, gave to Communism a dramatic attractiveness for the impatient and the long oppressed. To add to its appeal Lenin promised that war would be abolished by the universal dominion of

a world Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In part, Lenin was offering the old alternative of empire, but now it was dressed in beguiling new clothes.

That the proposed dictatorship of the proletariat would be a dictatorship; that the Russian party's control meant national domination of the world revolution; that imperial power corrupts; that resort to violent coercion contradicts all promise of persuasion; that an all-powerful, self-selecting, party bureaucracy in control of the tools of production would become a new class—all this should have been self-evident.

But throughout the world tens of millions of weary people were searching for a solution and thirsting for a promise. They saw only that for the first time in history a world-wide political party had emerged, firmly based on the world's largest national land area, and that this party promised a solution to what they saw as mankind's most pressing problem. Enough seeds of Lenin's Revolution germinated in China so that there a nationalist, class-conscious rebellion led to a civil war in which Communism again emerged victorious.

Outside the immediate orbit of Communism, we have found the raw material of revolution among most of the billion or more people in the colonial, underdeveloped and largely colored part of the world. The Gandhian Revolution too was expressly aimed at the dual problems of War and Class. For Gandhi there was an obvious connection between ending Class and the prospects for peace. "A violent and bloody revolution is a certainty one day," he said, "unless there is a voluntary abdication of riches and the power that riches give, and sharing them for the common good."

This means, of course, that instead of one revolution—the Russian—on the periphery of Western civilization, we now face at least three. All of them, the revolutions of Lenin, Mao and Gandhi, have taken place in the City of the Poor, and each for better or for worse has grown out of the age-old, world-wide theme of revolt against injustice and misery. Outside any known orbit of influence, primitive passions such as those expressed by the Mau Mau in Kenya further suggest the inflammable attitudes that exist just under the surface in much of today's world.

With a profound stake in stability, vastly outnumbered, and faced with such extraordinarily disruptive forces, many Americans are inclined to denounce all proposals for change as alien and incom-

prehensible. But we can not easily run away from the consequences of our own history. We have seen that the forces with which we must now contend have been generated by the nations of the North Atlantic basin and often by America itself.

It was the people of the West who committed themselves in the days of the Renaissance to follow science and technology wherever it led, and to apply the fruits to the freeing of modern man from all forms of tyranny over his mind and body. This commitment led to today's world, whose people, wherever they can be heard, are demanding economic and political rights in some measure comparable to our own, and in a larger sense, demanding an end to Class and War.

Today the two Cities of the Rich and Poor are facing each other, accentuating these world-wide issues of War and Class. Communism, an outgrowth of the West, proposes to unite the two cities into one through violent revolution.

The West itself has suggested tentative alternatives. In 1944 we proposed the United Nations as a kind of voluntary union to enforce peace. Since 1948 we have worked to create a ring of military allies and military bases in an effort to discourage War. The UN specialized agencies, Point Four Assistance, and the Colombo Plan have been used to help bridge the economic gap. But generally on the issue of Class we have too largely abdicated our responsibilities and left the field open to our adversaries. Why has this been so?

America's Revolution, as we have seen, also involved a continuing assault on the problem of Class. And America did not lack spokesmen who proclaimed her solution as the universal remedy. But compared with Communism, the American prescription has always been less explicit, less doctrinaire, more a pragmatic shaping of measures to circumstances.

With it, we have succeeded within America in creating the most mobile society the world has yet seen, one in which class distinctions and the sundering inequality between the very rich and the very poor are all but eliminated for most of us. And yet, the very experimental quality that has made for the success of our effort has created handicaps in an ideological competition where people want clear answers and quick results.

The tempo of this competition mounts fatefully in the diplomatic discussion, which, alternately hopeful and deadly, goes on. America,

Russia, China, India and the rest of the Middle World—each sometimes sounds as if the century were reserved for one of them alone. Yet, however much some of them dislike the prospect, it is beginning to appear that all of them are fated to operate together on the world stage for the foreseeable future. It is also beginning to appear that unless the world is made tolerable for each of them, it may eventually prove intolerable for all.

Does this amount to coexistence? Yes, but coexistence is a misleading term, misleading in its implication of inaction. Certainly Moscow and Peking will continue to act everywhere they can on the issues of War and Class—if not for the time being, at least, brandishing armaments, then offering the many, formidable, non-military weapons which they brought increasingly into play in the post-Stalinist thaw: new ideas, new promises, new peace proposals, new economic programs, new cultural efforts, new political policies and persuasive “new looks” on the diplomatic front.

The nations of the Middle World can be expected to remain for the most part suspicious, preoccupied with their own problems, reluctant to take direct responsibility, inclined more and more to strike a middle if not mediating role between the two nuclear giants, and determined to be free, to be granted full respect regardless of race or color, and to create a better life for their people.

In our closely knit revolutionary world, tormented as never before in history by the ancient and fateful problems of War and Class, no single question is more fundamental than America's ability to come to grips with this complex, world-wide challenge.

CHAPTER 33

A Pax Americana?

WHAT are the alternatives before us? Since isolation is totally impossible, can we fly to the other extreme and follow in the footsteps of ancient Rome? Why not use our vast economic and military power to impose peace on the world and preserve the economic *status quo*? Why not establish a new kind of American empire for the benefit of everyone?

To do so would, of course, mean the abandonment of the essential idea which made America great, the idea of government by the consent of the governed. But the advocates of *Realpolitik* would not accept this as an answer. If we are to satisfy them, we must coldly ask ourselves whether such an imperial solution is feasible.

The key questions are obvious. Empire means the use or threat of force. Do we have the military means to put down the nationalist and class revolutions brewing on every continent? Do we have the means to enforce a Roman peace? Since both sides possess atomic weapons and the means to deliver them, we must face the supreme practical question: would war result in one Rome or two Carthages?

The estimated effects of atomic warfare have begun to make the double Carthaginian specter increasingly possible. The detonation close to the ground of megaton weapons (one megaton equals one million tons of TNT) produces not only blast and heat effects, but throws millions of tons of dirt and debris of all kinds eighty thousand feet or more into the air. The hydrogen bomb tested by the United States in the Pacific in the spring of 1954 blanketed a seven thousand square mile area as large as New Jersey with lethal radio-

active fall-out, according to an official statement released by the Atomic Energy Commission. Those familiar with the possibilities feel that they have been admitted to "the anteroom of hell."

Based on presently known or estimated Soviet capabilities, the assumptions of the Federal Civil Defense Administration include the following: that the USSR has the capability of striking any city in the United States, that if an attack should come it would consist of nuclear weapons including thermonuclear types, that these weapons would be delivered by air and detonated above ground during normal working hours, and that accompanying their delivery the enemy would use high explosive and incendiary bombs, biological and chemical weapons, sabotage and psychological warfare, including a confusing deluge of clandestine radio broadcasting over the call letters of American radio stations.

Civil Defense Administrator, Val Peterson, has advised the American people that in the event of war they have three choices: "Dig, die or get out." On June 15, 1955, his Civil Defense Administration staged "Operation Alert," a nation-wide test of our ability to carry on if an attack should come.

It was assumed that sixty-one principal American cities were struck simultaneously with nuclear and thermonuclear bombs ranging in power from twenty thousand to five million tons of TNT. The industrial capacities of all sixty-one cities were for all intents and purposes wiped out, and 25 million people were homeless.

In New York 2.9 million were dead including nearly half the city's school children. In Philadelphia the dead numbered 740,000 and in Los Angeles 584,000. The casualties in New England totaled nearly 6 million.

The evacuation tests showed that no town or city in the country was prepared to evacuate its people. Comprehensive plans for the transport, feeding and medical treatment of evacuees had barely begun. Jurisdictional overlapping between federal and state authorities, and between civilian and military agencies, had hamstrung and obscured responsibilities. The appeals of the understaffed and underfinanced Civil Defense Administration for industrial dispersal, municipal survival shelters and household basement shelter rooms, had largely fallen on deaf ears.

Moreover, critics promptly pointed out that "Operation Alert" by no means reflected the full extent of the damage which would be

inflicted on our cities in actual attack. The bombs which were presumed to have been dropped were described as "relatively old-fashioned and low powered." The Bikini test of March, 1954, involved a blast equivalent to twenty million tons of TNT, four times as powerful as the largest which was considered in "Operation Alert."

At the same time that newspaper columnists have been speculating on the undetermined effects of cumulative radiation on human genetics, the estimates from the scientific front continue to expand the possibilities of direct human destruction. In June, 1955, a speech by Dr. Willard F. Libby, member of the Atomic Energy Commission, indicated that the hydrogen bomb can now be made with the cheapest atomic explosives and in virtually unlimited size. Dr. Libby referred to H bombs that released energy by fission rather than fusion, indicating to physicists that ordinary, cheap Uranium 238 was the major explosive element.

The enormous significance of this disclosure meant that any country able to make ordinary atomic bombs could, with a little additional effort create superweapons of the megaton class, that these weapons could be made in any size because of the comparative simplicity and cheapness of Uranium 238, that the fall-out could persist for days, weeks, or months, and that there is no real defense against a bomb which could desolate 100,000 square miles, an area twice the size of New York State.

Such forecasts of possible annihilation from overseas are so new to American thinking that it is not surprising that, in the absence of clear-cut official policies and leadership, the public has been inclined either toward apathy or fatalism. Yet the idea of America as a new Rome, imposing its will on the world by force of arms, has at times exerted an insidious fascination on the minds of some of our so-called "realists," which even the Geneva climate is unlikely to end.

For the most part these spokesmen have been former last-ditch isolationists, exasperated by the dangers and the indecisiveness of continuing the Cold War struggle. They have pointed with alarm to certain trends indicating the gradual loss of our economic and military superiority. They have recognized that the Soviet economy has been pushing ahead at a rate of growth higher than our own, and that eventually it may approach our own production levels.

They have been frustrated by the growth of neutralism, the com-

mercial appeal of trade with the Communist countries, the prospects of a Russian Point Four operation abroad. They have thrown up their hands over Nehru's unwillingness to choose sides, and predicted that South and Southeast Asia will slip under Chinese or Russian domination. Exhausted both by our effort at budget-balancing and the possibility of more local wars, they privately have seen no way out but to trigger it all in one mighty Wagnerian holocaust.

Most of this small defeatist minority have realized that there is no possibility of carrying the American public into a "preventive war" as a public and conscious act. Their urgings have been more subtle. They have advocated seizing all conceivable pretexts, blowing up small incidents into large ones, and maneuvering ourselves into positions where total war would become inevitable.

For a variety of reasons this doctrine of preventive war, in whatever form, is one of reckless impracticality. The harshest fact of all today is that the world's problems are not susceptible to swift and single answers, even to enormous and brutal ones.

The Soviet counterblow might be nearly as serious as one launched initially from Moscow, and our adversary would retaliate on an America against which most of mankind had disgustedly turned its back. What would be preventive about such a situation? What conceivably useful political objectives would it meet? What could emerge out of a Russia or China laid waste by atomic attack, out of a Europe and Asia stunned by a new barbarism, out of a United States steeped in unbecoming guilt? There would be little left for the new Rome to rule, and we would have forfeited all right to the world's respect.

* * *

IF an American Rome created through preventive war is out of the question, what of the possibilities of a Rome less dramatically achieved? Even if we deliberately oppose the idea of an American empire, do we know how to avoid it?

Empires sometime grow like Topsy. In a polarized world with America the chief power in her group, possessing overwhelming weapons and most of the industry and money, it would not be in-

conceivable for decision-making to gravitate toward Washington. On our part a "go-it-alone" callousness could arise that might gradually force our allies into the position of satellites.

Those who assume that America's power automatically entitles her to make unilateral nuclear decisions affecting the futures of millions of non-Americans, should not be surprised at the insistence from our allies that there be "no annihilation without representation." Their independence will increase if and as the Cold War subsides.

The feelings of Britain, our major ally, are a case in point. Although anti-Americanism in Britain is less professional and hard-bitten than on the European Continent, it is still widespread. There is no way in which a nation long accustomed to power, like Britain, can be induced to relish becoming junior partner to a brash newcomer to world affairs.

Sometimes the British reaction takes the form of incisive jibes at American expense, like the barbed remark dropped at a London diplomatic reception that "America will soon be the only former British colony which has not achieved responsible self-government."

Yet we must remind ourselves that in all likelihood the author of this comment might agree with the successful candidate for a job in the British Foreign Office who when asked to list the three most important things in life answered, "God, Love and Anglo-American relations." The surface manifestations of controversy often hide this underlying consensus of a common destiny, which in times of past crises has so convincingly seen us through.

Nevertheless the surface manifestations remain the observable ones, and disproportionately affect our own reactions. If Napoleon thought that facing a diversified alliance he had half his problems solved for him, there are times when the Kremlin must often think so too.

Yet the virtue of having allies rather than satellites is the same as the virtue of having democracy rather than regimentation. What is lost in efficiency is more than regained in the free play of ideas among individuals with common objectives but differing points of view. The methods of compromise and persuasion are likely to develop more adequate answers because the ground has been more widely canvassed. And the solutions adopted are likely to claim support because they provide more fully for the real interests of

those concerned, and all who participate know that they have had the chance to say their piece.

Alliances do indeed make great claims on the wisdom, patience, loyalty and good humor of statesmen and more especially of the people they represent. A state of mind which wearies of such qualities often reaches for abrupt and radical solutions.

It is this state of mind which has made the extremists in our midst so often the heirs of the old isolationists. Both exaggerate our capability for "going it alone." Both are uneasy and suspicious of "foreigners." Both often seem oblivious of the need and value of consultative, joint effort with other nations.

The one thing that the conscious advocates of preventive war and other less jingoistic forms of unilateral neoimperialism have in their favor is the self-assurance of a forceful, articulate position. A closer look, however, shows us that theirs is the negative assurance of despair.

Despite the air of bold risks taken, orders given, and rugged willingness to accept the ultimate test of war, it has at its core the hollow failure of nerve that marks the bully. Not even empires are, in the last analysis, won that way, much less a free world in which men and women can live daringly and creatively.

That kind of world requires of us a steadier resolve, a higher organization of all our resources than that of a gambler throwing the dice. It requires, of course, the continued maintenance of a military balance. But it requires, no less, a conscious awareness of the limited role of armed force.

Our diplomatic and economic resources must be fully committed. Most important of all, the considerable moral resources which we have seen as both the motivation and the product of the continuing American Revolution must be brought to bear on a scale we have not yet approached.

These are the problems that will concern us as we try to construct policies adequately responsive to the challenge before us.

SECTION VIII

American Policy in a World of Revolution

THE dogma of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CHAPTER 34

The Uses and Limits of Military Power

IN the main, our strategy under two administrations since the War has been to contain Communism in both its expansive Soviet and Chinese varieties, by creating situations of strength around the vast Russian-Chinese periphery. Since military power has often been seen by our strategists as the primary source of strength—an assumption we shall review later—let us examine our military strategy in terms of the revolutionary world we have surveyed.

In the last decade our military forces have been assigned two quite different missions: (1) to deter the Communists from any attack which would bring on an immediate world wide conflict—such as an invasion of Western Europe or an atomic assault on the United States, (2) to handle localized assignments, as in Korea, where the Communist forces are conventionally armed.

An examination of how well our armed forces have performed these two missions in the postwar decade from 1945-55 will help us to understand both the proper role and the practical limits of military power in the revolutionary decade ahead of us.

For the first mission—deterrence of all out war, we have relied principally on a strategic air arm prepared to counter any major aggression with devastating atomic force.

The very success of the development of atomic armament, however, both here and in the Soviet Union, has paradoxically limited

its role in the over-all military picture. The more powerful these weapons grow and the more annihilating the probable consequences become, the smaller becomes the range of likely occasions on which we shall be prepared to use them and to accept the risk of world-wide atomic war.

This predicament has already caused the collapse of "massive retaliation" as a world-wide policy. Launched with such fanfare in January, 1954, on the assumption that it would save the use of American infantry, the policy when broadly applied failed in the first test of its practicability four months later in Indochina.

In effect, the concept of massive retaliation was an attempt to assign both missions—deterrence of general war *and* resistance to local aggressions—to the Strategic Air Command. The fallacy of the concept when applied all over the world was decisively revealed when tested against a local war situation in Asia.

Obviously total nuclear war is not the pattern of war that we should consciously seek to establish, or make inevitable through our inability to fight any other. Yet to many of our allies the proposed doctrine of "massive retaliation" implied exactly that: that we were to have no more wars except an enormous and final one.

In Europe, of course, such a policy, based on the massive use of nuclear power, was neither new nor untested. From the time of our pell-mell demobilization in 1946 until the NATO buildup in 1950, the sole military deterrent to a Red Army move into the power vacuum between the Elbe and the Atlantic was our ability to destroy Russian cities through our monopoly of the atomic bomb.

Russia undoubtedly knew then and knows now that we would consider an attack on Europe as an attack on ourselves, and that in response to such an attack we would immediately launch a nuclear onslaught not only on her armies but on her cities, even though the ensuing general war would involve widespread atomic destruction in our own country. Indeed the NATO position has been stated on many occasions. On October 21, 1954, for instance, Field Marshal Montgomery said: "I want to make it abundantly clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defense. These weapons will be used if we are attacked."

But would America be willing to accept these same terrible risks to meet local aggression in Asia—say, in Afghanistan, Burma, Iran

or Indochina? Our deep-felt reaction to the expansion of the war in Korea, and to the bare prospect of an even more limited involvement in Indochina, seems to say clearly that we would not.

This fundamental difference between American commitments in Europe and Asia is almost certainly apparent to the Russians and to the Chinese. If, in the absence of adequate disarmament safeguards, we place our principal reliance in Asia upon a method of retaliation which carries what are probably unacceptable risks, and at the same time reduce our capacity for more limited, local responses, we will in fact invite rather than deter, local aggression in Asia.

Even if, in the event of such aggression, we are in fact prepared to launch atomic attacks with the certainty of a general war, a narrow nuclear policy may tempt the Communists to miscalculate our readiness. And if, on the other hand, the Communists calculate that we will not risk general war over some small Asian aggression, and they do succeed in once calling our bluff, as indeed they have already done in Indochina, does not much of any deterrent value of the policy disappear overnight?

These questions assume that American strategic atomic bombing of major Chinese cities, as of Russian cities, would result in the outbreak of World War III. But suppose, for some reason, that after an American retaliatory attack on Chinese cities, Moscow decided to ignore its commitments under the Soviet-Chinese alliance and held its fire. Suppose it did not even take the next step, that of supplying the Chinese with some atomic bombs and bombers for retaliation on us. How vulnerable is vast, decentralized China to our atomic attack?

China, unlike the Soviet Union, has no major industrial concentration. The Chinese economy is not dependent upon highly articulated transportation and communications networks. Chinese armies are mobile, schooled in guerrilla warfare and in survival off the land, and they operate without the elaborate supply and support formation of NATO armies. Thus the atomic devastation of Chinese cities might well be the opening engagement in a lengthy, sprawling, indecisive conflict in which China's main asset, manpower, might occupy most of continental Asia.

And is there not a broader issue, indeed a fundamental moral issue, implicit in the policy of broadly applied massive retaliation

which in all conscience we should resolve with our eyes open? We are a religious people, who believe that man is sacred to God. We pride ourselves on our democratic faith in the ultimate worth of the individual. It is these beliefs that distinguish our way of life from that of the Communists.

Yet if we threaten to bomb China's cities, we would seem to be proposing to wipe out millions of Chinese men, women and children, huddled in cities which, unlike those of the Soviet Union, are almost devoid of legitimate military or industrial targets. Are we prepared to exact this frightful toll of helpless people in order to punish the rulers who control them?

Even in Europe where sophisticated people could see as clearly as we the danger of a Soviet attack, the necessity of massive atomic retaliation as a primary deterrent has placed a severe strain on our alliances. It has often been said that democracies lose all the battles but the last one. In a future war there would be small comfort in that.

If disarmament efforts should fail and a war eventually start, Soviet bombers in all probability would by-pass Copenhagen, Brussels, Rome, London, Bonn and Paris to strike at New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Hartford and Chicago. Our NATO allies, already battered by two world wars, would be handed ultimatums calling upon them promptly to announce their neutrality or face total atomic destruction. To people who have barely dug their way clear from the wreckage brought by the obsolete weapons of World War II, the smoking ruins of American and Russian cities would lend a terrible validity to such a threat. One thing that Europe is determined *not* to be is a battlefield.

If the strain on our NATO alliance of a total nuclear defense strategy in Europe is great, in Asia it can bring us to the breaking point. To settle for the view that, faced with a marginal aggression in Asia or the Middle East, we must launch a nuclear war or accept humiliating retreat under local pressure would be disastrous.

Step by step this position would lead to the collapse of our alliances and to our eventual isolation on this continent—which would mean that our adversary had achieved by our own ineptness his central political objective. It would, of course, be at least equally disastrous if we fail to maintain the ability to fight a nuclear war to victory to the degree that victory in such a war is possible.

Our postwar military history shows an alternative to "massive

retaliation" as a way of dealing with local wars. We have assigned this mission to the conventional forces of ourselves and our allies. In Korea, at terrible human cost, but at infinitely less cost than that of a third world war, we finally repelled Communism by local and limited resistance.

But the policy of local resistance to local aggression has not always succeeded. In Indochina, much of the French Army was committed over a period of seven years. In the end, the situation had disintegrated so badly, that we decided not to send our ground forces even into limited battle. A comparison of these two theaters of local war in Korea and Indochina dramatically highlights the conditions under which we can expect to make successful resistance with conventional forces.

In Korea there was a line, the 38th parallel, strategically defensible, to which the world, through the UN, was previously committed politically. In Korea, direct organized overt aggression was reported by a UN Commission on the spot. Six hundred thousand Nationalist Koreans fought with courage and growing competence at our side. A narrow peninsula with a front of only 150 miles and a near-by privileged military sanctuary of our own in Japan enabled our sea and air power to play an important, if not decisive role. On both flanks our sea power remained unmolested, either by submarines or enemy air attacks.

In Indochina there was no militarily defensible line comparable to the 38th parallel. Instead the French had to rely on a series of hedgehog bases in a largely hostile territory, of which Dienbienphu was typical, and mechanized patrolling activities along major lines of communication.

More important, as we have seen earlier, there was in Indochina no line which was defensible in the court of world opinion. The presence of a white Western power attempting to cling to its imperial role made for sharp differences of view among the non-Communist powers—differences which were also reflected in American opinion.

The Indochinese people, denied the right to an independent government or even to convincing internal reforms under a colonial government, varied in attitudes from indifference to open opposition. The very factors which deprived France of effective indigenous troops with which to oppose the Communists, provided Ho with an

abundance of dedicated supporters. The centers of Communist power in Russia and China were not directly engaged, and the American military commitment was limited to the massive delivery of equipment which did not succeed in stopping the Communist forces.

If we assume that an effective and acceptable major disarmament program is likely to evolve slowly if at all, this brief review of the dilemmas of American military policy since World War II leads to three conclusions.

First, the aggressions against which we may have to defend ourselves are of different kinds, and they will require different kinds of forces to meet them. Trying to buy cheap protection on all fronts is an exercise in self-deception. Both strategic air forces and highly mobile conventional forces are indispensable, if we are to be able to deal effectively with any overt manifestation of Communist military force.

Second, this need not mean unlimited military expansion or expenditure. On the atomic side, the respective capabilities of the Russian and American air arms will at some stage reach a point where a surplus in numbers of nuclear weapons and the planes with which to deliver them will grow less significant, so long as there are enough deliverable weapons for the certain destruction of key targets in enemy territory. Thus, sufficiency and not superiority may gradually become the ultimate and less expensive measure of nuclear security.

The training and use of adequate conventional forces may in many instances be of decisive importance. But if the time comes when the bulk of the people of South Asia or any other vital area decide to throw their support to the Communists, no amount of American military effort rushing in at the late stages of this process of deterioration will be permanently capable of arresting the trend. For instance if the time comes when 200 million bitter and frustrated Africans become determined to expel the 4 million dominant Europeans, jets, tanks and tommy guns will not finally be able to stop them.

Military organization, training and expenditure should reflect these practical limitations, just as they reflect the capabilities of armed strength.

Third, the creation of situations of military strength has rewarded

our diplomacy in Europe in recent years. The line which we drew there in 1947 has not yet been dented or seriously threatened.

In the more complex areas of the Middle East and the arc of free Asia, an equally firm position is required. Here we must also draw a strategic line against any future overt military aggression by either the Soviet Union or Communist China.

That line cannot be casually or rhetorically drawn on the basis of bluff. Hazy and unilateral commitments, undertaken without adequate thought and without allies, even without the serious intention of fully honoring the commitments once taken, are as dangerous as no commitment at all.

If a strategic line in Asia is to have any precision or lasting validity, it must have the firm support of our major allies and if possible the beneficent acquiescence of the leading indigenous non-Communist powers of the region.

Moreover, these sharp lines against overt Communist aggression can and must be drawn without rendering our diplomacy inflexible on certain *ad hoc* issues. Thus the European defense line was clearly drawn in 1948 but the neutralization of Austria was nevertheless negotiated in 1955. Where, as in the Austrian settlement, there appears to be a net advantage to our over-all objectives, we should be prepared to accept changes through negotiation.

Therefore a strategic defense line would provide only the minimum limits for the military containment of Communism, limits which could always be extended if, hopefully, the areas of freedom expand and Communist power contracts, or if areas now dominated by the Red Army can be opened up by negotiation. Although the drawing of this new strategic line is of the utmost importance, we must look on it as a holding operation and little else. It is an essential ingredient in our policy, but it is by no means either the end or the means of total policy. It promises to stop aggression, but only of the external variety—and external aggression is the least likely variety of aggression that we will be called upon to face in the coming years.

Even while drawing this military line we must take other non-military factors into account. If in the process of setting up meaningful lines of defense we give the impression of being militaristic or aggressive, our total world position will be adversely affected. This

is not a simple problem. The same publicity which the armed services feel is necessary for their own morale, public relations and annual budgetary appearances on Capitol Hill may, when reported abroad, create the very impression of trigger-happy militarism which our responsible military leaders are most anxious to avoid.

To be militarily strong without becoming militaristic; to reject the dead end of preventive or invited war; to provide for various military contingencies; to learn to work with our allies in pursuit of strategic objectives without arrogance; to make clear our determination to defend a politically feasible line without appearing to threaten; this is the formidable sum total of the requirements of contemporary American military policy.

* * *

ONE of the most important things that the survey of revolutionary events in this book should have taught us is that, except under the conditions of all-out war, the capacity of military power to shape events is strictly limited. All of the essential military objectives just described, when added together, fall far short of an adequate foreign policy.

A competent police force does not in itself assure a community of goodwill and progress. It simply offers civic leaders an opportunity to create such a community, free from lawless elements bent on destroying the community or manipulating it to their selfish ends. By the same token no military security system, however vast and efficient, can alone assure the peace and sense of orderly progress which the world community must achieve if it is to avoid the twin dangers of War and Class.

"The purpose of military power," said America's great philosopher-strategist, Admiral Mahan, "is to provide time for moral ideas to take root."

Historians will be puzzled why a democratic and religious people like the Americans, two generations after the admiral wrote, have often acted as if military power were still the final objective of policy—why by concentrating so exclusively on military answers to complicated, human, nonmilitary problems, we have shackled our

abilities to deal effectively with the psychological, ideological and economic forces which are so clearly shaping modern society.

"War," said Lenin, "is part of the whole. The whole is politics." Politics in its full implication concerns the organization of the power of the people. It involves military organization, but it also involves ideas, ideologies, parties, governments, economic and social institutions and programs.

It is because Hitler essentially saw war itself as the "whole," and relied almost solely on the armed forces of one nation, that his aggressions were so unattractive to their victims and potential victims, and were eventually defeated by counterforce. To the nine-tenths of the world that was not blond, the new order of Nordic supremacy had no appeal.

It is because Lenin recognized that the "whole is politics," and because he designed a political program of world revolution which included but went beyond Red Armies, that he was a master revolutionary and that his revolution has grown to its present threatening dimensions. The promise, however hollow, of a *World Union of Soviet States* based on equality, and using science and technology to develop the whole world, has a powerful potential appeal everywhere except in the advanced, prosperous, industrial and democratic states of the North Atlantic.

This fundamental difference between the challenge of Nazism and the challenge of Communism, basically a difference in their assessment of the military factor in politics, suggests where our own present analysis of the world situation may be inadequate.

To the extent that the Kremlin has embarked on a career of Napoleonic or Hitlerian militarism, we have recognized the threat and known how to resist it. But to the extent that Communism is a revolutionary world political program, an iceberg of which only the ultimate violent phases show above the surface, our preoccupation with military answers has proved grossly inadequate.

We have learned the central lesson of the 1930's: the futility of appeasing a rising military power. For ten years in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, we have sought boldly to apply that lesson to our problems with the Kremlin. We have been successfully doing the very things which might have prevented World War II had we done them twenty years ago.

The tragedy is that what might have worked to stop Hitler is, by no stretch of the imagination sufficient to stop world Communism. History moves, and its age-old challenge of War and Class returns in more formidable shapes.

Today, as we saw at the outset of this book, a common denominator of many recent American attitudes has been a stubborn lack of understanding of what constitutes strength in world affairs. Although we value deeply our own free institutions, we seem to have overestimated the effectiveness of material, military strength, and to have underestimated the strength of people and ideas.

The paradox is heightened by the fact that our limitations of manpower, resources and geography are clearly apparent, while ideas, human sympathy, faith, scientific techniques, persuasiveness, are qualities that we have long had in abundance. Standing at the end of a century of unprecedented political and industrial growth, America should understand best of all the dynamic qualities on which its own greatness was built.

The greatest power anywhere is people. In our age, above all others with its modern communications and propaganda techniques, big ideas and big principles—good or bad—will move people into action.

President Roosevelt was close to the heart of the matter when he proposed his toast at Yalta to "give every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and well-being." But in his effort to find an acceptable basis for peace with Russia, President Roosevelt himself sometimes appeared to emphasize Russo-American power politics until they occasionally seemed to displace the goal of his own Four Freedoms. This too was largely an understandable result of a preoccupation with the military aspects of World War II.

Nevertheless "unconditional surrender," unlike the Fourteen Points, allowed little room for the political dimension. Instead of a repetition of the German internal collapse of 1918, Allied soldiers had to fight their way into the very heart of Germany in 1945. Because ideas were so often neglected, the war may have taken longer than necessary.

When in a wartime conference Stalin cynically asked, "How many divisions has the Pope?" we said that the Moscow leader had a shortsighted view of power and that the spiritual strength of millions

of people would eventually make itself felt. The Catholic Church in Europe has proved its power to resist Communism, and the Kremlin today seems keenly aware that people are the raw material of political action whether it be revolutionary or not.

Can we Americans now afford to become the cynics, who discount people and ideas, and ask how many battalions has the Pope? What greater irony than that the country which built its greatness on individualism should have appeared to place its fundamental emphasis on atomic retaliation, while the capital of so-called dialectical materialism has sought, however cynically, to capture the leadership of a world revolution by winning the minds of men.

Ours is the land that was created out of a faith in people and principles. Have we somewhere along the line lost a firm grip on that faith? To the degree that we have, we are weaker in maturity than we were at our birth. Now that we are heavy-laden with the ornaments of power, we are being pressed to abandon those very traditions which once, in the days of our Nation's infancy, made us unique and beloved. Yet if we will look closely we will see that people have been choosing the muddy water of Communism only because they are so thirsty for change. We ourselves have been dangerously tardy in helping them to the clear water of freedom.

Our purpose must once more become what in our greatest moments it has always been, the affirmative task of achieving a democratic world and safeguarding for "every man, woman and child on this earth the possibility of security and well-being."

Behind the crucially important advance lines of our military defense against Communism, and regardless of what Moscow does or fails to do, we must develop a world program which meets the age-old problems of Class and War. When the capitals of the Atlantic nations again offer such a program, their principles will once more become what they were for six centuries—the freeman's wave of the future.

CHAPTER 35

The Uses and Limits of Economic Aid

TODAY inside the City of the Poor the issues of War and Class are underscored by the universal demand for rapid economic progress. Its achievement has become essential to political stability. Thus a world-wide assault on this aspect of the problem of Class is now an integral part of the solution of the problem of War.

At Bandung we saw that on this subject every government in Asia, Africa and South America today is on trial. In the next few years these governments must demonstrate to their people that they can provide not only progress toward political freedom for each individual, but also steady and even spectacular economic growth. Those which fail this test, however honest and anti-Communist, may eventually go under.

Under the best of circumstances, success will not be easy. Demands for higher living standards, for more food, for freedom from disease, for schools and roads, for the damming of rivers to provide irrigation and hydroelectric power, for the expansion of railroads and communications, are catapulting ahead in geometrical progression. Progress in meeting these demands has been arithmetical at best. Although this gap can never be fully closed, it is imperative that a greater effort be made to narrow it.

The obstacles in the way of more rapid progress are great, and one of the most stubborn is lack of capital resources. Whether the country is rich or poor, whether the economy is capitalist, Commu-

nist or Socialist, capital accumulated through savings is the essential motive force which determines the speed with which industry can be expanded and living standards raised.

Today every underdeveloped nation is struggling with the question: Where can the savings be found to push forward development at a pace that will satisfy the impatient people? If a democratic government like India, Burma, the Philippines or Japan piles the taxes too high, it will face defeat at the polls. Yet if it fails to match the progress of the Communist nations such as China, it may be swept aside in revolutionary upheaval.

Economic development has always been a painful process. It was painful in our own country and in England. It has been far more painful in Russia and China, and in the case of China, the pains may soon enter an even more acute stage. We could not eliminate this painful process for the non-Communist underdeveloped countries no matter how much we would like to. Even if we could provide enough money to meet all their capital demands, the difficult adjustment of values and changing social and political patterns would still remain.

We can, however, help those non-Communist nations to ease the pain that goes with growth, and keep it from becoming intolerable. We should begin by recognizing the fact that the methods by which free nations can accumulate capital for development are much more limited today than they were when we were building our own country.

We have seen that the growing American economy in the nineteenth century had certain important assets: (1) very low wages which allowed massive profits, which in turn meant ample savings for investment and expansion; (2) foreign loans which we paid off during the First World War to our European creditors by selling them the military equipment necessary to support their defense of our common civilization; (3) very low-priced raw materials from underdeveloped countries in South America and elsewhere; (4) the unique resources of our own frontier.

Two decades ago, the United States was dedicated to the policy of the Good Neighbor in our relations with the great peoples south of our border who should be our closest friends. Yet today the serious problems of Guatemala are symbolic of many others in Central and South America, and suggest that we have been too con-

cerned with the superficial aspects of friendship, and not enough with the substantive policies that make friendship endure. Freed from a Communist-oriented government, the Guatemalans in many ways have since had a discouraging experience in trying to meet the age-old, pressing, economic problems which produced Communism in their country in the first place.

Britain, in addition to the economic advantage of her colonies, shared with Japan another favorable factor: widespread world trade based on a large and profitable merchant marine which swelled the coffers of domestic prosperity.

Even with all these advantages, the industrialized countries of the nineteenth century built their economies gradually. The industrially underdeveloped countries which are now trying to keep out of the Communist orbit are in a much greater hurry. The political pressures behind them are insistent.

Their governments are also pressed with well-organized demands for higher wages. Outside capital on a major scale, either by loans or grants, is hard to get, and they have no colonies to exploit. Even with the help of heavy taxes they are unable to accumulate the capital savings required to meet the growing political demands for progress.

But why must America provide so much of the necessary assistance? There are many reasons, all of which should be evident from what we have said thus far, and any one or combination of which should be sufficient for a thoughtful citizen of our Republic. Let me summarize them briefly.

Because only as people feel a sense of progress can they develop the indigenous strength and conviction which will inspire them to fight if need be for their own, not our, freedom.

Because the people of the industrially underdeveloped world are hungry for progress, and because when progress is too long delayed they become an easy prey for demagogues.

Because the world is watching with fascination the great economic competition between democratic India and totalitarian China to see which will accomplish the most in the shortest time.

Because our world is becoming constantly smaller and more inter-related and we cannot survive in prosperous isolation, an envied mansion in the midst of a world slum.

Because if the Cold War continues to relax, the competition

between the Communist way of economic development and the democratic way will be intensified and Moscow will have more resources to throw into the conflict.

Because with half of all of the world's industrial production we alone are in a position to render adequate assistance to the non-Communist underdeveloped nations.

Let me add that the idea of economic assistance to people less fortunate than ourselves is far more acceptable throughout grass-roots America than many of our Washington leaders seem able or willing to realize. Anyone who has traveled widely through our country knows how easily this simple concept can be translated with popular approval into positive action. It lies at the very core of the Christian ethic—the brotherhood of man—which prompts the behavior of most Americans in their family and neighborhood and community relationships, and thus it is one of the easiest of all principles for most Americans to understand.

These reasons for the development of an adequate foreign aid program seem to me persuasive. But let me also suggest some common arguments, which I believe should be rejected as invalid and some others which must be accepted as qualifications.

Contrary to the assumptions of some diplomatic and military strategists, foreign aid will not enable us to purchase allies and friends. We can no more buy the loyalty of a free people than we can buy the loyalty of a free individual.

Nor will foreign aid even assure us the gratitude of destitute people in Asia, Africa, or South America. Gratitude like loyalty is not for sale. If we petulantly seek gratitude, we shall assuredly be disappointed.

Neither should the extent of the Communist danger necessarily guide us in our aid appropriations. Must a nation be shot full of Communism before its people are entitled to our help? Are countries without Communists to be crossed off our list regardless of their needs? It would be strange indeed to put such a premium on noisy Communist minorities.

We have also seen that merely filling people's bellies, ridding them of malaria, and teaching them to read and write, is not sufficient in itself to turn them into anti-Communists. Indeed awareness of blatant economic injustice is often a more explosive factor than sheer want. As I suggested in a previous chapter, Asian revo-

lutions are more often led, not by hungry peasants, but by frustrated middle-class intellectuals.

The misery of the billion or more people who rarely get enough to eat must steadily be eased. But the method by which progress is made is as important as progress itself. Unless people develop a sense of participation in their own betterment, a spiritual sense of belonging within their own communities and within a secure society, economic growth may bring more rather than less unrest. Progress cannot be made from the top down. It must grow from the bottom up, largely through the efforts of people determined to help themselves.

Nor will foreign aid, no matter how generous, enable us successfully and permanently to bolster corrupt or feudal governments. Not only will our appropriations often be wasted, but we will lose the support of the promising, young, indigenous, democratic leadership in the process. We cannot save any nation that is not determined to save itself and willing to make substantial sacrifices in the process. Next to colonialism, feudalism is the Communist's most dependable ally.

By recognizing these qualifications carefully, we will find it easier to face up to the legitimate and urgent reasons for foreign aid, and we will at the same time save ourselves many frustrations, irritations and disappointments.

* * *

IN seeking the establishment of growing areas of goodwill, stability and understanding behind our strategic defense line, we must also be careful not to identify "stability" with the political *status quo*. Like riding a bicycle, political stability in revolutionary Asia and Africa can only be achieved by forward movement.

In planning our aid we should therefore make a clear distinction between our opportunities in such places as Vietnam and South Korea, which have been operating under the guns of direct Communist military pressure, and the broader policy opportunities which are open to us in such countries as India, Burma, Pakistan, Japan, Indonesia, and certain parts of Africa.

In the first case, we are shoring up countries which, without our help would probably go under almost immediately. The immediate purpose of our policy is to deny territory to the Communist bloc.

Such holding operations, unfortunately, have accounted for the great bulk of our foreign aid budget. Essential though they are, they only enable us to avoid slipping backward. In order to advance we must face up to the broader, positive opportunities to help build more permanent areas of strength.

Our major peacetime economic investments should go to help those key countries which have the capacity to develop their own resources, their own free governments, their own sense of progress, their own sense of participation, their own sense of belonging to a free world community. As such nations gain confidence they may often disagree with us, and often in our more discouraged moods their criticisms will seem to grow in proportion to the gains they have made.

Nevertheless, we must be mature enough to welcome their progress and to realize that it is the very cockiness which comes from their growing indigenous strength which makes them impervious to Communism or any other outside force. This is a formidable task materially, politically and psychologically.

But the alternative is clear. If the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and the Middle East are not able to work out a close economic association with the world's foremost industrial power, they will move sooner or later into a close economic relation with the world's second industrial power. And in Asia, as elsewhere, politics usually follows economics.

Persuasive Russian trade representatives are already peddling their wares throughout Europe and Asia. A sizable Soviet Point Four Program is being developed in Afghanistan.

When I was in India in March, 1955, negotiations were under way for a million-ton steel mill to be built with a Soviet loan on easy terms. The Indians' request for similar help had previously been rejected by us. Plans called for some three hundred Indians to go to Moscow for training and to work on the plans. "That means," said the now tactful Russians to the Indians, "that the mill will be really built and planned by you."

In June, 1955, Premier Bulganin pointedly complimented Nehru

on India's development program during their public speeches in Moscow. I would be surprised if further Soviet aid based on technical assistance and favorable loans did not follow.

The political implications of this developing phase of Soviet policy are of profound importance. For 180 years the people of Asia, Africa and South America have looked at America not only as the stronghold of democratic freedom and individual opportunity but as a dynamic example of the power of free institutions to soften economic injustice and to create an expanding society.

In the coming years as part of their "new look," we must assume that the Soviet will offer extremely persuasive proof to the underdeveloped, uncommitted world that under Communism the economic pace, at least, can be spectacular, and that Russia stands ready to help those nations which will accept her help. Although the political price of Soviet beneficence may be high, it would be folly to discount the skill with which it will be presented or its attraction for newly independent people desperate for progress.

* * *

WE have already discovered that the complex problems of economic development are interrelated. For instance, lower American tariffs and increased trade would help greatly to reduce the amount of direct foreign aid that the Middle World requires for its essential economic progress. The underdeveloped nations should pay for that progress as far as possible, and with few exceptions they would prefer it that way.

But there are only two ways that they can get dollars: First, they can earn them by selling us things which we need, and spend the proceeds on American-made machinery, equipment, and bulldozers which they need, and on the hiring of American technicians. Second, they can get the dollars they need for these purchases through American grants and loans.

Thus the easier we make it for other nations to sell part of their production to us, the fewer grants and loans they will require from us. Moreover the higher their living standards rise, the more goods they will be able to buy from American manufacturers.

The question of tariff policy is one that affects critically, not only

the underdeveloped countries, but developed nations like Japan. The Japanese Government is desperately seeking the trading outlets which a modern, industrial island nation needs to survive. Memories of the pre-war Chinese market for Japanese goods remains vivid in Japan, as I discovered repeatedly in talks with Japanese businessmen in Tokyo. Unless American policy can supply an effective alternative, trade among China, Russia and Japan will grow in the coming years. With it may come other important economic and strategic ties, and new pressures toward neutralism.

Since the end of the war we have subsidized the Japanese economy on a large scale, first directly with dollar grants, and more recently indirectly by such means as payments for services to American troops based there. At best these expedients are shaky.

Another alternative is to allow major tariff concessions to Japanese products in American and other Western markets, so that Japan can earn the dollars she needs by selling to us. The efforts to negotiate a reciprocal trade agreement with Japan represents a step in that direction, but progress is bound to be slow.

The reason why it is slow is evident to anyone with a speaking acquaintance with American political life. As Governor of a state, I saw at first hand the formidable domestic pressures that can develop in opposition to lower tariffs. The serious dislocations which may occur in certain communities because of abrupt tariff changes can be ignored by Senators and Congressmen only at considerable peril to their political futures. To them the argument that the increased foreign purchases made possible by a more liberal trade policy will strengthen our own economy is usually unconvincing. Such gains, they point out, always seem to occur in someone else's state or district.

The world problem nevertheless remains, and in one way or another we must ultimately face it. If it is politically impossible for us to permit other nations to sell us enough to earn their essential dollars, then we must provide them with the dollars through some form of subsidy.

We should frankly recognize this, however, as a *double* subsidy. The American people as consumers are first forced to pay a higher price for the American equivalent of the goods which they might buy more cheaply from a foreign manufacturer. Then because we have prevented the foreign exporter from earning dollars here, the

American people as taxpayers must bail his government out of its resulting economic difficulties.

Private investment in the underdeveloped countries is an appealing alternative. But the fact is that it hasn't happened on the scale that is necessary. Since the war, private investment in the United States has averaged \$46 billion annually. During this same period our total overseas investment was only \$1 billion annually. Most of this was in Europe and Canada, and it came largely from profits earned in those countries by American corporations.

If we eliminate American oil expansion in South America and Saudi Arabia, American private investment in the underdeveloped nations totals scarcely \$1 billion in the entire ten-year period.

There are valid and understandable reasons for this meager flow of capital. Political as well as economic conditions in most underdeveloped nations are uncertain. Often there has been unreasoning prejudice against foreign investors based on colonial experience. In some cases tax laws make it difficult to take out a reasonable share of the profits once they are made. There are often nagging bureaucratic difficulties in day-to-day operation.

Our own government should offer every practicable encouragement to American firms interested in expanding their investments overseas, particularly in Asia, South America and Africa where the capital needs are so great. The proposal has been made that our Federal corporation tax on profits earned overseas be reduced by 14 per cent and that this tax should be collected only when the profits are brought to this country. Why not increase this tax break to 25 per cent or even 50 per cent to help get more American capital flowing abroad?

But even under ideal conditions the total investment that is required would be too great for private capital and the profit opportunities too limited and uncertain. Such basic primary needs as increased electric power, adequate port facilities, more efficient railroads and improved communications must largely be created with government funds. Only after these foundations have been built can we expect really inviting opportunities for private investment to be opened up.

These foundations are essential for any country's transition to sustained economic growth. As the transition is made, the need for outside assistance will subside. But meanwhile we must come to

grips with the fact that in most underdeveloped nations, direct governmental loans and grants on a substantial scale are essential for an adequate rate of progress.

This in turn means public funds from this country and its principal European allies, committed in advance over a period of years. The need for such funds, and the difficulties which would grow out of our refusal to provide them, will increase significantly as development plans take hold and these nations are able to absorb capital investments more rapidly.

Under no circumstances can the total amount of money required be more than a small fraction of the American defense budgets of recent years. At the same time, the sums needed are considerably in advance of any proposals that have been seriously made by any administration, either Democratic or Republican, since the dramatic announcement of the Point Four concept by President Truman in January, 1949.

* * *

EVEN with increased expenditures, how can we make sure that our funds are employed where most effective? Between 1951 and 1955 I have had a valuable opportunity to study the operation of our own economic programs and those of the United Nations and the Colombo Plan, in all countries of non-Communist Asia and in much of Africa. Some conclusions about the essentials of sound development activity seem to me very clear.

Of first importance is a comprehensive over-all development plan for the particular country, carefully related to its needs and resources, and fitting the individual projects into the general program. Without such a plan, individual projects are likely to be ill-conceived, badly timed, too costly, and often unproductive.

An effective development plan must start with two essential features before it tackles the more ambitious problems of industrial development. *First*, it must provide for the full mobilization of the country's own economic resources. This means, principally, that the tax system must be equitable and strenuously enforced. It requires controls on foreign exchange expenditures so that fertilizer and bulldozers will receive priority over French perfume and custom-

built sport cars. It means reasonable emphasis on the development of natural resources which can earn foreign exchange.

Second, a good development plan must include measures which will result in an early, clearly recognizable improvement in the standard of living of the people of the country. Rapid and often drastic land reforms are essential in every country where serious land tenure problems prevail. Emphasis on health and education programs, especially if geared into a broad village-to-village community development effort such as India's, are also effective means for touching the people with the new benefits of development.

Only by such efforts can the enthusiasm and energy of the people be released and turned into constructive channels rather than into impatience, violence and despair. Yet this presents American policy makers with an important dilemma. How can we assure the essential conditions for sound economic development without interfering in the domestic affairs of the assisted nation to an extent which is distasteful to us, and which will lay us open to charges of imperialism, domination and bad faith from those who suspect our motives?

This dilemma is not so sharp as it may seem at first glance. As we saw at Bandung most of the leaders of the underdeveloped countries are anxious to achieve balanced and wholesome development in the sense we have just discussed. There already is a good deal of expert knowledge on how this must be done—in the UN and its agencies, in the Colombo Plan, in the internal experience of the underdeveloped countries themselves, in our own Point Four files, and in the studies of a number of private agencies which have been active in the development field.

The underdeveloped countries have generally shown themselves eager to take advantage of this accumulated information and experience. Thus the general direction being taken by many of the underdeveloped countries is often the one which a sound American policy ought to encourage. There are of course a number of glaring exceptions.

This task of influencing foreign development without dominating foreign politics will require from us not only capital, but highly trained, sensitive people both in Washington and in foreign assignments. Although we have a number of well-qualified people in these positions now, too little thought has been given to the need for systematic recruiting and training.

Frequently, individuals who may be technically well trained arrive on the scene with little understanding of the language, customs, history and tradition of the people with whom they are to work. We must actively seek to recruit able, dedicated personnel—Americans and others—who are enthusiastic about the prospects of development work in the particular country where they will be stationed.

A special government or foundation supported school, attached to a major American university, could do much to prepare people for foreign assignments. Here men and women who are attracted by this exciting new frontier career could receive both the technical training they need in agriculture, health, education, sanitation, industrial development and engineering, and also the broader economic, political and cultural backgrounds which are essential to the success of their mission. For many reasons, such a school should not neglect the wives.

Another important way in which the United States can successfully influence development without evoking hostility and resentment is through the activities of private industrial, religious and charitable groups. Many of these, like the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations have already made valuable contributions in many parts of the underdeveloped world.

In India under the outstanding leadership of Douglas Ensminger, the Ford Foundation has played a particularly important role. I know that high officials of the Indian Government agree that its contributions to village development, small industries and education have been invaluable. The importance of the Rockefeller Foundation's efforts in the field of public health has been widely acknowledged.

The United Nations specialized agencies also have a big role to play—the Children's Fund, UNESCO, World Health Organization, Food and Agricultural Organization, International Labor Office and the UN Technical Assistance Administration deserve our continuing support. In many countries aid under UN auspices is enthusiastically accepted while bilateral aid is still viewed with suspicion. Though their funds have been pitifully small, the work of the UN agencies has won wide respect and confidence among the world's underdeveloped peoples.

In the debates on making UN development projects even more effective, America, unhappily, has at times assumed a negative role.

These debates have revolved around two proposals, stoutly supported by all the underdeveloped countries as well as by most of the experts who have been closest to the requirements.

These are, first, the creation of a Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development, SUNFED, which would be used for financing needed capital projects in the underdeveloped countries on a grant basis, and second, increased and liberalized lending authority either in the World Bank or a special Development Bank to support projects from which repayment would be expected.

The capital involved in these proposals totaled about \$350 million, about half of which would have been subscribed by the United States. In 1954 we modified our position on the second proposal, but we have maintained a consistent coolness to SUNFED.

The use of UN machinery takes on new significance in Africa, for there the responsibility of the international organization through the Trusteeship Council extends in more or less direct form to much of the continent. Here is an unmatched opportunity for giving the United Nations tasks of a scope and responsibility commensurate with the high hopes which were entertained for it.

As a consistent friend and supporter of the United Nations, however, let me add that some of the specialized agencies' have a long distance to travel before they are prepared adequately to meet their full responsibilities. Overlapping authority, petty jealousies and rampant bureaucracy have on many occasions stood in the way of effective administration.

In all of its economic and social efforts a well-managed United Nations can perform an invaluable service in reassuring the City of the Poor that the vexing problems of Class can be met by co-operative and democratic methods. Economic development, let me emphasize again, must always be pursued in such way that at the end we shall have not just another age of healthier, contending, national states but viable fledgling democracies, linked together with common ties of economic interest.

The increased pursuit of this challenging task could give flesh and blood and muscles to the United Nations. Through such means it could be made the organ of our common hopes. By helping to channel the various national assaults on Class, the UN would come to its own aid in the simultaneous assault on War. The two problems are tied together, and in the end they may stand or fall together too.

Even more specialized international groups than the UN have important advantages as channels for the distribution of American economic aid. Experience with the Marshall Plan has demonstrated that regional bodies, on which the assisted nations are effectively represented, can, if given our full support, become exacting overseers of the programs of the constituent countries.

In the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, a permanent staff reviewed all the activities to which Marshall Plan funds were committed. Annual meetings analyzed reports on general economic progress, laid out requirements for future programs, and insisted on high standards of administration and follow-through.

A comparable body for Asia exists in the Colombo Plan organization, originally made up of British Commonwealth nations, but since extended to include every non-Communist country east of the Indian Ocean. The United States has been accepted into membership, and in a formal sense co-ordinates its technical and economic assistance activities in the region with the organization.

Yet the link has been more verbal than real. In practice we have given the Colombo Plan no significant responsibility in the allocation or review of American development expenditures.

The Organization of American States provides a similar opportunity for regional administration of Latin-American economic development funds. Here again progress has been stymied by the consistent United States refusal to consider significant expansion of its economic efforts in the hemisphere.

The closer we can come to developing broader responsibility for economic aid the more effective our efforts will be. However, in one way or another the challenge must be met on a sizable scale, and over a period of years. If it is politically impossible at this stage to administer assistance primarily through such international agencies, let us at least use our Export-Import Bank which in 1955 had more than \$2 billion of authorized idle capital.

* * *

ENOUGH has been said to indicate the breadth and variety of ways in which America, the world's foremost industrial nation, can help to meet the economic challenge of our day. Our

survey of world revolutions has shown us that among awakening peoples in many lands the old economic order has long since lost its romantic appeal, and is now rapidly losing its roots. For most of these people, America at one time or another in their recent history has been an ideal of economic opportunity which they have admired and sought to emulate.

The basic philosophy of government held, however tentatively, by people in most of these underdeveloped areas is still oriented toward democracy and the West. If the Communist alternative eventually wins, it will be because the methods and procedures of America and the Atlantic nations have been rejected as inadequate to the central business of development that these countries now demand.

Some good starts have been made, and it would be calamitous for us to falter in mid-passage. America alone has the resources and capacity, the techniques and skills to provide that critical margin of economic help which in the long run may spell success or failure for the hundreds of millions of people around the world who are striving to achieve or to maintain their freedom.

But economics like defense is only one of the dimensions of peace. A competent diplomacy that recognizes the political realities of our age is another.

CHAPTER 36

The Politics of Peace

AS the post-Stalinist thaw in Soviet diplomacy becomes evident, the inadequacy of America's concentration on military answers has come sharply into focus. It is also obvious that even a vastly stepped-up economic aid program, essential though it is, will not alone redress this inadequacy. In 1955 Moscow and even Peking seemed to be heavily shifting their emphasis from a reliance on heavy-handed Cold War bluster to winning people through ideas—propaganda, promises, slogans and amiable diplomatic behavior.

Moreover, the importance of this new emphasis was underscored by what looked like a drastic shift in Moscow's immediate diplomatic objectives. One of the two superpowers of the bipolar American-Russian world seemed to be systematically setting out to depolarize world politics.

The new Soviet leadership appeared to be considering the reduction of Russia's sphere of domination in return for the broadest possible help of neutralized buffer states on the borders of the USSR, for normalized relations with former enemies like Germany and Japan, and for the predictable goodwill from abroad which would flow from a less ferocious Soviet diplomatic posture.

For reasons that we have already examined, this switch in Soviet policies may reflect many political and economic factors without necessarily adding up to a fundamental change in Soviet motives or intentions. "The policy and practice of the Russian Government," said Lord Palmerston a century ago, "have always been to push

forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it met with decided resistance."

If a careful testing period demonstrates, however, that Soviet policy for whatever reasons really wants to liquidate the Cold War, American policy would be foolhardy to try to keep it going. We did not start it. We have never wanted it. If by any chance a practical settlement on specific issues can now be made, we should assuredly not be the ones to prevent it. If the paraphernalia of the Cold War can gradually be dismantled, so much the better for the world and for our principles—even though the switch may put those principles to a tougher test in the dynamic coexistence that will then inevitably ensue.

If war is the extension of diplomacy by other means, and if the liquidation of wars, both hot and cold, is now the first item on the diplomatic agenda, we need to set out some guideposts for our diplomacy itself. For despite the essential military and economic aspects of our foreign policy, diplomacy remains at the core of the conduct of foreign relations. Its usages and practices are still the ways in which difficulties and tensions among nations are resolved, short of war.

Agenda for Diplomacy

The United States lacks the advantage of the diplomatic tradition which has accumulated around the British Foreign Office. In any event, it is unlikely that our free-for-all democratic tradition would tolerate such extensive and autonomous activity by a professional elite. To a greater degree than in England, American diplomacy is in the public domain.

Faced with that fact, a first requirement of our diplomacy—as of all our international efforts—must be a clear understanding of our objectives. These objectives must be feasible. Although they must endeavor to command the support of a sizable majority of Americans, they must be more than an undigested compromise of our many diverse preconceptions and prejudgments. They must be grounded in a combination of intelligent leadership and democratic discussion.

As Communist tactics become more flexible, we need all the more to re-examine and clarify our objectives in regard to world

Communism Obviously we do not like it, and we would prefer to see it disappear. Yet as we have seen, deliberately to set out to destroy it by force would call for aggressive military measures which the vast majority of Americans rightly reject.

Ultimately we must face up to the plain but vexing question on what basis are we prepared to live in peace with the Soviet Union and Communist China?

America has been coexisting with dictatorships throughout its history. Although Czarist Russia was a notorious autocracy, it was often on friendly terms with the United States. Many of the South American nations that vote most enthusiastically with us in the United Nations are dictatorships, as are several of our allies including Spain, Portugal, Thailand, Formosa and South Korea.

This suggests that it is not dictatorship as such which threatens us, much as we may disapprove of it, but a totalitarianism which seeks to extend its control over its neighbors by overt aggression or subversion.

Communist doctrine, as we have seen, insists that the struggle between the Communist and democratic worlds is never-ending and that eventually it must end in the destruction of one or the other. On various occasions Soviet leaders have maintained that the "inevitable" collapse of the capitalistic world must eventually come through an armed struggle. At other times they have taken the more moderate view that since it is part of the inevitable process in accordance with the law of "it is" it will happen in due time anyway, and there is no particular need to help history along.

If our strategic line against Communist military aggression is firmly held over a period of years, if the two thirds of the world which is not Communist is gradually drawn together in a broad area of economic and political co-operation, and if the rate and manner of progress is such as to discourage internal subversion, then a new generation of Communist leaders may decide to accommodate theory to facts. They have done it before.

In the meantime we can expect to see many diplomatic variations among the themes of Communist foreign policy, in a world eager for detachment from nuclear Cold War politics. In the new climate that surrounded the Geneva Conference these variations have already enabled the world to breathe more easily and relax from the immediate fear of war.

What contribution can American diplomacy make to bring us closer to a more stable world if time demonstrates convincingly that the Soviet is serious in its new attitudes? At a minimum we must systematically clarify in our own minds an acceptable basis for settlement, the calculated risks we can justifiably take, and the positive responses we can responsibly make to test Soviet intentions and to produce, where possible, honest and mutual agreement. One thing at least is certain. A policy of unconditional surrender can be as costly to our efforts to ease the tensions of the Cold War as it was to our effort to end World War II.

As American and Russian diplomacy enter an era of "competitive coexistence," each will be competing for the attention and sympathy of the great jury of the uncommitted world. That jury will be making constant assessments of our motives, based on the net impression made by our diplomatic behavior.

If we are tempted to strike poses for domestic political consumption at the risk of alienating world opinion, let us remember the sage advice that the British statesman, Castlereagh, once gave to Lord Liverpool in the days of the Congress of Vienna: "Our business is not to collect trophies, but to bring back the world to peaceful habits."

If we are tempted to sound an arrogant note at international forums, let us remember also that another British diplomat once pointed out in a different but relevant context that diplomacy consists of knowing clearly what you want, knowing what your opposite number wants, and then expressing what you want in terms of what he wants.

One of America's essential diplomatic tasks has now become one of harmonizing our approach and our interpretations as far as possible with those of other non-Communist nations. In recent years our record in this regard has not been high. A fundamental concept of American diplomacy must be by advance consultation to associate all other non-Communist nations with our diplomatic efforts, however informally. If the Soviet Union or Communist China then stands in the way, the rebuffs will not be isolated ones for us to suffer alone. Our failure to achieve mutually agreed-upon objectives then becomes the associated failure of the entire free world.

This in turn means that the objectives which we seek must be stated in terms which appear feasible and reasonable to a wide range

of objective persons. They should not be presented in a manner obviously designed to embarrass the Soviet Union or Communist China, but in a manner designed to make consent and compromise easier and to free the Communist leaders, where possible, from their own captivity in "double-think" psychology which so long has led them to talk as though peace and world Communist dominion were consistent objectives. We can help clarify Communist policy by making our own more explicit and broadly based.

Our major proposals should be carefully discussed, not only with our allies, but to the maximum possible extent with those key nations who are attempting to remain aloof from the present struggle. The process of negotiations can never be precisely forecast and much will depend on the abilities, personalities and sensitiveness of those who are responsible for the development of policy and for its implementation.

* * *

AN essential objective of American diplomacy during the new period of Soviet flexibility will be the maintenance of our European alliances under new Russian pressure. These alliances were built at great cost, and they are worth maintaining at considerable further cost. Consequently we must pay particular attention to the points of difference and irritation between America and other nations of the North Atlantic basin.

Examples from Europe which illustrate the materials for Allied dissension upon which the Kremlin may hope to capitalize would surely include the following:

1. Our NATO allies share a terribly exposed position in the age of thermonuclear weapons. Their very geographical position dictates a prime objective of their diplomacy. It is an objective which many of them feel America's less exposed position has permitted us sometimes to forget: the primary importance of relaxing tensions in world affairs.

2. The foreign ministries of Europe, accustomed to the steady, undramatic methods of secret diplomacy and professionalism in the conduct of foreign policy, have been ready to reel over the unpredictable fluctuations of American policy, our devotion to slogans, and the unilateral release of documents like the Yalta papers.

3. Such influences as McCarthyism and the crude application of the McCarran Act have dangerously distorted the American image in the press of many European as well as Asian capitals—so far that American popularity itself at times has seemed to be inversely dependent on such uncertainties as their fluctuating degrees of friendliness and animosity toward Mao's China.

4. Many Europeans and non-Communist Asians think that in recent years London, in contrast to Washington, has brought to the making of high policy a calm objectivity and a willingness to face facts. More and more they have been looking to Britain for leadership, and Prime Minister Eden's international rescue work as Foreign Secretary during the crises over Indochina and EDC did nothing to diminish the reputation of British diplomacy. Its quiet self-assurance has retained for the Foreign Office the mingled confidence and jealousy of most foreign observers. At Geneva in July, 1955, President Eisenhower started to redress the balance.

•5. "The Europeans incline to view the UN as a forum for compromising conflicting interests, while we at times seem to view it exclusively as an instrument to oppose aggression. These variations are obviously reflected in contrasting attitudes on the admission of Red China and other nations still seeking UN membership.

These points of difference are suggestive of the tasks confronting American diplomacy in its effort to build positive structures of peace and progress behind our strategic frontier.

Domestic pressures in Western Europe will also increasingly tend to obscure Allied politics as Soviet pressure relaxes.

The Germans face an uncharted future once Adenauer leaves the chancellorship. Their perpetual political problem of energetic instability remains unsettled, and the dangerous question of a partitioned Germany in the heart of Europe cannot stay forever unresolved.

A mutually acceptable arrangement must also be struck, satisfactory to all NATO allies, which will allow increased capital investments in the essential modernization of the French and Italian economies. For the citizens of these two countries in a period that suggests a change from Cold War to a Cold Peace, domestic economic problems may increasingly tend to displace the priorities of foreign policy. The critical housing problem in metropolitan France

will permit no further governmental indifference. Redistribution of land in southern Italy is a political problem that demands vigorous attention without further delay.

Under domestic pressures of this sort and in the face of a diminishing Cold War threat, America may expect demonstrations of European uneasiness over the economic costs of defense. Critics will say that while the resources of their country are siphoned in a seemingly endless and less urgently needed military program, the dangers of Communist led social discontent at home will become more and more serious.

To the extent that they boldly advocate the economic and social reforms which in much of Europe have been too long delayed, European governments will have a persuasive case. Many astute observers believe that the one thing required to bring about the ultimate collapse of the Communist parties in Western Europe is a competent, genuine, left-of-center effort to achieve a more reasonable distribution of the fruits of production.

American diplomacy must anticipate these new measures, and cushion them wherever possible by encouraging the gradual integration of Europe, politically and economically and by associating ourselves imaginatively and constructively with that integration whenever and however that seems appropriate. The breadth and vision of its Charter permits NATO itself to reflect the shifting political pressures as the military danger lessens.

Europe, America and Colonialism

No one would deny Europe the right to be preoccupied with her own problems. Resolving them has almost as great a priority for America as for Europe itself. But it cannot be stressed too often that the world revolution is pressing in upon us all and it affects European policies internally and externally just as it affects our own.

The revolution is reflected internally in all the manifold—and often unsatisfied—demands that the less privileged people of Europe have themselves been making upon their governments since the war.

It is reflected externally in the complicated adjustment which Europe's vested interest in the outside world has had to make, or has failed to make, in response to the decay of colonialism. In the

context of our efforts to maintain the Grand Alliance, the European attitude on colonialism presents another problem of the first order for American diplomacy.

We have already emphasized the relevance of the American Revolutionary tradition to our standing in the colonial world. Carlos Romulo stated the challenge bluntly: "America, child of revolution, seeing its revolutionary inheritance handed on to Asia, cannot see it lost by default to Soviet Russia.

"To get closer to the heart of Asia," he continued, "America must use its own heart more. The peoples of Asia will respond with understanding and sympathy to the freedom-loving, the generous-hearted, the deeply humane America of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. On the other hand nothing will more surely repel them than an America that carelessly allows its escutcheon to be blemished by the sins of its European allies."

We should not forget, of course, that the leading colonial powers—France and Britain—have fathered, no less than America has, the revolution now sweeping the Southern continents.

"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" was the historic slogan of French Revolutionary origin, and so strongly has it been identified with the nation of its birth that men everywhere have known what Jefferson meant when he remarked, "Every man has two countries, his own and France."

At a time when French colonial policies often seem tragically inept and decadent, it is still pertinent to remind ourselves that France was once the central inspiration for world revolt. When foreigners were invited to appear before the French Constituent Assembly, a Prussian named Anacharsis Cloots, introduced as the "Spokesman of the human race," said passionately, "When I lift my eyes to a map of the world, it seems to me that all the other countries have disappeared, and I see only France, regenerator of peoples."

If France seems to have neglected her heritage somewhere in the bankrupt colonialism of Indochina and North Africa, the French tradition can still be found today as an ironic inspiration on the revolutionary bookshelves of Saigon and Casablanca. And despite the discouraging aspects of French colonial policy, let us always remember that racism is a blight of which Frenchmen have never been accused.

Less dramatic than the French Revolutionary heritage, but far more steady, has been the gradual identification of English political practice too with the hopes of the new world revolution.

If Americans are proud of their own model colonial revolt against England, they should remember that they were "never more English" than when they shook England's soil from their feet, "angrily writing out their protest" so that all the world could see—or when they raised the old cry of Hampden, "No taxation without representation," and when they dumped the tea in Boston Harbor.

Among the achievements of British democracy is that unique aspect of current world affairs found in the freely expanding "Commonwealth," whose very name was taken from Cromwell's earlier revolutionary chapter in English history. This recent advance in British political thinking has been reflected in the application of Britain's democratic principles in her own "creative abdication" from South Asia, the Sudan and the Gold Coast.

Enough has been said of the frequent tact and wisdom of postwar British policy to make it clear that the colonial issue is not reducible to a simple question of a righteous revolt against an obstinate imperial power. The transition from empire to commonwealth is not only a policy of decent withdrawal when the time has come, but one of affirmative consultation and co-operation.

Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the attention the British Foreign Office gives to the views of the South Asian members of the Commonwealth, and in the splendid joint economic effort of the Colombo Plan. We should recognize of course that this situation involves an adjustment to a new status for the colonial power, just as it does for the ex-colony.

Nevertheless the pace for the colonial liquidation, which inevitably lies ahead, will not be set in Europe. We have seen that the whole might of France, supported lavishly by American assistance, was insufficient to maintain its postwar grip on Indochina, that the Netherlands found her struggle to hold the rich East Indies a losing proposition, and that Britain avoided a series of bloody civil wars only by the dignity and skill with which she extricated herself from India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma.

The remaining colonial areas pose a challenge to American policy makers which must be met but which has not yet been met. To visiting Americans, accustomed at home during political campaigns

to hear about the "liberation" of satellite peoples, the African sometimes asks bitterly, "Why not begin with me?"

In Asia, too, I have heard men say: "If you Americans seek to liberate the nations dominated by Russia, the result may be war. But there are twice as many people waiting to be liberated from the Colonial domination of your NATO allies. Here there would be no risk of war," the refrain continued, "and your influence might well be decisive. Can it be that the dark-skinned Africans have less appeal to your liberating conscience than the white-skinned Poles?"

On the issue of colonialism, it is doubtful whether even the dramatic lesson of Indochina has been seriously absorbed. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations committee in May, 1955, I said that our good faith would not be accepted in Africa and Asia until we took a clear position on the subject of colonialism.

There were nods of general agreement, but one Senator spoke up to say: "Yes, but isn't this really an academic question? Europe is determined to hang on to her colonies and our own security system is bound to Europe and NATO. If we take an independent position in opposition to colonialism, our whole military security system will fall apart."

This suggests that unity on all questions has become an end in itself, and that we must willy-nilly accept the views of our colony-controlling allies even though this involves the abandonment of our principles on an issue where compromise, however well intended, has already cost the free world dearly.

If this were really required of us, the prospects for the future of Western civilization would be grim indeed. In the coming years the Soviet Union and Communist China would win the leadership of the City of the Poor by default. Toynbee's warning about the lethal effect on a civilization of the unresolved issue of Class would take on a dramatic significance.

But this also assumes something which no thoughtful American who understands and respects Europe's past achievements and potential power can readily accept: that neither Frenchmen nor Europeans in general are capable of reading the clear lessons of recent history.

One of the principal tasks of American diplomacy in the coming years is tactfully, reasonably, intelligently and understandingly to

ease the adjustment which clearly must be made by the colonial powers. Paradoxically, it is this very adjustment on which the future greatness of Europe itself so largely depends.

Many Europeans speak nostalgically of their past, assume that the present may be tolerable, but seem convinced that the future will be impossible. Yet it seems clear that Europe should have every reason, under certain circumstances, to look forward to the future with responsible new hope. Those circumstances may largely depend upon the direction of events in Africa, the next continent of revolution.

For instance, Belgium in her own right is a small power with eight million dynamic, competent people. But Belgium in partnership with the Congo, an area half the size of the United States and for all we know with half of our resources, may eventually emerge as a major power.

Here, however, is the vital point. Unless Belgium eventually goes into partnership with the twelve million Africans of the Congo, this role will be denied her. It will not always be enough to see that the Africans are well fed, well clothed, well paid and well cared for. Sooner or later they will demand the dignity that goes with equal political rights, and those demands must be met.

Many thoughtful Belgians understand this. On June 22, 1955, at the UN conference at San Francisco, Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, said, 'This conference has fully convinced me that the complete equality of all races with all of its natural consequences has become a reality. Any contemporary statesman who refuses to admit this will make many mistakes.'

Africa offers France a similar opportunity for an expanding creative partnership with the 25 million people and the rich resources of French West Africa, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

Surely it cannot be beyond the resources of European and American imagination to develop programs of action which take account of the complexities of the different colonial situations and yet represent an unmistakable commitment to early self-rule. We achieved this in the Philippines, and the British have done likewise in South Asia, and now in the Sudan and West Africa. If solutions of comparable goodwill and restraint cannot be developed elsewhere in the colonial world, only one thing is certain: instead of

the promise of India, Burma, Ceylon and the Philippines the Atlantic nations will eventually be faced with a worldwide catastrophe far more devastating in its implications than that of Indochina.

* * *

THE fact that our position occasionally differs from that of our Atlantic allies should be mutually understandable. We should not hesitate to disagree with them when after sober consideration we are confident that they are out of step with the realities of today's world. Our apparent readiness to accept their position in the past, however reluctant it may have been, has hurt us grievously in Asia, Africa and elsewhere.

What we Americans must do is emphatically and meaningfully to change our public image as seen by colonial peoples. We must seize the recurring opportunities to re-establish our anticolonial heritage. Our diplomatic behavior must demonstrate as tangibly as possible that we are honestly and seriously committed to the proposition on which our nation was created—that all people deserve democratic self-government as soon as they are reasonably qualified for it.

The policies we adopt should at the same time be totally responsible, tactful and in line with the realities of the conditions which exist in both Africa and Europe today. I would suggest that the pattern of our policies for Africa, the remaining colonial continent, should contain at least the following points:

1. Let us start with the fact that we do not control Africa, that we have no desire to control it and that there is a strict limit to what we can do there.

2. Without pompously lecturing our European friends on their colonial manners, or making a demagogic play for the applause of the African gallery, let us privately and publicly place our influence behind every orderly and responsible proposal that moves toward freedom.

3. For better or for worse, Africans themselves over the long haul will decide the pace toward self-government. However, if America convinces the Africans that we honestly favor their independence as rapidly as they can manage it, we shall be in a position to help

moderate the demands of those Africans who demand more authority than they are yet qualified to use

4 If the Gold Coast, Nigeria and the Sudan, like India, Pakistan, the Philippines and Burma develop as free nations in an orderly democratic way those who are honestly convinced that the African cannot govern himself in the foreseeable future will be forced to modify their views. Everything that America can do to help assure the success of these new, emerging free West African governments will serve this constructive end. This requires not only economic assistance from our government, but imaginative, tactful help from our private agencies, including foundations and churches.

5 For the same reason we should generously assist those African nations which are already free—Egypt, Libya, Ethiopia and Liberia. Their progress will help determine the pace for others.

6 Before agreeing to support any economic program in Africa we should scrutinize it carefully to see that it offers full opportunity to people of all races. If we identify ourselves even indirectly with lingering European colonial supremacy in Africa, or with racism in South Africa, our efforts will be self-defeating.

7 We should give Africa a far higher priority in State Department attention. Today we have only a handful of diplomatic missions in Africa. Although I was impressed in 1955 with the ability and earnestness of the personnel, most of them are overworked and responsible for areas well beyond their physical capacities.

8 State Department and United States Information Agency people should be instructed that the primary purpose of their work is to develop close understanding and working relationships with the Africans and not simply with the small European ruling group at the top. Our information effort in Africa should be stepped up materially and concentrated on reaching the Africans.

9 In the United States itself there are now sixteen million Americans of African descent. In both private and official capacities, we could have no better ambassadors to Africa than these sons of America who are also great-great-grandsons of Africa, as visiting lecturers, teachers, government employees and missionaries.

10 African studies should be given a much higher priority in American universities.

11 An African charter calling for the steady development of

political rights, first local, then regional, then national, should be encouraged with a timetable to suggest the pace of progress toward independence. When such a timetable was proposed in January, 1955, by a subcommittee of the United Nations Trusteeship Council that included an American member, the opposition from British, Belgian, Portuguese and French was prompt and outspoken.

This, however, is a situation which during the ensuing years we must have the courage to face. Within practical limits we should support the United Nations as an instrument for organizing, correlating and encouraging the growth in African progress toward ultimate freedom.

Implicit in our whole discussion of an African policy is the point that American diplomacy must now recognize that the sources of potential power in Africa lie with the Africans, not with their European rulers. In the long run the strategic peoples of this great continent will determine who shall have access to their strategic material. The same point bears emphasis throughout our total diplomatic effort.

The Poles of Power

In Europe we have long known that the key centers of people and industry were of primary value in orienting our own policy. We have waited and worked patiently until a European defense system embracing both France and West Germany could be achieved. We have seen that this same lesson must soon be applied in the totally different context of Africa.

In Asia we can no longer ignore the primary importance of this same basic principle. Although all of non-Communist Asia must be defended if need be and encouraged in its democratic development, the true poles of potential non-Communist power are India and Japan. Between them they have 455 million people, 20 per cent of the world's population. This is the only effective Asian manpower counterbalance to China's 582 million.

With 75 per cent of Asia's industrial output, millions of skilled and potentially skilled workers, and, in the case of India, ample natural resources, Japan and India constitute the only effective Asian industrial counterbalance to China. With her long religious and cultural heritage, dynamically brought to life in recent years by Gandhi,

India is by far the most significant Asian spiritual and ideological counterbalance to China.

These factors should encourage us to increase our efforts to find common ground between ourselves and strategically placed India and Japan. While living up fully to our other commitments in Asia, we must develop a special priority approach to these two key nations without which a free, stable Asia is impossible.

This involves a shift in the emphasis of the policies which we have followed since Chiang Kai-shek was driven from the Chinese mainland. Our primary Asian military strategy has been based on Formosa, South Korea, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan, whose combined total population is only 12 per cent of Asia. We have often treated the independent policies of India, Burma and Indonesia with aloofness, if not resentment. At times there has been evidence of a similar coolness toward Japan.

In the Philippines a reform-minded, popular democratic government is moving steadily forward, and in Pakistan a government headed by men of democratic goodwill is trying earnestly to broaden its political base. But in general our test of any regime's qualifications for American support has been its willingness to oppose Communism, and to accept our leadership. Its following, stability and political methods have received secondary consideration, if and when they have been considered at all.

In Asia the row of little flags, pinned on our military maps to indicate the ring of countries that have signed military agreements with us, make an impressive façade. But how long can any of these governments survive under fire unless it faces the challenge of revolutionary Asia and puts its own house in order?

India, as we have seen, is striving to meet her staggering problems through a complete revolution achieved through techniques of democratic leadership, persuasion, compromise and planning. This effort has won the admiration of most Americans who have seen it, and so far compares favorably in results with that of India's unspoken and yet clearly evident rival, Communist China.

Yet the remaining political and economic problems, already discussed in a previous chapter, are formidable. On the success or failure of India in meeting these problems may ultimately depend the stability of all of South Asia and the Middle East.

Anyone who studies the map, people and resources of Asia must agree that it is dangerously immature to brush India aside, wallow in our frustrations over the speeches of Nehru, denounce India as neutralist, and let it go at that. Even if our professional "realists" discount India's surge of democratic faith and her emphasis on ideas and principles borrowed from us, even if they put the entire proposition on the basis of statistical geopolitics in its most limited sense—do they think for one minute that much of free Asia could survive without a free India?

Because of the pressure of internal problems or for other reasons, China may gradually modify her approach to world affairs. If so India may play a part in hastening this modification. In the meantime let us keep our own blood pressure under control when Nehru expounds his own modern version of Washington's farewell warning to avoid a "permanent alliance" with imperialist powers.

Our interests, too, would be promoted if India comes to realize her own responsibility in bringing security to the two crucial areas adjacent to her—the Middle East and Southeast Asia—as we helped bring security to South America 130 years ago through the Monroe Doctrine. We should never lose sight of the fact that our true interest is not to bind the nations of Asia blindly to our leadership, but to encourage them in their own way to create the kind of indigenous growth and dynamic strength which will discourage Communist designs either by overt aggression or by subversion.

If world Communism continues to be as aggressive in the next decade as it was from 1945 to 1955, India, Burma and Indonesia will eventually awake to the danger, and agree to take their stand in clear-cut opposition. If, as seems more likely, the 1955 Soviet thaw continues, the test of our diplomacy will become far more formidable.

In Japan our diplomacy will be tested against somewhat different standards. Here we have military agreements in which we place great faith. We have air bases on Japanese soil which in 1955 were still protected by American infantry. Japan was our essential arsenal and staging base during the Korean War.

But policy makers who believe that we can count on Japan to follow American policy willy-nilly in the next decade indulge in a particularly dangerous kind of wishful thinking. Our bases there were given to the victor by the vanquished. The pressure was tactful and in the interest of Japan's defense, but it was foreign pressure just the

same, and so recognized by most Japanese. Like India, Japan has a strong hankering for a neutralist withdrawal from threats of nuclear conflict.

"The Japanese," General MacArthur once said, "are realists, and they are the only ones who know by dreadful experience the fearful effect of mass annihilation. They realize in their limited geographical area, caught up as a sort of no man's land between two great ideologies, that to engage in another war, whether on the winning or the losing side, would spell the probable doom of their race."

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that neutralism in Japan has increased. It will increase even more, unless Japan can develop more confidence than she now has in our ability to understand the forces that shape Asia.

In emphasizing the paramount importance of India and Japan, I do not mean to imply that we can take other free Asian nations for granted. The Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Ceylon, Formosa and South Korea all obviously have their own important roles in affecting America's Asian policy.

If a resurgent democratic government should develop in Formosa, this island could have a particularly constructive role to play. Already on the basis of literacy, land reforms and village electrification, Formosa has one of the highest living standards in Asia. For this reason alone it is almost certain that in a free plebiscite Formosa would refuse to join the impoverished mainland.

If a fair measure of political freedom is introduced, and the seven million native Formosans are given a final say in their own destiny, a dynamic and constructive society may gradually emerge out of the present maze of confusion and bitterness. It is defeatist to say that Formosa must either reconquer the mainland or fall apart and come under Communist domination. There is a third possibility—a free developing nation which eventually could become a symbol of democracy in the Far East, and an inspiration to millions of Chinese on the mainland and elsewhere.

However, American policy makers can never afford to forget that the strategic keys to the future of free Asia are India and Japan, the first so largely by-passed by irritated Americans, the second defeated, uncertain and increasingly unpredictable. Unless these two nations maintain both their independence and their progress, historians may someday describe what we now call "free Asia" as no

more than a brief and passing phase in the upheaval that swept over all of Asia following World War II.

The Image of America Abroad

In an era when people and ideas are on the move, American diplomacy must absorb the fact now that the personal dimension of foreign affairs is also coming increasingly into focus. A growing aspect of our total diplomatic effort unquestionably is the official and unofficial impression foreigners receive of American attitudes, life and talk. Every year thousands of unofficial American ambassadors go abroad on pleasure, business and education. Each makes an impression.

The total impact of these personal impressions goes far to fill in the image of us seen and accepted by others. In comparison to the cumulative effect of these multiplied personal impressions, our official American information effort takes second place.

The accepted cartoon of arrogant, money-worshipping Americans, drinking their way around the world and making enemies as they go, is grossly unfair. In India I discovered that the areas where most Americans were stationed during the war are the very areas where Americans today are best liked and understood. Nevertheless the lasting damage which a small conspicuous minority of American visitors can cause to the reputation of their country should not be casually dismissed. Both officially and unofficially, we must do all we can to correct it.

On the official level our government missions could be strengthened in many ways. Obviously Americans with protruding racial prejudices should not be sent abroad on government missions. Yet I have met more than one American official in Asia and Africa who at times has talked and acted not unlike the racist American stereotype regularly found in Russian propaganda.

The United States Information Service and its successor the United States Information Agency have done their best under difficult circumstances. They have attracted many capable, sometimes extraordinary, people who have devoted their time and talent with great dedication. But the necessity of pleasing the often unsympathetic and sometimes grossly misinformed Congressional audience on Capitol Hill is not always consistent with the effective use of our money abroad.

For this very reason it may be fair to say that the distorted picture of American life which has developed in many parts of the world has to some extent been created by ourselves. In our effort to create an image of a powerful, strong, prosperous and rich America, we have created envy and the spiteful, but human, hope that we may stub our mighty toe.

We have as yet found no satisfactory solution for the dilemma that grows out of the stream of sadistic and tawdry moving pictures and comic books which help to create a jaundiced, unrepresentative picture of America abroad. Opposed to government censorship on principle, we have hoped that sooner or later the film and publishing industries might set up their own effective self-policing. So far they have not done so.

Of course, in the long run the image we project abroad will never be better or more appealing than we are ourselves. Underlying the official and unofficial impressions we create are always the qualities we embody as a people, qualities nurtured and developed so largely by our educational system.

Yet today American education is probably our single most important domestic problem. No one pretends that our present system is adequate in either the quality or quantity of results. Not only are we vexed with the varying problems of juvenile delinquency, underpayment of teachers, and curriculums that often miss the heart of contemporary world problems, but we are wasting the talents of gifted American youth. Each year 200,000 superior high school graduates do not enter college, and an equal number after entering are unable to remain for financial reasons.

If these 400,000 promising young men and women each year were given the advantages of higher education, the result would be far more than to keep pace with Soviet technological competition, important as that is. For a sizable number of its citizens, America would be broadening the appreciation, outlook, and capacities required for dealing with the new dimensions of world affairs. A major expansion of educational facilities, improved curriculums and the adoption of more democratic policies for the admission of able youths to colleges are items that demand immediate priority ahead of the tidal wave of increased college applicant's expected in 1956-60.

Related to the educational problem is a highly controversial aspect of the image we project to the world which should be brought into

the open light of public discussion. In the world-wide contest of ideas between Communism and democracy, it is unfortunate that we in America should be the most vulnerable target for Communist propaganda. One reason is that our spokesmen stick too stubbornly to outmoded terms of reference.

When we talk in terms reminiscent of a nonexistent nineteenth century free enterprise system that has little resemblance to the existing, pragmatic American economic approach, we feed the Communist propaganda mills which are constantly striving to stir up prejudice against a stereotype of capitalist imperialism. Much of our talk, designed by American politicians to coincide with an obsolete American economic folklore, fills in our image abroad exactly the way Moscow wants it filled.

This is a paradox. In this sense our economic terminology is often militantly doctrinaire and unappealing in the world ideological struggle. Yet as we have seen our national American economic practice has successfully sought a synthesis of economic justice which has prevented the growth of extremist Marxist movements in our society. While American businessmen sometimes talk in terms recognized everywhere else in the world as the language of an economic ideal which never existed even in the world of Adam Smith, they still sign long-term contracts with labor unions, complete with escalator clauses geared to the cost of living index, and they agree to approximations of the guaranteed annual wage.

Yet throughout the world people have come to know our terminology better than they know our practical justice. When, as in the case of TVA, they think they have found something magnificent to admire in American practice, they are shocked when they hear our leading spokesmen decry it as creeping socialism.

Such political lip service to imaginary bogies does us a lot of harm abroad. We can no longer afford the unbridled overstatements to which our political life has become accustomed. Let our political leaders instead learn to talk in forthright terms that reflect their justifiable pride in what both political parties have actually accomplished, and then all of us will have a better right to lament when we are not listened to.

A re-examination of our official information program convinces me that we have been far too preoccupied with the negative con-

cepts of anti-Communism. By now everyone knows that we are opposed to the Communists. People are waiting to hear more about our positive views on the great issues of our age.

Although many of our libraries abroad are effective, they could become more so if they would deliberately strive to become centers of positive studies of freedom in all its implications. By making available a wide and basic selection of foreign as well as American writings, on all aspects of political and economic democracy, our libraries would vastly broaden their influence.

If we built our American information service around the four revolutionary principles which so largely motivate the people of the Middle World and which have emerged so repeatedly in this book—national independence, human dignity, economic advancement and peace—the effect would be heartening. People around the world are not so much interested in the glitter of America, but in how we have struggled persistently generation after generation to improve our democratic society, so that it may offer increasing opportunities to everyone; how our problems are related to their problems, and how our successes and our failures, too, are relevant to their own.

Let me suggest with the greatest emphasis that an effective information program is in no way related to selling laundry soap. Overstated, glib appeals not only fail in the long run, but they degrade us in the process.

When through ineptness or under pressure from thoughtless Congressmen, we indulge in empty claims or half truths, our own system of democratic discussion promptly exposes our exaggerations. The result is to convince uncommitted people—not all of whom by any means live in Asia, Africa and South America—that there is nothing to choose between the slanted appeals of Moscow and Washington, that neither is to be trusted.

Psychological warfare is a cynical phrase borrowed from Goebbels and Stalin. If we insist on employing it to describe our activities, we will continue to lose the respect of millions of people throughout the world who were brought up to believe that America is more than a clever gimmick or a cynical maneuver.

Our information should be honest, positive, and accurate. Dishonesty even in a good cause is still dishonesty, and it inevitably depreciates those who deal in it.

The information program of a totalitarian government enjoys the tactical advantage of operating without democratic criticism at home to show up its false claims. It thrives on the assumption that what people think are the facts is often just as important as what the facts really are. In many parts of the world the success of the Soviet peace campaign, symbolized so beguilingly by the Picasso peace doves, has been an immeasurable instance of this problem. Through much of the world it has been the popular impression during the last several years that the Soviet Union, not the United States, has been most insistent on halting the arms race. No impression could be more damaging to America's image abroad.

Disarmament: Pretense or Promise?

Since 1947 when the Soviet threat of aggression and subversion became fully evident to us, most Americans have assumed that its nature and dimensions were equally evident to others. This has led us separately to underrate the effectiveness of Russian propaganda on peace and disarmament.

Despite our own uncertainty about Moscow's motives, Russian pretensions toward peace and disarmament are now widely accepted. Throughout the non-Communist world, among our allies as well as among the neutrals, a majority of people have clung stubbornly to the belief that peace between the United States and the Soviet Union is possible. It is unfortunate that remarks by some American military and political leaders have been widely considered by people abroad to be inconsistent with peaceful objectives. By his sincere and earnest statements at Geneva President Eisenhower helped to restore confidence in America's peaceful purposes.

Abroad the widespread conviction that peace is possible has developed from a complex of many pressures and emotions including the fear of nuclear destruction, grim memories of two world wars and foreign occupations, and man's deep inherent desire for peace and goodwill. It was nourished dramatically by the shift in Soviet attitudes that came into force in 1955.

In South Asia, Africa, and even in the United Kingdom in the winter of 1955, I discovered that America's early imaginative proposals for atomic energy control and disarmament are either unknown or forgotten. This constitutes a major failure of our information efforts since the war.

It is all the more difficult to explain because our case is an excellent one. Relying on the good faith of our wartime Russian ally, the United States promptly demobilized its armed forces after World War II. Less than a year after the discovery of the atomic bomb, we proposed that the United Nations develop an effective plan for the international control of atomic energy.

The same year, Bernard Baruch, United States delegate to the UN, presented our constructive and courageous plan for atomic energy control and development. With minor modifications this plan received the overwhelming endorsement of the General Assembly in 1948. In accepting it the Assembly expressly recognized that in the field of atomic energy control, as in the field of armament generally, paper promises to desist from manufacturing weapons were insufficient. The very heart of the problem lay in international inspection by UN teams to assure the world that promises once made were being kept.

In the following months the Soviet Union repeatedly stalled progress in both the UN Atomic Energy Commission and the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments, where proposals for general disarmament were being discussed. In the first commission the Soviet Union bluntly rejected the control features of the atomic energy plan. In the second it rejected with equal vehemence the proposals for a system of disclosure and verification of armaments generally.

In 1951 in an effort to end the deadlock, the United States joined with Britain and France in proposing a fresh approach to disarmament through a new commission which would consider both nuclear and conventional weapons. This commission was established by vote of the General Assembly.

In April, 1952, the American member proposed that the United Nations accept as its goal Franklin Roosevelt's interpretation of his phrase "freedom from fear" to include "a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any nation—anywhere in the world."

The American member proposed a series of "essential principles" which called for a step-by-step program of disarmament covering all categories of weapons including the atomic bomb. He warned against a "haggling process" and said that nations "must come to

rely for their strength, not on the number of battalions or weapons they have ready to unleash on a moment's notice, but on the health, happiness, and economic strength of their people."

A month later the American, French and British delegates spelled out their proposal for numerical ceilings on armed forces—a total of 1 million to 1.5 million each for Russia, China and the United States; 650,000 each for France and the United Kingdom, and between 150,000 and 200,000 each for all other countries. All of these proposals were first ridiculed and then rejected.

In the fall of 1954 the Soviet Union began to modify its position. In the political thaw which occurred in the following spring, Moscow suddenly seemed to concede some of the very positions which had long been advocated by the Atlantic nations and which Soviet spokesmen had repeatedly denounced. Much of the language in the 1955 Soviet proposal was lacking in precision; there were many possible escape clauses. Nevertheless the Soviet Union appeared willing to accept the ceilings on armed forces suggested by the Western Allies, a modified proposal for disarmament by stages, some kind of single control organ, and inspection at least of port and airfield facilities.

With this unbending of Soviet rigidity, it is more important than ever that the story of American efforts toward disarmament be reiterated effectively abroad. If, as many suspect, a real change in the Kremlin's attitude toward the problem has taken place, we must be prepared for serious discussion. The creation of the cabinet post of special assistant to the President on disarmament matters can be of invaluable aid in channeling, analyzing and dramatizing all aspects of the disarmament question.

For the first time in the long history of disarmament talk, there is a possibility that the leading armed powers may be able to agree on the initial steps in dismantling the elaborate structure of weapons of war. Hitherto, faced with an intransigent and inflexible Soviet policy on disarmament, the United States has been able to avoid the practical, political difficulties which a forthright attempt to disarm would involve. We have been serious in our disarmament proposals, but because of Russian intransigence we have not had to face the problems which the acceptance of these proposals might entail.

Now for the first time we must face those problems, and they revolve around four key questions going once more to the very root

of our attitudes on the whole disarmament question: Is disarmament still really in our interest? Would nuclear disarmament make us more safe or less safe than we are now, i.e., is it possible to work out a practical system of control? If the answer to these questions is affirmative, would such an agreement be politically feasible? Finally, what would be the consequences if we should fail to accept an apparently honest and workable proposal by the Soviet Union if it should be offered?

The very fact that we must ask ourselves whether disarmament is still in our national interest suggests that we have successfully become accustomed to living under total crisis for an extended period of time. So widely has the notion been accepted that the only basis for peace is a kind of balanced terror that we almost seem to forget how inconsistent "peace" and "terror" once seemed, and how utterly precarious our situation remains.

If peace is dependent on terror, we still are constantly at the mercy of terror and face risks of an order far more terrifying than previous generations ever faced. Since the war the ultimate decisions on the lives of millions of people have rested with a handful of world leaders. As nuclear military capacity becomes available to a widening group of nations, the dangers will even increase.

Any program of disarmament which could reduce these risks is not only emphatically in our national interest, but so important as to rate the constant and unremitting attention on the highest levels of government and the thoughtful concern of every citizen.

Hitherto all disarmament negotiations have stuck on the issue of enforcement. Have the prospects really improved for a practicable system of armament control? We may have to face the fact that no one in the near future is likely to produce a disarmament plan which is 100 per cent safe. Technical complexities themselves are numerous, and at least in the early stages, access to information essential to complete enforcement would require an overnight departure in long-standing political practices of some of the governments involved.

We may find that our first practical objective may have to be limited to an effective warning system designed to disclose any aggressive military buildup in advance and to prevent the kind of massive surprise attack which could be decisive in the first assault.

If mutual confidence grows as such a disclosure system begins to operate, the way will be eased for further steps. Quantitative con-

trols over conventional armaments might follow linked to a reduction in nuclear strength. It is obvious that approaches to both nuclear and conventional disarmament must proceed simultaneously.

Conceivably we could move through five or ten years of experience with gradual stages of disarmament. The imperfections of initial agreements could merge into the improved enforcement of subsequent ones. Experience itself may prove to be essential to the building of the goodwill necessary to continue the process. In any event hopeful experimentation would be preferable to the unpredictable terror of the present.

What about the political feasibility of starting and continuing the disarmament process? Would even the initial agreement be politically practicable? Would they in treaty form win a two-thirds vote in the United States Senate? Would we trust an international inspection agency, containing a Russian inspector at Oak Ridge or at any other spot it wished to check?

The affirmative reaction on the part of most Americans to President Eisenhower's proposals to the Russians at Geneva calling for the exchange of blueprints of military establishments and for the aerial inspection of each other's defense facilities suggests that public opinion may be willing to regard such proposals favorably.

In opposition to disarmament agreements will be the honest doubters and those who fitly oppose any limitation on our atomic weapons. There is another factor not entirely objective and yet heavily involved—the formidable one that much of our national economy is now tied to our \$30-billion defense budget. The jobs of hundreds of thousands of people are geared to production for defense. Should a major reduction in armament expenditure become possible there is scarcely any large community in America which would not feel the economic effects of the change.

The transition to a gradually disarmed economy would be difficult, and imaginative and sympathetic leadership by both business and government would be essential in smoothing the adjustment. Unless the immense sums now allotted to war could be effectively transferred to productive, peacetime spending the political impact would be great. Yet no nation which so desperately needs new schools, new roads and new health programs as America should quail before the economic effects of disarmament.

Even without these possible obstacles, disarmament is a compli-

cated subject and it would be foolish to be more than cautiously optimistic about it. Nevertheless we have reached a point where the age-old assumption that disarmament is utopian has become an unacceptable counsel of despair. In the face of the decisive newness of our problems, people everywhere are demanding of their leaders nothing less than unparalleled effort to end war.

The major underlying basis of hope at Geneva was the mutual conviction on all sides that war has at last become an impossible instrument of policy. Vast differences in outlook and objectives were recognized but there was an implicit assumption that serious as these differences were war was no longer an acceptable solution for them.

This common assumption is itself a new dimension in world politics and it is of the utmost importance.

Among other things it means that policies smacking of negativism will no longer be tolerated by world opinion. Soviet proposals must be examined carefully, soberly, objectively with the determination that if no solution can be found it will not be because we were lacking in either imagination or determination. The effects on our alliances, on the growth of neutralism, and on our foreign bases would be catastrophic if we should seem to rebuff sincere overtures toward disarmament made by others or if we should otherwise fail to demonstrate our good faith. We must cautiously but honestly go ahead, not only responding to the proposals of others but actively offering our own, aware not only of the risks inevitably involved but also of the unmatched opportunities.

We may, as we have seen, find it necessary to begin with intermediate steps but to be effective over the years disarmament must become drastic and comprehensive. It cannot succeed if its purpose is limited to the regulation of selected weapons. It must eventually encompass an end to war itself.

In his remarkable speech on January 20, 1965 before the American Legion Convention in Los Angeles, General Douglas MacArthur succinctly posed what is undoubtedly the central question of our age. "Must we live for generations under the killing punishment of accelerating preparedness," he asked "for a war that would be suicidal," while we "trifle in the meantime" with such "palliatives as limitations of armaments and restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons?"

No less than the "abolishment of war" should be our objective, said the General. If it came, it "would mark the greatest advance in civilization since the Sermon on the Mount." He added that "the hundreds of billions of dollars now spent on mutual preparedness could abolish poverty from the face of the globe."

The present tensions with threats of national annihilation were, he felt, "kept alive by two great illusions." These were the beliefs of America on the one hand, and the Soviet on the other, that sooner or later its adversary intends to strike. He believed that "both are wrong. For either side war would mean nothing but disaster."

The problem was one of leadership, said MacArthur. "The great criticism we can make of the world's leaders is their lack of a plan. . . . When will some great figure in power," he asked, "have the imagination and courage to translate this universal wish for peace—which is rapidly becoming a necessity—into action?"

MacArthur stressed that "we are in a new era. Old methods no longer suffice. We must break out of the strait jacket of the past. There must always be one to lead, and we should be that one. We should now proclaim our readiness in concert with the great powers of the world to abolish war. The result might be magical."

Indeed it might.

* * *

IN the disarmament field, as in other areas previously mentioned, we have an opportunity, if we will use it, to strengthen the United Nations by giving it the powers of inspection and enforcement. No other organization exists embodying the aspirations of so much of the world. Its two major goals, set out in Article I of the United Nations Charter, deliberately held out hope for the solution of the two giant problems of War and Class:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace;
2. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character.

In numerous ways we have already suggested that the role of the UN can be critical in meeting these affirmative social and economic problems. If UN membership is increased, the inclusion of more nations of the underdeveloped world will focus attention even more on such problems. In its first decade of existence the UN has made valuable contributions to world peace in the political field. the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, and British and French troops from Syria and Lebanon; the investigation of Greek border incidents; the handling of the Palestine conflict; the cease-fire in Indonesia; the participation in the Korean conflict and truce negotiations; and the negotiations on United States prisoners in China.

If the United Nations can now move affirmatively into the major field of disarmament control, its efforts could give it a new initiative far surpassing all its past accomplishments.

If it is to pursue such objectives, of course, the United Nations must be sufficiently broadly representative to be effective. Two divergent attitudes toward the UN have handicapped a decision on a score or more pending applications for membership which so far have been rejected. One attitude views the UN as a group of like-minded nations, whose primary objective is the safe-guarding of certain limited but agreed-upon political goals. This approach, which at times has been followed by both Russia and America, has tended to value the UN when it seemed helpful in the Cold War struggle, and to devalue it otherwise.

The other attitude views the UN as a forum whose chief future advantage could lie in its universality of membership, where the real problems on the world's agenda could be discussed and effectively dealt with. Perhaps in a period of decreasing tensions this more hopeful alternative may finally prevail.

CHAPTER 37

Rising with the Occasion

WE have seen in this book that the new dimensions of peace are many-sided. We cannot produce a peaceful world with nuclear weapons, essential as they are. Without ideas, faith and understanding, our dollars too are hopelessly inadequate. We can no more use them to purchase our salvation than we can exact salvation at bayonet point.

We cannot move from atomic stalemate to even the beginnings of peace, unless we reach an understanding with the masses of mankind. Man does not live by bread alone. He desires justice. He desires independence. He desires brotherhood.

As a part of our effort to understand, we must summon the imagination and the courage to look the essence of today's world revolution in the eye and confidently reclaim it as our own. It was born in Independence Hall in 1776, and we have no reason to apologize for it. Then as now it stood for liberation from every form of tyranny over the mind and body of man.

Can modern America in her period of wealth and maturity awaken what William James once called "our slumbering revolutionary instincts"? Have we the capacity to lead the world along paths of responsible change? Are we capable of initiating and maintaining so broad and imaginative a world policy? Can we summon the necessary leadership in Washington and the necessary public support in Jonesport, Torrington, Akron and Fort Worth?

We face this awesome challenge with many advantages. Among them is the staggering statistical tabulation of American produc-

tivity, machines, skills and possessions which so often, both for Americans and foreigners, sums up the ultimate measure of American accomplishment and power.

Yet if this were the full measure of America's strength, our society within the next generation could easily join Toynbee's list of earlier civilizations smashed on the rocks of history. To contemporary observers the Assyrian, Roman and Napoleonic empires must once have appeared fully as omnipotent as the United States today.

But modern America is far more than a composite of bombs, air power, steel mills and crowded four-lane highways. It is also the culmination of a free people's struggle for four centuries to build a nation that would enshrine the inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

American democracy has cheerfully accepted this perpetual challenge, and we can be proud of the result. Those of our families that still draw aristocratic mantles over themselves were born yesterday and will disappear tomorrow. Any representative list of American leaders would reveal that as likely as not they, or their fathers or grandfathers, were farmers, frontiersmen, laborers or cabin boys, who made their mark in large part by the grace of application, integrity and personal ability.

We have absorbed thirty million immigrants in the last century, and Americans today include literally every racial, religious and national element in the world. "Fellow immigrants," Franklin Roosevelt once said, as he began a speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution.

Our persistent progress toward wider sharing of the fruits of our production, and the successful use of political power to achieve this sharing, testifies to honest growth toward economic democracy.

If we desire comfort, we are still committed to the dignity of hard work. If our religious consciousness is often zealous, we have been equally zealous in preserving the separation of church and state. Our community optimism has been grounded in our belief in progress and in our willingness to assume public responsibility. Our system of public education is distinctly American and for the most part peculiarly dedicated to the needs of a democratic citizenry.

Measured by such standards our capacity as a free people should be immense. Our generosity and sympathy, our dedication and hard work, our belief in freedom, human dignity and peace—all of these

appeal to those hundreds of millions of men throughout the world who want and believe these things too.

But it would be less than honest to deny that our society has developed some sobering weaknesses which in today's world might cost us dearly. It is important that these weaknesses and their implications should be carefully considered.

Although we were born in revolution and our numbers have been constantly refreshed from overseas, many of us have become cut off from the hopes and aspirations of a majority of the world's people.

Although we are one of the most literate nations on earth, scarcely one American in a hundred has more than a rudimentary knowledge of the history of Asia, Africa and South America, where the bulk of mankind lives and where the shape of the future may largely be decided.

Although no nation has given so generously to aid others, our public statements often make us appear calculating and selfish.

Although our nation was created out of our faith in the liberty and integrity of the individual, millions of people throughout the world have been led to believe that we are now pinning our faith on money, the military and moralizing.

Although two-thirds of the world's population is yellow or black, and our Declaration of Independence proclaimed 180 years ago that "all men are created equal," racial discrimination among us has not yet been abolished.

Although our standards of living are the highest in the world, some of our present prosperity is precariously based on Cold War defense programs.

Although in wartime we are willing to make almost any sacrifice, in the absence of actual shooting many of us appear unwilling to make the sacrifices through which war may be prevented.

Although Americans are basically a hopeful people, the nuclear conflict has sometimes pressed us into an unbecoming fatalism.

Although militantly democratic, under the guise of anti-Communism, we have tolerated practices in our national affairs which sometimes bear out the Oriental proverb that adversaries adopt each other's vices.

Although the roots of our country were firmly embedded in a profound respect for education and learning, we have been stampeded into panicky attitudes which have led many of our scholars

to become cautious and unimaginative, our liberties to be placed on the defensive before snoopers and censors, and the reputations of our great private foundations to be recklessly attacked.

This list of weaknesses amounts to a severe judgment against us. I do not wish to underestimate it, for that is the way the world judges us. Nor do I mean to imply in the argument of this book that there is an easy equation between the problems we faced in 1776 and the complexity of the world's problems today. Nevertheless I am deeply convinced that the American Revolution, refreshed and strengthened and for the first time focused on world affairs, can become a powerful political, social and economic force affecting the lives of every man, woman and child in the world.

In our efforts to bring this about, the quality of our convictions may prove to be crucial. Indeed, the degree of our commitment to the things we say we believe may make all the difference.

Our foreign audience, as we have seen, is somewhat skeptical. The word has got around that we have lost touch with our tradition. Consequently our rediscovery must be genuine. If it isn't, whatever attempts we make to sound like Jefferson and Lincoln will ring hollow, and all our protestations will appear like the badges of fraud. A fake return to the idealism of the American revolutionary tradition for tactical purposes only will surely fail.

The difference between asserting moral positions for the limited purposes of "psychological warfare," and living by them because they are the warp and woof of our national life, is precisely the difference between manipulation and genuineness, tactics and truth. Thus, the test of our sincerity will not be the frequency with which our revolutionary slogans resound in political speeches, television extravaganzas and broadcasts of the Voice of America, but our actual day-by-day performance on the issues which move mankind. This is one more reason why the life of the individual American citizen is now so inextricably involved in American foreign policy. His involvement can be as rewarding as it is challenging.

After all, the view of democracy implicit in our Declaration of Independence was a conception of human power capable of shaping events, the theory that a society's productive forces are realized only to the extent that every member, regardless of race or rank or creed or class, is free to make his distinctive contribution to the common good, and is equally responsible to common standards of social

decency. So viewed, democracy points the way to the unfolding of a vast future for us and the world.

The responsibility for putting democracy to work in this manner is not a diffused, mass affair. It rests squarely on the shoulders of each individual. To sustain our heritage of freedom of worship is a sacred obligation of Catholic, Protestant and Jew—and of those whose only faith is the cause of truth and brotherhood. These faiths all predispose us to broader understanding and better policies at home and abroad.

So does every opportunity we seize for the remedying of injustice and the co-operative building of a healthier and happier community. From the days of the Mayflower Compact and the pre-Revolutionary Sons of Liberty, America has had an unmatched tradition of voluntary group activity. We have been a nation of joiners, and let us hope that our urge toward constructive voluntary association never dims.

The labor movement that is not ashamed of the idealism in which it was born can take a more affirmative role in fighting for a democratic regeneration at home and abroad. Every group among us that has organized its efforts to better the lot of immigrants, Negroes, sharecroppers, slum dwellers or any other underprivileged group, can assert its faith in the dignity of the individual, not only in our own communities but across oceans, mountains and iron curtains.

"Private American citizens have always been their country's best ambassadors. GI's distributing cigarettes or befriending orphan waifs have often been far truer representatives of American decency and generosity than some of our more conspicuous officeholders. The letters of American immigrants to their relatives abroad have given a far truer and more persuasive picture of American democracy at work than the most carefully prepared statements of many of our politicians.

The self-sacrifice of American missionaries, doctors and teachers who have thrown in their lot with depressed people all over the world and helped them in a thousand ways, has conveyed more of the spirit of America than the speeches of many Presidents.

These are the things that we have done before to reach past emperors and dictators to the hearts of their people. If a resurgent American tradition can again grip the consciousness of the Amer-

ican people, we will automatically begin to project a more convincing image abroad. It will be the image of a people free and at work, committed to compassion and tolerance because their faith in the infinite value of the individual protects the right of any individual to differ.

Of course totalitarian ideologies lend themselves to monolithic propaganda barrages in a manner we neither could nor would emulate. Communism is a doctrine in the hands of determined leaders backed by the instruments of national power.

Democracy by contrast is in a sense nonideological. It is marked by diversity, discussion and deference to minority opinion. Yet American democracy's greatest strength has always been its ability to provide a working consensus of common belief.

If the tone of our political parlance can be raised, our political leaders in both parties will themselves be contributing to that essential climate of public discussion where bipartisanship will be more than a slogan. Without surrendering their essential democratic right to ask hard questions, political leaders can, if they will, work together across party lines to create the flexible, dynamic policies which the world situation requires and which are impossible without the support of a sizable majority of the American people.

The greatest challenge of all is perhaps the challenge to the individual American to play an explicit and conscious role in the conduct of our foreign policy. Neither blind acquiescence in the need for a professional elite nor its opposite, the diffused concept of a continuing national town meeting, offers an answer to this pressing dilemma of modern democracy. The two extremes must be compromised. The people must be alert to demand qualified leadership, and then prepared to follow that leadership, loyally but critically, once they have it.

To do so involves maturity, political tolerance and a widening appreciation of the complexities of our relations with other peoples. But the individual American himself is at the heart of the matter and, for better or worse, his must be the final choice. Perhaps as he makes up his mind, he will place his own fear of Communism in a more realistic, affirmative context.

What the Kremlin itself must fear most is that we will break loose from the hypnotic grip that Communism has upon us. cease to think

largely in terms of negative response to it, realize the broad dimensions of our own great strength, and rally to the support of positive policies keyed to the needs and objectives of mankind.

If a sizable number of us will begin to live by the faith that we are our brother's keeper, we as a nation will begin to provide ourselves with purposes mighty enough to constitute the "moral equivalent of war." Once we begin in this way to solve the problems of Class and War on a world level, we will find as a by-product that we have achieved the only genuine containment of Communism possible.

A century that began with Lenin, Sun Yat-sen, Gandhi and Wilson was certain to be shaped by ideas. The struggle for the minds of men has now become sharp and clamorous. It is, I believe, the spirit of Lincoln that the world expects from us, and it is only by recapturing some of that spirit that we can successfully cope with the new world that is now taking shape.

On February 21, 1861, at Independence Hall, Lincoln summed up America's message. "All the political sentiments I entertain have been drawn from the sentiments which originate in and were given to the world from this hall. . . . It was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland, but the Declaration of Independence, which gave liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to all the world, for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance."

If we can recover some of Lincoln's democratic faith and apply it to the world, we will find that our own American Revolution in all its dynamic implications has come to life again, and we will see the people of Europe, Asia, Africa and South America reach out their hands to us in new confidence and in friendship. Then the danger of nuclear destruction may subside, and a stalemate achieved by terror slowly may merge into peace.

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